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This thesis set out to examine the role played by monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in 
promoting good governance in South Africa.  It examined how M&E, in promoting democratic 
and good governance deliverables, such as transparency, accountability and learning, 
influences public administration practice. The reciprocity between democracy and M&E was 
demonstrated by assessing how the country managed democratic transition, the influence of 
globalisation on country  practice, and specifically how the developmental State advances 
good governance. The thesis reviewed the evolution of M&E at the continental and country 
level, and also examined how the discipline has evolved over time, and its particular 
application in South Africa. A comprehensive overview of the oversight infrastructure was 
conducted, and tested against the performance of the Department of Social Development 
(DSD), the case study.  Through an assessment of three distinct, but interrelated M&E 
perspectives, termed mandatory, persuasive and civic M&E, a differentiated picture of policy 
and actual performance was seen.  It was found that mandatory M&E was strong, and the 
DSD generally performed well against this benchmark. Mandatory M&E also provided the 
legal basis and support for other forms of M&E. However, it was not always clear that 
compliance on its own leads to good governance. In examining persuasive M&E, the 
decision-making environment within the DSD was assessed, and the role of the DSD M&E 
function examined in terms of, amongst others, improving learning.  Civic M&E revealed that 
the DSD has considered and acted upon the results of the non-government sector in revising 
its policies. However, there was no effective civic M&E at community level, largely due to 
uncoordinated or weak NGOs, many of whom were now contracted to the DSD. The 
research suggests that whilst information has been generated through different forms of 
M&E, without effective follow-through by decision-makers, it generated transparency, and 
not necessarily accountability. Furthermore, administrative compliance cannot on its own 
tantamount to good governance. The thesis argues for methodological pluralism, stronger 
civic M&E, and confirms the assertion that M&E promotes good governance.  
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1.1 INTRODUCTION TO TOPIC AND FIELD OF STUDY 
 
The field of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has gained ascendency over the past two 
decades, to its current status where there is an impressive body of literature, a community of 
practice and even a profession of persons called “evaluators”.  A part of the prominence lies 
in the fact that over the same period there has been a heightened awareness of the 
importance of good governance in society, and more specifically a focus on the conduct and 
operations of government.  The issues of transparency and accountability, which this thesis 
probes from various perspectives, is aligned to questions about the quality of public services, 
and the role played by various actors in ensuring that citizens benefit from an accountability 
architecture, which operates and articulates at various levels.  This thesis sets out to trace 
how global forces that prevailed upon South Africa`s democratic transition have influenced 
country policy and practice, including the promotion of good governance.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH TOPIC AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
This study explores the role of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in promoting good 
governance in South Africa.  It is primarily informed by the theories of M&E and good 
governance. The following are the broad research questions that are addressed: 
 
1. What is the nature of M&E in South Africa, and how does it compare to the 
practice of M&E internationally?  
2. How effective is the South African developmental State in using M&E to support 
efforts at promoting good governance?  
3. What are the lessons from practice to date, and how can this better inform the 
implementation strategy of M&E in South Africa?   
4. What is the impact of M&E in promoting good governance in South Africa, as 
evident from the case study of the Department of Social Development (DSD)?   
 
The research problem is to establish whether M&E contributes to good governance, and the 
research purpose is to examine why and how the different forms of M&E contribute to good 
governance.  
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The study is relevant to the M&E1 and good governance2 fields of study.  It unpacks both 
concepts and establishes how elements of each reinforce each other.  The common 
denominators that link both are transparency and accountability, with good governance 
being a normative concept of what is right and desirable, whilst M&E functions as a tool and 
strategy for the attainment of good governance. Central to the thesis is the question of 
whether “M&E in South Africa is structured and driven in a manner that optimally supports 
the transformation of the Public Service, thus promoting good governance?”  
 
The assertion advanced is that M&E does play a role in supporting the transformation of the 
Public Service in South Africa, as it advances the ideals of good governance.  This is 
because M&E, at both the strategic and operational level requires and amplifies concepts of 
transparency, accountability and improvement, which resonate with the tenets of good 
governance. M&E plays a critical role supporting performance management at various 
levels, in that it contributes to a thinking that is results oriented and also provides 
methodological options to support performance management.  The various strategies and 
methods used in the pursuit of oversight emerge when there is an M&E discourse, which 
although varied in terms of purpose and level of operation, is threaded together by the 
issues important to good governance and M&E.  The more critical question that is asked in 
light of the above is the extent or impact of M&E in supporting transformation and good 
governance, as evidenced from the case study3.   
 
This research methodology which is described in chapter 4 presents the rationale for the use 
of a case study methodology which is deemed appropriate for a study of this nature in that 
the unit of analysis of a government department is typical of other government departments 
in the country, as it operates within a defined policy framework.  Furthermore, the selected 
department, the national Department of Social Development (DSD) which is described in 
detail in Chapter 5, also has a defined M&E function and a policy focus that is directly related 
to the transformation of the country. This study examines how different forms of M&E 
interact with the operations, and thus influence the performance of the DSD in relation to its 
attainment of the objectives of the developmental State.  It thus provides an understanding 
                                                 
1
 M&E is defined more extensively in the next chapter. At this stage it will suffice to refer to it as a strategy and   
tool that supports more effective management. 
2
 Good governance is defined as a concept that constitutes parts that are deemed appropriate for advancing 
service delivery and democracy. There are 9 Constitutional values and principles in South Africa, which may 
be advanced as the definition and indicators of good governance in South Africa.  
3
 The case study of the Department of Social Development is used given its appropriateness to effecting socio-
economic transformation, the significant size of its budget and the existence of a functional M&E. Assessing 
the DSD thus allows for broader comments to be made on M&E and the developmental State. 
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of the differentiated impact these M&E influences have had on the DSD, in relation to how it 
has been rated against various standards of good governance and more importantly, service 
delivery.  As a typical government department, the DSD implements policies that are aligned 
to the mandate of the ruling party, and if departments are well governed and accountable, 
the political priorities are more likely to be achieved. M&E serves the purpose of keeping 
departments, as implementation units, on track and focused on the political priorities of 
government.  
 
This thesis defines and assesses the concept of M&E influence, and begins on the premise 
that M&E is a dynamic and multi-dimensional activity, which is led from different quarters 
and for different purposes, each of which is informed by contextually appropriate 
methodologies.  The perspectives are described in Chapter 4 (Methodology), with the 
constructed typology developed using the criteria of direction, with its associated location 
and authority, determining an M&E type.  The most visible and authoritarian type of M&E is 
the accountability type, which operates from above, and has been termed mandatory M&E 
(MME).  This is when Constitutional oversight institutions operate by stipulating performance 
standards and benchmarks for departments, and measuring and reporting their performance 
against these.  The MME tends to be judgemental, produces data for comparative purposes, 
and its results lead to a higher level of transparency and accountability around government 
performance.  Critically, it helps to entrench an M&E ethos and culture. The second M&E 
perspective examines M&E from the perspective of its own management, by examining how 
MME is perceived and valued and also looks at the functionality of the DSD`s own M&E 
function.  As a less obligatory type of M&E, it focuses on organisational learning and the 
promotion of good practice, and assessing its effect requires a more perceptual based 
methodology.  The third type of M&E is more an external, socially driven and political 
perspective, which is termed civic M&E and considers the influence and perceptions of 
citizens, the oversight role of Parliament, the Non Profit Organisations (NPOs), and the 
media.  These three M&E influences on the DSD are considered in terms of the research 
purpose of the thesis, which is to examine the relationship between M&E and good 
governance.  
 
The nature of public policy in South Africa means that public administration is prescribed and 
regulated4, and this promotes a high level of compliance and similarity of operations across 
government departments.  From a research perspective, it means that findings can be 
extrapolated to other government departments, and inferences made about cause and effect 
                                                 
4
 The Public Service Act, 1994 and Public Service Regulations 
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more generally.  In selecting the DSD as a case study, broader debates around development 
can be seen, as the mandate of the DSD goes to the heart of questions about the 
amelioration of poverty, the reduction of inequality and the overall improvement in the quality 
of life of citizens.  If the DSD executes its mandate well, and demonstrates good 
governance, it can be an exemplar for how government departments can be effective in 
fostering broader socio-economic transformation.  
 
In terms of the good governance influencers, which this thesis sets out as M&E 
perspectives, the strongest influence, and hence most seriously taken M&E (MME) comes 
from the Constitutional bodies, the main being the National Treasury (NT), Auditor-General 
(AG) and Public Service Commission (PSC).  The authority exercised stems from the role 
played by these bodies in influencing the budget and ability to publically censure 
departments.  The persuasive M&E category is inward looking, albeit influenced by the 
results of the MME and CME. What is important to note in the third perspective, civic M&E 
(CME) is that a true test of public value of a department comes from citizens themselves, 
either through holding government accountable through political structures or assessing the 
value of services offered. Chapter 8 is important in supporting the thesis proposition in that it 
seeks to assess how the various results bring about tangible results. 
 
The three perspectives are conceptual categories meant to delineate the issues and assist in 
analysis, but as this thesis will demonstrate they are not mutually exclusive in practice.  The 
conceptual distinction is more cognitive than real, and is meant to advance the discussion 
and analysis.  How the perspectives, as sub-sets of M&E in general, work in practice in 
promoting good governance as evidenced from the DSD remains the key research question. 
The overarching criteria of whether the DSD is an example of good governance, will depend 
on the extent to which M&E, from all sides, leads to transparency and accountability in the 
DSD.   
 
The case study is situated within the context of an evolving Public Service within which M&E 
is also developing. The DSD reflects both evolutions, and provides a rich insight into how a 
government department responds to policy imperatives for good governance and how well 
its own systems help it to achieve this goal.    
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1.3 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.3.1 Public Service transformation and accountability 
 
This study is very topical and is being undertaken at a time when there is heightened interest 
in the assessment of government, both locally and internationally (Kusek and Rist, 2004:2). 
This interest stems from many sources, and there is an acknowledgement that globalisation 
improves governance, due to, amongst others, the accompanying openness it brings 
(Bonagliaet al, 2001).  Within a context where information is readily shared, it also becomes 
the platform for debate and can help shape norms, as globalisation has done (Castells, 
1999).  The increased exercising of democratic rights by citizens also puts pressure on 
governments to self-asses in order to remain relevant, and the relationship between civic 
culture and government performance demonstrates that a strong civic culture positively 
influences government performance (Rice and Sumberg, 1997). 
 
At the global and national level there has been an explosion of information from what is 
couched as the “measurement industry”, and which is fed by an appetite for performance 
results in particular of government.  These have taken the form of surveys, assessments, 
barometers, audits and scorecards, all of which reflect contemporary society demanding 
increased accountability and transparency from government (Vestman and Conner, 2006).  
The demand is more pronounced in a maturing democracy like South Africa, which is trying 
at various levels to break with its apartheid past where previously the performance of 
government was not considered to be a matter of public concern.  In fact, performance 
information was deliberately kept away from the public.  
 
Kalema (2009: 546) provides a critical review of the evolution of the South African Public 
Service, by demonstrating that prior to the elections in April 1994, and democracy, the 
apartheid bureaucracy was subject to several shortcomings, which critics have broadly 
typified the system as being “illegitimate, unaccountable, unrepresentative, secretive, 
abusive of human rights and responsive only to the white minority, and to a lesser extent 
coloured and Indians”.  He states that with the advent of liberal democracy, the bureaucracy 
needed to change, and whilst there has been progress; many of the problems from the 
apartheid era are proving difficult to resolve.  He critically comments on critical areas of 
transformation, such as legitimacy, accountability, administrative neutrality, 
representativeness and courtesy and human rights.  In each of the areas, whilst there has 
been progress, largely at a policy level, the reality is that serious problems prevail.  There 
are several examples of a lack of action, and examples are cited, for example around the 
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AIDS programme, of a lack of accountability on ill-fated programmes, police action and poor 
service delivery.  The reality has been more complex, with the notion of administrative 
neutrality, for example, not being practiced due to the system of appointments. The author 
contends that whilst the country has made good progress compared to its continental 
counterparts, the ideals have not reached adequate levels.  
Cameron (2009) shows that during the apartheid era, the South African public service was 
isolated and out of touch with international developments.  He shows that New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms were influential in South Africa, and this paralleled the reforms 
in other countries at the time.  The evidence of this was the fact that there were, during the 
period, efforts at producing a lean State, decentralisation, agencification, contract 
appointments, performance management and service delivery.  The key feature of NPM, he 
contends, is the decentralisation of authority and responsibility to managers. However, in the 
absence of delegations, power remains centralised.  Overall, there has been a view that the 
State plays a strong role in redressing apartheid`s ills.  
 
In today`s democracy, it would be difficult for government to deny the potential and power 
that performance results have over government, irrespective of where it stems from.  There 
would always be political, economic and social implications emerging from any performance 
results of government.  In the public domain there is awareness, stemming from political 
pronouncements, of what good governance means.  The 9 Constitutional Values and 
Principles5 for public administration may be viewed as the operational definition of good 
governance, and actual performance results can be tested against these ideals.  At the 
political level, there is the political manifesto which highlights what it means by the 
overarching phrase of “A better Life for All” (ANC, 2004).  Government, in having proactively 
and confidently conveyed to the populace its understanding and support for the normative 
framework of good governance, has positioned itself to be assessed.  The sincerity of its 
intentions will be tested in practice, when it is in fact evaluated and subject to scrutiny.  
 
1.3.2 The transformation of the DSD and its contribution to socio-economic 
development 
 
This thesis asks how well government is performing in delivering good governance, and 
what is the role and impact of M&E in supporting the production6 of good governance.  In 
                                                 
5
 These relate to professional ethics, efficiency, effectiveness and economy, development orientation, fairness                
and impartiality, public participation, accountability, sound human resource management and representivity.  
6
 The term production relates to the generation of conditions and effects that resonate with the ideals of good 
governance as already mentioned. These include transparency and accountability.  
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answering these questions the political and social context within which departments such as 
Social Development operate is considered.  A comprehensive description of the department 
follows in Chapter 4 of this thesis, but it will suffice at this stage to identify the following 
characteristics of the case study department to demonstrate the relevance of this 
department to the transformation of the country.  The main features of the DSD are that its 
work impacts on the lives of all South Africans, given its role in disbursing social grants, of 
which 25% of the population are beneficiaries.  Transfer payments in the form of grants are 
the main sources of income for the rural population, and serve as a safety net against 
poverty. It also plays a critical role in supporting the transformation processes of the country, 
in that it is responsible for social services which in essence help to ameliorate the effects of 
social inequality, influenced by colonialism and apartheid.  This forms part of the DSDs 
broader purpose of contributing to the socio-economic transformation of the country. The 
budget of the DSD is significant and the propensity for corruption is also high.  This behoves 
the DSD to practice good governance in order to reduce the risk of corruption. The service 
delivery model of the DSD is to use an agency, the South African Social Security Agency 
(SASSA) to disburse its funds in the form of social transfers.  
 
In light of the above, the DSD must of necessity adopt a leadership and management 
orientation that is responsive and able to predict any transgressions of its policy. This would 
also apply to any threat to its good governance model, which is largely prescribed by 
legislation and regulation and for which the oversight institutions drive compliance. It will also 
ensure that the DSD is able to meet its broader purpose of contributing to the socio-
economic transformation in the country.  
 
1.3.3 Governance improvement in relation to international benchmarks 
 
As a member of the global community, South Africa is obliged to promote policies that meet 
the international norms and standards of good governance (World Bank, 2006). M&E 
becomes important in helping an administration develop the predictive capacity necessary to 
better plan and implement its policies (Kusak and Rist, 2004). Ultimately economic and 
political sentiment, whether factually or perceptually based, tends to be pitched according to 
universal and objective-type measures that can be delivered through M&E systems. The 
inherent power of M&E is that it makes judgements that have far reaching implications which 
decision-makers cannot ignore. Access to M&E capacity is therefore an essential source of 
power for decision-makers.   The measurement of the quality of governance is a global 
concern, as it is telling of the quality of public administration, which has a direct bearing on 
development (Farazmund and Pinkowski, 2006). 
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The overall international climate means that countries now operate in a more interdependent 
manner than before, with globalisation and its resultant information flows and expansion of  
democratic values, coercing participating countries to demonstrate certain minimum 
standards of good governance. Bonglia et al (2001) demonstrate in a multi-country study 
that globalisation does affect governance by making domestic institutions more open. There 
is a spread of common, good governance practice across society  when there is 
globalisation, and this is brought about by the signing of multilateral treaties and agreements 
around trade and anti-corruption, to name but a few.  
 
Organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and 
Management (CAPAM)7 direct government practice globally. The South African government, 
as a member of this community, is obliged to measure and improve its own performance. It 
has to concretely demonstrate that it is attaining standards of good governance. The 
importance accorded to these reviews can be seen in the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM)8, which looks at elements of good governance, economic governance, corporate 
governance and socio-economic development. M&E can support these areas and help a 
country to build its own case when it is faced with Peer Review Assessments9. However, the 
implementation of the APRM in South Africa has not been without controversy, with some 
contestation existing as to how open the process of producing the peer review report for 
South Africa has been (City Press, 22 July 2007: 24).There has, however, been critique of it, 
with Boyle (2008) stating that many of the objectives have not been met. Irrespective, this is 
the first time that such a comprehensive and transparent approach has been made to 
improving governance in Africa.  
 
South Africa is obliged to meet standards set out in mandatory developmental ideals, such 
as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (United Nations, 2000).  Achieving the MDGs 
has complemented other efforts to develop M&E in the country, as it triggers an internal 
process within government to establish appropriate M&E frameworks so that the country can 
generate information to show progress against the MDGs. The attention to MDGs comes at 
a time when there is growing concern about what the real impact of development 
                                                 
7
 The Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management (CAAPAM) is an umbrella 
body providing support to member countries on amongst others, advise to improve the quality of 
governance.  
8
 Department of Public Service and Administration. 2005. Africa Peer Review Mechanism. Republic of South 
Africa. Pretoria. 
9
 South Africa emerged in 2007 from a Peer Review, which was the subject of contestation due to issues of 
legitimacy about the process. 
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interventions have been and remain, given the deepening poverty in Africa (Gariba, 2005: 
332).  Given that poverty is a persistent issue in South Africa, M&E remains important for 
informing poverty reduction strategies.  
 
The country has undertaken a Ten Year Review of progress10, in which it assessed its 
progress in meeting what government set out to do. This report is an amalgamation of 
various reviews covering the themes of governance; social, economic, justice and 
international relations. The assessment charts government`s role in effecting transformation. 
Following on this broad, largely qualitative and narrative report, a quantitative assessment of 
progress over time, against critical performance criteria related to the MDGs has been 
produced by the Presidency for 200811 and 200912 These reports indicate that M&E is being 
used in the country to assess matters relating to governance.    
 
There is a trigger effect when macro-assessment reports such as the Ten Year Review are 
produced. They could result in amplifying the M&E ethos into departments themselves which 
are now obliged in turn to set up their own frameworks to provide information required from 
institutions of oversight, such as the Presidency. The development indicators report is 
organised around ten themes, of which good governance is one. The attainment of all of the 
other areas is premised on whether good governance exists, as it is an enabling condition 
for socio-economic development. Good governance is thus a precondition for socio-
economic development in the country, and by M&E supporting good governance, it also 
supports democracy and development13.  
 
The political sphere of government has a vested interest in M&E results, as it informs it of 
the performance of the bureaucracy over which it has command (Christensen and Laegreid, 
2001). Evaluative results, whether those sensationalised by the media or brought into the 
public domain through other channels, generally lead to questions being posed about the 
suitability and competence of specific political or administrative heads (Bratton, 1994). More 
importantly, it has been shown that organisations that have high levels of political support 
also have higher levels of organisational performance (Kusek and Rist, 2004).  There is clear 
vested political interest in performance results, with the political sphere motivated to 
scrutinise the performance of the administrative sphere under its control. Therefore, it is in 
the interest of the political sphere of government to have access to M&E information to meet 
                                                 
10
 Presidency. 2003 Towards a Ten Year review. Republic of South Africa. 
11
   Presidency. 2008. Development Indicators. Republic of South Africa. 
12




 African Evaluation Association Conference was organised around the theme: “Africa    Matters, 
Evaluation matters – joining forces for Democracy, Governance and Development. 
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this pragmatic political purpose, a situation that applies to both the ruling and opposition 
parties who use it to justify success or otherwise.14 
 
1.3.4 Governance in relation to local imperatives and supporting mechanisms 
 
In South Africa there is a stated political commitment to good governance, which is 
contained in the election manifestoes of the African National Congress (ANC). This ideal has 
been translated by government into a series of policies and programmes that are meant to 
effect transformation and are contained in the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF)15, 
which is the policy framework meant to realise this approach. The strategy for service 
delivery stems from a budget process which requires clear identification of needs, 
determination of resources, and deliverables in terms of outputs leading to specified 
outcomes and measurement and reporting instruments. The mechanism, which is part of the 
budget process, is meant to be transparent and accountable, and thus resonates with good 
governance principles. The bureaucracy or Public Service is expected to use these 
instruments to help deliver on political commitments. The Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) in essence translates the election manifesto into a Five Year Strategic 
Plan, which contains the deliverables and outputs, both of which are measurable and require 
M&E. M&E plays a key role in informing the political sphere of progress between the planned 
(committed) and actual (which would be experienced as service delivery in terms of quantity 
and quality). In this context, M&E has an important predictive and early-warning role to play.   
 
Cloete (1998: 3) describes the configuration of the South African public service, and 
describes the public institutions. The term “State”, which this thesis refers to, includes the 
territory with its population, that is independent and with public institutions to maintain law 
and order and provide public services for the maintenance of the community and to promote 
the general welfare of the population.  He provides a description, from a political, legal and 
administrative perspective of how such a State functions. 
 
The administrative arm of government, the Public Service, in turn also requires M&E to 
inform it of whether it is meeting its targets.  It details its deliverables in the MTSF and 
MTEF.  It uses M&E to inform its principals of progress made when called to account by 
                                                 
14
 Reports such as the State of the Public Service Reports, produced since 2004, have been used to inform 
debates on the success and failure of the Public Service in Parliament.  See www.psc.gov.za 
15
 National Treasury. 2007. Medium-Term Expenditure Framework Treasury Guidelines. 2008 MTEF. June.  
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Parliamentary Portfolio Committees.16  Departments are also put under pressure through 
national and public pronouncements made through the public posting of the Government 
Programme of Action (PoA)17. The PoA states what the targets are, and invites public 
scrutiny of government‟s actual performance. Departments require M&E information to 
address this oversight pressure and avoid censure for poor performance, which would grade 
their performance and impact upon their subsequent negotiations for budgets. 
 
An important imperative of good governance comes from the citizens themselves, who are 
the ultimate beneficiaries of government policy (Chelimsky, 2006). In South Africa this shift 
has been pronounced following the transition to democracy in 1994. Pre-democratic South 
Africa was characterised by a hostile interface between government and the majority of 
citizens, with the Public Service bureaucracy ensuring the political alienation of the majority 
of citizens18.  The democratic government through its orientation of the developmental State 
(ANC, 2005), to be defined later, professes to be citizen-centred and interventionist (Salojee, 
2007).  In terms of the developmental State, it requires that there be a productive interaction 
between State and citizens, and this requires a unified system of public administration 
(Levin, 2005a, 2005b).  It encourages M&E by citizens of its operations, and supports this by 
adhering to constitutionally enshrined principles such as openness and transparency, an 
example being the PoA which comes under scrutiny.  It is a sharp shift from an authoritarian 
order to a transparent one, brought about by a slew of Acts and regulations, all of which 
support the effective M&E of government (Friedman, 2004).  If used fully, good governance 
can be promoted.  
 
There is also the economic imperative for good governance which stems from the prosperity 
arguments; namely, how does government policy and practice promote economic prosperity 
for its citizens? Picciotto (1998: 3) argues that in an integrated global economy the quality of 
public expenditures is important, as are issues of economic governance, with evaluation 
capacity development becoming critical to address these. The related question is how can all 
this be measured?  This is related directly to the developmental goals fostered by the 
developmental State, which are to reduce poverty and unemployment, so that the country 
can prosper.  It is rooted in the very real economic question about how well incomes and 
expenditures are managed, and whether the performance of different sectors of government 
                                                 
16
 Portfolio Committees are multi-party structures set up to oversee the progress of departments. Deliberations 
within them are open to the public, and discussions are generally reported on in the media, thus providing the 
public access to the workings of departments.  
17
 Presidency. 2007a. Government‟s Programme of Action. http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/poa/index.html 
18
 Public Service Commission.2006d. State of the Public Service report. Republic of South Africa. 
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enhances the growth and development prospects of a country19.  The AG20 plays a central 
role in assessing financial performance, and produces Annual Outcomes reports which point 
to areas of deficiency21.  This, if not addressed, will undermine the realisation of the 
economic imperative. Sound M&E systems, of which auditing is one, help to ensure that the 
economic imperative is realised.  
 
In South Africa intervention in the economic trajectory of the country has already taken place 
through policy options followed by the ruling party.  The Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR)22 strategy was used to stabilise the economy, reduce debt, enhance 
investment and then provide funds for social and infrastructural investment.  The policy has 
been contested, but broadly achieved some of its objectives, which are being taken forward 
by other policies such as the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa 
(ASGISA)23.  The use of the Public Service Act24, the MTSF and MTEF, underpinned by the 
Public Finance Management Act (PFMA, 1999)25 are the cornerstones for sound public 
administration.  Whether this translates into delivering good governance depends upon how 
well policies are implemented and whether these result in an improvement in the quality of 
life of citizens. M&E measures this.  
 
The above discussion illustrates at a macro-level the importance of M&E for the 
achievement of good governance, and utility of M&E to various stakeholders responsible for 
supporting good governance.  The discussion will now focus on the specific contributions of 
the study.  
 
1.4 SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study makes specific contributions to the domain of knowledge, policy and strategy as it 
relates to good governance.  The contribution to knowledge is in respect of the field of public 
administration, specifically good governance and M&E. Based on the empirical assessment 
of how M&E operates in the DSD, proposals are made on how to improve policy and 
strategy for M&E in order to optimise the full potential of M&E in improving governance. 
                                                 
19
 Public Service Commission.2007d. State of the Public Service Report .Republic of South Africa. 
20
 The Auditor-General has constitutional powers to operate independently in exercising oversight over fiscal 
performance. It is thus a focused M&E entity. 
21
 Auditor-General. 2006. General Report on Audit Outcomes for the Financial Year 2005-6. Republic of South 
Africa. Pretoria. 
22
 Presidency. 2006b.  Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy. Republic of South Africa. Pretoria.  
23
 Presidency. 2006a. Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa. Republic of South Africa. 
Pretoria.   
24
 See The Public Service Act, 1994 and Public Service Regulations 
25
 Public Finance Management Act, No. 1 of 1999. 
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1.4.1 Knowledge generation in the field of good governance 
 
The South African transition is multifaceted and complex (Kitchen and Kitchen, 1994).  The 
political transition has been relatively smooth and resulted in an administrative transition, at 
least at the policy level, in a re-oriented Public Service (Khosa, 2001).  This Public Service 
posits to operate within the model of a Developmental State which is activist and pro-poor. 
To be responsive and relevant it is dependent upon M&E.  The Public Service needs to 
execute its policy through an administration that supports the transformation of society along 
political, social, economic, spatial and racial lines.  This mammoth task has to be 
accomplished against high expectations and it requires government to be well-equipped to 
guide this process. This thesis assesses how successful government has been in achieving 
this. 
 
The South African literature on good governance shows that some elements of New Public 
Management (NPM), with its bias towards outsourcing, privatisation and efficiency, may not 
be applied in the South African public sector as it has been elsewhere.  Whilst it has been 
shown to devolve political control in some parts of the world (Christensen and Laegreid, 
2001), in the South African developmental State, there has been an emphasis on driving 
development from the centre.  Thus, the imperatives of the developmental State may clash 
with the ethos of NPM. The contribution of NPM, however, lies in its emphasis on efficiency 
which cannot be ignored by even a developing State.  The manner in which both these 
seemingly contradictory thrusts contribute to good governance, is explored. 
 
1.4.2 Knowledge generation in the field of M&E 
 
The literature on M&E emerges largely from observations of the practice of M&E in countries 
outside Africa. M&E has been a relatively late entrant to Africa (Naidoo, 2010).  It does have 
an accountability emphasis, and questions need to be asked about how effective this has 
been in improving performance (Naidoo, 2009).  The entry of M&E into Africa has been 
largely through donor programmes, but this has been accompanied by an import of theories 
and methodologies that are largely northern in origin.  This does pose a challenge to M&E in 
Africa, which has a significantly different context, and which may not be as receptive to 
northern exports as thought. 
 
The concepts, theories and methodologies that embody M&E may not be applicable to the 
development experiences of Africa.  In the written form, the discourse tends to be dominated 
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by the West, giving the impression that there is little M&E in Africa.  This is not true, and can 
be attested to by the number and quality of contributions made at the various conferences, 
seminars and training sessions held under the aegis, for example, of the African Evaluation 
Association (AFrEA).  The number of participants at the Third26 and Fourth27 AFrEA 
conferences, coupled with the breadth and depth of papers delivered on developmental 
issues by various countries, indicate that an M&E discourse is present on the continent, 
albeit uneven.  
 
Perhaps the inability of AFrEA to systematically collate these papers and publish more 
broadly gives the impression that M&E in Africa is nascent.  This domination by M&E 
literature/information in the north may be due to how it has evolved into a profession, 
attested to by the vibrancy of professional M&E associations in these countries.  To date 
there is no African evaluation journal, and the number of Africans publishing in the 
mainstream evaluation journals is insignificant. In the north the M&E associations have more 
M&E consultants and professionals thus there is a strong private or consultancy sector 
bias28.  In Africa the M&E expertise generally comes from within the government sector, 
which is the main player in M&E.  This is evident from the participant lists of M&E 
conferences in Africa29.  It was also shown at the inaugural (2007) and second Biennial 
(2009) Conferences of the South African Monitoring and Evaluation Association (SAMEA) 
Conference30, both of which were co-hosted by the PSC.  
 
There is now greater support on the continent from governments for M&E where it is 
recognised by many African countries that M&E is important for societal transformation 
which comes about when there is a greater transparency and accountability of its operations. 
M&E supports the deepening of democracy.  There are, however, several challenges. 
 
The main challenge for M&E in Africa is that the promotion of transparency and 
accountability goes to the heart of challenging political hegemonies.  This means that M&E 
in Africa also takes on a transformative and social justice emphasis, as demonstrated by 
Whitmore et al (2006). In practice this means that the M&E practitioner in Africa needs to be 
politically astute, sometimes compromising, and working incrementally to achieve small 
gains.  This would probably be different from the concept of absolute independence which 
                                                 
26
 Third African Evaluation Association Conference, Cape Town. December 2004. 
27
 Fourth African Evaluation Association Conference. Niamey. April 2007. 
28
 Deduced from an assessment of participant profiles at the AAE, EES and AFrEA. 
29
 As reflected in the proceedings of the Third, Fourth and Fifth African Evaluation Association Conferences 
held on the continent.   
30
 Reports are available on the website of the South African Monitoring and Evaluation Association (SAMEA) 
at www.samea.org.za 
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probably applies in the West.  Another challenge is that the freedom to present findings in a 
public domain may not exist or be censored.  All of these impact upon the relationship that 
M&E has to the political, administrative and civic elements of society.   
 
In South Africa the thrust for M&E stems from several critical events at the political, 
administrative and civic level.  At the highest political level pronouncements for strong M&E 
and performance management have been made by the President of the country in State of 
the Nation Addresses, 200431, 200532 and 200633.  The citing of the PSC in the 2008 
address has underscored the importance of this M&E body.  The implementation of the 
Government-wide M&E system (GWM&ES)34, driven from the Presidency, has also been 
important.  The profiling of M&E findings by the PSC has placed evaluation findings in the 
public domain, and is evidence of the PSC exercising its constitutional mandate.35 
Collectively, there now appears to be a critical mass of M&E supporters to keep performance 
issues on the public agenda.  This has probably raised public consciousness about the 
importance and power of M&E to hold government accountable.  
 
The growth of M&E in South Africa has taken on a particular emphasis as it is seen as 
critical to supporting transformation.  This has meant that more emphasis has been on 
accountability (short term) than supporting organisational learning (long term).In the more 
mature democracies where administrative fundamentals have been established, there has 
been more space to focus on methodological rigour and emphasise organisational learning.  
This is not a problem per se, and should be where M&E eventually evolves to in South 
Africa. The current emphasis on using M&E to entrench accountability and transparency is 
needed to support public sector reforms and instil a performance culture.  
 
The South African situation with its short association with M&E and its particular pragmatic 
challenges has not been explored adequately in the literature.  The frameworks that are in 
place are not fully operationalised and the impact of the work of the PSC as a mandatory 
                                                 
31
  Mbeki. T.M., President of the Republic of South Africa. State of the Nation Address. Joint Sitting of 
Parliament. Cape Town. February 2004 
32
 Mbeki. T.M., President of the Republic of South Africa. State of the Nation Address. Joint Sitting of 
Parliament. Cape Town. 3 February 2005. 
33
 Mbeki. T.M., President of the Republic of South Africa. State of the Nation Address. Joint Sitting of 
Parliament. Cape Town. 3 February 2006. 
34
 Presidency.2006c. Proposal and Implementation Plan for a Government-wide monitoring and evaluation 
System. A publication for Programme managers. Republic of South Africa. 
35
The Public Service Commission is a Chapter 10 body in the South African Constitution, responsible for 
investigating, monitoring and evaluation public administration. Its functions are stipulated in section 196 (4). 
.  
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body is yet to be fully assessed.  There has been little assessment of M&E in practice, given 
the stage at which M&E is in at present.  
 
This study will consider the case study of the DSD in the context of what is in place.  The 
GWM&ES is an ambitious project being undertaken in a context of high expectations. For it 
to achieve its aims and objectives it needs to be guided by a thorough analysis of the context 
within which it will operate.  An audit by the PSC of M&E and reporting requirements in 
government shows that progress in entrenching M&E is slow, with M&E viewed as the 
process of reporting to central departments, rather than a practice of critical reflection and 
learning within departments themselves.36  This requires that the receptiveness of the 
departments (capacity) must be assessed to inform the implementation strategy.  If not, the 
benefits may not be seen, resulting in poor support for the system through poor quality of 
information provided.  
 
An assessment of how the South African M&E paradigm compares to other relevant 
international M&E paradigms for supporting good governance would provide lessons to 
bolster M&E in South Africa.  It thus remains a fertile area for future investigation.   
 
1.4.3 Knowledge generation for M&E systems development and implementation 
 
The study contributes to the policy options for implementation. As such it will contribute 
pragmatically to improving the operations of these two key areas of M&E activity in the 
country.  
 
The overarching model for M&E in South Africa is the GWM&ES which presents a 
framework that is comprehensive for addressing the political, constitutional, economic, 
service delivery, administrative and governance issues. It set out to provide an overarching 
framework that provides the norms and standards for M&E and was supposed to guide M&E 
practice in that the departments would be obliged to report on in the first instance core, 
critical information pertaining to financial performance, service delivery, public 
administration, governance issues and the PoA. This study assesses whether this happens 
in practice. There will be authority vested in the central departments for this to take place. 
Statistics South Africa will play a role in ensuring the integrity of the statistics and the Public 
Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA) will be responsible for 
                                                 
36
 Public Service Commission. 2007e. Report on the Audit of Reporting requirements and departmental 
monitoring and evaluation systems within National and Provincial government.  Republic of South Africa. 
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training. Over and above meeting the central reporting obligations, departments will be 
encouraged to customise their M&E systems to their departmental requirements.  
 
It must be noted that a comprehensive M&E training strategy is only now being launched, 
under the aegis of the PALAMA. There is influence of the SAMEA, which is expected to 
produce a community of practice. Of late, there have been publications to inform 
practitioners about M&E. These include elementary guides from the NT, the Presidency and 
the PSC37 on M&E. 
 
This study has set out to assess how M&E works, at different levels to bring about good 
governance, using the case study of the DSD. The theoretical framework that follows locates 
and assesses in more detail the issues around the dynamics of the different interfaces that 
are inevitable when new policies are implemented and when the operational reality is also 
subject to its own changes. This relates to how the policies of the democratic government 
have been influenced by international influences and pressures that come about when a 
country has to engage in a global context, and align many of these norms to be accepted. 
There is also the question of how M&E has been conceptualised and used at different levels 
to bring about greater scrutiny of performance, an aspect that forms the subject of the three 
empirical perspective chapters of this thesis. The essential research question answered 
through the perspective chapters is what has been the influence of specific types of M&E on 
the three traditional M&E outputs of learning, accountability and transparency, and the main 
good governance indicators of transparency and accountability and greater public 
participation. The theoretical framework is followed by a chapter on methodology, which 
details how the M&E perspective chapters have been constructed. 
 
1.4.4 Knowledge gap addressed 
 
This thesis generates knowledge in several areas. Firstly, it provides insight into how a 
global practice has been absorbed into the South African public service, modified and used 
in pursuit of achieving global standards of service delivery and good governance. The nature 
of the articulation between international bodies that promote good governance and M&E are 
explored, by examining the dynamic nature in which this manifests itself in management 
practice within a department. Secondly, the extent to which M&E in South Africa is perceived 
as enabling the developmental State to achieve its outcomes is assessed. Finally, through 
                                                 
37
 Public Service Commission.2008a. Basic Concepts in Monitoring and Evaluation. Republic of South Africa. 
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the research, insight is provided into the configuration of a public service department through 
a comprehensive overview of its policies and practices.   
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual Framework   
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The conceptual framework used for this study is informed by the literature and observations 
of the researcher, as it pertains to the field of M&E and the ethos of good governance. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, this study looks at the relationship between the thrust for good 
governance, which is driven at different levels and by different actors, and the practice of 
M&E, which is an adjunct to good governance. A permeating thread in the arguments 
presented is that there is a global sentiment that democratic governments, such as South 
Africa, need to adhere to certain democratic, international norms and standards which seek 
to improve government practice by ensuring higher levels of transparency and 
accountability. These levels are measurable by a range of oversight actors (institutions, 
management and citizens), who have either as their mandate or responsibility, the task of 
commenting on areas of performance.  
 
The specific manner in which the M&E-good governance relationship plays out is described 
in the next chapter, which more specifically describes the configuration of the developmental 
State1 in South Africa, as it relates to issues of performance. In each of the empirical 
chapters, further detail is provided on how a particular form of M&E works, and thus the 
literature review focuses on the overarching architecture for good governance and M&E in 
South Africa. The case study of the DSD is an appropriate unit of analysis for exploring how 
M&E and good governance work in a particular setting, for the reasons noted in Chapters 4 
(Methodology) and 5 (Description of the DSD). M&E is thus viewed as an approach which 
may be differentiated in terms of its purpose and intent, but which ultimately helps practice 
align practice with ideal, in the pursuit of good governance2.   
 
Given that judgement is a key part of evaluation, and thus in turn requires criteria by which 
judgement can be made, norms and standards need to be presented upfront for the 
assessment of the M&E-good governance relationship. This chapter presents these by 
looking at what M&E seeks to achieve, and also examines the global literature on good 
                                                 
1
  The developmental State in South Africa is a particular construction emerging from the particular history of 
the country, and seeks to redress apartheid by advocating policies that are pro-poor and interventionist. 
2
  A full definition of good governance follows. It broadly relates to the conduct of government, and relates to 
amongst others being transparent, accountable and efficient, and working by the rule of law.  
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governance to identify what the standards are that have been set by good governance 
seeking bodies. This allows for a comparison of the South African practice. Within this 
discussion, the field of M&E is explored in terms of its nature, purpose and intent. There is 
also an assessment of the transformative purpose of M&E, which is particularly important 
when it comes to South Africa and the case study of the DSD, where M&E needs to move 
beyond information production, to also addressing social and transformation issues.  
 
At a broad level, M&E in pursuit of good governance should lead to discernable changes in 
the manner in which government is managed, and services experienced by citizens. It 
should yield the three pronged purpose of improving transparency, accountability and 
promoting learning. The main question or problem statement is “does M&E produce good 
governance?” The purpose statement of this thesis is to explore the relationships between 
international influence on country practice, and country policy on departmental practice, and 
such practice on service delivery. The research seeks to understand the dynamics that arise 
based on each of the M&E pressure points. The empirical chapters (6, 7 and 8) present a 
typology of three distinct but interrelated M&E relationships; that is good governance and 
compliance (MME), departmental M&E and good governance (termed PME), and citizen or 
civic involvement and good governance (CME).  
 
M&E is thus presented in this study as a differentiated and dynamic activity, which influences 
and is influenced by particular contexts. The cumulative effect of M&E is to generate an 
ethos (transparency and accountability) that resonates with good governance, a higher level 
outcome. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Relationship between good governance and M&E 
Source: Constructed from the key assertions made in the thesis regarding the relationship between good 
governance and M&E 
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There are conditions for supporting and measuring good governance, as illustrated in Figure 
2.2 below.    
 
Figure 2.2:  Support for Good governance  
 




The literature on good governance and M&E is drawn on throughout the empirical chapters 
to assess how actual performance, viewed though the M&E perspectives, produces good 
governance in the DSD. Figure 2.3 below shows the basis for M&E effectiveness, which is 
also a set of criteria to test M&E in the DSD.  
 
Figure 2.3:  Basis for M&E effectiveness  
 
Source: Constructed from literature review on M&E 
 
The above Figures illustrate the mutually supportive relationship between elements related 
to good governance and effective M&E. The eventual “production” of good governance is an 
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outcome or effect, but tangible activities and outputs at the administrative levels are 
evidence that good governance has been achieved. The empirical/ M&E perspective 
chapters explore these relationships by assessing what occurs at these levels, in terms of 
their individual and collective contribution to good governance. The levels are those relating 
to law and obligation (mandatory M&E), managerial practice (persuasive) and citizen impact 
(civic M&E). The empirical chapters elaborate upon these areas, as it relates to the country 
and the DSD.  
  
2.2 MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
 
This section appraises M&E, in terms of its classification and nature, which illustrates the 
dynamic nature of the discipline that has resulted in its broad scope with regards to 
approach and methodology. The second aspect looked at is the area of definitions, and the 
third returns to the question of purpose, by examining how evaluator perspectives influences 
practices. These set the basis for the assessment of M&E in South Africa.  
 
2.2.1 The trans-disciplinary and transformative nature of M&E 
 
This review begins with the field of M&E, and focuses on the elements that are relevant to 
the research question. It must be emphasised that the philosophical orientation and 
conceptualization of M&E has evolved over time. This has mirrored the paradigm shifts that 
have occurred in society and the social sciences, with M&E practice in the 1960s being 
dominated by a strong emphasis on quantitative data, reflecting the social scientific trend of 
the era. The emphasis on empowerment evaluation mirrored the period of social discontent 
around the social sciences in the 1970s. The focus on empowerment methodologies sought 
to focus on lived experiences, and give voice to many stakeholders as possible, which was a 
secondary goal of a consensus-shaping evaluation process (Schwandt and Burgon, 2006: 
109). The M&E methodologies that followed began to focus on participatory approaches and 
empowerment techniques. Subsequent to this, there were less distinct trends, and what one 
finds today are several approaches to M&E, which in essence reflect the history of 
evaluation and its many purposes and roles, and which need to cater for different audiences 
(Mark et al, 2006: 23). A content analysis of key evaluation conferences indicates the 
diverse range of approaches to M&E3, and the increasingly high number of topical interest 
                                                 
3
    The researcher set up a template to categorise the content of evaluation conferences, by specifically looking    
at criteria relating to accountability, learning and empowerment. This is discussed fully in chapter 4. 
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groups is a further indication of the broad ambit of M&E4. There is a rich diversity, which also 
illustrates regional and thematic priorities5. The growth in the evaluation field may also be 
attributed to greater accountability concerns, and the general increase in the discourse 
around measurement6. The absence of a common purpose for M&E has meant that M&E 
has gained popularity as it has catered for a diverse range of subjects, and the international 
recognition accorded to it as a profession, may be seen in the country and continental 
evaluation associations that have been established7.    
 
One needs to try to resolve the question often asked about whether M&E can be categorised 
as a field, an approach, or a discipline? It is the very particular manner in which M&E has 
evolved that has resulted in Scriven (2004: 185) choosing to refer to the field as “trans-
disciplinary”,  a concept that is used more in recent times to describe M&E (as opposed to 
the term discipline or field). He contends that evaluation would constitute a discipline, albeit 
“trans”, in that it meets the tenets of adhering to a discipline. This trans-disciplinary field does 
not mean that there is no overarching cogency to M&E. What it does illustrate is the drawing 
from other fields to advance the discipline, and what is clear that M&E has been influenced 
by the social sciences; at the same time it is distinct from the social sciences due to its 
applied orientation. This distinctiveness is important, and means that M&E must be 
considered in terms of how it supports decision-making and action, which given its 
overarching nature, and ability to pronounce makes it potentially transformative in a political 
and social sense.   
 
Irrespective of how M&E is defined, a common thread and concern that transcends the 
philosophical orientation remains that of “independence”, which evaluators feel strongly 
about. It links directly to questions of credibility and authority, and is dependent on factors 
such as capacity and organisational location.  
 
2.2.2 An operational definition for M&E  
 
An important conceptual problem, similar to how to classify M&E, is “what is M&E?”  The 
                                                 
4
  A content analysis of the programmes of the American and Canadian Evaluation Association Conferences, 
the European and UK Evaluation Society, African Evaluation Association (AFrEA) and South African 
Monitoring and Evaluation Association (SAMEA) was undertaken to arrive at this assertion.  
5
  The AFrEA and SAMEA conferences indicate that themes drive the programme, and there is more 
coherence emerging from these conferences. 
6
  The use of facts and figures remains persuasive, and benchmarks for all forms of governance or performance 
are taken seriously given the economic implications.  
7
    Each continent has evaluation associations, which have helped to profile the field and give evaluators an 
identity by creating communities of practice.   
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literature review indicated that there is no single, uncontested answer as to what M&E is, 
which may in turn be attributed to the fact that there is no consensus around its purpose. 
The purpose question thus influences the “what is?” question. The purpose ranges from 
promoting accountability8, to transparency9, to organisational learning10, and depending on 
the particular purpose, the approach would vary. There would also be different permutations 
to the above which in turn would depend on the context and subject matter. It is for this 
reason that M&E can at times come across as a nebulous11 concept. This lack of a clear 
definition may be due to often serving contradictory and opposing purposes, as there is an 
argument that there could be tensions between accountability, transparency and learning. 
Proponents of different schools of thought use political, philosophical and methodological 
arguments to justify their particular approach, and this is reflected in the diversity that one 
sees in M&E today. The diversity can be seen in terms of methods used and the subject 
matter considered12.  
 
2.2.3 The use of the term M&E 
 
This research deliberately uses the term M&E, as opposed to just evaluation or monitoring. 
This statement is about the unity between these elements, which whilst distinct at one level, 
are in fact necessary for a holistic understanding13. The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2002: 27) definition of M&E are useful to also 
consider, given their widespread use. 
 
Monitoring is seen as a continuous function that uses systematic collection of data on 
specified indicators to provide management and main stakeholders of an on-going 
development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement 
of objectives...allocated funds. 
 
                                                 
8
 In contexts which are considered in need of reform, accountability is a major thrust expected from M&E. 
This applies to transformational contexts like the South African public service. 
9
  Transparency is seen as a means to prevent abuse of power and corruption, and by insisting on certain levels 
of reporting, it is seen as a way to instil good governance. 
10
  Organisational learning has not been studied in depth within government contexts, as there are assumptions 
that information about performance translates into deeper understanding and subsequent skill enhancement. 
This may not necessarily be the case.  
11
  This does not mean that M&E is nebulous, rather that proponents of particular views tend to thrust their 
views as hegemonic, hence the positioning that emerges from different M&E practitioners.  
12
  In a relatively short period of time M&E has moved beyond assessing projects, to now producing evaluations 
of most subject areas.  
13
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Glossary of Terms in Evaluation and 
Results-based Management. 2002. 
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Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed 
project, programme or policy...the aim is to determine relevance and fulfilment of 
objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability....it 
should involve incorporation of lessons learned into decision-making process...it also 
relates to the worth or significance of an activity, policy or programme. 
 
The “M” is related to, hence the “and”, the “E”. Thus monitoring, whilst seen as an on-going 
management function, and evaluation as the post-event function, which feeds information 
back to management for the next event, is too simplistic a distinction. In doing monitoring 
one is evaluating, as one is making a judgement about progress and intervening on the 
basis of this judgement. Similarly, when one does an evaluation, one does so on the basis of 
monitoring data, and judgements can best be made with these insights. In practice, the 
sequencing is not as linear as one following the other, but more dynamic depending on the 
situation. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 14 defines monitoring as a 
continuing function that uses systematic collection of data, on an on-going development and 
on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders with indications of 
the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated 
funds.  
The OECD‟s Development Assistance Committee defines evaluation as a systematic, 
maximally objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy 
and of its design, implementation and results whose aim is to determine the relevance and 
fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An 
evaluation must provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of 
lessons learned into decision-making by both recipients and donors. This study uses the 
terms M&E separately and together, depending on the discussion.  
2.2.4 The purposes and types of M&E 
 
There is a spectrum of views on what M&E means and what it should achieve. The most 
distinguishable views within this spectrum comes from those who see M&E as supporting a 
purely accountability function. This grouping aligns itself to the field of auditing, compliance 
and performance management (Cook, 2006). The forms of M&E for accountability would be 
oversight, exercised by external and internal players. The external players would be those 
actors that fulfil a regulatory function, such as the Auditor-General. It would also include 
                                                 
14
  OECD, Evaluation Quality Standards. Development Assistance Committee. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/62/36596604.pdf  
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some form of civic oversight, which would come about when citizens hold government 
accountable for the use of funds and performance on programmes.  
 
In accountability orientated M&E, high levels of scrutiny are expected, and judgement 
generally made against clear standards and norms that have been established for a range of 
performance areas. This would include the proper management of budgets, personnel, legal 
and regulatory compliance with process and procedures and as in the case of South Africa, 
transformational and ethical considerations. Deviation from any of the standards invites 
censure, and the ranking of departments across these indicators and making such findings 
public may take place. In this context M&E is seen as supporting a governance function, 
which Cook (1997:14) points out “encompasses the entire management, operating systems 
and culture of an institution”. It also links to government if supported by a strong government 
auditing system. Improving governmental management is yet another reason evaluation is 
employed in government (Davies et al, 2006: 165). It is thus not surprising, as discussed 
under chapter 3, why evaluation has been explicitly employed to advance the goals of the 
developmental State. Furthermore, the importance given to it by governments in Africa, as 
part of their process of improving their efficiencies, indicates recognition that change cannot 
be driven without appropriate tools that generate strategic management information.  
 
Apart from M&E serving the very necessary purpose of accountability, for reasons 
mentioned above, it also is meant to promote the “learning organisation”. This would be at 
the level of M&E use, and comes about when results are presented. The assumption is that 
organisations would become more open and self-reflective when faced with evaluative 
information, but it is not necessarily the case as operationalising learning is not easy, given 
the complex array of protocols and management culture which must be negotiated (Preskill 
and Russ-Eft, 2005). It has been shown that whilst it is implicit that M&E should lead to 
learning and reflection, this may not be the case and the way in which organisations 
integrate information may be complex, and not as causal as suggested in classic M&E 
project or programme management terms.  
 
Utilising evaluation in organisations is, however, not easy, and influenced by several factors: 
contextual (political), technical (methodological) and bureaucratic (psychological). These 
factors overlap, but what is clear is that unless “all the elements are lined up, organisational 
learning is difficult” (Mayne, 2000: 29). Tuckermann (2007) assesses this grouping in terms 
of how M&E contributes to learning and reflection, and notes that in this mode M&E is seen 
as but one tool that supports management by improving the quality of information provided 
for decision-making. Whilst most of the research has focused on NGOs, there is growing 
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interest in seeing how M&E helps to build learning organisations (Roper and Pettit, 2002). 
There is much potential for evaluation to lead to organisational learning, and not just 
accountability, which has been illustrated by Gray (2009). The point made is that M&E intent 
is very important, as it could lead to different outcomes. It should be remembered that M&E 
has assumed different identities, due to context, and depending on this it may be used for 
accountability, promoting a behaviour or practice, or learning, as demonstrated in a series on 
the subject (Bemelemans-Videc et al, 2007a). Within the context of asking the question, 
what is the purpose of M&E, there are dilemmas as it often shares an identity with auditing, 
especially when is assumes an accountability function (Bemelmans-Videc et al, 2007b). The 
multiple uses of M&E are demonstrated in these works.  
 
The relation of information to action was assumed to be linear and straightforward, but is not 
so in practice, as little attention has been paid to the theoretical understanding of 
organisational learning processes or the manner in which organisations assimilate and use 
information (Leeuw and Sonnichsen, 2000). There are clear pre-conditions to learning, which 
include understanding the policy cycle and government decision-making processes. Rist 
(2000) states that many factors needs to be considered, and learning cannot be taken for 
granted.   
 
This section has illustrated that M&E does serve different purposes, each of which is distinct 
but not mutually exclusive. In looking more specifically at some of the M&E types, it is 
important to consider the work of Patton (1997) who has become widely known for his utility-
focus in M&E. He asks a critical question; “so what after M&E”, and in so doing, challenges 
the school of thought that argues that M&E practitioners are only responsible for evaluation 
results till they hand this over to decision-makers15. According to Patton16 the utility of results 
must be demonstrated, and can only come about if change emanating there from is seen. A 
utility-focused M&E requires M&E practitioners to ask questions about the whole process, 
and this goes to the heart of questions about roles and responsibilities. M&E practitioners 
need to think beyond the production of the report, and consider how they can influence 
decisions, and thus see the value of their work. In this context, it means that M&E 
practitioners should understand the organisational and political contexts within which they 
work, and customise their strategy for achieving influence according to this reality. This 
                                                 
15
  This approach absolves the M&E practitioner of any responsibility for M&E impact. It is discussed more 
fully in this section, but sees the M&E as a detached professional who need not enter the decision-making or 
political terrain.  
16
  Ibid. 
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approach requires an appreciation of the decision-making context and the administrative-
political interface, which is where decisions are made and carried through.  
 
M&E functions and is used in a particular context, which Stern (2006: 293) shows is 
“mediated by geography, politics and subject matter, which in turn determines the adoption 
of particular philosophical, subject and methodological dimensions”. This reinforces the point 
made about how M&E mutates in particular contexts, and cautions against the notion that a 
standardised M&E approach can be applied in any context and be expected to work. Thus, 
M&E in the developmental State context would be different from how M&E operates in other 
contexts, as the questions asked would pertain to the specific policies and content.  
Furthermore, if citizens are clients of M&E information, they need to be treated differently 
from the decision-making clients within the bureaucracy, and this means differentiated 
approach and products to ensure relevance.    
 
Given the very important influence that positivism has had on M&E systems development, 
especially those used to drive compliance, it is important to critically appraise whether 
driving compliance should be an end in itself. Whilst statistics are important, it would be 
important to assess whether such outputs solve deeper policy and organisational problems, 
or whether they just alert when there is non-compliance to some parameter or measure. 
Compliance driven systems would privilege the measurable and visible, but a deeper 
concern is whether they produce the type of information that helps to solve problems. In 
other words, it may produce accountability and transparency, but does it lead to 
organisational learning, beyond information as to where one lies on the compliance graph?  
The logic of measurement may be associated with “the truth”, but the question that must be 
asked is whether the exercise is simply a measure of compliance or effective and good 
governance.   
 
The purely quantitative approach to M&E did not last long globally or entrench itself as a 
dominant approach, which was understandable given that purely scientifically based 
approaches to social problems is limited  (Rossi et al, 2004). The more critical approach to 
social problems privileged context, interrogated socio-political and socio-economic 
relationships more deeply and was evident in the Marxian and post-Marxian approaches. 
This constructivist approach argued that since contexts produce the issues and problems it 
is only by returning and considering the same contexts that problems can be solved. 
Problem solving in this approach is more than getting accurate data and facts; it is about 
understanding the logic behind the data and facts and contextualising such facts in order to 
give it true meaning and value a more relevant question would be whether compliance per 
I. A. Naidoo:    |   Chapter 2 29 
 
se leads to good governance? This is in light of the fact that the targets may simply be 
measures of “tolerance”; in other words, what range of deviation is tolerated before a 
department is considered non-compliant. This returns one to the question of whether 
compliance on its own is an indicator of good governance.  
 
The use of quantitative approaches in M&E globally is not a problem per se, rather it 
becomes a problem when there is no interpretation beyond the statistics, and figures 
become the irrefutable answers to questions (Black, 1999). A sensitive approach to M&E 
should endeavour to change, through engaging with users and providing a critical 
interpretation of data and employing plural methods that triangulate and thus provide more 
sensitive and context specific analysis and reports. M&E would then add value, and not just 
be another form of audit. The question that needs be asked is how does M&E distinguish 
itself and add value to public policy and the promotion of good governance, rather than just 
compliance?  A sound M&E should not just improve compliance; it should also enhance the 
reflective capacity of organisations, whilst simultaneously increasing transparency, 
accountability and supporting a culture of learning (Engel and Carlesson, 2002). In 
measuring M&E effectiveness, all of these must be considered.   
 
The above discussion is embedded in the issue of enlightenment and rationality, with M&E 
practitioners often presenting themselves as experts, whose sheer arguments in reports 
cannot be ignored, and who serve a greater good in making things work correctly. There 
would be a leap in faith if one were to assume that knowledge from M&E experts is the sole 
information used for decision-making, or that evaluation reports automatically translate into 
rational decisions. Marra (2000) demonstrates that the link between knowledge generation 
and utilisation is often not clear, and it is difficult to isolate which information is the basis for a 
particular decision. This is a salient point when assessing M&E functionality or effectiveness, 
as the assumed causality, and hence value is often not easy to distinguish, which may result 
in M&E practitioners not seeing their particular contribution or value. This can be 
disempowering and needs to be managed carefully.  
 
2.2.5 Methodological debates and considerations 
 
Another vexing question which should be highlighted, and which is also prevalent in M&E 
forums, is that of methodology. M&E practitioners are aware that their findings can be 
rejected based on the credibility of the methodological basis. The methodology question will 
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always be central to M&E, as it is the basis for the construction of the “truth”17, from which 
important judgements and recommendations are made.  
 
At a broad and generalised level the methodology question tends to bring up some of the old 
debates that still prevail in the social sciences and which relate to the old dualities in terms of 
how knowledge is best constructed and validated. It leads to the so-called dualities between 
the objective and the subjective, positivistic and interpretative approaches. Fortunately, the 
sharp dualities and positioning has faded away and given way to the use of pluralistic 
methods, more options than directives, with mixed-methods seen as acceptable (Greene 
and Caracelli, 1997).   
 
In the terrain of citizens and the M&E of government performance, a caution needs to be 
sounded as there are obvious pitfalls when this sector (civil society) is evaluated by 
government alone. Issues of “legitimacy, transparency, independence and incompatible 
objectives” come to the fore (Rogers and Williams, 2006: 76).  It is for this reason that civil 
society needs to be involved in monitoring, as it promotes transparency and accountability, 
as demonstrated in projects where there are many role players (Fox, 1997). A balance thus 
needs to be struck by incorporating the use of assessments generated by NGOs and CBOs, 
if these exist, into the results of government evaluations. This will be the only way in which to 
credibly assess the views of citizens of government performance. The issue of using M&E 
for purposes that address accountability, service standards, whether management changes 
work, and whether policies and programmes are effective, have been highlighted by 
Goldstein (2008). 
   
Irrespective of which M&E perspective is taken, the implicit assumption is that the process 
and results are credible, irrefutable and valid and the overarching principle of validity 
remains. The validity argument is central to the discussion on credibility. Credibility of M&E 
comes about when users of M&E see it as valid, which they base on what utility the M&E 
information serves. This is also informed by how confident they are about the independence 
and capacity of the M&E function.  
 
If M&E is not perceived as being capacitated, the credibility of M&E may not be entrenched 
and results will be questioned (Boyle and Lemaire, 1999). The M&E function should thus be 
capacitated to deal with both qualitative and quantitative information requirements, and 
                                                 
17
  There has been much written about M&E playing God, having the final answer. This goes back to questions 
of measurement, and fortunately there is now a more realistic approach to the facts, with a view that final 
recommendations must be constructed by role-players, rather than handed down by experts.  
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capacity building18 and institutionalising19 the M&E function is important. This will influence 
how seriously such a function is taken and influence its support. It has also been shown that 
for M&E to have utility and assist public sector management, it must be institutionalised 
(Mackay, 2006). These are important considerations for assessing M&E effectiveness.  
 
2.2.6 Summary: M&E 
 
This section has shown the evolution of M&E, and illustrated that given its ability to address 
overarching questions of governance, it has a wide application. Furthermore, it serves 
several purposes, and uses different methodologies for attaining its goal of improving 
transparency and accountability. It does, however, remain a strategy and tool for the 
promotion of good governance, and the results generated need to be applied through a 
management hierarchy. The approach to M&E can be varied, and is informed by context, 
which influences that nature of the practice. The next section discusses the second 
conceptual area that is relevant to this study, namely, good governance. 
 
2.3 GOOD GOVERNANCE   
 
In this part of the conceptual framework, the concept of good governance is analysed. A 
deeper analysis of this concept is necessary, so as to understand its rationale, which 
emerges from a historic context which saw many governments facing legitimacy and 
development crisis due to poor governance. The thrust for good governance since the 
1980s, largely led by multinational organisations, was an attempt to address these problems. 
Globalisation has resulted in increasing information flows and interaction between counties 
and has helped to raise consciousness about issues of corruption and accountability, and 
many bodies now exist, which measure and report on different aspects of governance. 
These ratings are influential, and by virtue of country performance being measured 
externally, there has been the development of country-specific policies and systems which 
address the elements of good governance through their own M&E systems. Good 
governance is thus not an abstract notion, it is a way of conducting affairs that are in the 
public interest and should be democratically enriching.  
 
 
                                                 
18
 Most evaluation conferences now have capacity building workshops to maximise the opportunity to expose 
practitioners to both debates and build skills.  
19
  Institutionalising M&E is important to give it authority, and hence support its influence with key decision-
makers.  
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2.3.1 Locating the concept of good governance  
 
There terms governance and good governance are being increasingly used within 
development literature. Governance refers to the process of decision-making and the 
process by which decisions are implemented. It can be used in several contexts; corporate 
governance, international governance, national and local governance. Governance may be 
defined as a set of values and principles which promote elements of transparency and 
accountability, although there are permutations to this definition as demonstrated by Rhodes 
(2000) who defines good governance as marrying NPM to liberal democracy.  
 
Weiss (2000) shows that many academics and practitioners use the term governance 
synonymously with government, which he regards as  incorrect. Government is the 
institution, the administrative machinery for effecting policy, but the quality of that which is 
produced is governance. It is a higher level outcome and goes beyond the traditional 
services of government and needs to also align to ethical and democratic standards. 
Governance implies going beyond the legal authority, and implicitly implies that there will be 
some form of validation or judgement of activities20, to see whether these do align to the 
values of good governance. Given the need for validation, it requires sound M&E to indicate 
whether or not this ideal is achieved.    
 
Santiso (2001) mentions that governance as a concept is relatively new, and emerged in 
1989 in the World Bank`s report on the crisis of governance in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
the capacity, ability and willingness of political authorities to govern effectively in the 
common interest was highlighted. The governance question has been illustrated as 
important for Africa by Amuwo (2000) who describes the relationship between globalisation 
and the New Partnership for Africa`s Development (NEPAD) and argues that with 
globalisation African countries, previously on the margins of the good governance networks, 
were brought in through African driven initiatives like NEPAD, to align these countries with 
international good governance values.  
 
A good governance system also requires that the process of decision-making and public 
policy formulation is transparent and accountable. It extends beyond the capacity of public 
sector to the rules that create a legitimate, effective and efficient framework for the conduct 
of public policy. It implies managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable, participatory 
                                                 
20
  Good governance can be measured and is validated when practice is assessed through some form of M&E.  
Examining the performance against constitutional values and other principles indicates the extent to which 
this goal is realised.  
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and equitable manner. It entails effective participation in public policy-making, the 
prevalence of the rule of law and an independent judiciary, institutional checks and balances 
through horizontal and vertical separation of powers, and effective oversight agencies.  
 
There is the argument that the nature of the bureaucracy of government themselves, tends 
to dilute policy intent, which may include good governance imperatives, and has been 
blamed for slowing down government. This has led to the drive that private-sector solutions 
be introduced to improve government efficiency, which is generally referred to as the 
Washington consensus, but which does not have support today, particularly in developing 
countries (Williamson, 2005). The current global crisis which has resulted in the call for more 
government monitoring of all sectors of the economy, and the bail out of the private sector, 
shows that leaving the private sector without regulation or only using the private sector to 
deliver government services, or uncritically importing private sector solution into the public 
sector is not desirable. The South African developmental State professes to be 
interventionist and pro-poor, for reasons that are discussed later, and which reflects a 
particular history and experience.  
 
In the global discourse on good governance, there has been a proliferation of international 
bodies which support good governance, and do this by measuring and reflecting on a 
country`s performance in different areas related to governance, such as corruption and 
transparency. Assessments made by bodies such as the World Bank, Transparency 
International, and in the African context, the African Union, have been prominent, are taken 
seriously and tend to influence foreign direct investment and a country`s development. Good 
governance measures serve as confidence indicators (both domestically and internationally) 
in the political and administrative management of a country. The recent global economic 
crisis has been a crisis in the systems of governance, both private and public sector. This 
period has seen government intervention to help the private sector, and to an extent has 
indicated that the private and public sector are not so separate, with them impacting on each 
other. The hegemony enjoyed by capitalist, free-market thought, has also come under the 
spotlight. In light of this, it is not surprising that corporate governance has also come under 
the spotlight.   
 
The question of what is good governance has also been interrogated by influential 
international bodies, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which whilst generally 
judging countries they engage with, have now begun to interrogate the manner in which they 
govern themselves. In a compendium of studies of IMF governance, the question of 
transparency and accountability, and the manner in which boards conduct themselves is 
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scrutinised (Lamdany and Martinez-Diaz, 2009). This shift is positive and probably reflects 
the current economic climate which has negated many of the assumptions about how growth 
and development should take place, by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.  
 
The concept of good governance21 is broad (Weiss, 2000); however, what is clear is that it 
relates to a way of doing things, or conducting activities that are proper22, transparent and 
accountable23. This discussion will show that different institutions list different elements in 
their definition of good governance, but common to all is the question of transparency and 
accountability. When looking at the definitions of agencies such as the Asian Development 
Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Economic 
and Social Committees for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the World Bank on 
governance, this variation is demonstrated. This is thus an important discussion as it 
presents concepts that will be assessed in the perspective chapters of this thesis. The 
ESCAP24, definition lists 8 major characteristics, namely consensus orientated, accountable,  
transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient, follows the rule of 
law, and participatory.  
 
The above definition, if applied to South Africa would be favourable, given the divisive impact 
that apartheid had on the population. The drive for consensus, being responsive, promoting 
equitable and inclusive measures, and engaging in participatory practices is very relevant. 
The element of responsiveness is one of the eight Batho Pele principles in South Africa, and 
measuring it at the service delivery level provides an indication of the quality of governance. 
Similarly, if public participation practices seek to build consensus, programmes are likely to 
be more sustainable and owned. The question of equity is particularly important to South 
Africa which needs to engage in redress mechanisms. The ESCAP model thus has 
application to the South African situation.   
 
The African Development Bank (2010) clarifies its concept of governance by identifying four 
elements, these being accountability, participation, predictability and transparency. This 
definition would also be applicable to the developmental State in South Africa, especially in 
terms of participation. The African Development Bank definition addresses issues of 
participation of project beneficiaries and affected groups, addresses the importance of 
                                                 
21
  The indices of good governance may vary, but generally relate to a better way of doing things, of value-
adding. In South Africa the 9 constitutional values and principles are considered as indices of good 
governance.  
22
  Proper would relate to normative ways of doing things, of following standards and measures. 
23
  Transparency and accountability are stipulated as two of the 9 Constitutional values and principles. These 
elements are also common to definitions of democracy and M&E. 
24
  See http://www://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/Project activities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp 
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improving the interface between the public and private sector, and views NGOs as 
important. The issue of predictability is important, as this is necessary for investment and 
growth, as too frequently political changes tends to prevent development from gaining 
momentum. The issue of policy continuity and stability are measures of good governance 
and means that policies have sufficient time to be implemented, provided off course that they 
are appropriate and meet the tenets of good governance.   
 
The UNDP (1997: 2) views governance as the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authority to manage a country`s affairs at all levels. It states that good 
governance is achieved when the following 9 characteristics are displayed; participation, 
strategic vision, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity 
building, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability. 
 
The rule of law, apart from accountability and transparency, are common features across all 
good governance definitions. The UNDP prioritises those aspects relating to participation, 
consensus orientation (implying democratic processes of engagement to achieve this 
outcome), equity building and responsiveness. The UNDP definition would, as in the case of 
the ADP and ESCAP offer some relevance to the South African context where there is a 
need for improving civil society participation. There is also the need to shift from a central 
government approach to one that involves all stakeholders and brings in marginalised 
voices, thus ensuring accountability, with bad governance meaning a lack of accountability, 
and which comes about when citizens are not involved in the matters of government 
(Gurung, 2000).    
 
Researchers at the World Bank, Kaufmann et al (1999) have distinguished six main 
dimensions of good governance: 
 
 Voice and accountability, which includes civil liberties and political stability; 
 Government effectiveness, which includes the quality of policy-making and public  
service delivery; 
 The lack of regulatory burden; 
 The rule of law, which includes protection of property rights; 
 Independence of the judiciary; and 
 Control of corruption.   
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The World Bank definition which tends to focus more on the formal aspects of governance is 
biased towards the market (lack of regulatory burden) and the protection of property rights – 
presumed individual. It correctly emphasises the question of corruption and sees an 
independent judiciary as important, presumably to curb the abuse of political power.  It 
appears to be rooted in a very particular history of engagement with developing countries, 
and this assertion is made in light of how it has engaged with countries when advising and 
funding development. It appears to focus more on individual rights (civil liberties, property 
rights), which need to be served by an independent judiciary, and accords a full dimension to 
the corruption question. Having clarified what constitutes good governance, the discussion 
proceeds to assessing what the implications are for the South African developmental State, 
which is a particular model that seeks to drive governance and development in a particular 
direction.  
 
In actualising governance, the question that arises is what specific use M&E has; in other 
words how can one achieve greater management accountability and promote good 
governance through M&E (Mackay, 2007). Opponents of good governance may suggest that 
there is a major difference between the private and public sector, and may argue that the 
nebulous nature of public goods means that it is not measurable, as there is no bottom line. 
However, public goods can and must be measured, which Smith and Bratton (2001: 453) 
show when they say that the public sector is “not special, as it uses resources and must 
account for it”. It should therefore demonstrate its value-add and also be subject to the same 
levels of scrutiny that the corporate sector experiences.  Also, with increasing private-public 
partnerships, the sharp divide between the private and public sector has become more 
blurred and interchangeable, resulting in a more demanding expectations from citizens of the 
governments they elect, and the governance they expect.  This implies the need for M&E to 
demonstrate at one level the value added by government.  It marks a shift from an 
unaccountable government, operating within an opaque and unaccountable bureaucracy.  
 
The above relates to what the intention of good governance is.  The more fundamental 
question is what happens when the quality of governance is indeed measured, as would be 
the case in countries that accept the need for good governance (World Bank, 2006).  It is 
incorrect to assume that measurement on its own naturally leads to change and 
improvement, as performance information on its own will not deliver the changes envisaged. 
Schick (2001: 43) argues that it is “a myth that an organisation can be transformed simply by 
measuring its performance and that performance information can only affect incentives to do 
so”.  This raises the question of transparency and accountability, measurement and 
improvement. One could have M&E, but if results are not acted on it is a futile exercise. This 
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is where the issue of conversion comes in, which refers to the mechanisms or institutions 
that convert findings into action by using authority to effect change, which would be 
management and political committees, to name a few, that can use results to improve 
performance.  This has implications for M&E, and means that the bodies termed convertors 
or enactors must be engaged with actively to promote use, or the classic problem of M&E 
disuse will prevail.  
 
The discussion on promoting good governance indicates that organisational change should 
precede, not follow performance management.  There must be a receptiveness to measure, 
reflect on and integrate learning and findings.  Thus in looking at how good governance is 
promoted, it is clear that the enactors, or authority structures, must be examined in terms of 




This chapter has presented the key arguments related to M&E and good governance, by 
describing each area, in order to show the commonalities and how they are mutually 
reinforcing.  The conceptual framework indicates that M&E is a tool, which is only effective if 
used in a manner which increases transparency by putting credible results in the public 
domain. In such a case, it serves an accountability function.  To achieve the accountability 
purpose requires that information is acted upon, and M&E in this instance becomes 
dependent upon decision-making structures in order for its findings to be applied and utilised 
to improve performance.  The issue of context, evaluator perspective and methodologies is 
also to be taken seriously. This is the basis of the arguments in this thesis, and therefore 
each empirical chapter looks not just at M&E production, but also its use.  The concept of 
good governance was shown in the review of the international good governance promoting 
institutions as having much commonality in addressing common issues. The manner in 
which this has been embraced in South Africa is addressed in the literature review.  
 
 








The purpose of this chapter is to critically appraise the literature relating to M&E and good 
governance as it applies to South Africa. Whereas the conceptual framework provided a 
broad overview of the international trends in governance, public administration and M&E, 
this chapter specifically focuses on the manner in which the concepts of good governance 
and practice of M&E have been have assimilated into the democratic State. The post-
apartheid State, with its emphasis on transforming historic developmental imbalances 
operates within an overarching Constitutional democracy that obliges the public sector to 
operate in a manner wherein transparency, accountability, performance and citizen-focus 
are evident. 
 
The chapter focuses on the following areas, which expands upon the conceptual framework 
provided in Chapter 2.  Firstly, it sketches the evolution of the accountability framework in 
South Africa in relation to how good governance and M&E principles have been 
incorporated. This is followed by a discussion on the South African developmental State and 
its role in bringing about bureaucratic change. The various challenges in improving State 
performance, through measures related to the ethos of New Public Management (NPM) and 
M&E, are discussed, as these seek to bring about the necessary administrative change. The 
critical area of good governance and the democratic mandate is addressed, by focusing on 
specific imperatives for M&E in South Africa.  The chapter serves the purpose of 
contextualising M&E and good governance in South Africa, which builds upon the 
conceptual framework that is used for this assessment.  
 
3.2 EVOLUTION OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
The South African Public Service has been shaped by its colonial and apartheid history. Key 
characteristics include it being regulation and rule bound, inward looking and noted for its 
deference to authority. It was also risk averse, highly compartmentalised and fragmented, 
and slow to respond to changes. This character has prevailed since the Union and even 
after the Republic of South Africa in 1961 and democracy in 1994 (Naidoo, 2004). Changing 
the nature of the Public service required a strong, developmentally oriented State, which 
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could intervene to redress the development anomalies caused by the colonial and apartheid 
rule.  
 
South Africa`s accountability and governance system has only now, after 16 years of 
democracy, begun to seriously mirror the good practice of its international counterparts. This 
is understandable given that reversing a fractured governance system that was based on 
racial identities, and replicated unevenly in the form of systems of public administration takes 
time. The current situation of having nine provincial governments, each with a high degree of 
administrative autonomy, but expected to adhere to national guidelines in terms of 
governance, is indicative of a situation where there are different levels of accountability 
across the different tiers of government. There are clearly challenges in managing such a 
transition, and being able to manage the performance of the public service is such a context 
becomes critical (Van der Waldt, 2004). In order to improve the performance of government, 
a Ministry for Performance Monitoring and Evaluation was established in 2009, to amongst 
others, guide the transformation process and ensure optimal performance of the State 
(Chabane, 2009). As can be seen, this emphasis on performance emphasises the 
importance placed on, and reflects an important political commitment to the principles of 
good governance, as it promises greater transparency and accountability around 
government performance.   
 
Many of the changes that took place in South Africa are similar to the changes that occurred 
in the United States of America, which Forsythe (2001) shows have been linked to budgets 
and planning. This continues to be the trend globally and can be seen in South Africa today. 
There has been an evolution in how budgets have been considered, but the issue of budgets 
remains a driving force and finds expression in how the South African government deals with 
its budget, especially when dealing with the question of promoting efficiencies in its 
assessment. A large part of the current M&E framework is about tracking expenditure, and a 
significant part of the focal area of mandatory M&E is assessing the quality of spending. This 
element is driven by the National Treasury (NT) and the Auditor-General (AG)1, the former of 
which disburses budget and the latter which assess the quality of spending.    
 
All of these changes were motivated by a desire to improve government efficiency. The 
economic bias of these shifts reflects the power that Treasuries yield all over the world and 
how performance improvement plans that originate in Treasuries tend to rapidly become 
used in government. This is also evident in South Africa where many reform initiatives 
                                                 
1
 Full explanations of the mandate and work of these institutions is provided in chapter 6. 
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emanate from the Treasury2. Its influence is pronounced in how budgeting is practiced, and 
the call for sound consideration of objectives and resources to deliver outputs and outcomes 
can be seen the MTSF3 and the MTEF4 processes. The M&E of departmental performance 
against these, undertaken through Annual Reports and other measures, is a form of 
economic and management oversight. The AG plays a role in exercising further oversight of 
budgets. The proper planning and management of budgets is an element that meets one of 
the criteria of good governance, that of government effectiveness. 
 
Central to the thrust for good governance is the South African Constitution, which regulates 
the relationship between the tiers of government. The Constitution, in relation to issues of 
good governance, prescribes what the accountability architecture is, in the form of stating 
where the different competencies reside, and describing how the Institutions Supporting 
Democracy (ISD), also referred to chapter 9 and 10 bodies, should operate. These ISD 
include the Auditor-General, the Public Protector and the Public Service Commission.  All of 
these bodies are expected to ensure effective oversight, operate independently, report 
directly to Parliament, and in general ensure that performance information on government is 
placed within the public domain. This is an essential element for good governance, as all the 
definitions make reference to issues of transparency and accountability, which ISD advance.  
 
South Africa only embraced M&E, as it is internationally known, since the democratic era, as 
the preconditions for M&E (transparency and accountability), were largely not in place during 
the apartheid era. Addressing the preconditions in part were the passing of legislation such 
as the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) and the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA)5. The setting up of the ISDs, which report to Parliament and not to the 
Executive, ensures that at a policy level the various oversight institutions can exercise their 
mandate without political interference. A key issue for any M&E is the protection of 
independence.  
 
The institution which has the most explicit mandate in terms of promoting good governance 
in the Public Service is the Public Service Commission (PSC), which is required to 
                                                 
2 
The Public finance Management Act, 1999 clearly stipulates how budgets are to managed, and has an 
efficiency and effectiveness bias. 
3 
The MTSF requires that all sections of government translate political priorities into programmes of action, 
taking into account resources, and produce 3 year schedules of deliverables or outputs. 
4 
Predictability in expenditure underlies the MTEF, which requires sound financial planning and monitoring. 
There is a clear accountability framework for the management of funds. 
5
 The emphasis of these acts has been to legally entrench the right to secure information held by the 
government and the right to reasons for any administrative decisions. They are pivotal to democratic 
practice.  
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“investigate, monitor and evaluate” the Public Service “without fear, favour or prejudice”.  Its 
work over a decade has helped to introduce the practice of M&E into government, and its 
reports have become the basis for public and political engagement on the performance of 
the State. The Ministry for Performance Monitoring and Evaluation has raised the profile of 
M&E even more, due to amongst others, the introduction of political accountability systems, 
wherein the President holds Ministers accountable in the form of publically accessible 
service delivery agreements. The public profile given to this practice has resulted in a 
greater emphasis on the need for M&E, and has helped to strengthen the accountability 
framework further, due to the potential consequences for non-performance at all levels.  
 
In South Africa there is a high expectation that government shall play a key role in the 
delivery of services. The consequence of such a situation where government is dominant is 
that there must be adequate accountability mechanisms to prevent the abuse of State 
power. M&E can play a key role to ensure that democratic gains are not lost through 
corruption and other acts which undermine democratic and governance advancements.  
 
3.3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND BUREAUCRATIC CHANGE  
 
3.3.1 Defining and explaining the developmental State 
 
The developmental State needs to be discussed it terms of its origins and features and 
relationship to international imperatives for greater State efficiency, one of which is the 
influence of New Public Management (NPM). The key feature of a developmental State is its 
activism and interventionism. Saloojee (2007) points out that there are many examples of 
developmental States, and that no one form should be privileged. He argues that the South 
African developmental State is unique, and in this particular context government leads a 
concerted drive for economic growth and sustainable development through forging 
partnerships6 with key stakeholders7. It is pro-poor, has particular institutional and 
administrative configurations, and focuses on the vulnerable and marginalised8 groups.  
 
In addressing how the developmental State brings about good governance, it is important to 
reflect on the historic context that has shaped the current Public Service, and embedded 
                                                 
6




 Most of the government policies talk about the need to consult and engage with stakeholders, which tend to 
be diverse. In doing so, this shows democratic maturity and points to an intent to produce inclusive solutions. 
8
 The majority of the voting population may be classified as poor, and thus remain a key constituency which 
must be attended to.  
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different areas of performance emphasis. The developmental State professes to take its 
mandate from the political mandate of the ruling party, which is explicit about its support for 
the poor and marginalised (ANC, 2004). To alter the status quo, institutions are expected to 
configure themselves to meet this mandate. This would include changing existing racial 
asymmetries and inequality, which remain pronounced after apartheid (Van der Berg, 2006). 
Given that the developmental State is not seen as an ideology by government, but rather a 
pragmatic focus on addressing developmental objectives, government feels that it is proper 
to apply certain interventions at certain times in its history. Examples are interventions that 
have been achieved through policies such as GEAR were largely macro-economic9 in nature 
and seek to stabilise the economy, reduce the deficit and introduce fiscal prudence to a point 
where there would be surpluses for social and infrastructural spending, as the last few 
budgets have shown. In an attempt by government to bring in partners for development 
there has been the ASGISA initiative, which seeks a stronger private sector role in 
supporting government in its development initiatives. 
 
The envisaged developmental State is expected to the flexible and supportive of the 
transformational agenda. It also has an interventionist bias, and should improve service 
delivery and integrate government (Levin, 2004a). It is expected to mobilise support from 
non-public sector stakeholders and form partnerships to improve its propensity to deliver 
services. Naidoo (2006) has argued that whilst there was the intent by the State to capably 
intervene and shepherd societal resources to achieve national developmental objectives, 
this has not been achieved. The reports of the AG indicate serious concerns about the 
quality of financial management, which indicates that resources are not optimally utilised.  
 
The good governance thrust also needs to be situated in the context of what is expected 
specifically of the developmental State of South Africa10 about how it is meant to promote 
transformation and development. The developmental State must be well-informed about its 
progress, and relies of different forms of M&E to inform it, both politically and 
administratively. M&E in such a context would be largely focused on the accountability use 
of such information, but would more broadly contribute to transparency about the operations 
of government which would enrich democracy. South Africa should therefore address the 
traditional elements of transparency, accountability, privilege participation, seek consensus 
(as a part of national building) and emphasise responsiveness. On the issue of democracy, 
                                                 
9
 The macroeconomic policy, whilst criticised as being too socially prudent, did help the country improve its 
international economic and competitiveness rating.  
10
 A key assumption is that the State needs to intervene, given the mandate given to it politically. The 
intervention is justified on the grounds that most of the population are vulnerable, and a strong State is 
necessary to protect and advance citizen interests and development. 
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with its rights-based focus, this is very relevant to the South African situation which has 
prioritised issues of rights in the Constitution, and which has been followed through in policy. 
Adopting this definition thus implies that the basis for good governance exists.  
 
3.3.2 Challenges in incorporating New Public Management into the South African 
developmental State 
 
The NPM emphasis seeks to bring about greater efficiency, which is linked to the 
accountability question, and whilst there may be questions about how appropriate this import 
is in the South African Public Service, the efficiency question remains important. The 
introduction of NPM, which was a way to address government inefficiencies, and rooted in 
private sector or corporate logic, argues that managers can bring about changes if they have 
the authority over decision-making and resources. Given its bias towards efficiency and 
measurement, it is amenable to M&E due to it persuasive logic. In developmental States like 
South Africa, effectiveness considerations may be prioritised over efficiency ones, which 
means that the question of budget efficiencies becomes more complex. Thus, whilst 
elements of NPM may not be applicable in South Africa, the importance of ensuring greater 
efficiency, largely through M&E, remains. 
 
However, NPM may not work so well in transformative contexts such as South Africa, where 
many of the management decisions are of a political nature, and may in fact be seen as 
wasteful when measured from a NPM perspective. Furthermore, management does not work 
in a vacuum, as there is a strong link between management and the political structures. The 
argument therefore, that government inefficiency is simply a management problem, solvable 
through transplanting remedies from the private sector in order to creativity into the 
bureaucracy, did not work so well in practice (Marschke, 2001). This approach has been 
largely discredited, despite its strong assertions about the reasons and solutions for 
government inefficiency. Its solutions of outsourcing and downsizing, have largely not 
worked in contexts such as South Africa, where a developmental State operates. This has 
been pointed out by Levin (2005b: 81) who states that whilst appealing, as it puts citizens at 
the centre and emphasises the good governance ethos by focusing on results, outcomes 
and accountability, it does in fact have limitations. It should thus be viewed with 
circumspection. In other words, it may not produce the type of good governance it promises. 
Examples of failure have been cited by James (2001) who points out that in the United 
Kingdom it has had perverse effects, with the wrong things being measured. The initial 
enthusiasm has been replaced by serious questions about its real impact and sustainability. 
Despite this, variants of NPM are used in developing countries (Labi, 1999). For South 
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Africa, as Levin (2004a; 2004b) points out, one should not embrace the measurement 
aspect of NPM uncritically, to the point where the solutions it offers are also embraced 
uncritically. This comes about by the fact that it is not so easy to superimpose NPM on an 
inherited context which is fragmented spatially and socially, and expect problems to be 
solved.  
 
A further challenge faced by the developmental State is that of globalisation, which meant 
that challenges relating to corruption had to be addressed Levin (2002). He further states 
that in order to address the challenges of the developmental State, one of which is to 
integrate the two economies, the developmental State needs to be “people centred and 
capable of meeting the socio-economic needs of the entire population, especially the poor, 
marginalised and historically oppressed” (Levin, 2005b:14). He notes that whilst “NPM 
advocates a free market and a weak state, the developmental State is premised on a strong 
interventionist „activist‟ State”, and he goes on to argue that “whilst the goal of both NPM and 
the developmental State is the same, being people-centred and oriented, the route to get 
there differs, as it is important to negotiate between addressing local needs and imperatives, 
largely people-oriented and redistributive, and the neo-liberal market ideology that argues for 
the primacy of the market over the State” (Levin, 2005a: 82).  Thus whilst this approach has 
been in part fulfilled by the GEAR policy framework which has brought about macro-
economic stability, it has meant that there were trade-offs in terms of job security and the 
policy has been contested by organised labour.  
 
There is the need to bridge the gap between the first and second economy, and reduce 
inequality, which has been shown not to be so easy, despite the removal of unequal laws 
(Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen, 2008). Poverty has been difficult to measure and 
inequality has persisted (May and Klasen, 2000). In this context the developmental State 
comes in, which may have to intervene to reduce inequality, but in so-doing be effective 
rather than efficient. This means that interventions may seem wasteful when measured in 
classic efficiency terms, but could be socially effective in that they bring about social stability, 
an example being the various social grants that have been introduced. This means that 
whilst NPM tends to prioritise efficiency ideals (easily measured through M&E), in the South 
African context this may be difficult when addressing developmental ones (which may not 
conform to such ideals). It is not possible to simply superimpose a system of efficiency on a 
historical context that is spatially and socially fragmented, and where redistribution and 
redress are required first. There will thus always be a tension between meeting these 
elements, although it should be noted that the positions are not diametrically opposed or 
contradictory. 
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The discussion on the interplay between democracy and M&E needs to be linked to the 
increased interest in the country in the measurement of the performance of the State (Fox 
2002: 1). This is because the public sector plays a central role in society and affects the lives 
of the citizens in direct and indirect ways. It plays a pivotal role in the management of 
expenditure, revenue, wealth, allocation issues, regulation and the quality of services. The 
quality of the management of the resource base by the State, from which both the private 
and public sector draws, is important to all parties, as demonstrated in the era of New Public 
Management (NPM) (Ferlie and Ashburner, 1996). South Africa, especially in the post-
democracy era has entered the global environment and been exposed to these experiences 
and influences, and what is now occurring is an alignment of the country`s governance 
systems with that of other democracies. This is particularly so in relation to M&E, which in 
other democracies is also used by governments to improve their effectiveness11. M&E also 
plays a role in improving service delivery, and has been given priority in the country, as it is 
seen as a strategy and tool for improving accountability. The centrality of M&E in helping 
advance service delivery has been demonstrated by Amin and Goldstein (2008), who 
through a series of essays show how this approach is realised in practice. 
 
3.3.3 Reorienting the bureaucracy   
 
There are many measures that have been put in place to improve the efficiency of the 
bureaucracy, and the Public Service in general.  Sangweni (2003: 20) looks at the individual 
level, and argues that “better performance management is critical to public sector 
transformation”.  He states that an effective state must be able to manage and monitor the 
performance of managers, before public sector capability and leadership can be improved.  
In trying to improve governance, there has been the argument that the problems are 
managerial in nature, and improving management will bring about the desired changes. 
However, this private sector import must also be considered in light of some of the other 
reform efforts (Sinclair, 2008). 
 
It is necessary to understand the bureaucracy in order to appreciate what is required to 
effect change.  Cloete (1981: 21) shows that the terms bureaucracy is generally used in 
three contexts; to refer to large scale institutions which have a hierarchical nature, or in a 
derogatory manner for real or imagined procrastination, and thirdly the exercise of political 
                                                 
11
 Governments are obliged to exercise fiscal discipline, in light of international guidance on finances. The 
credit rating of governments, which influences investor confidence, is dependent on how effective resources 
are managed.  
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power, in other words government by officials. It is widely recognised that it is not easy to 
change the bureaucracy which is generally considered “impervious and resistant to change” 
(Bozeman, 2000: 8).  Solutions to change this may not be as simple as often advocated by 
proponents of the reengineering or reform movement, such as privatisation and outsourcing. 
The transformation of the Public Service is a long term and complex process.  A key issue in 
the change process is the role played by the human factor; the public servant who 
implements government policy.  Unless this ethos changes, and there is a link between the 
imperative for change (politicians) and the change agents (public servants), commitments 
can be rendered ineffective when it comes to the interface of service delivery.  It has been 
argued that the application of effective leadership by the senior management service is 
critical for the transformation of the public service (Fraser-Moleketi, 2005). 
 
If one were to look at the administrative arm of government, and the bureaucracy, which 
plays a central in effecting transformation, one can appreciate why M&E must be used to 
support an effective political-administrative interface.  There is an important reciprocity that 
must be addressed for more effective government, which is well-illustrated by Holden (1997: 
125) who states:  
 
Administration is a necessary form of action without which political power does not 
exist…and the centrality of administration to power is fundamental, and no leader can 
deliver without resources... administration is power in practice. 
 
In discussing the reciprocity between vision-maker and vision-translator, the question that 
emerges is “how close” should the public servant be to the politician?  This leads to the often 
contentious debate on professionalism; where bureaucrats see themselves as specialists, 
responding to some higher order, rather than politicians. Politicians, on the other hand prefer 
that evaluators be directly accountable to them.  Public servants prefer a more predictable 
situation, within which there are rules and protocols for translating political request into 
administrative action.  The reality is, however, often different and the clear demarcation of 
roles and responsibilities may not exist.  These questions go to the very essential question of 
politics, as Rourke (1992) pragmatically states when he says that when one serves 
government, one is expected to comply with policies that are essentially political in origin.  
 
It is not enough to look at the bureaucracy as faceless, and the point about the value-added 
by individuals is evident from Gawthrop (1998: 67), who correctly states that “effecting 
changes depends on the values of the individuals within a democratic system”. Thus, any 
reinventing government mission must be cognisant that this does not take place in an ethical 
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vacuum as administration has a soul.  The United Nations (2006) in its World Public Sector 
Report argues that the human factor12 in terms of the quality of public sector personnel is 
critical for success.  The report cautions against the reinventing government mission being 
reduced to a technical exercise of redesign.  This has been recognised in South Africa 
through the introduction of the Batho Pele (People First) strategy, which attempts to motivate 
public servants so that their behaviour contributes to delivering measurable results.  In other 
words, to align the values and ethics professed with actual performance by public servants 
directly involved in delivery (Raga and Taylor, 2005). 
 
The reorientation of the Public Service in South Africa has been supported by many forces, 
several of which are extraneous to and beyond the control of government itself.  This is a 
positive development that came about with democracy and mention must be made of an 
informed citizenry, who due to increased information flows, largely from a vigilant media, has 
sensitised the public to government performance.  Whereas in the early days of democracy 
patience was exercised by the citizenry around government‟s ability to perform, as this initial 
period was largely celebratory, but with time the issues of importance to citizens could 
change (Khosa, 2001). 
 
The bureaucracy is characterised by what is known as “red tape”, which is seen as 
frustrating. However, in a context of public accountability, this is not necessarily anti-delivery 
and may be beneficial in that it ensures that the state remains accountable to its citizens 
Pandey and Scott (2002).  The discussion on bureaucracy has tended to become associated 
with perceptions of State inefficiency, which in turn have revolved around the negative 
stereotypes that characterise the public sector. Cohen and Eimicke`s (1995) analysis of 
these perceptions found that they largely stem from the issues of finance; that government 
consumes, rather than produces and is self-perpetuating.  However, whilst accepting the 
accountability, it is possible to increase levels of efficiencies and make the bureaucracy 
more responsive. In the South African Public Service there are many mechanisms to ensure 
accountability, which pose problems within the context of a new democracy and public 
sector reform, where faster service delivery is expected (Muthien, et al, 2000).  The problem 
has been recognised and a Centre for Public Service Innovation is operational, the key task 
of which is to come up with solutions for more effective service delivery, without 
compromising accountability considerations13. It has seeks to ease the administrative burden 
of the Public Service (Future Watch, 2004).  
                                                 
12
 There is recognition that the capacity of public officials and servants is a key factor influencing how 
successful government eventually is in executing its mandate. 
13
 This is an entity under the DPSA which seeks to produce innovations to service delivery. 
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The proposed solution seen in shifting government towards private sector ethos and 
efficiency is “underpinned by relevant and broader questions of how to entrench integrity and 
accountability in government” (Thomas, 2001: 113).  Evidence of success may be seen in 
what the Clinton administration did in  1993, when it introduced the notion of empowerment 
zones which included strong private-public partnership synergies aimed at holding 
government accountable and promoting civic involvement.  There is also a clear relationship 
between democracy and public administration, with the link between citizens and public 
policy illustrated by Krane (2006).  This involves forms of engagement which actively permit 
citizens and stakeholders to participate in the work of government, and may include 
measures such as public conversations, citizens‟ juries, and collaborative policy-making, to 
name but a few. Liebenberg (2000) explores perceptions about democracy, and finds that 
people experience it positively when governance is evident.  
 
Managerialism calls for a change in the manner in which the public sector is managed, but 
has also been challenged in that it often does not yield any benefits to the citizens due to its 
inward focus.  This is illustrated by Paine (1998) in his appropriately entitled article entitled 
“Dark side of a hot idea!”(illustrative of the fad nature of managerialism), who shows that the 
unplanned consequence of managerialism has been an increase in the costs of services, 
decisions being taken without thoroughly looking at the implications, and most often, the 
erosion of team work due to the  “what gets measured gets done” syndrome.  This comes 
about given the scrutiny managerialism places on the three Es (economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness), which in practice could mean that there is often a suppression of negative 
information, and at times even manipulation, to ensure that the desired outcomes are 
achieved.  However, Pollitt (1998) argues that managerialism cannot be rejected outright, as 
it has its benefits which can be seen today. 
 
This discussion cautions about the dangers of introducing M&E into a context where there is 
poor ethics and any environment that is not ready to receive and act on reflective or 
performance information, and where the achievement of outputs and outcomes is an end in 
itself.  This is an important point that must be remembered in implementing any M&E system 
in the country as managerialism easily causes perversion on the ground, as a desire to 
achieve measurable results overshadows other considerations.  It is important to consider 
what initiatives can transform this institution, which will include policy, strategies to subject 
the Public Service to scrutiny, measures that borrow from the private sector, and in general 
introduce a higher level of scrutiny, transparency and accountability.  Fraser-Moleketi (2000) 
has argued that M&E needs to be developed and supported in order to improve the 
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performance of the public service, and has consistently supported M&E initiatives during her 
term as Minister for Public Service and Administration.  These pressures would come from 
different sources, some government itself which has a responsibility for M&E, others from 
civil society, and others from citizens.  Thus the public participation processes generally led 
by Parliament and the use of Hotlines would be measures to change practice and behaviour, 
as they introduce greater pressure on government to be responsive.  The ability of 
government to meet its own policy standards, especially around being responsive to citizens, 
will indicate whether the shift towards better governance has taken place.  If this happens, 
one can argue that the bureaucracy has become refocused. The next section examines how 
M&E is used to promote good governance.  
 
The above discussion has highlighted some of the measures that have been used to refocus 
the bureaucracy. In critically examining them, it has been shown that managerialism and 
performance management on its own will not bring about the desired effect.  The human 
factor is critical, and the ethos of the public servants must be aligned to the political 
intentions in order that the Public Service is able to produce good governance.  The 
discussion on intervention versus efficiency is very much at the heart of the developmental 
State debate.  At the heart of these “either or” decisions is the economy and thus the 
comments by the Minister for Finance, Trevor Manuel (2004: 15) are pertinent as he states 
that “the two main thrusts of a developmental State must be how much the State spends 
fighting poverty and deprivation and how much of the country‟s resources go towards 
expanding the economic opportunities of all its citizens”.   
 
In considering that M&E should assume a particular approach in South Africa, and support 
the developmental State which is meant to be activist, developmental and pro-poor14, the 
type of M&E performed becomes important. It can also be used to empower (Nabris, 2002). 
It means that M&E should still drive good governance ideals and engage in activities which 
promote transparent, accountable and reflective public sector organisations.  At the content 
level, it needs to evaluate the pro-poor and developmental programmes advocated by the 
developmental State, whilst at the process level ensures that the methodologies used do 
empower and privilege individual and organisational learning.  Utility should be 
demonstrated at different levels, from improving management competence, to empowering 
citizens, to deepening democracy and driving transformation.  The next section on M&E in 
South Africa draws the links between this section and M&E, by examining how M&E as a 
tool for the developmental State seeks to promote good governance.  
                                                 
14
 The developmental State in South Africa is seen as pro-poor, serving a deliberate transformation agenda 
meant to redress apartheid and reduce inequality  
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3.4 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE DEMOCRATIC MANDATE   
 
South Africa exists within a global context that is characterised by competition and a drive 
towards governance excellence.  Governments today are expected to measure performance 
to meet these standards and deliver a quality of governance that is viewed favourably within 
and outside the country.  This has necessitated that governments focus on “performance” 
across a range of issues that touch on political, social and economic dimensions of society. 
The ability to meet the standards of performance, as prescribed in the South African 
Constitution for public administration, or externally through good governance promoting 
institutions, depends upon sound M&E systems.  This requirement for governance 
excellence comes at a time when the South African Public Service has had to change, from 
its traditional bureaucracy to one that supports a dynamic developmental State. Building 
such a developmental State has been a political priority, and the policies advanced by the 
former Minister for Public Service and Administration have sought to do this (Fraser-
Moleketi, 2005).  A key element for an effective developmental State, would therefore be the 
capacity to generate, consider and act upon evidence, thus showing what Bamberger (2008) 
refers to M&E utility.  
 
Good governance gets promoted through the administrative arm of government.  This 
involves the public servants who ought to understand what is required of them when it 
comes to implementing services.  It cannot be taken for granted that they will naturally and 
voluntarily display the attributes which are desirable from a citizen perspective.  It is for this 
reason that the Batho Pele principles have been developed in South Africa, to provide the 
normative benchmark which public servants are expected to adhere to, and which also 
provides citizens with a measure of what to expect from government.  In an administrative 
use of good governance, one is referring to an “efficient, open, accountable and audited 
public service (own emphasis)”.  The audit element implies that there must be an M&E 
element to ensure that practice is aligned to this norm.  The political use refers to a State 
enjoying legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate (Rhodes, 2000).  In 
the various good governance definitions the issue of an independent judiciary is mentioned, 
which is about legitimacy and authority.  
 
Furthermore, the country is now confronted with critical practical questions, such as what 
progress the country is making against the MDGs; how well the country fares across various 
governance indicators relating to questions about the state of the economy, the productivity 
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of the workforce, the impact of interventions on poverty alleviation and life expectancy15. 
However, whilst the MDGs have been a bold set of promises to poor people around the 
world, “development effectiveness is difficult to measure as there are many actors, and it is 
difficult to work out individual contributions and attributions” (White, 2005: 33).  The question 
of using M&E to ensure sustainable development has been advanced by Cloete (2005), and 
government needs M&E to meet obligations such as the MDGs.  
 
A governance-orientated Public Service should focus on delivering public goods and 
services according to the values and methods mentioned (Rhodes, 2000).  Whilst rules and 
regulations are important, and compliance or accountability will always be a key part of 
governance, the focus needs to extend beyond the outputs, and focus on the outcomes, 
which would be the experiences that citizens have of the full ambit of government. In many 
instances governments are able to describe their activities and outputs, but unless 
assessments extend into the realm of outcomes and impacts, public sector institutions can 
remain managerially efficient, but not be that effective.  The caution is that all aspects must 
be considered. It is possible to spend budgets efficiently, which is a performance indicator, 
but to what end is more important. In South Africa there has been a doubling of social 
spending and spending on education, but educational standards has been dropping16.  This 
is perhaps because the governance focus has been on important measures, but which may 
not have been relevant to what eventually counts.  The Presidency approach to measuring 
12 outcomes areas thus helps to sharpen the M&E effort, and introduces a discourse that 
citizens can relate to, as these outcomes are largely quality of life indicators, rather than 
technical indicators which often do not align with the quality of life indicators.  
 
M&E would thus have a particular profile in South Africa as it could be used to drive the 
transformation agenda of the developmental State through focusing attention on 
performance deficits17, which would require management to take action.  Its political power 
can also be seen in how M&E concepts such as transparency and accountability get 
operationalised in real managerial contexts, which helps to shed the legacy of secrecy and 
non-accountability that prevailed in apartheid public administration.  
 
Whereas government recognises the need to effect change, and bring about the desired 
service delivery standards, it is not easy even though there may be political commitment to 
                                                 
15
 The Presidency is responsible for reporting on progress against the Millennium Development Goals, and has 
produced publications in 2007 and 2008 on progress attained. 
16
 Public Service Commission. 2010. State of the Public Service Report. Republic of South Africa. 
17
 The Programme of Action (PoA) of government is a publically accessible document which states what was 
promised and actually achieved.  
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good governance.  At the heart of effecting change is the nature of the public servants who 
are expected to translate the political power of their principals into administrative power and 
which produces felt benefits for citizens.  The discussion on the professionalism of the 
bureaucracy has revealed that there are strong views in South Africa that public servants are 
expected to display political commitment in order to deliver on policies.  
 
The researcher has conducted a review of the work of good governance seeking umbrella 
bodies such as the CAPAM and examined the mission statements of the various continental 
M&E bodies and associations. It was found that irrespective of the emphasis each year on 
some aspect of public administration, the common aspect was ensuring accountability and 
delivering quality services to citizens.  In the case of M&E, the issue of transparency and 
accountability have remained pivotal, with the emphasis of late being on evaluation use and 
impact or outcomes18. The AFrEA event in 2004, for example, was held under the theme 
“Africa Matters, Evaluation Matters, Joining forces for Democracy, Governance and 
Development”.  The link between M&E, development and governance was explored at this 
watershed event, with the discourse on the subject being raised to new levels on the 
continent19.  The South African M&E Conferences focused on evaluation use in 2007 
(Evaluation in Action) and in 2009 on values (eVALUation).  The latter focused directly on 
issues related to the concept of good governance.  
 
The Association of African Public Service Commissions also has as its motto “promoting 
good governance through PSCs in Africa”20.  These examples suggest that the question of 
why there must be good governance is not contested, and the matter is now being engaged 
with by African countries themselves, although this historically was not the case.  The 
production of good governance is not the preserve of government, although government is 
expected to put in laws and measures to promote and measure it.  Other elements are also 
crucial for good governance, and this includes civil society, the media and an independent 
judiciary.  These need to act in concert so that there are the necessary checks and balances 
to prevent the abuse of power by government, which is a central player.  Given that 
government also acts on behalf of citizens by managing public funds, there is a strong 
accountability element expected, which must be exercised from different quarters.   
 
                                                 
18
 The researcher has reviewed the conferences programmes and meetings of the CAPAAM since 2001, and all 
indicate the dominant concern with government efficiency, corruption, service delivery and transparency.   
19
 The researcher was the conference co-chair. An assessment was made of the conference proceedings.  
20
 Public Service Commission, 2009a. Report on the launch of the Association of African Public Service 
Commission held on 16 February 2009. Cape Town, South Africa.  
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3.5 M&E IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
3.5.1 The political nature of M&E 
 
It is important to recognise that political support is essential for M&E, as it not likely to be a 
spontaneous uptake by individuals or institutions simply because it has a rational and 
persuasive appeal.  The need for political support for M&E in government is a global issue, 
and has been documented by Khan (1998), Kusek and Rist (2004) and White (2005), all of 
whom demonstrate the necessity for political support for M&E.  In South Africa, there have 
been several high level political pronouncements supporting M&E21, and internationally the 
relationship between M&E and development has helped to put M&E in the forefront, as being 
more than a tool but also helping to concretely address development issues22.  The impact of 
such pronouncements and influences is that M&E gets reinforced at different levels and 
becomes accepted as a politically, administratively and socially acceptable approach to 
promote good governance, development and democracy.  
 
M&E has a strong political bias23, and the manner in which evaluation takes place will always 
attract attention from several quarters, as a range of players use evaluation results to make 
political and economic decisions (Kusek and Rist, 2004).  The citizenry24 uses results to 
review their political support whilst government tends to use results to affirm its 
performance25, especially as it seeks external support for it policies and strategies (Mackay, 
2007).Evaluation of government, in particular, shall always remain a highly political issue 
(Taylor and Balloch, 2005).  When there is public M&E of government, which may occur in 
democracies as a normal activity, decision-makers are pressurised to operate within good 
governance norms, meaning that they will be accountable for their action.  The pronounced 
nature of M&E in South Africa results from its use not only to assist management, but also to 
support the transformation agenda of the developmental State. Given the history of 
                                                 
21
 In the 2007 Annual State of the Nation Address, the President of the Republic of South Africa stated that 
M&E needed to be strengthened to guide service delivery. This translated in policy thrusts that supported the 
development of M&E across government, making it a priority. 
22
 Mbeki, T.M. (2007) ANC Online, Weekly Newsletter of the African National Congress, 18 May 2007. 
23
 The political nature of evaluation means that it tends to be contested, as its results generally have far-
reaching consequences and implications. In view of this, questions of independence, location and bias are 
very prominent.  
24
 The concept will be fully elaborated upon. The term here relates to the spectrum of players outside of 
government who have an interest in the performance of government, such as media, advocacy groups and 
political parties. 
25
 Given the political nature of M&E, government M&E tends to be viewed with scepticism from role-players, 
who doubt the ability of government to M&E itself objectively and report negative findings.   
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apartheid with its norm of secrecy, M&E could also bolster democracy by promoting activities 
that lead to greater transparency and accountability26 of government and its operations. 
   
The nature of M&E in South Africa stems from the imperative of the developmental State, 
which in South Africa is expected to be responsive, relevant, transformative and pro-poor, all 
of which can only be achieved if policy-makers and implementers have M&E systems that 
provide quality information for decision-making.  Therefore the design of M&E systems is 
important to support the developmental State to meet its developmental goals.  
 
In South Africa the potential of M&E to be the tool for transformation rests on the extent to 
which the political and administrative structures are amenable to promoting the conducive 
environment referred to earlier in this chapter.  However, it should be remembered that 
political pronouncements on their own, will not deliver an M&E culture across society or in 
government. M&E can easily remain at the level of rhetoric unless the pronouncements on 
accountability and transparency are carried through by genuine action that considers 
performance information and uses it to correct deficits. M&E should not be seen as an end in 
itself, it should serve a broader transformative27 agenda. In practice, there may be resistance 
to M&E, because as Patton (2004) points out, M&E goes to the heart of organisational 
culture and tends to cause ripples and waves as it focuses attention on performance, and by 
implication individuals. It should thus be remembered that there may not be a spontaneous 
uptake of M&E, unless it is championed politically.  
 
It is also evident that M&E needs to be utility focused, and serve a clear political agenda of 
supporting transformation.  This means that M&E practitioners need to be conversant with 
the political imperatives of government, and design their approaches in a manner that, whilst 
meeting the exacting standards of research, does in fact point results in a direction that 
effects transformation. It implies that M&E practitioners are versed in the requirements of the 
developmental State, and are conversant with the M&E of government.  They also need to 
be conversant with organisational culture, so that results promote organisational learning.  It 
would not be adequate in this context of high expectation for M&E practitioners to take a 
largely detached stance. 
 
                                                 
26
 A key concern with the new government and citizens is making government accountable, which is a shift 
from the apartheid era where this was not the case. 
27
 There are many dimensions to transformation, political, administrative, social and economic. All of these are 
based on performance information being produced and used.  
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3.5.2 The transformative nature of M&E 
 
The philosophical orientations or school of thought must be considered in relation to the 
South African context, given the types of M&E that exist. In such a context, those 
perspectives which privilege the poor and broadly resonate with the South African 
developmental State and its transformation bias would be important.  In such a context 
issues of transparency, accountability, learning, empowerment, and a transformational bias 
that serves agendas that privilege the voiceless and poor are prioritised. This thrust would 
be in line with House (1993) who in his focus on M&E purpose, is biased towards the 
political and views the generation of knowledge as being important for social purposes.  This 
view supports the general consensus that M&E is expected to achieve in South Africa.  This 
gives substance to the argument that M&E takes form within a context28.  The context within 
which M&E operates is important.  These result in M&E taking the form dictated to by 
context (House, 2004: 219). It means that M&E can be pitched philosophically and 
methodologically to meet the imperatives of such a context.  There are thus many 
imperatives for M&E which may be considered29collectively as the building blocks of good 
governance in South Africa.  
 
In the South African and DSD context, M&E needs to support transformation and could be 
biased towards focusing on assessing those areas that are important for social change.  In 
the DSD measuring the impact of the social interventions becomes important, as all levels 
would need constant feedback on progress to management, given the enormity of the 
budget and the social and political pressures that accompany this.   
 
If evaluation is about bringing the silent voices to the fore, then in transformative contexts 
such as South Africa, evaluative methodologies should exist for empowerment evaluation 
(Fetterman, 1996).  Participatory evaluation, which privileges marginal voices and 
perspectives is important and would promote governance models that are developmental. In 
South Africa, development is constitutionally obliged to be participatory, transparent, 
accountable and empowering.  Classic quantitative, a-contextual and judgmental evaluation 
will serve a limited purpose in a developmental State, which is by its very definition obliged 
to promote democratic ideals.   
                                                 
28
 Context is emphasised as M&E cannot be viewed as a neutral, objective science transposable without 
modification to any context. African evaluators have resisted the toolbox of methods approach, fostered 
largely through donors wishing to assess their impact, which has been suggested as a way for doing M&E. 
There is a strong political underpinning to any M&E, given its eventual judgement outcomes and resultant 
reactions to this.  
29
 Government, civil society and international bodies (mentioned earlier) generally agree on the necessity for 
these values and attributes for sound democracy and governance. 
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Considering South Africa‟s history around popular participation and engagement, evaluation 
would need to follow such an engaged approach. It implies that the toolbox of evaluation 
should include participatory, constructivist approaches. In the South African context these 
contributions are particularly important as its political history necessitates engagement. It 
shows that one cannot proffer value judgments in a historical or political vacuum, as it is 
these contexts that inform phenomena, and solutions must come from there.  Evaluative 
judgments without context are vacuous and could be sensational but not very useful. In 
terms of policy recommendations in South Africa, given the inherited inequalities, any 
judgement of programme effectiveness or recommendations would have to be 
contextualised and located within specific socio-economic and political settings.  A simplistic 
approach to policy formulation may not work; it should flow from evidence based research, 
grounded in reality.    
 
The vision conveyed is that evaluation should play a more constructive role within an 
organisation, privileging an approach that is reflexive, engaging and didactically oriented 
while recognising the complexity of organisational infrastructure. In light of the history of the 
South African context, it behoves evaluators to work with departments and organisations to 
help them integrate learning, and to seek real change and solutions . In practice this is not 
easy, as demonstrated by Radebe (2003) who reviews some of the critical and challenging 
factors in inculcating this ethos of learning.  
 
M&E in South Africa, drawing from the discussion above needs to be oriented towards 
empowering individuals and communities, by providing them with results to advocate and 
hold government to account. M&E must also be demystified, and in a simple way be a 
service to the marginalised.   
 
Evaluation needs to also serve an agenda that changes relations of power, which can be 
achieved if transparency and accountability is entrenched in the Public Service.  When 
findings are made, evaluators should help with their applicability in organisational contexts. It 
would also have to contribute to the generation and reconstruction of knowledge about the 
country, as much of the previous knowledge was limited or Eurocentric in its orientation.  
The transformative power of evaluation must be recognised.  Finally, the notion of 
engagement over detachment should help to guide the practice, and M&E must be 
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3.5.3 Evaluator perceptions of what M&E is and the implications for M&E practice in 
South Africa 
 
The discussion has thus far focused on types of M&E and the purposes of M&E, linking it to 
how it is relevant to the South African context and foreshadowing how the concepts will be 
empirically assessed in the various chapters (perspectives) of this study.  The focus is now 
on the evaluators themselves, and this discussion explores how different perceptions held by 
evaluators can influence the type of M&E practiced. It is as relevant a discussion as the 
differences in the definitions and purpose of M&E.  
 
This discussion is particularly important in South Africa where M&E is a relatively new 
activity, and where a community of practice has not as yet been fully established30.  There is 
no consensual understanding about what M&E is amongst the evaluator community and the 
question remains a subject of debate as evidenced from the programme of most 
international evaluation conferences31.  The debate is necessary to allow for divergent 
contributions to the M&E discourse. It could even lead to contestation of centrally driven 
M&E strategies such as the previous GWM&ES, which has now been placed under an M&E 
ministry.  The contestation is to be appreciated, as it shows that there is divergence and 
vibrancy amongst the South African M&E community.  What is not clear at this stage is 
which perspectives get privileged by government, and which do not. It is also not clear 
whether in the overarching government architecture that is being designed; there will be 
place for strong CME, and whether the results thereof will be taken seriously by policy-
makers.  Much of the current and future contestation relates to the question of independence 
and credibility, especially when it comes to government M&E which could be viewed as 
politically expedient and not strong enough in carrying through threat to sanction poor 
performers32. 
 
The issue of corporate governance, and the interconnectivity between the corporate and 
government in South Africa began in 1994, when the King Report on Corporate Governance 
(King I) was published by the King Committee on Corporate Governance, headed by former 
High Court judge, Mervyn King S.C. King I, incorporating a Code of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct, was the first of its kind in the country and was aimed at promoting the highest 
                                                 
30
 M&E was first introduced through a donor programme in the National Department of Land Affairs in 1995, 
and is currently uneven in its capacity and application across government departments.  
31
 Noted from the programmes of the European and United Kingdom Evaluation Society Conference, London, 
October 2006 and the Canadian/American Evaluation Association Conference, Toronto, October 2005. 
32
 Minister of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation has issued media statements in May 2009 that poor 
performers will be sanctioned. 
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standards of corporate governance in South Africa.  Over and above the financial and 
regulatory aspects of corporate governance, King I advocated an integrated approach to 
good governance in the interests of a wide range of stakeholders.  Although ground-breaking 
at the time, the evolving global economic environment together with recent legislative 
developments necessitated that King I be updated.  These reports move away from the 
single bottom line (that is, profit for shareholders) to a triple bottom line, which embraces the 
economic, environmental and social aspects (previously not addressed) of a company‟s 
activities (King, 2009).  
 
...successful governance in the world in the 21st century requires companies to 
adopt an inclusive and not exclusive approach. The company must be open to 
institutional activism and there must be greater emphasis on the sustainable or non-
financial aspects of its performance. Boards must apply the test of fairness, 
accountability, responsibility and transparency to all acts or omissions and be 
accountable to the company but also responsive and responsible towards the 
company’s identified stakeholders. The correct balance between conformance with 
governance principles and performance in an entrepreneurial market economy must 
be found, but this will be specific to each company. 
 
Of importance is the interconnectivity between private, public and civil society sectors, which 
indicates that governance is an overarching concern.  
 
This was the first time that public sector institutions were brought into its jurisdiction, and the 
King report is consistent with government`s commitment to improving service delivery, and 
mentions as positive the setting up of a Ministry for Performance Management, M&E, which 
it sees as evidence that the public sector is moving in the right direction as far as 
governance is concerned.  It mentions the significance of the Batho Pele principles as being 
essential for driving good governance, and affirms the mention of accountability, 
transparency and service standards in the country`s policy on local government33. This 
report recognises the important role played by government in service delivery and 
development. This report supports the assertion made about the interconnectivity between 
the public and private sector (Flare, 2009). 
 
Having located the concept of good governance, the discussion now turns to the criteria 
question, which is pertinent to the measurement aspect. It can be noted that indicators of 
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 Department of Provincial and Local Government. 1998. While paper on Local Government. 9 March. 
Republic of South Africa. Pretoria.   
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good governance vary, indicating that aid agencies are not neutral, and by choosing 
particular indicators these agencies are making political choices. In a critical review of this 
question (The Broker, June 2007: 2) the point made is that governance criteria is essentially 
about making political choices, with donors tending to move funds between countries based 
on the definitions they choose. The elements that are privileged in normative definitions of 
good governance tend to frame the performance agenda and theoretically could drive 
performance in such a direction. Aid, for example, tends to be conditional upon recipient 
countries demonstrating certain standards of good governance. Definitions of what 
constitutes governance in a country, whilst subscribing to certain overarching commonalities, 
like transparency and accountability, is political, as these get prioritised in actual policy and 
practice of a country. There is thus a contextual element of governance, which informs the 
attention accorded to aspects contained within it. The evidence base for making such 
decisions is informed in part by the integrity of a country`s statistical system, which 
Kahimbaara (2004: 46) demonstrates in South Africa provides a credible statistical basis for 
making decisions about service delivery. Such a system not only promotes transparency; it 
also provides credible data which can be used by many role-players to interpret service 
delivery progress. It is one of the systems that support the discussion on governance.  
 
3.5.4 M&E approaches in South Africa 
 
In the current M&E environment, which moves away from the expert or sole judge, to 
drawing in expertise from participants themselves to identify and solve problems, 
participatory approaches are increasingly promoted particularly when assessing how citizens 
experience government. It is here that the use of empowerment evaluation, which helps 
citizens to come to grips with their own problems, and increase their individual and collective 
power over their destinies, is important (Fetterman, 1996). The use of participatory 
techniques would be relevant in South Africa and generate benefits beyond the traditional 
performance use that comes from M&E. If used well, they can act as an emancipator34.  
 
There is also now an acceptance that context and research questions drive methods, and 
there is no need for the previously entrenched dualisms, such as positivism and 
constructivism, M&E35. It has been shown that the approaches are compatible (Reichardt 
and Rallis, 1994).  The many uses of M&E in South Africa, for enhancing performance, 
                                                 
34
 The PSC follows participatory approaches to its citizen‟s surveys, and whilst costly, these have yielded real 
benefits.  
35
 Keynote address of Eliot Stern made at the Joint United Kingdom/European Evaluation Society Conference, 
Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre, U.K. in October 2006. 
I. A. Naidoo:    |   Chapter 3 60 
 
transparency and re-reinforcing democracy has also been illustrated by Naidoo (2004), who 
argues that M&E goes beyond producing organisational benefits, but also accrues benefits 
to society as well.  
 
M&E in South Africa must proceed from this historic contextual basis, so that change is 
understood in a context where there are realistic expectations. M&E results should strive to 
foster an understanding which empowers, rather than sensationalises.  In considering the 
work of MME institutions one should ask what impact these have had on producing good 
governance and advancing the developmental State by producing more effective 
administrations. 
 
Apart from M&E purpose, there is a need to also consider what the M&E approach is. In the 
engaged approach, M&E is seen as tool for empowerment, and is more people-oriented, and 
privileges the sharing of and engagement with results. It has elements of transparency and 
accountability, but these are not as pronounced as when M&E serves a purely accountability 
function.  In this M&E application, the focus is largely to improve practice and improve 
organisational learning, but whether it happens is dependent upon the extent to which the 
organisational structures and culture values learning from results.  Engagement is not 
necessarily an approach on its own; it could very well be used by those that promote 
accountability to enrich their engagement and support learning. It should be pointed out that 
engagement is more time-consuming, and would be used as part of a methodology when 
focusing, for instance on citizen-forums, citizen-satisfaction surveys and other forms of 
engagement that genuinely seek to solicit and consider the views of citizens on government 
performance.  
 
The discussion looks at how particular M&E systems in South Africa construct and act upon 
knowledge.  In terms of the formal, MME bodies, namely the NT and PSC, a systems 
approach36 to M&E has been taken.  There is a strong compliance element.  The types of 
reports produced are a matter of public knowledge. There is an emphasis on quantitative 
data, and the benchmarks for performance are explicit and documented. It is underpinned by 
rationality, with the implicit assumption that pointing out non-compliance will promote 
compliance and lead to better administration, and by extension good governance.  There is a 
strong positivistic bias with these reports strong in presenting facts and figures. These 
reports show trends, draw comparisons and reveal good and poor performance. Whilst the 
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 The systems for measuring compliance are clearly described against mandates and procedures. There is a 
regularity and predictability to how these systems work, and they are generally perceived as scientific and 
credible.  
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reports have qualitative narratives, these are confined largely to describing the trends and 
statistics. The systems are characterised by regular outputs and assume a clear line of sight 
between the production of data and presentation of results.  
 
The two other types of M&E considered in this thesis must also be reflected on 
philosophically.  The internal, departmental M&E, termed PME in this study, exists only 
because a management decision allows it to.  This implies that its independence is 
circumscribed by the relevant authority, which accords resources and determines priorities. 
Such units may not be at liberty to report on their internal findings to outside bodies, as they 
exist at the behest of the management of the department. It is for this reason that this M&E 
focus is termed persuasive; it does not have the power to compel, and has to use 
persuasion to conduct and report on evaluations.  
 
The third type of M&E assessed is CME.  This is not a homogenous grouping, and includes 
individual citizens, groupings, the media and political groupings, who draw on and produce 
their own assessments of government performance which they may use to advocate 
change.  The grouping may not even have a common understanding of M&E, or use the 
term, as it is informal and operates on a needs basis, and not necessarily in a coherent 
manner. The methods for engagement with departments and government are non-
traditional, but may include advocacy and even protest.  The basis for action would be 
streams of information, some validated others not, to build arguments. 
 
In summary, the type of M&E that is advocated for the South African context, when 
measuring or fostering good governance, should be oriented towards empowering, 
promoting learning, employing mixed-methods, and serving a transformational purpose. It 
should also promote transparency and accountability around performance, and help to foster 
linkages between the State and citizens, in supporting the quest for good governance.  
 
The independence question is deemed important in the evaluation community, with it being 
enshrined in the guiding principles for evaluators of the American Evaluation Association 
(AEA), which has five principles to guide its members.  These are systematic inquiry, 
competence, integrity/honesty, respect for people, and responsibilities for general and public 
welfare37 . In South Africa, the PSC portrays itself as being independent, working without 
fear, favour or prejudice, whilst the Republic`s constitution emphasises that the 
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 See American Evaluation Association. Guiding Principles 
http://www.eval.org/Publications/GuidingPrinciples.asp 
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independence of oversight bodies must be protected.  In reality, these bodies are 
independent with the parameters afforded to them politically.   
 
A separation between the evaluator and decision-maker is implied. In the South African 
context this approach is may be seen as supported if one were to look at how the 
independent PSC, expected to “act without fear, favour or prejudice” operates (Constitution, 
Chapter 10). Whilst it reports on its findings without prepublication censorship from the 
executive38, it does not have the power to enforce its recommendations and operates within 
a particular political configuration. Rossi‟s (2004) approach is one of political pragmatism.   
   
O`Sulivan (2004: 33) states that context is particularly important in evaluation:  “If the 
purpose of the evaluation is politically motivated, then the evaluation context will influence 
how the evaluation unfolds. Evaluation can be psychologically threatening, as it implies 
judgement, and people are often uncomfortable with others judging their world”.  This will be 
important in South Africa, especially given the political sensitivities, which can produce 
difficult dynamics for evaluators who will find it difficult to negotiate entry and present results. 
Issues that come to the fore would be those relating to location (from where the evaluation is 
directed), who undertakes the evaluation (the credibility question) and what the extent of 
participation is, in terms of formulating the terms of reference and deciding on the evaluation 
questions.  Within this, the issue of” values are critical, as inappropriate personal or cultural 
preferences or biases may lead to faulty conclusions and therefore misguided judgements” 
(Davidson, 2005: 90).  It is doubtful whether evaluators in South Africa have been 
adequately sensitised to this factor, or whether they assume possessing certain skills makes 
them credible and irreproachable.  In the absence of a certifying agency for evaluators in the 
country, the profession can easily be undermined as training tends to focus on the technical, 
without due consideration of the contextual and personal.  
 
Returning to the debate on objectivity versus subjectivity, one notes that at a broad level of 
generalisation M&E ranges from a largely positivistic perspective on the one hand where 
quantitative, scientific approaches are used to generate information, to the more 
interpretative and constructivist approach on the other hand which privileges the generation 
of local knowledge, learning and use. In the context of the South African developmental 
State, it is expected that M&E will be required to generate both statistical information and 
provide assessments according to targets and goals.  However, M&E needs to probe deeper 
and explain phenomenon, rather than simply describe data, and this means using qualitative 
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 As an independent body, the PSC presents its findings directly to parliament or the media, without pre-
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approaches and methodologies. The latter is particularly important given that post-apartheid 
South Africa also requires the construction of new knowledge and understanding39. 
 
The foregoing has argued that in South Africa, M&E plays a critical role in not only improving 
the effectiveness of service delivery, by supporting management, but also by supporting 
democratic principles through improving transparency and accountability.  In the discussion 
on definitions of M&E, it has been made clear that a more expanded view of M&E be taken, 
and in the discussion on purpose, it has been argued that the political thrust of M&E must 
not be forgotten.  There has also been an assessment of the importance of M&E to fulfil the 
purposes of accountability, transparency and learning, and it has been emphasised that 
having a well-capacitated M&E is critically important to ensure that the function is taken 
seriously and there is confidence and credibility in the M&E functionality.  The assessment of 
M&E has been briefly related to what will be done analytically.  
 
The considerations for M&E were shown to range from accountability to civic considerations, 
and in terms of the credibility of M&E, the issue of independence has been raised in the 
context that there must be some M&E conducted outside of government.  If the State is 
serious about measuring its own performance it should actively draw in social partners to 
augment its own M&E processes.  This goes to the heart of accountability, and through the 
reporting of performance by itself to the citizens, it would practically show a willingness to 
share and engage with performance data about itself.  The process is currently largely 
limited to national initiatives, such as reporting against the Government PoA, posted on the 
Government Website. There are also the Budget Vote processes of the different Ministries, 
whereby plans and budgets need to be reported on allowing for debate.  The PSC through 
its own M&E programme also places performance data in the public domain.  Thus M&E has 
a role to play in terms of promoting a dialogue on the performance of the developmental 
State by encouraging discussion between politicians, administrators and citizens.  This 




This chapter has demonstrated how good governance and M&E are considered in the South 
African government, by looking at the developmental State uses M&E to advance its policies 
and strategies.  It has looked at the form of M&E, given issues of context and politics, and 
introduced the three empirical perspectives that follow. 
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 Knowledge construction is one of the outputs of M&E, and in the South African context important as it 
would produce the basis for public administration assessments.  








This chapter explains the methodology used for the study, and justifies the research 
methods and choices by presenting a justifiable and objective research process which is 
pivotal to answering the research questions (Babbie and Mouton, 75: 2006). The 
comprehensive nature of the study necessitated the use of a mixed-methods approach, 
which is based on the philosophical orientation of pragmatism, wherein the research 
questions, not the methods, dictates the orientation of the study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998; Creswell, 2009). Triangulation is generally considered to be one of the best ways to 
enhance validity and reliability in qualitative research, and can partly overcome the 
deficiencies that flow from using one type of method (Merriam, 2002; Neuman, 2006). In this 
study, as the latter part of this chapter shows where the research framework is outlined, data 
is considered from both qualitative and quantitative sources, to assess whether the 
performance of the DSD meets the norms and standards for good governance.  
 
As a qualitative case study it goes beyond descriptive questions to answer the “how and 
why” questions (Yin, 1993). The study thus is exploratory in nature, and seeks explanations 
for questions related to the M&E-good governance relationship.  It also allows for researcher 
insights to be fed into the analysis. It allows for analytic generalisations, and has the 
potential for theory building (Babbie and Mouton, 2006). This study is not a theoretical 
exercise, but exploratory in nature as it assesses the influence of several forms of oversight 
on the case study of the DSD, to understand internal processes. The mixed-methods 
approach allows for a range of insights to be brought to bear on the assessment.    
 
Underpinning the research questions are the testing, either explicitly or implicitly of issues 
that relate to accountability, transparency and efficiency, which resonate with the notion of 
good governance. The conceptual framework and literature review has formed the basis for 
the definitions and concepts that have been used to forge more detailed research questions, 
and was the basis against which actual, empirical performance is measured. These are 
outlined at the end of this chapter.  
 
 
I. A. Naidoo:    |   Chapter 4 65 
 
4.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.2.1 Research design 
 
The research adopted a design to assess whether broadly M&E plays a role in producing 
good governance, by examining how three forms of M&E act individually and in concert to 
produce the outcome of good governance. The research has thus been designed to include 
overarching frameworks within which norms and standards are contained for testing the 
research assertion in actual practice. This chapter outlines why a mixed-methods approach 
is appropriate, and provides the road-map used to set up the perspectives, clarify the 
propositions contained within each, and explain the forms of data sought and used. Each of 
the three perspectives has resulted in a particular M&E perspective designed based on the 
conceptual framework and literature review, a rationale for the use of particular forms of 
data, specific research questions and an analytical framework that returns to the key 
concepts of good governance and M&E. The data has been drawn from the personal 
perspectives of respondents, documentation (reports and evaluations) and observations. 
The study ensured that the research design was explicit, objective and replicable, to ensure 
that the roadmap for collecting, measuring and analysing the data was appropriate (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2001: 134).  The more specific steps of the research design are outlined 
below.  
 
4.2.2 Securing co-operation and ensuring confidentiality  
 
The researcher is a professional evaluator employed by the PSC and responsible for the 
M&E of government. It was important that this position not be abused in the securing of co-
operation for this personal academic research. Prior to conducting the research, the letter of 
permission was sent in advance, and staff was ensured confidentiality. It was made clear in 
all communication that this was not research being done for the PSC, but for personal 
academic purposes. In this regard, a letter was prepared and signed by the Director-General 
of the DSD, giving permission for the research (Annexure 1). There were instances where 
staff chose not to participate, and this was respected. No names of any respondents were 
used in the data, and all responses were numerically classified, in the case where interviews 
were undertaken. The researcher will present the key findings of this research to the DG. 
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4.2.3 Data storage, organisation, retrieval and analysis 
 
As a qualitative case study, the research required that the extensive qualitative data be 
properly organised for analysis, and the guidelines which have been established for 
documenting the process to ensure completeness and accuracy of data and its classification 
has been followed (IDRC, 2008). The researcher organised the data according to three sets 
of data files for each of the empirical chapters. The design for each of the three empirical 
chapters has been informed by the research problem and questions, in accordance with the 
steps prescribed on research design by Babbie and Mouton (2006).   
 
The manner in which the data was managed for the empirical chapters is as follows. For 
Chapter 6 (Mandatory M&E), the data was classified into the following areas; policy and 
regulation documentation, wherein laws and prescripts relating to the mandatory oversight 
institutions was analysed and external assessment of the DSD undertaken and expert views 
and observations on compliance M&E, which included the researchers notes. Methods for 
undertaking content analysis were followed throughout the study (Weber, 1990). This 
included scanning data, the creation and classification of code categories, through grid 
tables for the purpose. In all instances where content analysis has been done, the data was 
organised into two operational areas, the National Department of Social Development (DSD) 
and the Provincial Departments of Social Development (PDSD) and according to the 
financial years for the period under study1.  The more specific headings used for each piece 
of policy or law have been sequential allocation of code for articles, audience (who uses it), a 
researcher subjective evaluation based on a 5-point or three point scale depending on what 
is being assessed or valued, and application. In relation to application this relates to 
obligation or advice.  
 
In Chapter 7 (Persuasive M&E), the researcher immersed himself into the organisation and 
also relied on expert views and data from interviews and questionnaires. The researcher 
attempted to be unobtrusive, so as not to disrupt functions and/or generate an unnatural or 
contrived response (Lee, 2000). The field notes on observations were classified according to 
date, nature of engagement, level of participation and subject matter and as assessment of 
meeting. In addition the minutes of management meetings for the research period were 
assessed, to see whether the subject of oversight was taken seriously. During the research 
period the researcher presented findings on the DSD in his professional role, and was able 
to observe how these results were received. In terms of the qualitative data derived from the 
                                                 
1
  The financial year for government is 1 April of each year, to the 31 March of the following year. The results 
thus compared the appropriate cycles with each other.  
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questionnaires that were sent to managers, the researcher undertook content analysis using 
the Statistical Programme for Social Sciences (SPSS) to code and summarise responses. 
The data from this chapter was heavily reliant on the perspectives of individual respondents, 
which were viewed as valuable as these were lived experiences, and thus constitute 
valuable insights. This part of the research, being qualitative in nature, is phenomenological, 
as it sought to understand how the management cohort perceived the areas identified from a 
lived experience. These perceptions as those based on a real world setting, and has allowed 
for greater explanation and more in-depth study (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). It is the first time 
that such a comprehensive study has been undertaken on how M&E is perceived and 
experienced by a cohort of managers in the country.  
 
In Chapter 8 (Civic M&E), the researcher focused on all the departments commitments to 
engaging citizens, and assessed the function within the DSD, by looking at its 
communication and engagement strategy, as well as views of persons and groups who 
engage with the DSD. The next part examined key reports on the effectiveness of the 
policies of the DSD. The researcher focused on a selection of critical studies which 
assessed key policies and deliverables such as the child support grant. The researcher also 
looked at the Parliamentary questions, and classified these in terms of year and theme. This 
allowed for an assessment to be made of the type of questions posed by civic and political 
parties on the performance of the DSD. The proceedings of the Portfolio Committee 
responsive for the DSD was assessed and classified, to do an analysis of the quality of 
these engagements.  
 
4.2.4 Research strategies 
 
As described above, several research strategies have been used. Given the comprehensive 
nature of the research, process worked simultaneously, with data gathering and analysis for 
the empirical chapters taking place alongside each other. This helped to keep the research 
within reasonable time-frames, and prevent research fatigue as the researcher would not 
have to return to the same respondents and experts repeatedly as matters emerged from the 
research. The idea was to keep the research participants informed, but not be obtrusive.  
 
The use of the case study for this qualitative assessment allowed for an assessment of the 
phenomena as it unfolded within the complexity of a real situation (Maykut and Morehouse, 
1994). The researcher was engaged with the DSD over a period of 4 years, and was able to 
build a relationship with it, and observe trends in its performance over the period. This 
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assisted with the in-depth qualitative analysis which was made possible through this 
approach.  
 
4.2.4.1  The case study approach and its application to the DSD 
 
This case study approach was used, which is deemed appropriate given that the unit of 
analysis has similarities with other units (Stake, 1995). In this case, the similarities are 
between public service departments which operate within a common legislative and 
regulatory framework. The case study of the DSD is thus an appropriate unit of analysis for 
testing the assertion of the thesis that M&E does contribute to good governance, and for 
making extrapolations from this unit of analysis. The guiding principles for conducting such a 
case study have been met, in that the need and relevance have been identified (in  
Chapter 1) and concepts relating to the study defined in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The research 
framework has been constructed based on a combination of the literature review, and the 
researcher`s own observations and experience in the field, and the broad proposition is that 
M&E does lead to good governance. These have been the guiding principles, and assisted 
in structuring the data-collection process (Babbie and Mouton, 2006). 
 
As a non-experimental design, it does not use random selection or control and comparison 
groups, and is used when the researchers wants to gain an in-depth understanding of a 
process, event, or situation and explain why results occurred. Case studies are frequently 
used in development interventions, and are useful for describing what the intervention looks 
like on the ground and why things happen as they do, and focuses on the effects of an 
intervention (Imas and Rist, 2009: 271). The use of M&E to promote good governance in 
South Africa, through the case study of the DSD, is an example of an intervention by 
government, based on the Constitutional imperatives for good governance, and the case 
study, which is an intensive investigation of a single unit, in this case an organisation, allows 
for many focal areas to be assessed (Tellis, 1997). Thus, the forms taken by the intervention 
of M&E of government practice, analysed herein through three lenses, would support the 
approach of a case study that informs a particular development intervention. Babbie and 
Mouton (2006) show that case studies can inform best practice, when it comes to issues 
relating to policy implementation and evaluation, human resource practices, management, 
organisational issues, organisational culture, processes of change and re-engineering. This 
research will cover most of these areas, making this methodology appropriate. In addition, 
the DSD is a relevant case study in that:    
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 It has a mandate directly relevant to the transformation of society and the Public 
Service, and addresses key priorities of the developmental State such as poverty 
alleviation, which are conducted under the aegis of the DSD2. The developmental 
State in action can be seen through this department.  
 The DSD has a sizeable budget, which needs to be managed in an accountable, 
transparent and efficient manner. This clearly requires M&E. The spending on social 
assistance grants has increased from R57,7 billion in 2006/07, to R62 billion in 
2007/08 to R69,4 billion in 2008/09 financial years3. Over 12 million citizens received 
social grants, which is approximately 25% of the country‟s population receiving some 
form of social payment4. The policy intervention of the DSD impacts directly upon the 
lives of most South Africans, especially those amongst the poorer segments.  
 The re-configuration of the Public Service post-1994, is also pertinent in that the 
service delivery model used by the DSD to effect its mission, that is, provision of, 
amongst others, grants and welfare services, hinges on an outsourcing model. This 
relates to the use of an administrative agency, the SASSA to implement delivery at 
previously un-serviced areas, in order to improve livelihoods, reduce poverty and 
bring about socio-economic transformation. The SASSA delivers services according 
to uniform norms and standards, which implies an acceptance of good governance 
prescripts in that there are established standards for service delivery. An assessment 
of the DSD and by implication its service delivery agency, SASSA, is an assessment 
of the extent to which good governance has been achieved5. 
 Although a central department, the DSD due to it concurrent nature and function, has 
a provincial presence across the country and a geographically wide impact. Using the 
DSD as a case study, this allows for deductions to be made about government 
across the entire country.  
 The DSD has a functional M&E. The researcher drew on an audit of reporting 
requirements and departmental M&E systems within national and provincial 
government departments study which indicated that this was one of the few 
government departments that had a formally established and functional M&E system 
in place6.  
 The achievement of good governance in the DSD, given its importance, would be an 
exemplar for good governance across government departments, and also illustrative 
                                                 
2
 Public Service Commission. 2007b. Report on an audit of Government`s Poverty reduction Programmes and 
Projects. Republic of South Africa. 
3
 Presidency. 2009. Development Indicators. Republic of South Africa. 
4
 Public Service Commission.2008b. State of the Public Service Report. Republic of South Africa. 
5
 South African Social Security Agency. 2007. Annual Report 2006/2007. Republic of South Africa. 
6
 Ibid. 
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of the quality of democracy and rate of transformation achieved to date.  
 
4.2.4.2  Expert views 
 
The researcher followed the guidelines of Daite and Lightfoot (2004) in terms of how the 
views of interviewees were considered. Given that M&E is a relatively new field in South 
Africa, the researcher drew on an extensive network of international and local experts to 
solicit views of matters relating to the interface between parliament and departments, civil 
society and government and also obtain a more general view on other successes achieved 
in the implementation of M&E in government. Thus several interviews, to solicit different 
information, were undertaken. and in each instance the details have been recorded, either in 
the text or footnote. The researcher interviewed research experts, parliamentarians, 
evaluators at the PSC and elsewhere, to name a few.  
 
Views on the subject were obtained through engagement during the research period with 
delegates at four international M&E conferences7, where the researcher made professional 
presentations, as well as his professional role as instructor at the International Programme 
for Development Programme (IPDET)8, since 2008. The content of the interviews varied, 
depending on the information sought. The results have informed the analysis, and confirm 
that these issues, as reflected in the literature, are indeed critical for achieving successful 
governance. The names have been excluded, to ensure anonymity. All of the interview data 
was classified and captured onto EXCEL 
  
4.2.4.3  Observations 
 
The researcher was able to make observations, which he recorded according to different 
categories, on a variety of performance areas. In most instances he used unobtrusive 
research methods (Lee, 2000), whereas in other areas he observed and recorded, and 
followed up thereafter asking more specific questions to probe reasons for behaviour or seek 
explanations. In all instances the attempt was to triangulate data in order to produce in-depth 
understanding of phenomena.  
 
                                                 
7
   The 3
rd
 African Evaluation Association Conference, Cape Town, 2004; the American and Canadian 
Evaluation Association Conference, Toronto, 2005; the UK/European Evaluation Society Conference, 
London, 2006 and the Global Assembly of IDEAS, Johannesburg, 2009. 
8
   See www.ipdet.org  
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Firstly, the manner in which the M&E functioned at the DSD was observed, in relation to how 
it receives results of oversight structures, such as the PSC and also engages with the DSD 
management. The observation included the manner in which management receives M&E 
findings, and the perspective has been augmented through management questionnaires and 
interviews.  A second area where observation techniques have been used relates to the 
committees of parliament, which receive reports from oversight bodies. This is a critical area 
of observation as it is these committees which have the power to use performance 
information for accountability purposes, and such observations were valuable in that they 
served to provide insight into the receptiveness of political and management structures to 
oversight, which a key factor influencing the authority is given to M&E, and thus oversight.  
The researcher also drew on his professional membership of the South African Monitoring 
and Evaluation Association (SAMEA) and the American Evaluation Association (AEA), the 
International Development Evaluation Association (IDEAS) and the IPDET, where he 
participated in topical interest groups where a range of M&E matters, including methodology, 
strategy and use of M&E, are discussed. In such professional forums as either a presenter 
or participant he was able to test ideas and receive critical feedback to assertions made. 
Throughout the research process the researcher presented paper relating to some aspect of 
M&E and its relation to good governance, and was able to obtain further information sources 
which were used for the literature review. 
 
4.2.4.4  Literature review and content analysis 
 
The literature was reviewed according to the methods presented in Hart (2005) and the body 
of literature was reviewed systematically, by collecting information on the subject, in this 
case M&E and good governance, and then identifying and appraising the debates in the 
field. The latter was done through internet searches and participation in evaluation 
conferences and forums. The literature was classified in terms of general concepts and 
ideas, South African specific application, and DSD literature.  
 
This process assisted with the systematic and critical review of the literature in terms of its 
quality.  The quality, especially in terms of the evaluations of the DSD, was established 
based on whether the studies were peer reviewed, and the extent of the citations within the 
reports. In all instances original studies were obtained. In terms of the literature on 
mandatory M&E, this largely took the form of examining government policy, strategy and 
reports, and as such thus was used for benchmark purposes, against which actual 
performance was assessed. The other area where there was a comprehensive review of the 
literature was in relation to In terms of the information on the performance of the policy of the 
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DSD. This involved reviewing the content of the assessments on policy, as well as the 
questions posed, through the parliamentary process of questions to the Minister.  
 
The content of the questionnaires obtained for informing the management perceptions of the 
DSD was assessed thematically. Based on the guidance provided by Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane (2006: 1), a hybrid approach was employed which involved reading and reading 
the data to establish patterns. The researcher also used colour to code the data. The coding 
of data was done using SPSS and EXCEL, and helped to classify the large amount of 
narrative data obtained (Richard, 2005: 85). The codes helped to identify features as well as 
patterns (Wolcott, 2001). The process of arriving at generalisations was iterative. The 
following phases were used to understand the qualitative data from the open-ended 
questions; data familiarisation, generation of codes (colour and numbers were used), 
establishing commonality (trends and themes), confirming the themes and quantifying the 
trends. It should be noted that given the small sample size, the results are indicative, but 
provide an understanding of how a relevant management cohort perceives matters relating 
to oversight.  
 
4.2.4.5  Documentary analysis 
 
The various documents used for this study were systematically classified and organised into 
the following categories; government policies, proceedings of conferences, minutes of 
meetings and parliamentary question and answer sessions, documents on government 
policies, programmes and performance were organised into the three M&E perspective 
areas, and thereafter analysed in terms of its status, whether it was a policy, guidance or 
direction document or assessment. This was then used in the respective sections to 
demonstrate or illustrate a point.  Most of the documents from government were assessed 
for the mandatory M&E section, as these were of a policy and direction nature, and have 
been footnoted and referenced accordingly.  Similarly, when it came to the results produced 
of government departments by the mandatory M&E bodies, they were referenced in terms of 
the financial year under consideration.  
 
The proceedings of conferences were used to establish the major themes and issues by 
counting the number of sessions dedicated to a topic. the various meetings of the DSD were 
assessed in terms of the type (level) and frequency, content (agenda and actual minutes), 
and follow-up, by tracing the actions based on different meetings so as to establish whether 
the minutes were in fact an accountability tool.  The researcher obtained all the 
parliamentary questions posed to the minister for social development, and then recorded the 
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responses.  This helped to establish what the thrust of the questions were, and based on the 
responses, whether there was sufficient seriousness regarding how the questions were 
answered.  
 
4.2.4.6  Thematic analysis  
 
The questionnaire used for assessing the management perspective of M&E was designed 
around themes, which was based on the research questions. This allowed for the responses 
to be quantified in relation to the categories offered (Holiday, 2007). The narratives from the 
various interviews (experts) and questionnaires were done according to the guidelines for 
qualitative analysis (Black, 1999).   
 
4.2.4.7  Descriptive and inferential statistics 
 
The use of SPSS allowed for descriptive and inferential statistics. A series of visual 
presentations were generated allowing for the comparison of cohorts of respondents 
according to the thematic areas. The data was also organised to show trends and variations, 
and the use of weighted averages helped to show where views were on the thematic areas. 
Despite the small sample size, trends are discernable and explanations are possible, given 
that there is a consistent comparison of views for the three cohorts set up, namely the DSD, 
the non-DSD (or other departments) and the PSC (which is viewed as having the greatest 
M&E expertise).  
 
4.2.4.8  Sampling size and procedures 
 
The research used a purposive sample in that the potential respondents were known in 
advance, and the selection is based on the fact that the group has the relevant knowledge 
and experience with which to contribute to the study (Flick, 2009; Imas and Rist, 2009). In 
this case, it was the entire management cohort of the DSD. The respondents within this 
cohort could choose to exercise their right to participate or not.  The respondents were from 
levels 12 to 15, which is the entire management cohort, excluding the Director-General, who 
is at level 16. This means that the respondents were sufficiently senior to offer credible 
insights into their perceptions of various aspects of oversight.  
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4.2.4.9 Research instrument  and questionnaire administration 
 
For purposes of the interviews, which were part of the study, a questionnaire was used 
(Annexure 2). The questionnaire was semi-structured and open-ended, and based on the 
conceptual framework and literature review. The questions were planned and worded to 
ensure that there was no ambiguity, and clearly laid out (Babbie and Mouton, 2006).  The 
initial questionnaire was tested in small pilot study with 5 respondents not participating in the 
study, and based on their feedback the language and layout was improved. 
 
The respondents were assured in the purpose statement that there were no right and wrong 
answers, and emphasised that the views of them as managers were valued. This was 
achieved through emphasising the personal aspect, and hence the use of the word “you”.  
The questionnaire also sought to be brief, hence the use of the Lickert scale. It also offered 
them the opportunity to respond in various ways (fax, email or solicit a telephonic interview). 
The confidentiality was assured. This was customised for the three cohorts of respondents, 
the DSD (case study), the Non-DSD (other departments) and the PSC. The data was 
assessed at an aggregated and disaggregated level. 
 
In three instances face-to-face interviews were conducted, and the questionnaires filled in by 
the researcher. In these instances, it allowed for greater probing. There were two instances 
where telephonic interviews were conducted. In all instances, the questionnaires were filled 
and used for purposes of analysis using SPSS. 
 
The questionnaire was divided into four sections, which became the basis for analysis, and 
gathered biographical data, such as level within the organisation and management 
participation, as well as years in the position. This helped to construct a profile of the 
experience within the DSD.  It asked questions relating to the thematic areas on the role 
played by oversight institutions, the effectiveness of M&E within the department the 
managerial role in promoting good governance, their training and experience and challenges 




The researcher conducted personal interviews with experts in the field to validate 
observations, and this took place throughout the research process. These interviews were 
conducted both personally and over the telephone. In both instances the interviews were 
manually recorded, in the form of notes, which the researcher used in the analysis. In all 
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instances interviewees were assured confidentiality, and the research purpose clearly 
outlined to them. The researcher was able to obtain interviews with high level persons, who 
possessed both the experience and knowledge of the area under consideration. The 
purposeful sample included former Chairpersons and members of Portfolio Committees of 
Parliament, members of parliament, members of parliament who served on special 
committees and advisory groups, and staff of parliament. Interviews were also conducted 
with former senior managers at the DSD as well as persons from the Non-Profit 
Organisations (NPO), who had some contractual relationship with the DSD.  
 
4.2.4.11 Data analysis 
 
The data was analysed using SPSS, which helped to generate the tables and frequencies 
for analysis. The qualitative data was managed in a manner which ensured that the data was 
broken into discernable units to show patterns and trends (Bogden and Biklen, 1982) and 
the use of SPSS allowed for this data to be quantified, in terms of comparing cohorts. 
 
4.2.4.12 Ensuring validity 
 
Given that this study falls within the qualitative approach, the question of validity is important. 
The use of multiple sources of information to assess a particular area is thus important, and 
increases the validity of the findings. All of the data is treated with due circumspection, and 
the relevant qualifiers have been applied in terms of these data streams. The Figure below 
depicts the triangulation process: 
 
Figure 4.1:  Triangulation as used in the study 
 
Source: Construction based on thesis approach and key questions  
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4.3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND CONJECTURES MADE 
 
The elements relevant to using a case study have been considered, with the 
conceptualisation of the study having dealt with the reasoning, hypothesis as well as the 
literature and researcher‟s experience around the core questions. Within this, various 
propositions have been presented for testing the assertion, the main one being that there is 
a relationship between good governance and M&E. Propositions made, are that the following 
leads to good governance: 
 
 Compliance to reporting requirements brings about greater transparency and 
accountability, through the exercise of power by oversight institutions and bodies.  
 Better management practice and organisational learning brought about by 
persuasive, or internal M&E, is an outcome of effective M&E, which should also 
contribute to higher levels of transparency and accountability around performance. 
 Greater accountability comes about through civic involvement or engagement around 
the performance of the department. 
 
4.4 RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 
 
The DSD was examined through 3 perspectives or lenses, each of which interrogates the 
relationship between good governance and that type of M&E. Although each perspective is 
treated as distinct, they are in fact interrelated and complement each other. Each of the 
perspectives meets the following criteria. Firstly, the rationale for the perspective is 
conceptually sound, based on literature and the context of the study. The perspective is 
illustrated through the use of multiple streams of information, and includes both quantitative 
and qualitative data. Where possible, criteria and standards have been presented as norms 
to test specific areas of performance within the DSD.  Secondly, each perspective leads to a 
broader theoretical discussion, which helps to address the following areas and questions: 
 
a) What is the relative value of the M&E type, or perspective, in driving 
governance? 
b) What is the relationship between an M&E perspective, and other 
perspectives? 
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c) What is the relationship between a particular M&E perspective, and 
democracy, public  administration, learning, and support for the 
developmental State? 
d) How does the DSD performance in an area comply with best practice?  
e) What policy considerations emerge from each perspective? 
 
Figure 4.2: Outline of M&E perspectives in relation to good governance in the DSD 
 
Source: Constructed from thesis outline and research questions 
 
The figure below explains the logic used in the construction of the empirical chapters, and is 
followed by a synopsis of the M&E perspectives. It is important that there are standards for 
evaluation, as noted by Stake (2004), and these are indicated for this study. 
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 This concept has been discussed in chapter 2, where the differences are illustrated by Perrin (2000: 44), and 
the purposes shown as incompatible. Various dangers of misusing accountability are also show.  
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4.5 CONCEPTS GLEANED FROM THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND WHICH 
ARE USED FOR FRAMING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
There have been several concepts and ideas presented in the conceptual framework to 
inform the discussion on the relationship between good governance and M&E. These are 
now tabulated in a brief synopsis, in order to help frame the more detailed research 
questions posed by the study. 
 
Table 4.2: Key concepts drawn from conceptual framework that will be tested 
Concept/Idea/issue 
Applicability to M&E in DSD and 
government 
Applicability to good governance  
Transparency 
 
Prerequisite for M&E 
Result of M&E 
Attribute and indicator of good 
governance 
Indicator of democracy 
Accountability 
Result of M&E 
 
Outcome of good governance and 
M&E 
Indicator of good governance 
Policy and standards 
on M&E and GG 
Helps direct and inform M&E 
Helps managers to assess 
attainment of good governance 
Public scrutiny of 
operations and 
results 
Gives M&E integrity and supports 
validity 




Key focus area of M&E, indicator of 
managerial competence 
Sound human resource necessary 
for good governance 
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Concept/Idea/issue 
Applicability to M&E in DSD and 
government 




Central element assessed by M&E Key indicator of good governance 
Promotion of ethical 
compliance 
M&E of ethical standards promotes 
transparency and accountability, 
and supports good governance  
Ethical standards and adherence 





Should be generated by M&E and 
result in a more reflective 
organisation that is more 
transparent, accountable and 
amenable to organisational 
learning 
Indicator of good governance and if 
sustained can entrench sound 
managerial practices  
Contextual 
importance 
Should result in customised M&E 
Must be considered in the 
production of systems to produce 
good governance 
Objectivity  
Necessary to produce valid and 
credible M&E 




The use of methodological 
pluralism is important, aim to have 
M&E empower, but both 
accountability and learning are 
important 
DSD needs to engage with citizens 
to ensure good governance, linked 
to principles and values of public 
administration (public participation) 
Citizen rights 
M&E must include participatory 
M&E to solicit views and opinions 
of key beneficiaries or citizens 
Views should be incorporated as 
an indicator of performance, and is 
yet another element of good 
governance 
MDGs  
M&E (internal and country level) 
must test progress towards these 
Contribution of DSD in the meeting 
of MDG targets 
APRM processes 
Should support M&E ethos and 
lead to M&E capacity building 
DSD is a contributor to the overall 
result 
Public service ethos Must be measured by M&E 
Critical in the effectiveness of DSD, 
which is front-line, and citizen 
centred in approach  
Developmental State 
Requires a responsive and flexible 
M&E, that can measure 
intervention processes, outputs, 
outcomes and impacts 
Orientation of the DSD should 




M&E should be innovative to 
produce interventions that retain 
accountability but accelerate 
service delivery 
Critical if the DSD were to be 
efficient and become an exemplar 
of good governance 
Measuring 
performance 
translates into better 
performance 
M&E should help create the link 
between results and actions 
Good governance will happen if 
M&E can help the DSD to achieve 
this 
 
From the above Table is it evident that there is a dynamic relationship between M&E and 
good governance. At a conceptual level there is a link between conducting sound M&E and 
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the outcome of good governance. Good governance in the DSD would thus relate to an 
improvement over time in the ability of management to achieve the following: 
a) Satisfy the requirements of MME players, which is mainly to report according to 
stipulated criteria and time-frames; 
b) Demonstrate an ability to improve its performance in terms of transversal M&E 
systems, such as those implemented by the PSC like the PSM&ES which looks at 
adherence to the good governance values and principles; 
c) Show support and use of its own internal M&E capacity; 
d) Make use of M&E information for decision-making; 
e) Entrench accountability and transparency mechanisms; 
f) Develop a culture and practice which improves organisational learning; and 
g) Engage critically with external stakeholders to support and integrate opinions and 
views held about the performance of the DSD. 
 
These would be the broad areas that are assessed through the empirical chapters of the 
study. 
 
4.6 KEY RELATIONSHIPS TESTED 
 
The study assesses the impact of the following relationships on good governance. Key to 
each of these is the purpose of the evaluation, which in terms of the Key Evaluation 
Checklist (KEC), and cited in Davidson (2004: 13) is: 
 
a) Who asked for the evaluation and why? 
b) What are the main evaluation questions? 
c) Who are the main audiences?  
 
Defining the purpose of evaluation is critical, and whilst it has already been mentioned that it 
could serve the purpose of accountability, transparency and learning, there are other 
important questions. These are: 
 
a) What is the overall quality or value of something? 
b) To find areas for improvement. 
c) Both of the above. 
 
In this area, evaluation serves the purpose of determining overall quality or value. The 
question that this study asks is whether the types of M&E conducted, do go beyond the 
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traditional purposes of transparency, accountability and learning, and determine value, in 
order to improve. 
 
4.6.1 Articulation of M&E at the DSD with other M&E Initiatives  
 
It is important to establish how M&E in the DSD articulates with M&E players across the 
country, which points to the quality of relationships in terms of building capacity and being 
effective. The M&E of the DSD would have to interact with the M&E of the Presidency and 
the PSC. It would also continue to engage with the NT, which exercises key financial 
oversight. In terms of building its own capacity, it would have to engage with the PALAMA, 
as one of the providers of training. Furthermore, the National DSD M&E unit would be 
expected to provide some overarching framework to M&E functionality that may be set up in 
provincial departments, and the SASSA. These vertical and horizontal communication lines 
would demonstrate how well M&E is evolving in South Africa.  
 
4.6.1.1  M&E and the DSD 
 
The manner in which the DSD`s own M&E unit operates is an indicator of how enabling the 
DSD is for M&E, and also how capacitated this M&E is to produce valid and credible results. 
The capacity of the M&E in the DSD would be dependent upon factors such as: 
 
a) Its organisational location and capacity. 
b) Its track record of success. 
c) Its perception by managers within the department. 
d) Its ability to articulate with the SASSA M&E and other overarching M&E institutions. 
This will include the Presidency M&E, the PSC M&E and SAMEA, to name but a few. 
 
The assessment of the DSD M&E unit is a valuable indicator of how effective M&E is across 
the country, and indicative of its power to influence good governance in the DSD.  
 
4.6.1.2  Good governance indicators and the performance of the DSD 
 
Good governance indicators exist at the international and South African level, and these 
have been presented in chapter 2 of the study. In South Africa they are drawn from different 
policies, with the Constitution having the most explicit and comprehensive definition of what 
good governance means for public administration, as contained in the 9 Constitutional 
Values and Principles. These have become the M&E framework for the PSC, which 
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conducts all of its assessments along these indicators. The study reflects on the extent to 
which the DSD adheres to good governance definitions, such as International good 
governance dimensions from the World Bank (2006), which include voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, including the quality of policy-making and public service delivery, 
the lack of regulatory burden; the rule of law and the protection of property rights; the 
independence of the judiciary and the control of corruption. The World Bank defines 
governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country`s 
economic and social resources for development”.  
 
In addition the country is assessed in terms of internal agreements and accords which would 
include: 
 
a) The APRM of the NEPAD  
b) The MDGs, as per the development indicators 
c) Transparency International ratings 
d) Credit and investment ratings of international rating agencies which assess 
creditworthiness and investor levels 
e) Adherence to CAPAM 
 
The South African public administration good governance indicators, from the Constitution 
are:  
 
a) High standard of professional ethics must be maintained 
b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted 
c) Public administration must be development oriented 
d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias 
e) People`s needs must be responded to and the public must be encouraged to 
participate in policy-making 
f) Public administration must be accountable 
g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and 
accurate information 
h) Good human resource management and career development practices to maximise 
human potential, must be cultivated 
i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, 
with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, 
fairness and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad 
representation 
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The specific good governance indicators for the NT are: 
 
a) Quarterly reports are submitted and deviations explained 
b) Expenditure is within a 2% range of allocated funds 
c) The MTSF and MTEF is produced according to guidelines 
d) The Annual Report of departments reflect performance against planned outputs, with 
66% of objectives being realised and deviations explained 
 
The quality of planning and financial performance is assessed by the AG, who provides audit 
opinions on performance. The favoured opinions are the clean audit, the unqualified audit 
and the unqualified audit with matters of emphasis. Specific good governance indicators for 
service delivery are the 8 Batho Pele principles10 which are: 
 
a) Consultation   
b) Service Standards 
c) Access   
d) Courtesy 
e) Information  
f) Redress   
g) Value for money 
h) Openness and transparency 
 
Political good governance indicators include meeting the goals of the PoA of government, 
and more recently meeting the requirements of the 12 Outcomes of government. The 
assessment will be done taking into account purpose. It should be noted that there could be 
different evaluation purposes, which may or may not contribute to good governance.  
The above list may thus be considered the direction for M&E for producing good governance 
in the DSD. This study takes an expanded view of M&E, and sees it not as just a formal unit 
that operates within an organisational or institutional context. It defines it as individuals, 
bodies, actors, players and institutions which through various strategies and methods exert 
influence that leads to transparency and accountability generally. This may then also 
contribute towards deepening democracy, by empowering citizens to use results to hold 
government to account.  
                                                 
10
 These are values and behavioural attributes expected of public servants and which citizens can expect when 
they interact with government. 
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4.7 LOGIC USED IN CONSTRUCTING THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 
 
The M&E and good governance relationship explored in this thesis has been demarcated 
into three distinct but interrelated areas. For each of the three areas an analytical framework 
containing operational definitions and concepts, drawn from the conceptual framework and 
literature review in chapters 2 and 3, was constructed. Information and data relevant to each 
area of focus are analysed against the broader good governance criteria. This is followed by 
an assessment of how well the DSD compares to these normative benchmarks, and where 
applicable other departments which have been assessed against these criteria. Finally, a 
qualitative assessment is made of how a particular M&E focus or attribute has been 
responded to by the DSD, and by extension government generally. The cumulative 
assessment of each area allows for an assessment to be made of how a particular M&E 
perspective contributes to promoting good governance.  
 
The value of schematically depicting the areas and their concomitant parts is that it 
delineates the constituent parts and shows how they work individually and in concert to 
produce the outcome of good governance. Good governance must thus be viewed as a 
dynamic, multi-dimensional concept that results from many inputs, factors and influences. In 
classic M&E terms, good governance is an outcome or impact, brought about by inputs (laws 
and regulations) that produce intermediary outputs. The outputs themselves are not “good 
governance”, but rather the building blocks for the outcome or effect of good governance. 
These outputs could include levels of compliance, behaviours and effects, all of which 
culminate in producing the overarching value of good governance. Whereas the outputs, 
such as audit reports and other products that produce transparency and accountability, are 
tangible, the outcome of good governance is less tangible, and can be discerned through 
proxy measures. These are measures which demonstrate that transparency and 
accountability are indeed practiced.  
 
For purposes of this thesis, the inputs (the body of policy and regulation employed by the 
developmental State to effect transformation) are identified and assessed in terms of what it 
seeks to achieve. The inputs are the investments (policy, M&E systems, etc.) made to shape 
behaviour and influence the trajectory of government. The outputs are realised depending on 
how well these inputs work. In the case of this thesis the various M&E systems used by the 
actors and role players is assessed in terms of what it produces and what effects the 
deliverables produced thereof have. In other words, the in-year financial M&E system of NT 
produces deviation reports. The question is whether the production of these reports 
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produces the type of transparency and resultant scrutiny and accountability that reduces 
these deviations? The same logic applies for the other systems that are assessed.  
 
Since M&E, as conceptualised herein, is a post democratic intervention, and given that there 
is knowledge of how the Public Service was prior to the advent of democracy with regards to 
its aversion for transparency and accountability, it is possible to discern fundamental change 
since democracy. The period of transition, which was 1994 may be viewed as the baseline, 
and the changes that happened after this period were at both the level of new, more 
democratic public policies accompanied by a culture of M&E, driven by democracy itself and 
for government in the work of the PSC. The situation now, evident from this study, should 
show how far the Public Service has progressed, and indicate whether the input of new 
policies, coupled with M&E, has created the outcome of good governance.  
 
The three perspectives examined here need to be looked at in terms of the before and after 
scenario; for MME it would relate to the old regulation bound service compared to the new 
compliance and performance driven Public Service. In terms of looking within departments, 
one would consider the old decision-making modalities in relation to the new; the old 
assumed to be lesser informed about performance whilst in the new M&E information is 
central. Finally, in terms of CME, one would be comparing an old Public Service with almost 
non-existent government-public interface to one where interaction is encouraged. Underlying 
all three perspectives would be how well the production and use of M&E information has 
helped to improve the discourse on measurement and drive accountability.  
 
With regards to the compliance reports, which is the largest type of M&E done in the country, 
it is relatively easy to measure progress made at an individual and aggregate level, as the 
indicators for compliance are often explicit in terms of which norms and standards must be 
adhered to. It is also easy to quantify progress and make comparisons with the normative 
ideals and to other departments within a universe (in this case other government 
departments). What is not easy to assess is whether compliance on its own translates into 
better behaviour and effects; in other words, does the transparency brought about by this 
type of M&E actually improve accountability, and does this accountability in turn produce 
organisational learning, and thus behavioural change?  
 
There will always be a discrepancy between the ideal envisaged in the input and reality 
realised through the output. One would expect, however, that through M&E the above 
translation of vision into practice takes place, and behaviour changes to reflect the value of 
good governance.    
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4.8 THE INTERRELATEDNESS OF THE M&E PERSPECTIVES 
 
Each of the three empirical chapters is considered as a perspective (or typology) of M&E. 
Although these are treated as if they are conceptually cohesive, they are in fact interrelated 
and mutually reinforcing. The “interdependency” may be seen as follows. Through the 
implementation of MME the support, parameters and norms for other types of M&E are 
established. MME is the product of an overarching political and administrative environment 
that supports M&E through word and deed. The commitment to M&E in South Africa has 
been shown by its emphasis at the highest political level in, for example, the State of the 
Nation Addresses. This has followed by it being given a priority the Cabinet11 as a priority of 
government. Practical examples of this follow through from word to deed can be seen in the 
creation of the Government-wide M&E Framework12, which has been encompassed in 2009 
by a Ministry for Performance Management and Evaluation. The express purpose of this 
Ministry is to develop a framework for measuring government outcomes, and operationalise 
an effective accountability system. The Ministry has been given authority as it resides in the 
Presidency, and will work closely with the Ministry for Planning, which also seeks to exercise 
oversight. An announcement was made in the latest State of the Nation Address that 
performance contracting will take place between the President and Ministers, and the public 
can expect reports on progress in various areas13. South Africa is fortunate in that M&E is a 
constitutional imperative, which means that it is mandatory and obligatory nature is 
uncontested. Clearly this helps M&E practitioners as there is a clear case for M&E, from both 
law and government. 
 
This political and legal support for M&E is conducive for other forms of M&E to take place, 
which whilst not obligatory are also important. These perspectives are called the PME and 
CME. PME is defined as what happens managerially within departments, which is influenced 
by the pressures placed upon departments by MME. In other words, the act of complying 
with the pressures placed upon it by external agents, the MME category, leads to internal 
managerial processes being initiated which are aligned to an M&E culture that supports a 
more effective managerial practice. This perspective is analysed by examining how 
management works in a department, and involves an assessment of knowledge 
management. It involves tracking decision-making processes against available knowledge 
                                                 
11
 The Cabinet comprises Ministers, and is the highest decision-making body of government.  
12
 Presidency. 2007b. Policy Framework for the Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation System. 
Republic of South Africa. 
13
 As stated by the president of the republic of South Africa. Honourable, J. Zuma, 11 February 2010.  State of 
the Nation Address. Joint Sitting of Parliament. 
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repositories. The assessment looks at the managerial behavioural terrain, including decision-
making, and seeks to produce fresh insights into decision-making processes in departments. 
Although this is a more subjective analysis, and less easy to discern issues of causality 
(between information availability and information use), it is a critical perspective and helps 
answer the question of whether management has responded to the M&E thrust of 
government. PME is important, as management is an important intermediary between policy 
intent (MME) and policy outcome (CME). PME is thus a look into the internal managerial 
processes and a consideration of how management perceives and responds to M&E, both in 
terms of MME and PME. 
 
CME examines the impact of government intervention, from the perspective of citizens as 
primary beneficiaries and tax-payers. This is probably the most valuable of the three 
perspectives, as it is proof of good governance from the perspective of citizens. It answers 
the question of whether M&E does produce good governance at the most critical levels. It 
tells whether the guardians (MME) and implementers (PME) have been successful in 
delivering public value. The other perspectives are irrelevant if government departments are 
unable to produce tangible benefits to citizens, the so-called “better life for all”. The 
assessment will be based on citizen perspective reports. In relation to the DSD, the question 
asked is whether social development, as one of a family of departments responsible for 
effecting social transformation, has managed to contribute to meeting the goals of the 
developmental State.   
 
The interrelatedness and mutually reinforcing nature of these three perspectives may be 
seen in that PME is helped by an overarching MME environment in the same way as CME. 
MME provides the legal direction for PME, and influences managerial practice. MME also 
sets the rules for engagement between departments and citizens, as it entrenches rights and 
obligations, without which citizens would be unable to call government to account. Thus 
when rights to challenge and access to information14 are constitutionally protected, citizens 
feel encouraged to question government. They are supported through the media and various 
public processes which allow citizens to exercise an oversight role that they were previously 
denied. The contrary also applies in that an unwilling and unsupportive political and 
administrative leadership could limit PME and CMC as citizens would not be protected when 
calling government to account. This was the pre-democratic situation when citizens did not 
have the legal clout to obtain performance information about a department which is 
supposed to deliver social and economic rights and benefits to them. 
                                                 
14
 Department of Justice and Constitutional development Promotion of Access to Information Act, No. 3 of  
2000. Republic of South Africa. Pretoria. 
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There is a critical normative benchmark for assessing performance, which coupled with 
Batho Pele principles sets the bar against which the Public Service can be judged. The 
catalyst or converter for delivering good governance is when M&E, in all of its forms, acts in 
tandem to translate policy inputs into values for good governance as an effect or outcome. 
The Table below compares these perspectives in more detail.  
 
Table 4.3:  Comparison of M&E perspectives along key characteristics 
Defining 
characteristic 
Mandatory M&E Persuasive M&E Citizen M&E 
Legal basis Constitution,  
Chapter 10, Public 
Service Act 










Parliament exercising its 





Internal, but also 
responding to external  
External, but this time 
towards the department 




Upwards and outwards, 
generally to satisfy 
requirements of national 
entities 
Primarily to internal 
management structures, 
may support external 
reporting requirements  
Advocacy and media, 
tends to be used to 





expect departments to 
use their own resources 
to generate reports and 
data, seen as statutory 
obligations 
Requires investment in 
terms of establishing 
funded units 
Largely funded 
externally, donor driven, 
dependent upon 
resourcefulness of 
CBOS and NGOs 
Positioning Accepted authority of 
oversight institutions 
Authority and credibility 
needs to be established, 
relationships need to be 
established and 
contestations around 
location, the distinction 
between management 
and M&E must be 
resolved 







coercive, developmental  
Democratic,  activist, 
sensational 
 
Drawing on the above, an operational definition of M&E to guide this assessment and which 
has been gleaned from the conceptual framework of the study but modified for the South 
African context has been formulated. It is:  
 
...an act or process intended to bring about scrutiny and transparency of operations 
(in this case government) and which supports a public sector ethos that is 
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democratic, reflective and accountable. M&E would work as an adjunct to those laws, 
policies and conventions that reinforce the above values.  
 
Having clarified the logic of the perspectives and thus the logic of the thesis, the discussion 
now proceeds presents the specific questions posed. 
 
4.9 GOOD GOVERNANCE IDEALS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
The analysis in this study moves between levels and across units of analysis. The question 
of scale is an important consideration for any government department, as its programmes 
are delivered across different scales and each level poses its own challenges. This means 
that the Public Service cannot be considered as homogenous, and contextual factors, raised 
as important in the conceptual framework, are important for assessment and understanding. 
The implication for this is that national statements and commitments may not pass through 
into departments at all level and with the quality expected. This pragmatic consideration is 
important in assessing how effective policy statements are in reality.  In summary, the above 
can be encapsulated in the following objectives which have already been stated in chapter 1. 
The questions that are addressed in this study are:  
 
1. What is the nature of M&E in South Africa, and how does it compare to the practice 
of M&E internationally?  
2. How effective is the South African developmental State in using M&E to support 
efforts towards good governance?  
3. What lessons can be learned from practice to date, and how can this better inform 
the implementation strategy of M&E in South Africa?   
4 What is the impact of M&E in promoting good governance in South Africa, as evident 
from the case study of the DSD?   
 
i Good governance brought about by MME 
 
An assessment of the extent to which M&E contributes to good governance in the DSD is a 
key focus of the study. There is a global shift from the notion of government and its 
ineffective bureaucracy towards the notion of governance with its ideals of democracy, 
transparency and efficiency. The push towards greater accountability stems from both 
internal and external sources. Key questions that are examined include: 
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a) How successful has the developmental State been in successfully instituting 
compulsory measures for good governance in the DSD? 
b) What has been the form and impact of MME measures in improving transparency 
and accountability in DSD? 
c) How effective is M&E in communicating performance information to decision-
makers and role-players? 
d) How well does the DSD articulate with the broader M&E community? 
 
The methodology includes techniques that draw on secondary data sources, with 
interpretative techniques that are constructivist and critical.   
 
ii Good governance brought about by non-mandatory, persuasive M&E 
 
This theme looks specifically at the role of Batho Pele (as a code for public serve behaviour 
and conduct) and performance management systems, in improving the propensity for good 
governance. The South African Public Service has recognised the importance of the people 
question, and attempted to change the work ethos through programmes such as Batho Pele 
(people first). It has also instituted performance measurement systems. The former is best 
measured by how the public perceives service delivery and the latter by how supervisory 
levels see individual performance changing. Both aim to institute transparency and 
accountability for money spent on the human resources of government.  
 
The key questions are raised in relation to whether these interventions are working. The 
results point to whether there has been transformation in behaviour, which is critical for 
supporting good governance.  
 
iii Good governance brought about by civic  M&E 
 
This third dimension examines the role played by citizens in holding the DSD to account. It 
looks at the political oversight role, and focuses on the role played by the NGOs and CBOs – 
termed NPOs. It also looks at how civic interests are protected. It provides a valid 
perspective on how civics, as users of performance information, help in driving 
accountability. Key questions asked are: 
 
a) How effective have these groupings (Parliament, the NPOs and citizens) been in 
holding the DSD to account for its performance?  
b) What has been the impact of the range of players in this category for producing good 
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governance at the DSD? 
c) How effective have the different mechanisms (Batho Pele, Hotlines) been in raising 
public consciousness about what to expect of the DSD and what has been the 
response to the concerns raised? 
d) What are the civil society perspectives on the performance of the DSD?   
 
The data for this section is drawn from assessments of Parliament, the NPO sector, and 
includes expert insights from persons involved in this terrain. It also includes perspectives 
from oversight bodies like the PSC, which direct public perception information to the 
executive to acts. The data from these sources are cross referenced to establish 
contradiction and validity.  
 
4.10 ETHICAL QUESTIONS 
 
The researcher is an M&E practitioner employed in the PSC. As such, he has access to 
evaluative data of government, and the DSD. A possible conflict of interest exists when 
using data from the PSC. However, the information used in this study is from published 
reports, which are already in the public domain.   
 
The study also uses reports on the department which he has had a role in writing. In this 
case, the necessary disclaimer is made. All PSC data is considered as secondary, and 
subject to critical, meta-evaluation review before it is used.  
 
In the course of this study, the researcher detached himself from the PSC, and made it clear 
to the DSD through the protocol of an introductory research protocol letter that he is studying 
the DSD for personal research purposes, and that the department would be provided with a 
copy of the thesis upon completion. This disclaimer is important as the DSD should not 
construe this research as a PSC evaluation.  
 
The researcher followed the necessary protocols and adhered to the ethical guidelines of the 
University of the Witwatersrand in terms of this research. This included obtaining the 
necessary permission to use information for research purposes, ensuring that validation 
takes place, and acknowledging sources of information.  
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4.11 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
This study does not follow a traditional chapter outline for a thesis, which is where there is a 
separation between the conceptual framework, research methods and research questions. 
This is not deemed to be particularly useful in this study. There are 5 concise introductory 
chapters, which locate the study, Chapter 1, Introduction, identify and clarify concepts, 
Chapter 2: Conceptual framework, which is followed by Chapter 3, Literature review. These 
chapters form the basis for Chapter 4, Research methods, whilst Chapter 5 provides a 
detailed description of the DSD, which is the unit of analysis that is subject to assessment of 
the M&E-good governance relationship through three empirical, perspective chapters 
(Chapters 6, 7 and 8), whilst the last chapter 9 provides an overarching commentary by 
returning to the research questions and objectives of the study.  
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Chapter 5 






The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background and description of the case study, in 
order to locate it within the policy environment of the developmental State. Given that the 
thrust of the developmental State is redress and development, the case study of the DSD 
reflects the extent to which transformative polices largely implemented by the national DSD 
can contribute to the goals of the developmental State.  
 
An assessment of the DSD using the three M&E perspectives referred to in chapter 3 of this 
study, seeks to establish how well the DSD responds to different levels of oversight and 
scrutiny, and whether this improves the propensity of the DSD to deliver services more 
effectively. Given that M&E supports management, a well-managed DSD is critical for the 
realisation of the policy objectives of the department and the developmental State. This 
chapter describes the configuration, policies, strategies and managerial infrastructure of the 
DSD as a backdrop to the empirical chapters that follow. In this description issues of 
location, context and partnership are highlighted, both of which point to how the DSD seeks 
to realise its mandate. The DSD is also a department with an operational M&E function, both 
at the departmental1 level and at the level of its implementation agency, the SASSA2. Whilst 
this thesis focuses on the DSD, it will consider the M&E of the SASSA in its assessment. 
The DSD is thus an appropriate and contextually relevant case study. 
 
5.2 APPROPRIATENESS OF THE DSD TO THE QUESTION OF GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
The DSD impacts upon the lives of all South Africans, given the overarching nature of its 
policies. It is also a front-runner in terms of effecting socio-economic transformation, as its 
policies are pro-poor and seek to reduce inequality and poverty. In its Annual Report of 
2008, it states that it has extended its social security net from 2,5 million beneficiaries in 
                                                 
1
  Department of Social Development. 2007g. Operational Plan for M&E within the Department of Social 
development.  unpublished, March.  
2
 South African Social security Agency. 2007. Annual report 2006/2007. Republic of South Africa.  
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1994 to 12,3 million (Department of Social Development, Annual report 2008: 14). It also 
claims to have helped create jobs which are seen as a major milestone in addressing 
poverty. The two thrusts for addressing poverty, those of social transfers and job creation 
are at the centre of the debates on socio-economic transformation that are taking place in 
the country. There remains debate as to whether the approach of providing social grants is 
financially viable in the long term, and whether it is adequate to move people out of poverty. 
There are also concerns that this intervention, whilst important at this juncture, may cause 
large scale dependencies, and prevent people from moving out of the cycle of poverty. 
However, the fact that the ruling party has not scaled down on providing such grants, and 
has in fact increased the grant options and reach of this form of social assistance, probably 
indicates that it is a policy that is here to stay. One may thus deduce that the DSD will 
remain a pivotal department in the years to come.  
 
At a strategic level the work of the DSD has been linked to the NEPAD and African Union, 
South African Development Community and other initiatives, institutions which also focus on 
some form of good governance. The issues highlighted in the plan of 2005 are that there has 
been an expansion of the social assistance programme. In the Annual Report3 of the 
department, the thrust of a caring society permeates, with the issues of how the DSD has 
linked to continental initiatives, such as the International Comprehensive Social Security 
Conference, resulting in the establishment of an International Social Security Association are 
raised. The thrust in the political pronouncements has been that the department has 
attempted to address poverty (Department of Social Development, Annual report, 2008: 6).  
 
As pointed out in chapter 1 of this thesis, the DSD would be typical of any government 
department, given the homogenising effect of government policy and administrative 
procedures, which seeks to standardise the operations of a government department.   
Assessing the DSD would also provide similar insights into how any department could 
respond to the three M&E thrusts: from above (MME); from within (PME) and from outside 
(CME). The three directional thrusts from M&E, all of which seek a form of transparency and 
accountability, should make the DSD more accountable to its political and administrative 
principals, but most important, the citizens. The Strategic Plan and Annual Report of the 
DSD do in a sense display the intent to be accountable. Both these documents have been 
cited in this chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
3
  Department of Social Development. 2008a. Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 2008.  Republic of 
South Africa.  
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5.3 LEGISLATIVE MANDATES 
 
The National DSD administers a range of laws or parts of legislation which constitute the 
legal framework for social development in South Africa. These have been amended a 
number of times since April 1994. In addition, the White Paper for Social Welfare, 1997 
(DSD, 1997) and Population Policy, 1998 (DSD, 1998) provide the policy framework for the 
department`s work. The Constitution also guides the work of the department, notably Section 
27 (1) (c) which provides for the right to access to appropriate social assistance for those 
unable to support themselves and their dependents, whilst section 28 (1) enshrines the 
rights of children with regard to appropriate care, basic nutrition, shelter, health care and 
social services, and detention (Department of Social Development, Strategic Plan 2008). 
There are a host of Acts that govern the work of the DSD, as noted in its annual and other 
reports.   
 
5.4 RATIONALE FOR THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION OF THE DSD 
 
The DSD is not a new department, but has been reconfigured and had its mandate 
expanded to cater for the democratic government. Its policies thus reflect the particular 
history of the country, in that it seeks to address the human and social areas which need to 
be improved. Thus in the post-1994 period the DSD accelerated its efforts to deliver social 
services and social grants to the majority of the population, which previously had limited 
access to such services. The efforts of the DSD were recognised as being essential for 
delivering on the election manifesto of the ruling party, with access to a range of transfer 
payments (social grants being a central deliverable). This was one of the most visible 
outputs of the democratic State. In the context of high unemployment and social dislocation 
caused by the migrant labour system, to name but a few, the delivery by the State of social 
services and grants in rural areas was welcomed and probably a major factor for on-going 
political support.  
 
The configuration and strategy of the DSD has changed a few times since democracy, with 
the most prominent recent change (2005) being the removal of the payment of social 
services (grants) function from the DSD to the agency established to administer such 
payments, the SASSA. Whilst the SASSA is an arm of the DSD, responsible to the Minister 
for Social Development, as a grant administering agency its work relates to the broad policy 
of the DSD. It was established to pay social grants, which includes processing of 
applications for the different types of grants, the verification and approval of applications, the 
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disbursement and payment of grants to eligible beneficiaries and quality assurance in terms 
of ensuring compliance to norms and standards, as well as fraud prevention and detection. 
There are other agencies which also report to the Minister for Social Development, these 
being the National Development Agency, the Central Drug Authority, the Advisory Board on 
Social Development and the Relief Fund Board. From the above, it is apparent that the DSD 
has a broad mandate, which is directly related to the strategic priorities of government.  
 
At a political level, the DSD has a Minister for Social Development, and is supported by a 
Deputy-Minister. The Director-General (DG), who is the Accounting Officer (responsible for 
budget), reports to the Minister. The DG is supported by Branch heads; there are 7 
Branches, each at a level of Deputy Director-General (DDG). The Directorate: Internal Audit 
and Appeals Tribunal Centre report directly to the DG. The DSD employs 534, out of an 
establishment of 687 personnel, at a cost of 133,479,000 (DSD, Annual Report, 2008). Its 
vacancy rate is 22,3%, and 37 posts have been filled in addition to the approved 
establishment. This figure changes depending on budget allocation. The cost for the highly 
skilled supervisory levels, levels 9-12 out of a band of 16, takes up 40,9% of the budget. It 
should be noted that the process of migration of staff to SASSA in 2008 was concluded. The 
turnover rate in critical occupational classes was an average of 12,2%. These figures may 
be found in the Organogram of the latest DSD Annual Report (2010).  
 
5.5 VISION AND MISSION OF THE DSD 
 
The vision and mission of the DSD is clearly articulated in its strategic plan of 2005/06 to 
2009/10, a document that provides both a strategic overview of the department (DSD, 
2005)4, wherein the priorities of the Minister and DG are articulated, together with the 
strategic priorities, goals and service delivery challenges of the department. It contains the 
main legislative and other mandates that drive it, and comments on policy developments that 
seek to make the DSD more effective, and align it to the national priorities. The document 
also highlights the budget programmes and sub-programmes. 
 
The Minister of the DSD in the foreword to this plan identifies how the work of the DSD fits 
into the political manifesto of the ANC(2004)  which refers to the “People`s contract”, and its 
focus on issues of “poverty eradication, social integration and the extension of work 
opportunities” The strategic goals and priorities relate to improving service delivery, seeking 
                                                 
4
  Department of Social Development. 2005a. Strategic Plan 2005/06 to 2009/10. 22005. Republic of South 
Africa.  
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the transformation of other welfare services, addressing HIV/ AIDS, poverty reduction and 
integrated development, and seeking social integration. It also sees itself as steering 
national involvement in the African and international framework and agreements with respect 
to socio-economic development.  
 
The vision of the DSD is that it would provide a “caring and integrated system of social 
development services that facilitate human development and improve the quality of life” and 
the mission is: 
 
 …to ensure the provision of comprehensive social protection services against 
vulnerability and poverty with the constitutional and legislative frameworks, and 
create an enabling environment for sustainable development. The department further 
aims to deliver integrated, sustainable and quality services in partnership with all 
those committed to building a caring society. The DSD commits to be people-
centred, to promote equity, to work in partnership, to use resources to deliver 
services in the most efficient, effective and innovative ways, to operate in a 
transparent and accountable manner, share knowledge and expertise with other 
departments and the sector, and to adhere to laws of the Public Service and to the 
Code of Conduct. 
   (DSD, 2005: 17) 
 
5.6 SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL 
 
The commitment in the 2005 document relates to shifting the social grants function to a 
specialist institution, the SASSA. The DSD would then primarily focus on policy formulation, 
M&E and social services that help improve the lives of citizens. These would include a range 
of services, most of which are supportive of individuals and communities which otherwise 
would be unable to cope with socio-economic and psychological challenges. In the DSD 
strategic plan, the DG notes that the establishment of the SASSA, through an Act in 2004, 
established a public entity to administer and pay grants, to target the poorest of the poor, 
and eliminate wastage. In the plan, the DSD seeks to, amongst others, ensure the integrity 
of social grants administration, to develop and implement a comprehensive and integrated 
service delivery model for developmental welfare services, and commits to implement new 
policy on financial awards to non-governmental organisations and other civil society 
organisations that provide welfare services to the needy and vulnerable. The DSD thus 
needs to have a good relationship with the NPO sector, which helps it to deliver the type of 
services that it cannot on its own.  
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In order to realise this vision, the DSD focuses more on policy and engagement with sectors 
to improve its service delivery capacity, than the administration of grants. A New Service 
Delivery Model would thus seek to integrate and expand welfare and developmental 
services, which is an institutional reform that seeks engagement with civil society partners. A 
range of grants have been introduced to broaden the safety net and bring more people into 
the social network. The standardisation of the SASSA seeks to bring in norms and standards 
to improve efficiency, and also prevent fraud and corruption. The SASSA in 2005 
administered R60 billion.  
 
The SASSA also established its own M&E function, and produced an integrated results-
based M&E framework5 (SASSA, 2009). This framework has been mooted to give life to an 
integrated M&E framework within the SASSA, and the key objective is to provide a 
framework to M&E the management and administration of Social Security programmes 
within the context of results based M&E.  
 
This agency now produces its own Annual Report, and whilst it reports to the DSD on certain 
matters, it remains the responsibility of the Minister for Social Development. The moving of 
this function to SASSA means that the DSD can concentrate more on social services, which 
seek to address issues relating to social problems, the main being the effects of HIV/AIDS. It 
also means that the DSD focuses more on the policy issues, which include matters relating 
on how to engage with stakeholders and the NGO sector, which is quite pivotal to bolstering 
the capacity of the DSD to deliver on the social services it promises. The question of sound 
relationships with external stakeholders, such as NGOs and CBOs is quite pivotal to the 
implementation of the policies of the DSD.  
 
The proposal of a New Integrated Delivery Model seeks the integration of the provision of 
social security support, welfare services and developmental interventions. The services 
would be integrated, and services meant to target the right people at the right time, with the 
model delineating the scope and services of different providers. A strong thrust is the use of 
partnerships, especially with civil society, brought about through financial rewards.  
 
                                                 
5
  South African Social Security Agency. 2009. Integrated results-based Monitoring and Evaluation 
framework. 2009/10-2011/12, Tools series 1: January. Republic of South Africa.  
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5.7 STRUCTURE OF THE DSD 
 
The DSD is structured around programmes, each of which seeks to ensure that the above is 
realised. There are 6 programmes in the DSD, and these are briefly described in the Table 
below.  
Programmes and functions of the DSD, constructed from the Annual Report 2008. 
 
PROGRAMME NAME CORE FUNCTIONS 
Programme 1:  
Administration 
Policy formulation by the Minister and overall management and support 
services to the department, including legal, international liaison, financial 
management and development.  
Programme 2: 
Social security, 
policy and planning 
This implements, develops and monitors the policies and strategies of 
Social Security and Social Assistance. It also assesses the social, 
economic and fiscal impact of social security programmes.  
Programme 3: 
Grant Systems and 
Service Delivery 
Assurance 
This programme seeks to ensure that services are provided to social 
assistance and disaster relief beneficiaries. 
Programme 4: 
Social assistance 
This is a transitional programme, which manages and provides funds to 
the provinces for social assistance transfers and provincial administration, 




Seeks to facilitate the transformation of development-oriented social 
welfare services to vulnerable individuals, households and communities. 
The strategic objective is to develop, monitor and facilitate the 
implementation of welfare service policies, strategies, programmes and 
service standards to empower and support vulnerable people, older 
persons and persons with disabilities, and mitigate the impact of 





This programme is responsible for the development and implementation 
of policies, legislation and programmes that are intended to address 
various challenges that pertain to the rebuilding of families, childcare and 
protection, violence against women and children, youth development and 





Responsible for developing, co-ordinating and managing sustainable 
income-generation projects, developing strategies and programmes which 
contribute to the well-being and social integration of vulnerable 
individuals, groups and communities; and developing policies and 
programmes to create and enabling environment for NPOs.  
Programme 8: 
HIV/AIDS 
The effects on the social sector are noted, which are that the chronic 
nature of the illness has implications for social grants, development and 
child care, which in turn brings about the disintegration of basic family 
units, increases the number of child-headed households and increases 
the number of orphans. To address this, the programme looks at 
community home-based care and support programmes, and other 





This looks at the population question from different angles, which draws 
from the 10 year review. This relates to the framework of encompassing 
interest (people`s contract), improving the performance of the State, 
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addressing the consequences of social transition and improving regional 
environment and implementing NEPAD . 
Source: Department of Social Development, Annual Report 2008. 
 
The Annual Report of the DSD lists, for each of the programmes, M&E measures. These are 
the outputs, performance measures, targets for the year under review (previous), the actual 
output and finally the percentage deviation from the target. he Annual Report thus becomes 
a measure of performance, although self-reported, of the DSD, and is a key M&E tool.  
 
5.8 M&E WITHIN THE DSD 
 
The DSD has a Chief Directorate: M&E, which falls within the Branch: Corporate services. It 
is staffed by 6 people, who are expected to manage the M&E of the department. This unit 
has four key result areas (KRAs), which are as follows: 
 
a) KRA 1: Improve institutional performance monitoring 
b) KRA 2:  Improved service delivery monitoring of social development services and 
programmes 
c) KRA 3: Effective information coordination and reporting system 
d) KRA 4:  Integrated M&E system across the sector 
 
The main task of the unit has been to help the DSD report on its programmes, as per the 
requirements of the NT. This means that it helps units to define outputs within the 
programmes, develop performance indicators and targets, assess the measurability of 
performance indicators and report on actual performance and reasons for non-performance. 
It thus provides the DSD with the technical capacity to improve its own self-reflection and 
evaluation.  
 
In terms of the KRAs listed above, the Chief Directorate has produced templates to report on 
each area, and in essence looks at performance against time frames, costs and comments 
on performance targets. In terms of institutional performance monitoring, the outputs relate 
to the institutional performance framework, the Annual Report, the annual performance 
measurement report, quarterly reports and performance review meetings.  
With regards to service delivery, the M&E Directorate produces a range of reports on service 
delivery, and has systems to track performance thereof. It has also commissioned citizen 
satisfaction surveys. This study will look at this area in chapter 7, wherein the perspective of 
citizens and external stakeholders will be considered. This effectiveness of the M&E in the 
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DSD, in relation to the above and its contribution to good governance will be critically 
appraised through the empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7 which follow. 
 
5.9 SERVICE DELIVERY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMME (DSD, STRATEGIC PLAN 
2004/5 – 2009/10) 
 
The DSD does have a service delivery improvement programme, which may be regarded as 
the normative benchmark against which the department can judge its own performance.  
This programme should have been the outcome of discussions and negotiations and would 
reflect what the DSD considers to be its priorities, as it indicates who it considers to be its 
potential service users. The service standards are the commitments made by the 
department in terms of what it can offer the clients.  
 
An assessment of the strategic plan reflects how the DSD defines itself in relation to the 
context within which it operates, and reflects on the area of  policy and legislation, and how it 
sets about to support provincial departments with implementation. It also lists its primary 
services, which are the provision of social grants, welfare services, poverty relief and support 
for victims of HIV/AIDS. In most instances the service users are listed as communities, 
community-based organisations and non-government organisations. This is in relation to 
financial and technical assistance for poverty relief projects, financial and technical 
assistance for HIV/AIDS projects and for other social development projects. The standards 
in these areas relate to acknowledging receipt of request within 48 hours, assessing 
requests within 2 months of receipt and transferring funds according to agreements. In terms 
of the area of disaster relief, the victims of disaster are the clients, with the service delivery 
indicators being the assessment of disaster within 7 days of occurrence and making 
payments within 3 months of confirmation. An area to be mentioned is NPOs, which are key 
clients and to which the DSD commits to registering applications within 48 hours and 
processing applications within 2 months of receipt. The Population Information Resource 
Centre sees its clients as government departments, and the main output being making 
information accessible through the department website. In terms of information, there is a 
commitment to members of the public and parliament to acknowledge receipt of letters within 
48 hours and reply within 14 days, in the language of choice where possible.  
 
The DSD has also committed to consultation arrangements, which include national 
consultations and bi-lateral meetings, and a commitment to meet with communities and visit 
projects. The modalities for such consultations are also indicated. In terms of information, 
there are commitments to undertake national campaigns for the registration of grant 
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beneficiaries improve the delivery of social security services, transform welfare service to 
improve services in rural areas, standardise and simplify procedures for communities, CBOs 
and NGOs, promote multi-lingualism, etc. In terms of transparency, the department provides 




This chapter has sought to sketch the vision and mission of the DSD, and by citing its key 
planning and reporting documents, it has indicated the context within which it operates, and 
described the leadership and management configuration that is in place to give effect to 
policy. The chapters that follow assess the DSD in terms of how well it responds to, and has 
been shaped by M&E, as it reviews the department from the three M&E thrusts described.  
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Chapter 6 
Mandatory M&E and Good Governance 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Mandatory M&E is the first of the three M&E perspective chapters, and examines what the 
relationship is between this form of M&E, which seeks to bring about compliance and 
accountability, and good governance. It describes the legislative and policy environment that 
has been put in place to ensure compliance with norms and standards in the Public Service, 
and assesses how well the DSD has responded to these imperatives.   
 
A key question that is asked is whether meeting compliance criteria, and hence addressing 
the accountability dimension, is sufficient for producing the effect or outcome of good 
governance, or whether the production of good governance requires a more comprehensive 
application of M&E. In other words, is there not also a need for M&E that produces 
transparency and learning, which is also seen as critical aspects by Roper and Petitt (2002) 
and Gray (2009). This question is asked in relation to the dilemma that may face M&E 
practitioners when they try to drive all three M&E perspectives simultaneously, but fail to 
recognise the inherent tensions and contradictions between the perspectives (Perrin, 2007). 
 
The discussion on good governance in chapters 2 and 3 has indicated that accountability 
and transparency are some, but not all, of the indicators of good governance. There are 
others, such as participation, the rule of law and inclusivity, which point out that even if there 
is good compliance by government, this is but a partial contribution to good governance, 
which is a more comprehensive, all-embracing concept. It is possible for a department to 
perform well in terms of mandatory compliance, but still not meet the standards of good 
governance, as compliance does not equate good governance, which is broader than 
meeting administrative standards. It was pointed out that higher level outcomes are what 
ultimately count, and these are best tested by users of government services, the citizens 
themselves.  
 
In addressing the above, the chapter is organised as follows: 
 
a) Description of MME, or accountability frameworks, within which all M&E bodies work  
b) Contextualisation of MME in the country 
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c) Discussion of the accountability and governance framework of government 
d) Description of the schema for assessment  
e) Analysing how each performance area is M&E by different institutions 
f) Description of how Parliament works in support of MME bodies 
g) Critical appraisal of the impact of MME on good governance 
 
6.2 MANDATORY M&E 
 
MME relates to compliance, and is the form of M&E where the express purpose is to ensure 
accountability. The following are the connotations of the word „mandatory‟: 
 
 Obligatory, being accountable, discipline, sanction bearing, compulsory, non-
negotiable, legalistic, authority bearing, prescriptive, ordained, implicitly meant to 
change and direct and control, accountable to norms and standards, objective, 
criterion-referenced. 
 
Source: Constructed from readings and the researcher`s own interpretation of the area 
 
MME is performed by central oversight bodies, each of which assume responsibility for a 
particular part of the overarching accountability framework. Departments are obliged to 
comply with the requirements imposed by each of the central M&E bodies, which assume 
responsibility for the following areas of policy: 
 
a) Compliance with the 9 Constitutional Values and Principles, PSC 
b) Financial accountability, NT and AG 
c) Compliance with HR provisions, PSC and DPSA 
d) Compliance with 8 Batho Pele Principles, DPSA (also assessed by the PSC) 
e) Accountability for political commitments, PoA, Presidency 
f) Ultimately, all departments remain accountable to Parliament1, which uses the work 
of the MME bodies to exercise oversight. 
 




                                                 
1
  A review of the work of Parliament helps to explain how accountability mechanism works, and indicates what 
the limitations have been. 
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Figure 6.1:  Performance Areas Brought under Scrutiny by Oversight Bodies (Source: researcher) 
 
 
The Figure above indicates the core areas that departments are expected to comply with, 
and the institutions responsible for exercising this form of oversight. Each of the institutions 
work off a political or policy mandate, and has their own protocols for gathering and reporting 
on performance information.   
 
From a systems perspective, the methods used by the institutions meet the tenets of M&E 
and would also qualify to be described as a system, in that there is a clear methodology for 
soliciting information and analysing it. The regularity with which the data is collected, 
analysed and disseminated would meet the broad definition of a system as well. There is an 
explicit purpose for these activities, clear norms and standards against which accountability 
can be measured, and forums where results are presented. Each of the institutions 
contributes in part to enhancing transparency around performance areas, and serves an 
accountability function given that it shows deviation from specific norms and standards. The 
Table below expands upon the above discussion and attempts to shows the relationships 
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Table 6.1:  Focal areas subject to mandatory M&E and its relationship to good governance  
FOCAL AREA INSTITUTIONAL 
RESPONSI-
BILITY 
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The collective impact emerging from the above should be a more compliant and accountable 
Public Service. Figure 6.2 summarises the above in terms of how these measures could 
potentially translate into the expected outcome and effect.  
 
 








The MME bodies are characterised by clear guidelines and protocols for engaging with 
departments. They have the power to sanction, and/or withhold resources and produce 
results without censorship. They generally have a strong monitoring capability and can insist 
on upward reporting. The presumed effect is that they increase transparency and 
accountability, and may as a secondary effect improve organisational learning.  
 
The aforementioned will be referred to in the subsequent sections of this chapter, where the 
M&E bodies will be further described and assessed in terms of their interaction with the 
DSD.  The discussion now moves on to contextualise this form of M&E in the country.   
 
6.3 CONTEXTUALISING MME IN THE COUNTRY  
 
It is important to provide a perspective of how MME operates in the country, as this will show 
the link between the political mandate and the role played by the MME institutions, which 
help to realise this aim.  This overview will show that there were many types of interventions 
used to align implementation to policy, and M&E bodies help to bring about this alignment.  
 
A central feature of the newly mandated Public Service has been ensuring that 
transformative policies and regulations are supported. There has been a clear legal basis, 
contained within relevant acts that seek to regulate the Public Service and also make it 
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perform in an optimal manner. The permeating political message is that there must be 
accountability for all areas of policy, and operations should be characterised by transparency 
and accountability. In this light M&E becomes a tool for supporting the attainment of 
accountability, and helping produce higher levels of transparency, which support good 
governance.  
 
At the apex of reporting on accountability is Parliament, which due to its multi-party nature, 
produces a level of debate when Parliament receives reports from the MME institutions. 
Considering how Parliament has exercised its role is thus important. Driving political 
compliance and accountability is the Presidency, which monitors compliance by departments 
against the PoA2. The PoA is a practical way of demonstrating political commitment to bring 
about an accountable Public Service, when performance information is made available to the 
public. The Presidency also leads in the roll-out of the GWM&ES, which has been replaced 
by the Twelve Outcomes for Performance3, and has produced synthesis reports on the 
implementation of government programmes, the most comprehensive one being Towards a 
Ten Year Review.4 Given that it interfaces with international bodies, such as the UN, which 
requires information on how government is performing in meeting the targets of the MDGs, it 
has published a set of development indicators relevant to South Africa‟s progress5.   
 
The main performance area is around financial discipline, and supporting government in 
achieving its policy goals is the NT, which has the instrument of the PFMA to compel 
departments to comply with principles of efficiency and effectiveness. The implementation of 
the PFMA is reported on to relevant committees,6 and the NT is able to assess how 
government departments have responded to its financial management measures7. The NT 
has also improved the financial accountability cycle by integrating the budget and planning 
processes at the national and provincial level.  It has standardised programme performance 
measures, and supports departments in reviewing their measurable objectives so as to 
improve overall performance information.  Its formats for reporting allow for both quantitative 
and qualitative information to be integrated. Importantly, it has customised reporting formats 
for key sectors, all of which are service delivery related, that is, education, health, social 
                                                 
2
  Presidency. 2007a. Government`s Programme of Action. Republic of South Africa. 
3
  Presidency. 2010a. Guide to the Outcomes Approach. 1 June. Republic of South Africa. 
4
  Presidency. 2003. Towards A Ten Year Review.  Republic of South Africa.   
5
 Presidency. 2009. Development Indicators 2009. Republic of South Africa.   
6
  Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) is a multi-party structure of Parliament. 
7
 National Treasury. 2004. Progress report on the Implementation of the Public Finance management Act 
(PFMA), 1999 as at 31 March 2004.  Presented to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts  
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development, agriculture, and transport. The format for each sector has key performance 
indicators, and allows for data to be compared across provinces8 .  
 
The NT exercises economic power over departments, and through its expectation of periodic 
in-year reporting on expenditure, it has the power to intervene when needed. It conducts 
assessments of how well its own policy works, and plays a direct role in guiding the process 
for budgeting, through the MTSFs and MTEFs. This helps to ensure that political priorities 
are translated into operational plans, and monitored. It produces clear guidelines in this 
regard.9 It links policy and service delivery, and the NT has strong monitoring capability, 
which it uses to keep departments focused on realising political priorities. It is 
understandable that the NT has entered the M&E terrain by attempting to standardise the 
language of performance, through the production of a framework for managing programme 
performance information10.   
 
The financials of departments are audited by a Chapter 9 institution, the AG11 and Public 
Audit Act, which in section 20(3) clearly states that it reports on the three Es (efficiency, 
economy and effectiveness) and also ensures that performance auditing standards are met 
and that there is quality assurance12. The reports of the AG are made public, debated and 
may be acted upon through other oversight institutions13. The AG provides an evaluation of 
financial performance, whereas the NT focuses more on the monitoring aspect.   
 
The DPSA has a responsibility to assess the extent to which government policies are 
adhered to, and as part of its policy formulation process, requires its own M&E systems. In 
terms of the latter it produces its own assessments of policy but also draws upon the work of 
other oversight institutions and bodies. The Minister for Public Service and Administration, 
as the political head for the Public Service, is vested with significant authority over the Public 
Service.  A strong M&E capability is thus required from the DPSA.  
 
The PSC is a Chapter 10 Constitutional body that has been set up to “investigate, monitor 
and evaluate public administration practices”. It is independent and operates “without fear, 
                                                 
8
  Verified information with Chief Director, National Treasury. 
9
 National Treasury. 2007. Medium Term Expenditure Framework. Treasury Guidelines, 2008 Republic of 
South Africa.  
10
 National Treasury. 2007b. Framework for managing Programme Performance Information. Republic of 
South Africa.  
11
  The AG is governed by Section 188 of the Constitution. 
12
  Republic of South Africa. Public Audit Act. Section 13(1). 
13
  Section 196 of the Constitution allows the PSC top issue recommendations for compliance.  
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favour or prejudice”. 14Through its work it promotes “good governance” largely by assessing 
adherence to the 9 Constitutional Values and Principles. The process of presenting its 
findings supports transparency and much of this information enters the public domain. To 
date, it has produced the largest body of M&E on the Public Service in the country.   
The MME institutions listed above are external to departments, protected by Acts which 
allow them to insist on the provision of information, and able to punish, through withholding 
resources or public admonishment, those departments that do not comply. These bodies 
have recourse to higher oversight bodies should they not be respected. The cumulative 
impact of these MME players is the generation of a compliance culture.15 The degree of 
independence exercised by these bodies should theoretically remove bias and ensure that 
they remain focused on their primary mandates. Noting that good governance is 
multidimensional, no one body working on its own will deliver against all the criteria and 
norms of good governance.   
 
There are certain features that the above bodies have, and which provide them with the 
power to exercise their oversight. The first is that they receive direction from the highest 
political office, and departments that fall under them are obliged to comply, or there could be 
serious political or administrative consequences. They thus have the power to sanction, 
which may take the form of a negative judgement or rebuke or the withholding of resources. 
The bodies may make performance information public, which can then be taken up by other 
bodies and used for calling departments to account.  
 
The second feature is that they draw on either a political mandate for assessing performance 
or compliance to legislation and policy. There is thus a clear authority for their work, and 
their M&E interventions cannot be reasonably resisted. It is clear in all instances that the 
work seeks to see whether there is accountability for resources allocated, and in this regard 
there tends to be a bias towards assessing how resources, in particular financial resources, 
are used. The M&E efforts are seen as ensuring accountability, and driving compliance, 
which means that questions of learning may be secondary. The thrust is external, and whilst 
the efforts may produce higher levels of transparency and greater amounts of performance 
information, this is more an outcome of the accountability drive than the main purpose of this 
type of M&E. 
 
                                                 
14
   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 1996. Section 196. 
15
  Each institution on its own has powers to sanction. Cumulatively, the bodies instil a compliance culture, due 
to their ability to seek public approval of their findings, or refer these findings to other, more influential 
oversight bodies (political, etc.). The connotation of power listed earlier thus applies.  
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This form of M&E has a strong judgemental nature, and is linked to punitive measures, 
which may be in the form of publically showing up performance or more serious sanction 
which is initiated either by the M&E institution or forums where such M&E results are 
presented. This chapter describes all of these in relation to the prevailing question of 
whether compliance or accountability driven M&E leads to good governance. It takes the 
view that good governance is an amalgam of effects and practices, and one form of M&E on 
its own is inadequate to constitute good governance. It also recognises that the different 
M&E effects (accountability, transparency and learning) may pose practical tensions and 
raise contradictions. Perrin (2007) makes this point when he talks of how the quest for 
accountability may be in contradiction with other M&E outcomes.  
 
Finally, these bodies produce information that has political and public interest, as it relates 
directly to the performance of government. There will thus always be a vested interest in 
results. Performance information from MME, given its potential to highlight poor performance 
and demand accountability, is highly political, as noted by Kusak and Rist (1997). 
 
Before proceeding to describe and analyse how the M&E institutions assess compliance in 
the DSD, it is necessary to present and assess the two key compliance frameworks for 
public service departments, namely the 9 Constitutional Values and Principles and 8 Batho 
Pele Principles. These frameworks are the basis for the validation referred to earlier by 
Weiss (2000), which is the evidence that there is compliance, and hence accountability.  
Accountability frameworks are rooted in legislation and policy, and may have different focus 
areas for different content or subject areas. Thus, the financial accountability framework 
which is derived from Treasury Regulations will emphasise compliance with spending norms, 
and look at economic, efficiency and effectiveness considerations. In a similar manner the 
area of professional ethics may look at aspects of fraud prevention, detection and response, 
to provide an assessment of how well departments comply with this aspect of accountability. 
The discussion now proceeds to describe the accountability and compliance framework used 
by government.  
 
6.4 ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH 
GOVERNMENT  DEPARTMENTS OPERATE 
 
Government departments, as publically funded institutions are subject to various forms of 
accountability, each of which uses different means to solicit, analyse, report and act upon 
different types of performance information. The need for government to demonstrate its 
commitment to accountability has been widely cited, and relates to the interest in the 
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measurement of the State (Fox, 2002). Accountability is a key measurement dimension. The 
primary thrust for accountability comes from the political sphere, and as Taylor and Balloch 
(2005) illustrate, gives M&E impetus. Kusek and Rist (2004) indicate that apart from 
evaluation being used for making political decisions, it is also used for making economic 
decisions. These studies indicate that there is a broad acceptance that M&E plays a key role 
in ensuring accountability. The accountability or MME aligns itself with those methods which 
are close to the auditing discipline, and where there is strong support for supporting the 
governance function (Cook, 1997: 14).  
 
This chapter assesses the different governance frameworks that are in place. At the political 
level there is the accountability thrust from the Presidency and Cabinet, which finds 
expression in the PoA, Parliament and its committees. The benchmark here tends to be the 
extent to which high level political commitments are met quantitatively (number of houses 
built, electrification rates, etc.). At an intent level, there is a commitment to being transparent 
around this process, with the PoA being placed on the government web-site. Information 
from Ministries, and presumably originated from the M&E units within departments, is fed 
upwards and then packaged for reporting. These reports are periodically updated, but there 
is limited information available on its effectiveness as an accountability tool.  
 
There are also political oversight structures which departments have to comply with, and 
these include Parliament and its committees. These committees use information generated 
from departments themselves, mainly Annual Reports, to exercise oversight. They also use 
the work of oversight bodies and departments such as the NT, AG, the DPSA and PSC to 
call departments to account on aspects relating to governance. By virtue of access to these 
committees being public, and the multi-party nature of the composition of these committees, 
one can assume that there is a degree of rigour and debate on the findings. Some of the 
deliberations may find their way into the public space which may be used by civil society and 
which serves to further bolster the accountability thrust.  
 
There are two explicit governance frameworks, elements of which are drawn upon by the 
key oversight bodies, these being the NT, AG, DPSA and PSC. The first is the 9 
Constitutional Values and Principles for public administration which is the M&E framework or 
definition for good governance of departments, and the 8 Batho Pele Principles. These 
values and principles contain directives for public administration, and how well departments 
respond to these may be considered an indicator of compliance to this accountability 
framework. The governance perspective is in terms of the ability to comply with what is 
politically agreed upon as good practice. 
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The Constitutional Values and Principles has elements which overlap with international 
definitions of good governance, which Santiso (2001) states is relatively new, and which 
emerged from the 1989 World Bank`s report on the crisis in governance in sub-Saharan 
Africa. (Kaufmann et al, 1999) define good governance as strengthening accountability, 
enhancing the rule of law and promoting participation. The most pertinent insight is that of 
Weiss (2000) who sees governance as going beyond government, and implies that there 
must be some validation or judgement of activities. The M&E bodies thus provide a type of 
validation (compliance and accountability) and a perspective of the extent to which this type 
of M&E contributes to the overarching concept of good governance.  
 
The Batho Pele Principles provide an assessment of governance from the perspective of the 
citizens. It provides a benchmark of what citizens can expect with regards to service 
delivery. It may also be considered as an accountability framework.  
 
6.4.1 Constitutional Values and Principles for public administration 
 
The key Public Service accountability framework may be regarded as the 9 Constitutional 
Values and Principles which stipulate the behaviour expected of the Public Service, in terms 
of how it is managed and operates. This relates to a range of areas of public administration.  
The values and principles intersect with the values of M&E, democracy and good 
governance indicators, the common denominator being the production of transparency and 
accountability. It may thus be assumed that if the Public Service is managed in a manner 
that directs performance towards attaining the Constitutional Values and Principles, good 
governance is promoted. 
  
The custodian of the Constitutional Values and Principles is the PSC, and is responsible for 
testing compliance against these values and principles. It drives these through its application 
of the Transversal Public Service M&E System which measures compliance at a 
departmental and aggregate level. Thus far it has produced over 100 such reports, and 6 
consolidated reports. These values and principles have also been used as the framework for 
the PSC`s nine State of the Public Service Reports which are high level Annual Reports that 
talk to these performance areas on a thematic basis. Collectively, it is the standard for good 
governance for departments, and government generally.  
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The Public Service is expected to enact these values and principles, and through its size16 
become an example for the country as a whole when it comes to matters of effective 
governance. Whilst many of the values and principles would meet global governance 
standards, in South Africa there is a contextual bias, noted in that there are additional values 
and principles that address historic factors, hence the addition of the value and principle of 
transformation (or representivity).  
 
These values and principles resonate with the Nolan principles17 in some regards, but more 
importantly intersect with the values expected of a constitutional democracy, including 
transparency, accountability and public participation. A right that is conveyed within this set 
is the right to fairness, and by implication the right to redress. There is also an expectation 
that there would be administrative and policy compliance, which would relate to the 
principles on human resource management and representivity.   
 
The Constitutional Values and Principles are the bedrock for good governance in South 
Africa and can apply to the Public Service broadly. They can be seen as relevant for all of 
the three M&E perspectives. As the bedrock for good governance in South Africa, it would 
be necessary to expand upon how the values and principles apply to the M&E perspectives 
selected for this study. The Table below illustrates the “governance element” for each value 
and principle, which are the normative benchmarks for assessing the performance of the 
Public Service.  
 
Table 6.2:  Constitutional Values and Principles and contribution to good governance 
Constitutional value and 
principle  
Contribution to good 
governance 
Other contributions 
1.  A high standard of 
professional ethics 
must be maintained 
 
Ethical performance  
This is a personal attribute that 
must be promoted. There is the 
expectation that public servants 
will not abuse their office for 
personal interest. The 
intersecting values between 
ethics and good governance are 
being efficient, transparent, 
accountable and honest. The 
broader question asked of 
departments within which public 
Foreign sentiment, political and 
economic,
18
 is influenced by 
perception of the quality of a 
country‟s Public Service, which 
is the key interface between 
development actors and 
partners. Corruption indices are 
indicative of the state of ethics 
in the Public Service, and the 
large number of conventions 
signed by the country is an 
                                                 
16
  The Public Service in South Africa is the largest employer, at 1, 2 million employees, and thus influential 
across a large economic, social and geographic context.  
17
  7 principles for public service, which include selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, 
stewardship. 
18
  Refer to the State of the Public service Reports of the PSC since 2004, see www.psc.gov.za  
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Constitutional value and 
principle  
Contribution to good 
governance 
Other contributions 
servants operate would be how 
well the environment promotes 
and presents ethical conduct.  
indication of a need to comply 
with international ethical 
standards thus positively 
enhancing international image.  
 
2. Efficient, economic 
and effective use of 








Given that the Public Service 
disburses public (citizens) 
funds, it should do so with 
prudence and ensure that there 
is sufficient probity which is 
necessary to meet the 
standards of good governance. 
This requires systems that 
allocate and track expenditure, 
and curb wastage. It also 
requires systems that lead to 
more efficient use of scarce 
public resources, and which 
report back to the citizens on 
how its funds have been 
disbursed. It is clearly a good 
governance issue.  
The financial size of Public 
Service makes it necessary that 
systems ensure efficiency, as 
problems in individual units that 
lead to wastage, when 
aggregated upwards can be 
quite significant. Good financial 
management does require a 
degree of micro-management, 
and systems from the NT and 
other M&E instrument ensure 
this. More broadly, private 
sector investment is influenced 
by the macro-economic policy 
and general fiscal performance 
of government. This principle 
also links to the principle (1) 
above, as corruption is a key 
factor that can negate this 
principle being realised.  
3.  Public administration 





The governance implications 
are more long term, as a stable 
and economically sound country 
is more likely to enjoy better 
levels of stability and 
democracy. Policies that seek to 
reduce inequality and reduce 
the Gini coefficient are meant to 
contribute to good governance.  
Service delivery is a part of 
good governance, not only in 
South Africa where there is a 
need to redress apartheid 
legacies. The development 
focus of government provides 
the impetus for other 
investment. This may be seen in 
private-public sector 
partnerships, those that support 
specific socio-economic 
improvements, such as the 
poverty reduction programme, 
increasing educational access 
etc. It also links to efforts to 
meet the MDGs.  
4.  Services must be 
provided impartially, 





This is also “contextually 
specific” although it is universal. 
In South Africa it is particularly 
meant to drive rights – thus 
ensuring that citizens are 
treated equally and fairly, and 
this is a good governance 
driver. The Public Service is 
seen as a lever to entrench and 
As a member of the global 
community the country 
subscribes to international 
conventions on human rights. 
This is most evident from the 
Public Service point of view 
through the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 
which seeks to prevent 
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Constitutional value and 
principle  
Contribution to good 
governance 
Other contributions 
deliver these rights, and thus 
enhance human dignity which 
allows for democratic benefit to 
be experienced more fully. It is a 
norm that can be measured 
from the perspective of citizens, 
and in many instances would be 
their main evidence of whether 
government is working for them.  
unfairness in administrative 
decisions. Most citizens 
experience some form of 
administrative decisions and 
from their point of view this is 
telling of how well government is 
working.  
5.  People’s needs must 
be responded to, and 






This is also a “contextually 
specific” principle, but links 
more broadly to issues of 
democratic engagement by 
citizens. It is privileged due to 
the quest to move from the old, 
autocratic order to a new 
democratic one, and seeks to 
make the Public Service 
accountable to the citizens 
themselves. From a good 
governance perspective it offers 
the potential for checks and 
balances to corruption or the 
abuse of power, and seeks to 
prevent the Public Service from 
becoming a self-perpetuating 
and non-accountable institution. 
Ensuring that this principle does 
in fact work is a challenge. The 
main value of an engaged 
citizenry is to hold government 
accountable, which means that 
citizens must have information 
and opportunities to participate. 
This is a cornerstone of good 
governance.  
6. Public administration 





At the apex of democracy is an 
accountable Public Service, 
wherein all its public actions are 
subject to review and scrutiny. 
The effectiveness of institutions 
of democracy (Parliament, 
legislatures, specific bodies 
empowered to oversee 
government), will be the true 
test of whether accountability, 
and thus democracy is working, 
which in turn is an indicator of 
good governance.  
The data from the institutions of 
democracy (Chapter 9 and 10) 
in the Constitution, together with 
the media, clearly indicate how 
accountable a government is. 
This in turn influences 
sentiment, and translates into 
public perception, voting, 
investment, etc.  
7. Transparency must be 
fostered by providing 








A precursor to accountability, 
this value has particular 
importance in SA, due to the 
apartheid past. The extent to 
which word is translated into 
deed and the extent to which 
performance information is 
actually used, is indicative of the 
quality of governance. The main 
value would be that citizens can 
The Public Service is obliged to 
be explicit about what it policies 
and procedures are. This allows 
for monitoring of its compliance, 
and through the media and civic 
engagement, it helps 
accountability. The extent to 
which the country is “open”, 
produces further effects in terms 
of sentiment, confidence, 
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Constitutional value and 
principle  





use such information to hold 
government to account.   
investment, etc.  
8. Good human resource 
management and 
career development 
practices, to maximise 
human potential, must 
be cultivated 
 
This is also a good governance 
issue, in that a competent public 
sector should translate into 
better benefits for citizens. 
Given that the South African 
Public Service is the largest 
employer in the country (1,1 
million public servants), it stands 
to reason that this capacity must 
be well managed.  
The effect of good human 
resource management can be 
seen in how citizens experience 
service delivery. This takes 
various forms, and it should be 
noted that there are many faces 
to the public sector, given the 
vast range of services provided.  
9. Public administration 
must be broadly 
representative of the 
South African people, 
with employment and 
personnel 
management practices 
based on ability, 
objectivity, fairness 
and the need to 
redress the imbalances 
of the past to achieve 
broad representation 
This is very much a 
“contextually specific” issue in 
that achieving representivity is 
necessary for better service 
delivery and demonstrating 
democratic achievement in 
practice. It seeks to reverse 
racial stereotypes around 
competence and help promote a 
more inclusive Public Service to 
meet the needs of a democratic 
country.  
Data indicates that large scale 
absorption of Previously 
Disadvantaged Individuals has 
contributed to the emerging 
black middle class, which in 
itself serves to improve the 
overall socio-economic profile of 
citizens.  
 
6.4.2 Batho Pele principles  
  
A further framework for compliance is the 8 Batho Pele principles which are a set of 
standards that citizens can expect of government when it comes to the delivery of services. 
Whereas the Constitutional Values and Principles is a set of managerial imperatives, relating 
largely to how departments should be managed, the Batho Pele Principles are public servant 
imperatives, indicating what is supposed to be done when public servants and departments 
interface with citizens, who are the clients.  
 
The DPSA is accountable for ensuring that departments implement the Batho Pele 
Principles, which it does in various ways. However, the PSC and civil society also conduct 
appraisals of the implementation of these principles. The chapter on CME will look at how 
the DSD has responded to this accountability requirement, which is largely an assessment of 
the quality of service delivery from the citizen perspective. It will require examining the M&E 
system of both the SASSA and DSD, in terms of examining what these systems prioritise.  
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The Table below indicates the Batho Pele Principles in terms of how these relate to good 
governance. 
 
Table 6.3:  Batho Pele in relation to good governance 




Leads to a people-centred 
government, services are relevant to 
the needs of citizens 
Relates to Constitutional Values and 
Principles – principle 8 (people‟s 
needs must be responded to) 
Forms of public participation 
Use of Izimbizo, citizen forums 
Executive committee meets the 
people 
Resources available for 
engagement 
Service Standards 
Introduces a level of predictability 
with regards to services, creates 
certainty and stability, reduces 
arbitrariness, helps to reduce 
corruption, produces equality 
Waiting times stipulated 
Clearly stating what are the 
application requirements 
Turn-around times stipulated 
Adhering to service delivery 
commitments 
 Access 
Gives substance to the commitment 
of being responsive to citizens 
needs 
Convenience of operating hours 
Ability to contact department 
telephonically and by other means 
Access to building by elderly and 
disabled 
Courtesy 
Basic human relations, indicates 
that citizens are the central subject 
of government 
Greetings 
Availability of water and toilets 
Cleanliness of facilities 
Officials work beyond time 
 Information 
Key way through which citizens can 
get empowered 
Availability of signage 
Information desk 
Availability for forms and user-
friendliness 
Language of documents 
 Redress 
Allows for recourse to higher order, 
if dissatisfied, is a check and 
balance to prevent the abuse of 
power 
Mechanisms to respond to 
complaints  
Responding to grievances 
Suggestion boxes 
 Value for Money 
Meets the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness principles from the 
Constitutional Values and Principles  
(principle 2) 
Effective services provided 
Reasonable costs for services 
Openness and 
Transparency 
A key measure of democratic 
government (from Constitutional 
Values and Principles) that relates 
to transparency. This is a critical 
means by which good governance 
can be promoted, as it prevents 
abuse of power and helps with the 
scrutiny of decision making.  
May be measured through the 
quality of Annual Reports and 
adherence of departments to the 
Promotion of Access to Information 
Act. It may also be measured at site 
level, which is where citizens are 
able to access information on 
government.  
                                                 
19
  Interview with Senior Manager at the PSC responsible for Service Delivery and Compliance Evaluation, 16 
February 2010, to validate study on drivers on citizen satisfaction by the PSC. 
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Having presented the two accountability frameworks for the Public Service, the discussion 
now looks at how performance management has been institutionalised. 
 
6.5 INSTITUTIONALISING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE 
 
All of the above relates to improving compliance with frameworks deemed appropriate for 
good governance. It is important to note that this has taken place in the context of broader 
discussions which sought to institutionalise performance management in the Public Service.  
The post-1994 period was characterised by political promises for holding the Public Service 
accountable. Since 1994 the Minister for Public Service and Administration has been 
promising that the Public Service would be accountable and managers held to account. 
Similar statements have been made by the President of the country in key State of the 
Nation Addresses.  
 
The post-1994 period was supposed to institutionalise performance management in the 
public sector, and oversight bodies expected to ensure there is compliance to these policies 
and systems which are assumed to be a lever for better performance management. The 
PMDSs were constructed very much in the period of NPM (Ferlie and Ashburner, 1996). The 
increased call for measurement of results was an outcome of the democratic period, where 
South Africa became a signatory to international accords on good governance like NEPAD 
(Amuwo, 2000), and this has translated into developing M&E systems within the Public 
Service. It has also been an era where the democratic administration became involved in 
M&E initiatives at a country, continental and international level, such as overt support to 
evaluation associations such as SAMEA and AFrEA. Given the political nature of evaluation, 
it is not surprising that these initiatives were also politically supported (Taylor and Balloch, 
2005). 
 
Having sketched the social and political context which was conducive to M&E, one needs to 
look at how well individual performance management systems actually work in government, 
and whether they have, through their compliance and accountability thrust, contributed to 
good governance. Whereas in the pre-1994 period performance was largely individualised, 
focusing on the so-called “incidentation” reports, and staff mobility at the time linked to 
issues of seniority. Theoretically the post-1994 period was intended to be a period where 
individual performance needed to be aligned to institutional performance. In other words, the 
performance contract of the Head of Departments (HoDs) should have key result areas that 
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are aligned to the political mandate of the department, and he/she would then contract to 
subordinates who would have key result areas that align upwards and downwards across 
the organisation.  The assumption is that if performance management systems are in place 
and contracts aligned, with managers complying with time-frames for conducting 
assessments, the desired outputs would be delivered.  
 
This makes certain critical assumptions about how performance can be managed and 
improved. It assumes that once the necessary contracting for performance takes place there 
is a legal and administrative basis for managing staff and their performance. It also assumes 
that there will be a cascading of responsibilities from the Minister to HoD, to other levels of 
staff, and this will ensure that key result areas are met. It also makes the assumption that the 
conducting of performance assessments will deliver the appropriate levels of reflection and 
frank feedback, learning will take place and future performance will be improved. It is a very 
systems approach to human resource management, and is predicated on the assumption 
that there would be objectivity and neutrality in managing the system. However, the fact that 
aggregated results show that there are still major service delivery challenges, it would 
appear that despite contracting systems being in place, they are not effective in generating 
the results where it matters, which is at the citizen interface with government. The ability to 
comply with elements of performance management does not imply better governance, only 
better compliance.  
 
6.6 THE ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS THAT DRIVE PERFORMANCE IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
The performance of government depends on whether there is service delivery. The actors 
and institutions which exercise oversight, largely the mandatory institutions which this 
chapter assesses are there to ensure that the Public Service is directed to achieve quality 
service delivery. It means that they do not exist in their own right, but are there for a purpose 
of improving performance towards the attainment of service delivery. These actors and 
institutions comprise those bodies given oversight responsibility based on constitutional and 
legal imperatives, such as the PSC and those which execute specific mandates as 
prescribed by regulation, such as the Public Service Act, 1999. This grouping drives different 
types of compliance, which in the case of the 9 Constitutional Values and Principles is driven 
by the PSC. With regards to financial compliance it is the NT and the AG and as far as public 
administration policy is concerned, it is the DPSA. These three institutions have a very direct 
relationship with government departments, all of which are obliged to adhere to different 
reporting requirements which they prescribe. Overall, they drive compliance, and exercise 
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oversight through implementing their own M&E systems, or drawing from M&E data. The 
oversight work conducted by such bodies is dealt with in this chapter under the heading of 
MME.  
 
Based on the literature review, and researcher observations, the can be assumed that MME 
shapes the internal managerial ethos of departments by directing management to meet the 
requirements of oversight bodies. All other work of the department tends to be influenced by 
these priorities. This will be taken up in chapter 6, to see how dominant this influence is in 
influencing management practices, and whether it is valued as useful or not. Validating 
whether this happens is practice is Parliament, which as a key oversight body, has the space 
and responsibility to judge whether there is compliance to good governance principles.  
 
6.7 SCHEMA USED FOR CONDUCTING ASSESSMENT 
 
The areas of compliance identified are assessed in terms of the schema below. For each 
area of compliance the following will be presented: 
 
The relevance of the area to good governance 
The rationale of the system from the policy-makers perspective 
The systems used to gather, analyse and present findings 
The contribution of the particular system or focus area to M&E and good governance 
 
Figure 6.3:  Schema for Assessing Compliance 
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6.8 ACCOUNTABILITY TO CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES AND PRINCIPLES  
 
The 9 areas which departments need to comply with constitutionally, as prescribed in the 
Constitution, could be regarded as an operational definition of good governance in South 
Africa. As already stated, the Constitutional Values and Principles relate to other 
internationally accepted definitions of good governance. The PSC uses the Constitutional 
Values and Principles as its evaluation framework, which serves as the lens through which 
departmental performance is assessed. Through the application of the Transversal Public 
Service M&E System, which measures regulatory compliance, it has thus far produced over 
100 departmental reports, which it has used to engage departments with in terms of their 
compliance to these principles. This assessment begins by showing how the DSD has 
complied to the Transversal Public Services M&E System in terms of the two applications of 
the system in the department, but focuses on the issue of professional ethics in more detail 
as it sees this as being a key area of vulnerability for departments, and which can undermine 
the thrust for good governance.  
 
6.8.1 Rationale of the system(s) from the policy-makers perspective 
 
The translation of Constitutional Values and Principles into indicators and a comprehensive 
M&E system is based on the premise that by focusing on relevant indicators, the 
management of departments are obliged to focus on areas deemed important for good 
governance. The Transversal Public Service M&E System has undergone much iteration 
since its inception in 2001, and what one currently has is a centrally managed M&E system 
that periodically appraises departments on their compliance levels with the Constitutional 
Values and Principles.  The latest framework may be accessed from the PSC website20.  
 
Interviews with the designers and managers of this system indicate that they show a strong 
belief in its ability21 to focus attention on the Constitutional Values and Principles. They also 
felt that it was taken seriously in that there had been improved levels of co-operation from 
departments, and the departments acceded to the request by the PSC to receive the report 
at a management level. They also interpreted the fact that most departments did not use the 
opportunity to provide comments on the draft report as meaning the system was acceptable 
and the findings authentic. However, they were not able to indicate whether the system was 
perceived as valuable from the managers of departments where it is implemented, or 
                                                 
20
    http://www.psc.gov.za  
21
   Senior managers responsible for the PSMES at the PSC, who implement the system nationally. 
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whether one could conclude that it improves the quality of governance. This is an important 
observation, and the inability of managers who drive the system to know whether it has an 
impact beyond highlight the value, and the fact that the system was not subject to any 
critical, externally review, is concerning. It may suggest an uncritical application of a system 
without appreciating its value and of achieving compliance without recognising the 
importance such a system could have for improving learning and reflection. The researcher 
noted that little effort was made to present and engage the results with the department, 
which is the critical learning moment. The emphasis has been on producing the report and 
returning thereafter to test compliance with adherence to the recommendations. Thus one 
cannot accept that this system on its own promotes good governance. Its true value may 
thus not have been achieved due to the factors mentioned above. 
 
The Table below indicates the key systems of the PSC, based on its operational areas, in 
terms of the different target audiences or users. 
 
Table 6.4: Key M&E systems of the PSC 
Governance Area
22





NACH Manages Hotline and 












Framework for the 
evaluation of HoDs 
Co-ordinate and chair 
panels for HoD 















of Senior Management 
service 
Draw on data of 
departments where 
officials have been 
charged, and develop 
annual trend reports 
Monitor submission 
rate of financial 
disclosures, and 










produce trend reports 
Adjudicate referred 
grievances, and 






Inspections and Batho 
Pele surveys 
Individual reports to 
political heads, with 
plan for follow-up on 
Political principals, 
management, public  
                                                 
22
   The researcher engaged with senior management of the PSC in the production of this list. 




From the above, it is clear that the focus of the PSC is more on compliance and testing 
adherence to policy. There is an accountability focus, and whilst there have been 
engagements with stakeholders on its work, this has been limited. It is not surprising 
therefore that an independently commissioned impact assessment of the PSC23 found that 
its impact in many key areas was limited, and that it was difficult to distinguish what it had 
done in terms of improving a more efficient Public Service. The discussion now focuses on 
the application of some of these systems on the DSD.  
 
6.8.2 Results of the DSD based on the implementation of the PSM&ES 
 
The DSD has been subject to two assessments in terms of the above system. The results for 
these periods are as follows: 
 











1.  A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted 
and maintained 
70 70 
2.  Efficiency, economy and effectiveness  90 60 
3.  Public administration must be development oriented 70 90 
4.  Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably 
and without bias 
60 100 
5.  People`s needs must be responded to and the public 
must be encouraged to participate in policy-making 
80 100 
6. Public administration must be accountable 80 90 
7.  Transparency must be fostered by providing the public 
with timely, accessible and accurate information 
100 100 
8.  Good human resource management and career 
development practices must be cultivated 
80 60 
9.  Public administration must be broadly representative of 










                                                 
23
  Public Service Commission. 2009b. An assessment of the impact of the work of the Public Service 
Commission on policy. Republic of South Africa.  
24
  The results were extracted from the reports of the PSM&ES for the evaluations conducted in 2002 and 2008.  
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From the above Table, which compares performance between two evaluation cycles, the 
DSD has improved in its compliance to the indicators at an aggregated level, from 70% 
(2001/2) to 85% (2007/8). Over the 6 year period, performance has been sustained or 
improved for most of the Constitutional Values and Principles, the exception being values 
and principles 2, 8 and 9. These are for the areas of efficiency, human resource 
management and representivity. In the area of efficiency, where financial management is 
considered, it was found that the score dropped from 90% to 60%, due the decline in the 
achievement of priority outputs. In the first period it was higher as more of the priority outputs 
were achieved, hence the score of 80%, but fell to 60% in the second period as only 
between 40-59% of the key priority outputs were achieved. The achievement of priority 
outputs is a key area of performance, as it points to the impact that a department is having in 
key policy areas. Where this has declined this suggests a misalignment between planning 
and service delivery.  
 
The decline in the performance area of human resources was due to the slow filling of posts, 
which fell outside the 90 day time period, meaning that capacity was not replaced when 
vacancies arose. More importantly, a skills development plan had not been implemented to 
the standard where two-thirds of the plan was implemented and two-thirds of planned skills 
development activities that impact on service delivery had been assessed. This is a 
concerning finding, and suggests that the key public-departmental interface issues was not 
taken seriously. In terms of principle of representivity, the performance declined because 
diversity management plans were not implemented. Therefore, in unpacking the 
performance of the DSD, it can be found that whilst overall performance has increased, in 
key areas of performance there were serious declines in performance standards. 
 
In terms of this assessment, a more detailed focus is made on the area of professional 
ethics, given that corruption is a key factor which undermines service delivery and stymies 
good governance. This focus is also informed by the fact that most of the compliance work 
undertaken by the PSC relates to this area, as noted in Table 5.5 above. The combating of 
corruption is dependent upon the extent to which compliance to the frameworks put in place 
to prevent corruption is transparent, as putting such information into the public domain helps 
to drive accountability. Addressing corruption is also a good governance indicator (World 
Bank definition). Therefore the focus on principle one under the work of the PSC is 
deliberate in that it seeks to answer two questions: 
 
a) How effective are the systems that are used by the PSC to identify areas of 
vulnerability in promoting good governance?  
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b) Can the act of compliance be equated to good governance?   
 
 
6.8.3 Ethical compliance as an indicator of good governance  
 
The first of the nine Constitutional Values and Principles, the “promotion of professional 
ethics”, is critical to good governance given that policy is mediated and implemented through 
public servants. The human factor has been identified as central for the transformation of the 
bureaucracy, and the personal disposition of public servants (as intermediaries between 
policy and citizens) is important, given their influence over decision-making and resources. 
The integrity they display at the workplace is a critical factor influencing service delivery. If 
public servants are dishonest, one can expect that the best intended policies will not come to 
fruition as the priority will not be on producing public value, but rather appropriating State 
resources for personal gain. The crisis in governance in many countries was really a crisis 
around corruption.  
 
This area thus considers professional ethics alongside risk management, with the former 
focusing on what is done to promote a certain type of behaviour and the latter examining 
how systems are used to make departments corruption resistant. Ethical compliance is thus 
viewed through two frameworks; the different policies and measures to ensure ethical 
compliance by public servants, and the quality of the risk management systems in 
departments.   
 
The magnitude of the issue needs to be looked at in the context of the South African Public 
Service, which at the national and provincial level, employs over 1,1 million public servants 
at a remuneration cost of over R70 billion Rands per annum. This is the investment by 
government in its Public Service and public servants are expected to translate policy into 
public goods and services. Ensuring that public servants adhere to ethical frameworks is an 
element of good governance, as unethical public servants would misdirect State resources 
and thus undermine service delivery. In this context it becomes important to look at how 
public servants are monitored in terms of compliance, and how departments adhere to risk 
management strategies. Both are necessary to keep the Public Service resistant to 
corruption, and a consideration of this is important in terms of the broader question of good 
governance.  
 
The South African Public Service operates within a global scenario where countries 
belonging to the Commonwealth, the continent and other bodies are constantly rated in 
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terms of their integrity (World Bank, 2008). The investment potential of countries is 
influenced by the extent to which minimum stipulations25 are met, and membership of such 
bodies is dependent on the degree to which countries have policies and practices which 
reflect a commitment to fighting corruption in the Public Service, which includes political 
pronouncements and practical commitment to fighting corruption.  
 
A concrete measure in the country has been the adoption of a Code of Conduct, which was 
promulgated in 1997 as a “guide for employees as to what is expected of them from an 
ethical point of view, both in their individual conduct and their relationship to others”26.  The 
efficacy of this code has been assessed, and whilst it has been shown as important in 
establishing a culture of appropriate behaviour, on its own will not curb corruption.27  
 
In essence, a combination of regional and international commitment to anti-corruption by 
government, the implementation of domestic policies and legislation to ensure that 
departments deal with corruption, coupled with a strategy to inculcate certain values in public 
servants, makes up the tools for fighting corruption.  How well this works in practice is shown 
by results from the key oversight institutions that focus on this element.  
 
6.8.4 Measures used to promote the Constitutional Values and Principles of 
professional ethics  
 
A key determiner of ethical compliance is the conduct of public servants and the quality of 
the risk management infrastructure in departments. The former seeks to instil a disposition in 
public servants that makes them professional and not self-serving, which is an indicator of 
good governance.  
 
A comprehensive strategy has been put into place to create an ethical climate that is 
conducive to good governance. At a policy level the establishment of a spectrum of role-
players dealing with anti-corruption, which includes the public, private and civil society 
sector, to work in concert to address the problem has resulted in the formation of the NACF 
which has instituted a range of projects to translate its vision into practice. It candidly 
reflected on its achievements in 2007 when it found that it was able to implement 27 
                                                 
25
  Republic of South Africa. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act No. 12 of   2004). 
26
  Code of Conduct for the Public Service as contained in Chapter 2 of the Public Service Regulations, 1999.  
27
  Public Service Commission. 2006a. Report on Measuring the Efficacy of the Code of Conduct for the Public 
Service. Republic of South Africa.  
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resolutions taken during the Second National Anti-Corruption summit in 200528. The overall 
strategy may be described as follows:  
a) Adopting a pragmatic approach to making departments corruption-proof, through the 
implementation of policies that insist on risk management strategies within 
departments. This includes issuing directives from the NT and the DPSA, which 
compel departments to identify and report on risk.29    
b) A legislatively driven approach, through catalytic policy instruments such as the 
PFMA, 1999. This requires that the HoD to exercise his/her role as the Accounting 
Officer, which means being held personally and severally responsible for all aspects 
pertaining to risks and ethics30 .  
c) The implementation of risk management strategies is M&E by the oversight bodies 
such as the PSC, which through its Transversal Public Service M&E System 
(PSM&ES). The system assesses departments‟ risk management strategies, and 
uses this information as an indicator for determining how well a department complies 
with the norms for professional ethics, accountability and transparency. The risk 
management strategy and effectiveness is also M&E by the AG and the NT.  
d) The inclusion of the public to M&E, the ethical conduct of departments and 
individuals. This is most pronounced through a Cabinet decision31 that there would 
be a NACH, which points to areas of concern for investigative follow-up. 
e) The placing of the burden of proof on individuals to prove they are not corrupt. This 
takes the form of submitting Financial Disclosures, which makes transparent the 
financial affairs of officials, assisting in the detection of conflicts of interest.  
 
The above are the key thrusts to ensure that the value of professional ethics is prioritised. 
 
6.9 M&E SYSTEMS USED TO ASSESS RISK AND CORRUPTION IN DEPARTMENTS 
 
There are many ways in which departments are assessed for complying with this principle. 
Through looking at its risk management strategies, one can deduce how vulnerable a 
department is to risk. By assessing data on aspects of financial compliance, financial 
misconduct, feedback on cases referred to departments from the NACH, one can get a 
sense of the ethical climate of a department.  
 
                                                 
28
 National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF). 2007. Annual report on the Activities of the NACF 2006-2007.   
29
  The Annual Report requires critical information to be provided on this area, thus bringing about transparency 
around the issue of risk management.  
30
  The Accounting Officer takes responsibility for risk and ethics, and is obliged to report on it periodically.  
31
  This was reported in Cabinet, and is recorded in Cabinet Memorandum 45 of August 2003.  
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Ethical conduct and compliance is the end product of an effective risk management strategy. 
Given the magnitude of risk faced by departments, mainly in the area of financial fraud, a 
comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy is required. Central to this strategy is the relentless 
implementation of M&E systems that test whether departments have complied with 
measures to make their organisations risk averse and effective in detecting and dealing with 
corruption and maladministration. However, there are other risks around tendering for 
example, which is supposed to be a way to get efficiency (lowest cost). The system has 
been shown to be vulnerable due to collusive tendering practices, meaning that whilst lowest 
cost is obtained, this is done in an unethical manner. The large scale collapse of public 
investments, such as defective housing, indicates that despite the measures being adhered 
to (procedurally), the outputs are defective. Billions of Rands have been lost due to the 
politicisation of the tender process, and this is the main subject of reporting on government 
in the country. From a good governance perspective the inability of government to deal 
decisively with corruption to date, indicates that the systems are not working. It may 
therefore be that the risk strategy is not addressing the correct issues. It is for this reason 
that the entire tender process is currently under review by the NT32.  
 
This section describes some of the measures to test the risk potential of departments 
generally, and the DSD specifically. The anti-corruption strategy hinges on effective 
communication and promotion. A message that corruption is unacceptable and that such 
behaviour will be detected and dealt with sets the behavioural parameters for government. In 
countries that score poorly on the Corruption Index33 or the other measures by Transparency 
International, the prevailing reason for pervasive corruption is that corruption has become an 
acceptable practice across society. In these cases the normative benchmarks are low and 
tolerance levels for corruption high. 
 
In South Africa, communication around corruption appeals to the conscience of the public 
and civil servants, and tries to make ethical conduct akin to the broader ideals of democracy. 
Whilst seemingly persuasive, its overall impact on producing desirable behaviour has not 
been tested empirically, with much of the M&E of corruption making assumptions about its 
causes and location, which is not embedded in any solid research. The comparison of 
current levels of corruption with the corruption in the Apartheid era is also not possible, due 
to the censorious climate then. There is thus no valid baseline against which to make an 
                                                 
32
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assessment between the current and past. In the democratic era current monitoring data on 
the subject becomes the baseline from which to proceed.  
 
However, such an approach may also not be empirically sound, since an increase in the rate 
of, for example, reported cases of corruption is not necessarily an indication of an increase 
in the incidents of corruption. Rather it may signal an increase in the levels of reporting, and 
vice versa. These reported cases in themselves remain allegations which must be tested, 
and most of them are not due to limited investigative capacity. The point emphasised is that 
the data emerging from such systems should be viewed with circumspection. The NACH as 
a system thus has limitations and analysing data from this system must take into account 
that it is merely a reporting and referral system, and not an integrity barometer. There is to 
date no operational integrity barometer in the country, and the subject of the levels and 
trends in corruption remains a source of intense public debate34. The decline in confidence 
levels in government from independent surveys, cited in government sources35, indicates a 
decline in public confidence. 
 
This calls for the use of proxy measures to test how corruption resistant departments are. 
One such measure is the responsiveness of departments to cases reported to it from the 
NACH. The response rate will indicate the resolve and/or capacity a department has for 
dealing with corruption, as its investigative activities sends a clear message within 
departments that action is taken on cases reported to it. It indicates the commitment of 
leadership and management to corruption. The response rate to cases referred has dropped 
to under 20% over the past 3 years, showing that this system is not working36.  These issues 
were raised in a summit of the NACF in 200837 . 
 
Other assessments would include a review of the fraud prevention infrastructure of 
departments. The PSC Public Service M&E System has an element within it which 
measures the quality of the fraud prevention infrastructure. There are also mandatory 
reporting obligations placed on departments to report fraud to the NT, PSC and submit such 
information in the Annual Reports. Appraising this data does point to how well this element is 
                                                 
34
  A review of press clippings over a 2 month period indicates that reports on corruption in the Public Service     
are a weekly, if not a daily occurrence. It also tends to be lead article news, and the subject of several 
editorials of national newspapers, including the Mail and Guardian, the Star, City Press and the Sunday 
Times.  
35
  The outcomes indicators produced by the Presidency, January 2010, acknowledges this as a problem by 
citing evidence of declining levels in public confidence. 
36
  Personal interview with Senior manager at the PSC, responsible for managing the system, 10 January 2010. 
37
   National Anti-Corruption Forum. 2008. Report on the Third national Anti-Corruption Summit. Birchwood, 
Johannesburg. 4-5 August 2008.  
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dealt with managerially. An important report is the one on Financial Misconduct38, which 
reports completed cases investigated, is another indicator of the propensity for corruption in 
departments, as it gives actual case data. This is probably the main document produced on 
this area of vulnerability and is the subject of debate when released publically. It brings the 
executive and management of departments under intense scrutiny and forces accountability, 
and is thus a contributor to good governance.  
 
At the level of the individual, one could examine the return rate of Financial Disclosure forms 
of the Senior Management Service, as an indication of how political and administrative 
leadership ensures that its Senior Management Service complies. The return rate is an 
important indicator, as there is a process before the forms are submitted to the PSC, which 
should include an application of mind by the Executive Authority (Ministers or Members of 
the Executive Councils) on the submissions, to identify and follow-up on potential cases of 
conflicts of interest. Yet another important measure is the speed with which departments 
deal with cases of misconduct, which once again is a measure of how effective the internal 
disciplinary processes are in bringing perpetrators to account. Should there be no decisive 
action, the message spoken about earlier of the issue not being taken seriously, will 
translate into an erosion of discipline in departments, and make the identification of 
corruption difficult.  
 
It must be pointed out that in seeking a quantifiable measure of the extent of corruption, the 
problem is confounded in that most corrupt activities go undetected or unreported, and if 
reported, many are not validated due to the lack of investigative capacity. The assessment 
will thus look at the results of the DSD when these systems are applied there. It will lead to 
an assessment of how well the constitutional value of professional ethics works in creating 
the conditions for good governance. The assessment will start by examining how the 
department adheres to the requirements for effective risk management.  
 
6.10 PERFORMANCE OF THE DSD IN RELATION TO THE M&E OF ETHICAL 
COMPLIANCE 
 
a)     Compliance to risk management policies 
 
The key issue from a governance perspective is that there must be a capacity to predict and 
respond to incidents of fraud and corruption. This is precipitated on the notion that 
                                                 
38
 The PSC produces reports on Financial Misconduct, which is an assessment of those cases that have been 
investigated and reported by departments to it, as required by legislation. 
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management has a responsibility to safeguard State resources, and ensure that it is used for 
the designated purposes. Treasury Regulations and the Public Service Anti-Corruption 
Strategy require that departments have an anti-corruption and fraud prevention strategy 
which must address fraud, abuse of power, embezzlement, bribery, favouritism and 
nepotism, extortion, and insider trading/abuse of privileged information. 
 
Before proceeding to the DSD, it would be useful to consider the results from a PSC audit of 
anti-corruption capabilities39 in 2003 showing then that just over half of the sampled 
departments had dedicated anti-corruption units. In the self-assessment phase, only 8% of 
departments rated themselves as fully effective, with 60% of departments not having a 
mandate or policy on anti-corruption. Investigate procedures were only present in 15% of 
departments, whilst clear reporting and accountability structures were evident in 20% of 
departments. The important aspect of whistle-blowing was not adequately dealt with, with 
the policy existing in only 25% of departments. Clearly the global picture for departments in 
the Public Service in 2003 was concerning. However, given that this was the first audit of its 
nature, it is a good baseline against which to assess subsequent progress.  
 
The DSD assessment shows that it performed better than this national picture, which is 
evident from both the Public Service M&E System‟s reports for the 2001/200240 and 
2008/941. The DSD is one of the few departments where the system has been applied twice, 
making it possible to draw comparisons around performance over a 6 year period. This 
interim period (2001-2007) is also important in that during this time there has been 
heightened focus on dealing with corruption. In both assessments, it is evident that the 
department complied by applying the legislation rigorously, which may be viewed as an area 
of strength of the department. Another measure of the quality of the departments risk 
assessment strategy can be gleaned from the results from of the PSC Public Service M&E 
System, emanating from two reports 7 years apart, which show that there has been much 
improvement from the 2001/2 period to the 2007/8, with the rating for accountability, of which 
risk management is included, improving from 70% to 90% at the compliance level. The PSC 
2007/8 assessment showed that there were no cases of fraud on the data base.    
 
In support of the above, an examination and assessment was made of key reports produced 
to support risk management in the DSD. The first is the Anti-corruption and Fraud Prevention 
                                                 
39
  Public Service Commission. 2003.  Audit of Anti-Corruption capabilities in Departments. Republic of South 
Africa.  
40
 Ibid.   
41
  Ibid.  
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Policy42, which deals with the corruption types already mentioned. In the DSD the policy is 
executed by a board, established in accordance with the PFMA, 1999, and appointed by the 
DG43, who is the custodian of the strategy. It also seeks to reinforce the department‟s 
adherence to ethical conduct as required by Batho Pele. The document is an explicit policy 
statement, listing actions constituting fraud, corruption and maladministration. It states who 
is responsible to conduct investigations, how losses are to be recovered, and the policy is 
signed by the DG and Minister, and thus adopted politically and administratively.   
 
The DSD also has an Anti-corruption and Fraud Prevention Strategy44 which aims to curb all 
forms of corruption in the department. It is mandated on a range of legislative prescripts45. It 
seeks to instil zero tolerance of corruption and fraud in the department, draw in support for 
its strategy, take action against perpetrators and improve the controls on fraud risk areas. 
The DSD also has an Anti-corruption and Fraud Response Plan46 which does damage 
control as soon as an incident of fraud and corruption has been reported. It stipulates the 
responsibility for reporting and reporting procedures, states how aggressive measures will 
be used to deal with fraud and corruption, lists the disciplinary measures in place, and the 
type of training recommended. It also cites measures used, such as civil action and 
blacklisting to address fraud. It has also been adopted by both the DG and Minister for 
Social Development.  
 
In support of the above, there has also been the production of a set of protocols for doing 
investigations. This includes a report titled Anti-corruption and Fraud Investigations47 and 
provides guidance on how this is to be done48. The DSD does comply with Treasury 
Regulations and the Anti-Corruption Strategy of government. It has a Loss Control 
Committee, appointed by the DG to assist with the development, implementation and 
                                                 
42
 Department of Social Development. 2007e. Anti-Corruption and Fraud Prevention Policy. Republic of South 
Africa.  
43
  The DG is required in terms of Treasury Regulations, paragraph 3.2.1, as the Accounting Officer, to ensure 
that the Fraud Prevention Plan is fully developed and operational. 
44
 Department of Social Development. 2007a. Anti-Corruption and Fraud Prevention Strategy. Republic of 
South Africa.  
45
 The following are the relevant pieces of legislation from the National Treasury. Public Finance Management 
Act, 1999; Treasury Regulations, Public Service Act, Public Service Regulations, Protected Disclosures Act, 
2000; Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities (Act, 12 of 2004); Labour Relations Act, 1995; The 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (No. 2 of 2000); the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (No. 3 
of 2000) and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA)(No. 38 of 2001) 
46
 Department of Social Development 2007e Anti-Corruption and Fraud Response Plan. Republic of South 
Africa.   
47
 Ibid.  
48
 There is a  protocol of how investigations are to be conducted, and includes guidance on planning, 
preparation, reporting writing, gathering of evidence, listing of disciplinary steps, protocols for recovering 
money and guidelines on dealing with the media.  
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maintaining of the Anti-Corruption Fraud Plan, which creates awareness of what 
unacceptable behaviour is and how to deal with perpetrators. Staff are expected to comply 
with the Public Service Staff Code, ethics and the policy statement of the Anti-Corruption 
Fraud Prevention Plan.  
 
Another important report that was examined is the risk assessment report of the department, 
which is an attempt to quantify all areas of risk, covering the entire area of operations.49 This 
report looked at the 53 directorates in the DSD that were involved in the risk assessment 
process, and for each was able to produce a weighted residual risk, based on an 
assessment made on a 5-point scale. The likelihood of potential fraud is assessed for each 
area on a 5 point scale, which helps to show which the most vulnerable areas are. The 
exercise is useful from a governance perspective in that it helps identify units at risk and 
helps prioritise areas for focus. This exercise has helped to identify areas of risk in the 
department to enable the Internal Audit Function to focus on the internal audit effort in this 
area.  
 
The report identifies the benefits of risk management, such as improving service delivery, 
enhancing risk management strategy decisions through quantification of risk tolerances, 
enhancing accountability and corporate governance processes, and ensuring greater 
transparency in decision-making and on-going management processes. The report is a very 
practical tool for managers to reflect on the importance of their functions, and identify issues 
that may impact on their ability to deliver on objectives. The report is particularly important in 
that it priorities areas that the department needs to examine over a three year rolling period, 
2008/2009, 2009/2010 and 2010/2011, and also states how the various areas of risk will be 
reviewed. In most cases it will be through a compliance review type assessment. The next 
chapter looks at how management implemented these recommendations. 
 
In summary, based on the above, it is clear that the DSD has complied with the 
requirements from MME oversight bodies, the main being NT and the DPSA, in putting in 
place an ethics infrastructure. It has established the appropriate committees to ensure that 
public power is exercised in the public interest, and these work in keeping the Accounting 
Officer informed of any potential threats to the integrity of the department. At an 
administrative level, the DSD has complied meeting the requirements for good governance. 
                                                 
49
  Department of Social Development. 2007b. Results of the Risk Assessment project presented by Ngubane 
and Co. September.   
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However, when other data is considered50, and which is elaborated upon in chapter 7, it will 
be found that the DSD does not respond timeously to cases referred to it by the NACH (with 
94% of the corruption related cases not being responded to), suggesting that dealing with 
fraud is not as good as complying with regulations around fraud. This is concerning and 
shows the disjuncture between administrative compliance and accountability to oversight 
bodies, and actually being effective.   
 
b)     Compliance to ethical frameworks for managing conflicts of interest 
 
This section focuses on the M&E of professional ethics. The compliance to ethical principles 
is measured through the financial disclosures framework, which seeks to address the 
vulnerable area of conflicts of interest, which happens when managers exercise power over 
resources. This is an important area for good governance, as it relates to whether public 
power is not compromised by private interests. There have been assessments made of the 
issue and evaluations produced relate to how conflicts of interests are managed.51 The 
contentious issue of the management of gifts has also been assessed, as the receipt of gifts 
can potentially lead to corrupt practices52.  
 
There are a range of regulatory provisions currently applicable to the receipt of gifts. This 
pertains to unauthorised remuneration53, the need to operate in an unbiased manner54, and 
the need to disclose interests55. In addition, there are Treasury Regulations56.  Of critical 
importance, the matter has been escalated to key Acts relating to corruption, such as the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, No. 12 of 2004, which looks at the 
question of gratification, by defining it and stating what is meant by unauthorised 
gratification.57 The issue of gratification is taken into the Draft Public Service Administration 
Bill, in which the conduct of an employee is stipulated. 58 
 
                                                 
50
  The researcher has examined the response rate to cases referred to the DSD from the PSC, and the picture 
shows an extremely weak response to cases referred to it.  
51
  Public Service Commission. 2006b. Report of Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Service. Republic 
of South Africa. . 
52
  Public Service Commission. 2008d. Report of the management of Gifts in the Public Service. Republic of 
South Africa.  
53
  Public Service Act, No. 103 of 1994 (as amended), Section 31 1 (1)(a) 
54
  Public Service regulation. Chapter 2 (Code of Conduct) 
55
  Public Service Regulations. Chapter 3 (Financial Disclosures) (D.(d),(e)&(f) 
56
  Treasury Regulations. Regulation 21: Acceptance of gifts, donations and sponsorships to the State (21.2., 
21.2.2, 21.2.3) 
57
  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, No. 12 of 2004 (PRECCA), Section 1, 3, 4 and 10. 
58
 Republic of South Africa. Draft Public Service Amendment Bill, Section 33. 
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An M&E instrument to prevent conflicts of interest and curb corruption is the process of 
scrutinising the Financial Disclosure forms of public servants at the senior management 
levels59. Given their managerial role it may be that their public roles conflict with their private 
interests, and the annual disclosures of interests to the Executive Authority, seeks to prevent 
potential conflicts of interest.  In an assessment by the PSC of this aspect between 2000 and 
2005, it was found that at the level of HoDs (either level 15 or 16) the highest potential 
conflicts of interest are likely to occur60. Evidently, this points to how susceptible high level 
officials in the Public Service are to being influenced. The area needs to be considered in the 
light of how gifts, another area that threatens ethical conduct, is managed61 . 
 
The instrument of Financial Disclosures is a simple form that gathers work related data62. It 
is possible through scrutinising these forms to see if there is a discrepancy between levels of 
remuneration and assets held, and instruments such as lifestyle analysis and other 
measures used by bodies such as the Receiver of Revenue, can detect discrepancies. 
There is a clear process for administering these forms63. The PSC has curatorship over the 
forms, and there is limited access to these forms within the PSC. They can be called for 
when an investigation happens, but by and large the PSC plays a custodian role.  
 
The contribution of this M&E instrument to good governance is that is brings about 
transparency, albeit to a limited degree, around the private affairs of the Senior Management 
Service, to the Administrative and Executive HoDs. This process in itself can serve as a 
check for corruption, although its efficacy is not absolute given the loopholes that are used to 
conduct business interests when such measures exist. Examples are that many of the 
business interests are registered in the names of spouses, who are as yet not obliged to 
declare their financial interests. The submission of these forms, however, is not enough, as 
the scrutiny levels are low, and in the absence of cross-verification and lifestyle audits, the 
submission of the financial disclosure forms on their own cannot be viewed as a proxy for 
good management of ethics. Indeed, the question of lifestyle audits, which will corroborate 
evidence between the deeds registrar and other financial institutions, has started, and initial 
                                                 
59
  This is levels 13-16 which is the decision-making echelon of government.  
60
  Public Service Commission. 2007a. Report on the Management of Conflicts of Interest through Financial 
Disclosures. Republic of South Africa.  
61
 Ibid.  
62
 It also asks for declarations of holding of shares, directorships. It requests information on gifts received, 
sponsorships and the value of fixed assets, i.e. residential property.   
63
 Process wise, each form is supposed to be certified by a Commissioner of Oats and submitted via the 
Director-General to the Executive Authority, who is expected to scrutinise these and submit to the PSC by 30 
April of each year. 
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results indicate that there has been misrepresentation (underreporting)64 by members of the 
senior management service. The issue has also been listed in the 2010 Budget Speech of 
the Minister of Finance as an area of priority. The fact that this is now acknowledged as a 
problem shows that the practice of using public office for private gain has become 
commonplace in the South African Public Service, and that the compliance measures to date 
have not proved effective.  
The rate of disclosures of forms does point to the effective management on the matter.  
However, for reasons pointed out above, submission on its own does not imply honesty. The 
Table below shows a very rapid improvement in compliance by the DSD on this aspect, from 
being seriously below the country average of 77% in 2004-5, to exceeding the average of 
2006-7 of 87%, by 10% and coming out at 97% in 2006/7. It is now one of the best 
performing departments when it comes to getting senior managers to disclose their financial 
interests, which is an indicator of good governance. It shows strong political will and 
administrative leadership in the department, in ensuring that there is compliance. The figures 
need to be viewed in light of the points being made about the probity of these forms, which 
has not been tested. Unless the submitted data is verified with lifestyle audits this simply 
suggests administrative compliance, which although high, is partial given the limitation of the 
tool and processes.  
 














National Departments 79% 74% 87% 80% 79% 
Overall Provincial  75% 86% 87% 90% 83% 
Country average 77% 80% 87% 85% 81% 
DSD National 44% 91% 97% 100% 96% 
Deviation from country 
average 
-38% +11% +10% +15% +15% 
 
The results of the DSD are important and must be viewed in context of a national situation 
where this matter has been deemed as poorly managed. The low rate of return has been 
cited by the PSC as a dereliction of basic leadership and management responsibility, and 
the institution has argued that only a 100% rate of compliance can be viewed as 
satisfactory66. The DSD is above the country average by 15%, which indicates effective 
performance in this area.    
                                                 
64
  A joint project by the PSC and Auditor-General showed that many managers had interests in companies, 
which they did not declare on the forms. This emerged only when checks were run between different 
databases. 
65
 Table constructed from PSC database on Financial Disclosures.  
66
  refer to the State of the Public service reports of the PSC.  
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c)   The management of discipline as an indicator of ethical compliance 
 
A third aspect that is now considered is the management of discipline. A disciplined 
workforce is essential for service delivery, and with the transformation of the Public Service 
there have been new codes and procedures put in place to guide the process. The 
transformation culminated in the parties, the employer being the State and the employees 
being labour represented by the unions, signing an agreement on a new Disciplinary Code 
and Procedures for the Public Service (Resolution 2/99), which was implemented on 1 July 
199967. In addition to this, there are clear codes in terms how long a disciplinary process is 
supposed to take (20-80 days). If departments exceed this period, it points to their inability to 
resolve matters speedily, and could lead to an erosion of discipline as perpetrators are not 
brought to account. This indicator as a proxy for professional ethics has been critiqued, and 
the PSC is currently reviewing its indicators, given that professional ethics is more 
comprehensive than just addressing discipline and misconduct. The issue of financial 
disclosures and feedback to cases referred by the NACH must be incorporated.  
 
The manner in which discipline is managed within a department is indicative of the resolve of 
management to implement ethical frameworks and promote professional conduct. There are 
clear regulations and procedures in place for the management of discipline, and complying 
with these indicates how well management within departments understand the regulation 
and their role within the organisation to instil discipline.  
 
The maintenance of discipline in the Public Service needs to take place within agreed upon 
procedures, and as such it is mandatory. It is monitored by the PSC, and the information 
generated from this process points to broader issues of ethics. The main indicator for 
Constitutional Values and Principles used by the Public Service M&ES for professional 
ethics is the time taken to deal with cases of misconduct. There is a perception that 
misdemeanour in the public sector goes undetected, or if reported, not acted upon. It is for 
this reason that an assessment of the disciplinary infrastructure and processes within 
departments is an important proxy measure for pointing to the quality of ethical conduct in a 
department.   
 
The system that measures this element is standards driven, with the various standards being 
                                                 
67
 As part of the transformation process, the Public Service Coordination Bargaining Chamber concluded two 
agreements relating to incapacity, namely the incapacity Code and Procedures for the Public Service 
(Resolution 10/99) and the incapacity Code and procedures in respect of ill health (Resolution 12/99).  
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the benchmark for assessing compliance, and by inference the value and principle of 
professional ethics more broadly68. Also assessed is whether there is frequent training 
provided on the handling of cases of misconduct and that the department has a fraud 
prevention and anti-corruption plan and strategy.69 The rating is based on a system that 
assesses how many standards have been met70. 
 
In this assessment, results for both the national and provincial DSD were considered. This is 
despite the point made earlier about the fact that there is no clear subordinate relationship 
between the national DSD and provincial DSD. The issue at hand is that results from a 
department in the provinces, in this case the provincial DSD from two provinces concerned 
points directly to managerial aptitude in driving ethical compliance at the important provincial 
level, where service delivery takes place. These reports produced from the system are 
standardised and allow for cross-referencing. They are also available on request from the 
PSC, and submitted to all managers of departments themselves.71 
 
Over a 8 year period the PSC has assessed four departments within this social cluster, two 
national and two provincial, these being the National DSD (2002)72, Provincial Department: 
North West (2002)73, Provincial Administration: Eastern Cape (2006)74, and recently the 
National DSD (2008)75. The results from these departments‟ form part of the overall 
assessment and are contained in the consolidated reports of various cycles.76 The 
assessment below is based on all four reports.    
 
The National DSD has performed well in complying with this ethical aspect, and in 2001 had 
already instituted an anti-corruption and fraud prevention strategy. In 2001 it had already 
established a Departmental Financial Misconduct Board with clear terms of reference for 
                                                 
68
 The standards relate to the existence of a procedure for the reporting, recording and managing cases of 
misconduct, that managers have a working knowledge of the system, and cases of misconduct are brought to 
a disciplinary hearing within 80 days, 
69
  Ibid.   
70
 Adherence to each standard is assessed and given a numeric value that is finally calculated to produce a 
composite score for this principle. There is rating on a 5 point scale, with 1 meaning that none of the 
standards have been met whilst 5 means that all have been met. 
71
  Republic of South Africa. 2008j. Fifth Consolidated Public Service M&E report 2007-8. Republic of South 
Africa. 
72
 Ibid.  
73
 Public Service Commission. 2002. Monitoring and Evaluation Report for the period April 2001 to March 
2002. Department of Social Services, Arts, Culture and Sports: North West Province. Republic of South 
Africa.  
74
 Public Service Commission. 2006c. Monitoring and Evaluation Report for the period 1 April 2005 to 31 





 Ibid.  
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operation, and the minutes of this Board indicated that management reporting was done and 
action taken against officials. In 2001 the DSD reported 47 cases of financial misconduct 
and 5 other type cases, and reports clearly showed the level of official involved, the type of 
crime committed and sanction applied. There was also the capacity at the National level to 
deal with cases of misconduct. For this performance the department received a rating of 
65%, which is considered above satisfactory.   
 
These results should be compared to KwaZulu-Natal, where an assessment was made of 
professional ethics, and found that the same issues discussed above; capacity to deal with 
corruption, collaborating with other enforcement agencies, challenged departments within 
provincial administrations. The report shows that promoting professional ethics requires 
going beyond mere compliance, but rather it is a multi-faceted task that requires leadership 
and resources.77   
 
The performance of the provincial departments of Social Development was less impressive. 
The department in the North West in 2002 had a labour relations unit, but did not have the 
ability to deal with cases of misconduct and referred these to the Misconduct Unit in the 
office of the Premier. There were 28 cases (most fraud related) referred, but management 
did not seem to take the matter seriously. The Misconduct Unit in the Premiers office is well 
capacitated and most of the cases referred to this Unit resulted in dismissals of officials.  
Overall this office was rated 40%, meaning that its performance was unsatisfactory.   
 
In the Eastern Cape there was no formal reporting of cases being dealt with to management 
and no evidence of management action, with 10 cases dealt with. Most managers surveyed 
did not have the capacity to deal with cases, no training was provided and cases were drawn 
out beyond the 80 day limit. This department was rated 30% (weak). The provincial 
departments complied poorly with this indicator, unlike the DSD which complies well with this 
indicator, evident when comparing the results between the 2001/2 with the 2007/8 period, 
where performance improved from 70% to 90%.  
 
The results above show that there is an uneven capacity to deal with misconduct, despite 
the framework being in place for almost 9 years. It can be concluded from this M&E 
instrument, which is indicative of the management of some aspects of professional ethics, 
the DSD at the national level has complied with the standards of the PSC systems. 
However, this result must be viewed with circumspection, in that the system is limited and 
                                                 
77
 Public Service Commission. 2007a. An Assessment of Professional Ethics in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial 
Administration. Republic of South Africa.  
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focuses on some of the managerial elements of professional ethics, not all. The inability to 
respond timeously to the cases referred to it from the NACH, and which is not captured in 
any of the formal systems mentioned here, shows that the DSD is lacking on a key area of 
accountability, which is to citizens who report cases to it for follow-up.  
This result must be looked at in terms of how it also deals with risk management and 
submits its financial disclosures.   
 
d)    Financial Misconduct in the DSD 
 
This section now looks at reports on cases that have been investigated and reported to the 
PSC, as required by legislation. This area of financial misconduct needs special attention 
given that it has the greatest impact on the budget of departments78. In terms of the 
requirements of the PFMA, departments are also obliged to report on its cases of financial 
misconduct in the Annual Reports, another public document which can be used to make 
judgements on performance and ethical compliance. There are thus many obligations placed 
upon departments to minimise financial misconduct, as it reflects poorly on them which 
arises from the obligatory reporting on the matter. As pointed out in (c) above, the system 
could also be limited as these are reports only on investigated cases, and when cases have 
not come to this level, the reporting could be deceptively positive for a department but mask 
a backlog of potentially serious, un-investigated cases, which is the case in the DSD if one 
were to look at the non-addressed NACH cases. This thesis has already mentioned the lack 
of investigative capacity, and hence this result must be treated with caution.  
 
The M&E instrument that brings this information to the fore is the reports on Financial 
Misconduct. Departments are obliged to annually report to the PSC on their finalised cases 
of Financial Misconduct. The reporting has resulted in the PSC being able to systematically 
track this aspect over time, and currently presents this report to the SCOPA79. In this forum it 
receives political scrutiny and the report enters the public domain thus contributing to 
transparency around government operations. These reports provide an indication of what 
financial misconduct is costing the State. Whilst not naming the errant officials, the reports 
do provide statistical information of financial misconduct, broken down by department, 
together with the types of sanctions imposed, thus providing a high level of public scrutiny 
and forcing accountability.  
                                                 
78
  Financial misconduct is probably the most reported form of ethical transgression, and the terms “wasteful, 
unauthorised and fruitless expenditure” are well know publically, and these terms are commonly used in 
reports of the Auditor-General in his assessments of departments. 
79
 The PSC presented its Overview on Financial Misconduct for the 2006/2007 financial year to SCOPA on 13 
May 2008. 
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As mentioned earlier, a lot of fraud goes undetected, but instruments such as these do 
provide a proxy, albeit partial, measure of the level of ethical compliance in the Public 
Service, as financial conduct is a key element of ethical behaviour. It is telling of the ethical 
climate of the Public Sector and serves as a barometer for ethical compliance, as it relates 
directly to fraud and breaches of the Code of Conduct. A focus on the frequency and nature 
of financial misconduct is telling of what crimes are committed within the Public Service and 
becomes a precursor of the ethical direction that the public sector is taking. M&E in this 
context serves a predictive function which supports management.  
 
The overview of financial misconduct report for the 2006/7 financial year80 is of particular 
relevance to the DSD, as the Chairperson of the PSC in his foreword states that there has 
been a large percentage of cases dealing with social grants fraud, and that this undermines 
the fight against poverty. As mentioned earlier, social grants are not disbursed directly by the 
DSD, but through its agency, the SASSA. Whilst the DSD does not deliver grants, it 
produces the systems that enable the efficient transfer of funds to the SASSA, and given 
that the DG of the DSD is the Accounting Officer, he remains accountable for the funds.  
 
In this report, the main categories reported (reported means cases where there has been a 
hearing and conviction) are fraud and theft and this comprise 64,7% of cases reported. Of 
the 1042 finalised cases, in 2006/7 financial year, 83% of employees were found guilty, 
which shows a high “conviction” (not in a legal sense) rate, and points to a good ability to 
take cases forward through the disciplinary process. It should be noted that the perception of 
the public sector as one typified by fraud is reinforced by the high number of media reports 
of tender and other irregularities, and this result is consistent with the public picture held. 
Unless there are also reports of the actual sanctions imposed, the perception that the public 
sector is soft on corruption will continue, and lead to more corruption.  
 
The cost of fraudulent conduct is high, which for the 2006/7 period was R130,615,998, of 
which only 20% was recovered. In looking at the sanctions it was found that there was no 
consistency, and dismissals not used, but rather progressive discipline preferred. In relation 
to the point made about sending a message about what the norm is and what would happen 
should it be transgressed, this has obviously not been the case. When reports such as these 
enter the public domain, government is not rated well when it comes to the good governance 
indicator of corruption. There is thus transparency, without the follow-through with 
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  Public Service Commission. 2008c. Overview of Financial Misconduct for the 2006/2007 financial year.  
Republic of South Africa.  
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accountability, pointing out that at the key level of acting on M&E information, there is grave 
problem. In chapter 7 in particular, where the role of civics is considered, this problem will be 
elaborated upon. It with thus appear that there has been the political will to put policies to 
curb corruption in place, but not the follow-up in acting decisively when required.  
 Overall there was an increase in the number of cases of financial misconduct, with 1,042 
cases reported in the 2006/7 financial period (up from 771 in the 2005/2006 period). From 
2001/2 to 2006/07 there has been a steady increase in the cases reported, from 434 to the 
1,014 in the 2006/07 year. The DSD reported 3 cases out of the 370 (0.8%) nationally 
reported cases. The provincial departments had a total of 672 cases, for the social 
development departments in the 7 provinces that reported cases (Free State and Gauteng 
did not have reported cases),  the number was 27 out of the 672 (4%) cases, bringing the 
total to 30 out of 1014 cases or 0.27%. The overall cost (National and Provincial) was 
R775,395. The net loss to the State (based on cases where there was no recovery) for the 
DSD was R6,133, meaning that the DSD managed to recoup most of the lost funds, which 
attests to good management in this area.   
 
From the above results it can be seen that whilst this is a problem for national departments 
generally when it comes to reporting and acting on fraud cases, the DSD performs relatively 
well. Once again, addressing fraud is complex and requires many interventions. The 
managerial compliance is satisfactory on this element, compared to the national average.  
 
The value of this type of reporting is that it shows action is taken in this important area of 
ethical transgression, and the transparency and accountability that should follow help to 
focus attention on the matter. As noted earlier, it is precursor information to assessing an 
important element of ethical compliance for both the country and department.   
 
e)   Additional indicators of ethical compliance 
 
This section looks at other indicators of ethical compliance. This includes data from the 
NACH which becomes a barometer for the state of ethics at a national and departmental 
level, given that cases can be disaggregated according to type of compliant and source of 
compliant (departments are named). There was only 1 complaint lodged relating to the DSD 
via the NACH for the 2005/6 period81. This low level of reporting to the NACH may be due to 
the DSD having its own Hotline, which is popularised and part of the M&E system of both the 
DSD and SASSA.  
                                                 
81
  Data drawn from the Data Base of the National Anti-Corruption Hotline, housed in the PSC. 
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The PSC receives complaints lodged with it, many of which relate to the behaviour and 
competency of staff (an ethical element as it is about transgressing Batho Pele principles).  
Complaints are lodged directly with the PSC or through the NACH. The majority of cases 
lodged with the NACH relate to unethical behaviour.  This is borne out by the fact that 271 of 
the 749 cases referred to the NACH, for national departments and the provinces, relate to 
the category of unethical behaviour. It may thus be deduced that where there is a large 
number of these cases concentrated within particular departments, there is obviously non-
compliance to ethical frameworks. In cases where the complaints lodged deal with matters 
relating to the public, these are referred to the Public Protector. In terms of the cases 
reported to the PSC which fall within the parameters of the Complaints Rules, the trend in 
reporting unethical behaviour has increased from the 2004/2005 period when it was 1, to 23 
in the 2005/2006 financial year. In the 2005/6 period, only 2 complaints were lodged against 
the DSD. This was very small compared to other departments82. However, this low rate of 
reporting cannot be extended to imply that there is satisfaction with the DSD; it is but one of 
many streams of information on compliance with the ethical framework in the DSD. Data for 
subsequent periods indicates that the number of cases increased significantly, which 
probably was due to the increased popularity with the PSC Hotline, or the actual increase in 
detected cases of fraud. 
 
Another indicator of ethical compliance would be the nature of grievances in the Public 
Service. This is because the grievances reported do indicate the level of disquiet staff have 
with management in their departments, and especially when the grievances relate to 
allegations of misconduct or nepotism, it must be taken seriously. The number of grievances 
received, and the time taken to resolve these points to the quality of human resource 
management in departments. In 2007, out of a total of 1104 grievances lodged nationally, 
426 (38,58%) were finalised, with 130 (11,7%) within the time-frames. For the DSD, there 
were only 2 cases reported (0,18%) of the total, and both were resolved.  
 
At the national level, the number of aggrieved officials in the DSD was 2 out of 1104, from 
January 2005 – June 200683. This element is well managed in the DSD, with it having the 
least number of aggrieved officials. However, it may mean that very few cases reach this 
level of reporting, as they are dealt with internally, which would also be positive. 
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 Public Service Commission. 2006f. Trend Analysis on Complaints Lodged with the Public Service 
Commission during the 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 Financial Years. Republic of South Africa.  
83
 Public Service Commission. 2007c. Report on Grievance Trends in the Public Service. Republic of South 
Africa.  
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6.11 COMPLIANCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES AND PRINCIPLES OF 
ETHICAL COMPLIANCE 
 
This sub-section selected the area of risk management and professional ethics as an 
indicator of good governance. It started by making an argument for why this aspect needed 
to be complied with, and what measures and strategies were put into place to drive the 
agenda of creating a corrupt-resistant Public Service. It showed that at the legislative level 
there has been much progress in putting in place the provisions, regulations and procedures 
for minimising risk and addressing corruption. The assessment showed that the key players 
in driving the infrastructural development for anti-corruption, has been the NT, which has 
used the PFMA as the main instrument to hold DGs accountable.  
 
The assessment showed that whilst the state of anti-corruption units was weak in 2003, it 
has progressed significantly thereafter and that the DSD has performed satisfactorily in 
complying with the provisions around this. In fact its performance has been shown to be 
favourable compared to other departments, and even when looking at how it performed 
against the Public Service Transversal M&E System (PSTM&ES), it has improved its 
performance from the 2001 to 2008 assessment. The rate of compliance for financial 
disclosures is higher than the national norm, there are few cases of financial misconduct 
reported and overall one gets a sense that the department performs well when it comes to 
addressing the compliance requirements of the systems mentioned. There is evidence that it 
has responded well to MME for this aspect, and appears to have good internal M&E systems 
to keep management informed and comply with this aspect.  
 
Therefore, for this aspect of MME, the DSD performs favourably, if one were to look at its 
ability to comply. Moving beyond the DSD the following general observations can be made: 
 
a) It has made the argument that at the policy level there has been a clear commitment 
to addressing fraud and corruption in the Public Service, and appropriate regulations 
and codes have been put in place to set the normative benchmark for behaviour. The 
matter of professional ethics has been emphasised through the NACF, and largely 
through promotional work done by the PSC, that is part of its responsibility for 
managing the NACH. More importantly, several forms of M&E have been applied to 
the area of professional ethics which can be summarised as follows: 
o The M&E of ethical transgressions, in particular financial misconduct, done by 
the PSC and which makes reporting of cases obligatory. This has the effect of 
ensuring accountability and demonstrating that transgressions are addressed. 
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o The M&E of the disciplinary procedure, to ensure that cases are dealt with 
timeously, sends out the message that poor conduct will not be tolerated. 
o The M&E of public inputs on their perception of government departments. 
This is via the NACH, and the response rate to complaints lodged will indicate 
a department‟s investigative capacity and corruption to dealing with ethical 
transgressions.  
o The M&E of financial disclosures, which helps to regulate private interests in 
a public position of power. The data herein currently serves the purpose of 
compliance. What is not clear is the degree of scrutiny is within departments 
in assessing these disclosures.  
b) The nature of grievances and complaints also provides a sense of how well a 
department is managing its staff. 
c) An assessment of its fraud strategies shows seriousness in establishing a capacity to 
deal with fraud. Of particular mention, is its risk management plans which have 
managed to quantify risk for managers, and help in M&E how this element is 
addressed. In this area of MME, the DSD has performed well.   
 
6.12 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS FORM OF OVERSIGHT TO GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
This section summarises how the work of the PSC through its M&E contributes to good 
governance. It critically revisits the methodologies used before making comments on how 
the PSC work in this area contributes to good governance. It draws on the conceptual 
framework in chapter 2 in undertaking this critique. 
 
a)    Methodological issues 
 
It is apparent that the systems used by the PSC to assess compliance with the Constitutional 
Values and Principles falls within the positivist, largely quantitative tradition, with the 
emphasis being on the objective and measurable. The criteria and indicators are upfront, 
and based on policies which seek to drive individual and departmental behaviour in a 
particular manner. The results from these assessments, which are largely statistical, 
compliance reports serve an accountability and enlightenment function. The reports cited in 
terms of the DSD and this area all fall within this type, and there was little evidence in any of 
the reports of a serious engagement with the contextual issues and the purpose of a type of 
report in terms of supporting the objectives of the developmental State. The importance of 
context has been cited in the literature as fundamental to any M&E, yet the PSC systems 
and reports are largely silent on contextual issues, and the systems, like the Transversal 
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Public Service M&E system fail to reflect these realities. The manner in which a policy 
department complies with the Constitutional Values and Principles would be different from 
an implementation department, yet the system fails to tweak the indicators or mention this 
fact in the reports. The reports and systems also fail to triangulate data, with the corruption 
indicators, for example, not taking into account public perception issues and not drawing on 
what is being said about a department on this subject in critical civic domains. It is too rigid in 
its application, and one is not sure where the compliance leads to; the focus appears to be 
largely regulatory, monitoring, as opposed to serious evaluation.   
 
However, apart from the various reports showing compliance on a comparative basis across 
departments and over time, there is little analysis, and the figures are in many cases 
conveyed as an irrefutable answer to questions; the truth. This is a limited approach, as 
demonstrated by Black (1999), and the limitation stems from an approach biased towards 
the quantitative. This is particularly apt when it comes to the reports on financial disclosures, 
financial misconduct and the PSM&ES, although there is some attempt in the PSM&ES to 
contextualise performance. The limitation of the Public Service M&E System is its inflexible 
application; it uses the same indicators for policy and service delivery departments, and has 
not been able to nuance the indicators to cater for these fundamental differences. There is 
limited evidence in the above reports of the widespread use of mixed-methods, which could 
address some of these deficiencies (Greene and Carecelli, 1997). In the 9 years that the 
system has been applied, it has shown that compliance levels with basic policy has 
improved marginally, but remains largely unsatisfactory. The lack of diagnosis is a major 
weakness of the systems, given that its recommendations are just about the need to comply, 
and there is little evidence of engaging with departmental management in constructing and 
working through the recommendations84. The question of utility, form a diagnosis and 
learning perspective is not clear. The reports are generally received as being punitive, with 
the engagement and learning element limited.  
 
The bias towards quantitative system approaches, applied in a standardised and a-
contextual manner does not distinguish it much from the systems used by the NT and the 
AG, means that it does in effect conduct more monitoring than evaluation. If one were to 
argue that monitoring is in any case a management function, then what the PSC does is a 
duplication of what departments should do, and is in a sense another level of management 
and monitoring. The PSC through its system collapses monitoring with evaluation, with the 
                                                 
84
  The researcher has examined all of the recommendations emanating from the system to arrive at this 
conclusion. He has also documented the critique from departments on the system when the reports have been 
presented to management.  
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scores for departments being seen as “the evaluation”. However, evaluation is deeper than 
measuring compliance, and implies deeper interrogation and investigation, moving beyond 
the data, which the system fails to do. The scoring system is based on discreet categories 
and indicators of performance, which is then aggregated. It would thus be erroneous, as the 
PSC has done, to aggregate performance and convey this as an evaluation of the 
department in terms of the Constitutional Values and Principles, and by implication the 
quality of good governance. All the system can be is an application of a set of limited 
indicators against the values and principles, the results of which are based on documentary 
evidence that must meet levels of tolerance of an indicator system. Any further extrapolation 
of the value of the system would be problematic. The system, in its favour, however, does 
direct performance towards areas of importance and does increase transparency about how 
the department performs administratively. It also does bring about a degree of accountability, 
and helps to reinforce the work of other oversight bodies. It also tracks the implementation of 
its recommendations. These are in themselves valuable.  
 
Based on the conservative, neutral approach of the PSC in its work, it may be 
understandable that there has been criticism for the PSC in terms of what its value-add has 
been. This is in light of there not being a discernable impact on quality of public 
administration. It is a concern in that the same issues are raised repeatedly in the same area 
every year. This indicates that the results of poor performance, even within this limited 
approach, do not translate into organisational learning. The PSC approach may thus be 
considered unsound. It may have improved accountability and compliance, but does not 
appear to have supported the culture of learning (Engel and Carlesson, 2002).   
 
The PSC does not assume an overt political role in ensuring that results are translated into 
actions. It relies on the bodies it reports to, which are expected to call to account and have 
the power to do so. Its role is in presenting evidence, which it argues as being persuasive 
enough and which cannot be disregarded, as it shows deviation to policy explicitly. The PSC 
does not have powers to direct, only to make recommendations. The type of work 
undertaken by the PSC in this area would fall within the description of Rossi (2004), 
professional work, but not taking a political position on it. It appears to have conducted its 
work independently, and presented well-research findings to decision-makers, but there is 
no evidence of a utility that goes beyond driving compliance and increasing transparency. It 
does not fall within the Patton (2004) view that utility should be the primary purpose, and in 
adopting a positivist, independent focus, there is no evidence of whether it has genuinely 
engaged with users of information to produce work that is valuable. In its reports it constantly 
cites its protected independence, and professes a neutrality, which would be at odds with the 
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view of House (2004: 19) who dispels this notion of neutrality in M&E. In emphasising its 
independence, it may dissuade a much needed critique of its approach and methods, as 
which is necessary even if construed negatively and dispelled as a threat to independence. It 
has been pointed out that influence comes from engagement, not detachment (and 
independence), and the PSC would do well to adopt this approach by subjecting its systems 
to broader scrutiny.  
 
b)   Contribution to good governance 
 
One cannot discount that monitoring ethical compliance is a foremost aspect for promoting 
good governance, and the DSD appears to have complied adequately with the frameworks. 
It has managed to build a risk-management infrastructure and appears to be effective when 
it comes to declaring financial interests and reporting on financial misconduct. Disciplinary 
cases are dealt with decisively. At a level of managerial compliance with the framework for 
the Constitutional Values and Principles, the DSD has performed well. 
 
The level of transparency around the above is important, in that unless these vulnerable 
areas are focused on and all aspects of performance therein are monitored and reported on, 
unacceptable practices can go unnoticed. The transparency dimension is supported when 
these types of scrutiny are applied, and is a critical good governance indicator. It does 
indicate that there is accountability for how State resources are used. The discussion has 
shown that good governance goes beyond compliance, and deeper levels of analysis are 
required of compliance data before concluding that a form of compliance equates good 
governance.  
 
6.13 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
6.13.1 Relevance of area to good governance 
 
Sound financial management is an essential component of good governance in that its 
quality is reflective of the ethical propriety of departments. The judicious use of public 
resources is central to good governance and monitoring and evaluating how funds are used 
becomes a responsibility of the State. The key oversight bodies for finance at the national 
level of government are the NT and the AG, both of which are constitutionally mandated to 
monitor and evaluate the finances of departments. In a similar manner to the PSC and 
typical of M&E bodies which drive compliance and assess accountability, the NT and AG 
have systems and protocols that inform their work. The M&E approach towards assessing 
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adherence to financial policies and protocols, which also tends to fall within the quantitative, 
positivist tradition and which emphasises periodic reporting of performance against norms 
and standards for financial management. From a good governance perspective, these 
address issues of accountability for public funds. 
 
This section considers the work of these oversight institutions, which is supported through 
certain Constitutional Values and Principles for public administration,85 in light of the 
performance of the DSD.  Both the NT and AG work towards helping departments to achieve 
this outcome by rigorously monitoring and evaluating financial governance.  
 
The NT has been effective in putting in place a range of polices and monitoring instruments 
to hold departments accountable for the funds allocated to them. There is a strong 
monitoring bias, which coupled with mandatory reporting, produces the levels of 
transparency, scrutiny and accountability to prevent a situation where fraud and 
mismanagement of funds go unnoticed. There is always a high public interest in the manner 
in which public funds are expended, which means that the instruments and mechanisms for 
reporting on financial performance need to be credible.  
 
Apart from the financial monitoring role played by the NT, there is also the financial 
evaluation role played by the AG. The latter evaluates the financial performance of 
departments, using standardised evaluation levels that allow for comparisons of 
performance across departments. These evaluative judgements provide insight into the 
financial propriety of departments. It should be noted that the matters discussed around risk 
management and ethical compliance in the earlier part of this chapter are relevant and have 
a bearing on financial performance. This is in terms of the financial management 
infrastructure, and which includes the audit manual86 that informs financial management 
practice in departments.   
 
6.13.2 Importance of sound financial management for the developmental State 
 
Sound financial management is not an end in itself; it is a part of good governance and is 
essential for service delivery. Unless resources are used judiciously, the developmental 
State will not be able to deliver on its ambitious goals of reducing inequality and addressing 
service delivery backlogs. The previous section addressed why ethical compliance is an 
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  Principle 2, is a “norm” for this aspect, and calls for public administration to be “efficient, economical and 
effective.” It is supported by the principles of „accountability” and “transparency”. 
86
  Department of Social Development. 2007c. Internal; Audit manual.  Republic of South Africa.  
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important Constitutional value, and presented arguments as to why the State needed to 
meet internal norms and standards which obliged member countries to address corruption. 
Apart from countries seeking approval for their governance stance, the global environment 
requires countries, in particular their treasuries to be active in ensuring that their 
departments operate to the highest levels of financial propriety. It has been shown that 
international investment ratings, which influence Foreign Direct Investment, are based on the 
quality of this part of government infrastructure, and in this regard questions of financial 
predictability and stability become key factors influencing these ratings. The investment 
ratings of countries by international bodies are taken seriously by government.  
 
In light of the global financial environment and domestic imperatives, there is a need for 
sound financial planning, and it is here that aspects such as the MTSF and MTEF become 
strategic features which drive departments to operate in a manner that is indeed deliberate 
and careful in how it goes about seeking its budget and expending it. These frameworks aim 
to bring about the alignment between the thrust of the developmental State and actual 
service delivery.   
 
In view of the above, the constitutional value and principle of being “efficient, effective and 
economical, the so called “3Es” when considered in the context of the developmental State, 
presents certain contradictions. This is because the 3Es concept applies best in a private 
sector environment, where such levels of efficiency and economy are necessary to optimise 
resources and maximise profits. It is also a concept that applies better in countries which do 
not have to straddle such a high socio-economic divide, and where issues of redress in the 
first instance are not necessary. In the context of the developmental State, as mentioned, 
sound financial management is necessary to optimise service delivery through effectively 
deploying resources that maximise the ability of the State to meet its service delivery 
challenges, hence being “effective”. 
 
In South Africa, the State has had to be effective first, by intervening in a manner that has 
not necessarily proceeded from the basis of efficiency and economy. An example would be 
the high levels of social spending, largely through the DSD, which help immediately 
ameliorate the levels of poverty, create social stability and provide a social safety net. In the 
broader development debates, this could be considered as a wasteful form of expenditure. 
The magnitude of the current spending is high and this form of intervention is considered 
critical for improving the quality of lives87 of citizens, evident in the fact that currently, nearly 
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  Manual T.  2006. Minister of Finance. Budget Speech 2006. 15 February 2006.Republic of South Africa. 
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22% of the population receive some form of grant88. In many instances this is considered as 
not worthwhile, as it could create a dependency situation.   
 
Irrespective of this debate, the developmental State purports to be activist and 
interventionist, and has intervened in similar ways to improve the socio-economic stability 
necessary for the country. This does not mean, however, that efficiency considerations are 
unimportant, as the discussion below will show.  
 
6.13.3 M&E systems used by the NT to ensure financial accountability 
 
The main financial oversight institution of national government departments is the NT. The 
NT has at its disposal the PFMA89, which gives effect to key sections90 of the Constitution,91 
and which provides a framework on how finances of the national and provincial spheres of 
government are to be managed. The PFMA claims to adopt an approach that focuses on 
outputs and responsibilities, rather than the rule-driven approach. It is a phased approach92 
towards improving the quality of financial management in the public sector. The PFMA is a 
road-map of how finances need to be managed, and the NT in promoting it, also emphasises 
the need for Accounting Officers to be held accountable for the financial management of 
their respective departments. Whilst the PFMA and its subordinate Treasury Regulations 
provide a broad framework for financial management, Accounting Officers are required to 
develop and implement financial policies and procedures in line with the business needs of 
their respective departments.  
 
From the above, it is clear that sound financial management is promoted through 
standardisation and driving compliance. The NT promotes uniform treasury norms and 
standards, and there is a compliance bias in its operations. As the custodian of State 
resources, it is able to stipulate the direction and type of financial governance of 
departments, which is necessary to ensure that there is overall fiscal discipline. The global 
financial rating of the country is influenced by the quality of financial governance 
arrangements that are in place, in particular in the public sector. The performance of 
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 Department of Social Development. 2006a. A profile of social security beneficiaries in South Africa. 
Volume 3. University of Stellenbosch. Department of Sociology and Anthropology. June 2006. 
89
  National Treasury.  1999. Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. section 38 to 40. 1999. Republic of 
South Africa. 
90
  In the PFMA, the relevant sections are 213, 216, 216, 217, 218, and 219 of Act 108 of 1996. 
91
  Ibid.  
92
 The first phase….proper financial management systems…and accountability arrangements for the 
management of budgets….subsequent phases look at efficiency and effectiveness and best practices‟ 
(PFMA, p. 1).   
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departments, individually and collectively, is critical for ensuring that macro-economic 
policies are met. Listed below are measures and tools used by NT to ensure compliance and 
to standardise the financial affairs of departments.    
 
The key reporting stipulations of departments from the NT are: 
 
a) In-year monitoring93.  Within 15 days after the end of the month, departments report 
on their expenditure and projections on a monthly basis, within 15 days after end the 
month. This allows for the NT to intervene when it sees there is likely to be over- or 
under-expenditure94. The NT requires that departments, in terms of Treasury 
Regulation, report on expenditure against projections on a monthly basis. This in-
year monitoring allows both the department and NT to determine whether the budget 
allocated will be expended by year-end. The NT also provides norms regarding what 
the expected expenditure should be on a monthly basis, so that departments can 
compare themselves to the norms. The problem that arises, however, is that there 
are invariably troughs and spikes in spending, with the early part of the year usually 
slow and acceleration towards the end of the year when there is the invariable 
“March spike”. This refers to the time when departments try to expend their funds, 
often on non-service delivery activities, so at to keep with the 2% norm95. The in-year 
monitoring system is an “early-warning system” that helps departments to self-
regulate their spending. 
b) Adhering to the guidelines for the preparation and tabling of Annual Reports (ARs)96. 
The ARs are considered a key M&E instrument of departments in that they ensure 
that departments report on performance against policies and plans. It is a criterion 
referenced form of reporting. As such the Annual Reports have multiple uses, but the 
most central is that they promote transparency and accountability. The AR for the NT 
is an accountability document, in that it shows whether and how well departments 
used their budgets, and through a range of financial and non-financial indicators, 
points to broader issues of management and governance. They indicate the quality of 
management, as the extent to which plans are realised in practice (the AR is 
backward looking), indicates the capacity within departments to plan, budget and 
expend according to the outputs stipulated in the form of strategic objectives. The 
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 Section 40 (4) of the PFMA. 
94
  This helps to keep departments on track, preventing budget deficits. From this data, judgements can be made 
about the quality of expenditure which in turn is reflective of how well the definable and measurable 
strategic objectives are met. 
95
  The NT develops trend reports of departments financial spending, and is able to identify these variances.  
96
 Ibid.  
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Annual Report allows for oversight bodies and institutions (this question is addressed 
in chapter 7) to assess whether departments have met their mandates, and whether 
the standards of governance, based on standardised indicators, have been met.  
c) Adhering to financial statement templates prescribed by the NT. Departments are 
obliged to compile their financial statements in terms of Generally Recognised 
Accounting Practice and in accordance with templates and notes as prescribed by 
the NT.  
 
At a macro-level the NT produces reports which indicate at an aggregated level expenditure 
patterns. These include: 
 
a) The publishing of reports on state of the budget97. Within 30 days after the end of 
each month the NT publish in the National Government Gazette a statement of actual 
revenue and expenditure with regard to the national revenue fund. The 
aforementioned statement must specify, amongst others the actual revenue for the 
relevant period and for the financial year up to the end of that period and the actual 
expenditure per vote for that period and for the financial year up to the end of that 
period.   
b) The Annual Consolidated Financial Statements98. The PFMA requires the NT to 
prepare and table consolidated financial statements for departments, public entities, 
constitutional institutions, the South African Reserve Bank, AG and Parliament. It 
highlights the financial results per cluster99 mainly to address government priorities 
and policies. The Consolidated Financial Information System provides information on 
the financial performance, including the achievement of government‟s social 
objectives and priorities.  
 
Moving on from the reporting stipulations, there are systems used by the NT as part of its 
M&E of finances of departments. The permeating feature of the methods is that they are 
based on verifiable, quantitative, reported data, collected periodically and used to compare 
against baselines and established norms and standards. In cases of deviation, the NT is 
empowered through legislation to intervene and assume control over the finances of 
departments. The features of the systems are as follows: 
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 See Section 32 of the PFMA.  
98
  See Section 8 of the PFMA 
99
 These refer to the Central Government Administration, which are Financial and Administration Services, 
Social Services, Justice and Protection Services and Economic Services and Infrastructure Development.  
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a) A system of budgeting that is based on receiving and translating political priorities 
into government priorities. The NT has prescribed that budgeting is done according 
to policy directives from the Executive, which means that the programmes of 
departments must contribute to policy priorities.100 For departments to secure the 
budgets they propose, they need to quantify the benefits of a programme and report 
on a quarterly basis their progress against their business plans. This relates in 
particular to the overall budgeting processes that are contained in the MTSF and the 
MTEF, both of which work on the notion of multi-year planning and budgeting, thus 
introducing predictability into the system. It produces what is known as the estimates 
of national expenditure101.  
b) Annually departments are expected to report on their actual delivery against the 
strategic objectives, in the prescribed, uniform format of NT. It is possible to quantify 
performance by measuring the ratio of achievements against plans, and the NT 
prescribes that at least two-third of the objectives must be realised. This is the 
benchmark for effective performance in terms of planning and delivery. 
c) The NT is currently in the process of developing a financial management capability 
maturity model with the view to determine the financial maturity of departments. The 
level of financial maturity of departments, once determined, will indicate to the NT the 
level of customised support and intervention strategies required to assist 
departments to improve their financial management102.  
 
As can be seen, the NT monitors the expenditure of departments, and through this 
monitoring it is able to keep the overall spending of departments on track, and ensure that 
the macro-economic targets are also met. 
 
6.14 THE AUDITOR GENERAL: EVALUATING FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE  
 
The AG is a State institution established by Chapter 9 of the Constitution. As such, it is 
independent, subject only to the Constitution and the law, is accountable to the National 
Assembly103. It must submit audit reports to any legislature that has a direct interest in the 
                                                 
100
 The country has a Cabinet Lekotla process, where policy directions are agreed upon and instructions given to 
Ministers and their DGs to implement. This requires the Ministers to propose budgets which show how they 
support a programme, list the outputs and measures thereof, for presentation to Parliament. This takes place 
within a MTSF (3 years rolling) and a MTEF (also three years rolling), meant to create certainty. 
101
 National Treasury. 2008a. Estimates of National Expenditure report.  Website. Vote 16. Department of 
Social Development.  
102
  National Treasury. 2008b. Strategic Plan 2008/11.  Republic of South Africa.  
103
  It is incumbent on all other organs of state to ensure its independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness. 
In terms of section 188 of the Constitution the AG must audit and report on the accounts, financial 
statements and management of all provincial and national departments. 
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audit, and any other authority prescribed by national legislation.  
 
The AG needs to provide an opinion, which enhances the quality of financial statements, by 
providing a level of assurance, but not absolute, to the users of such statements. This 
evaluation is important in that it is indicative of the quality of financial governance. In 
essence the AG can provide the categories of assessment mentioned in chapter 4. There 
are elaborated upon below. 
 
a) Unqualified audit opinion: This is a good opinion, where the financial statements fairly 
reflect the financial status of a department or entity;  
b) Unqualified audit opinion with emphasis of matter: Least severe opinion but there are 
a number of issues that are a cause of concern which are raised in the matter of 
emphasis;  
Qualified audit opinion: Severe opinion, the auditor concludes that an unqualified 
audit opinion cannot be expressed, but the issues are not so severe so as to lead to 
the next level, of adverse;  
c) Adverse opinion: The financial statements are seen as not presenting fairly the 
situation, material disagreements; and  
d) Disclaimer: No opinion expressed, due to the severity of the situation, and no opinion 
can be expressed. 
 
In discussing these opinions, it should not be mistaken with the reports of the Audit 
Committee, which is an internal structure of departments to advise the Accounting Officer of 
affairs, and which normally deals with the findings of the internal audit unit. The roles of the 
NT and AG must be considered in context of the various oversight committees that amplify 
the work of these bodies, in that they receive reports and consider it, and are empowered to 
pass resolutions or issue directives, to departments.   
 
6.15 SUPPORTING FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT: THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES 
 
There are many parliamentary oversight committees which assist the Legislature to exercise 
political oversight of departments. Key amongst these is the Public Accounts Committee, 
which is the “protector of the public purse”, and focuses on issues raised in the General 
Report of the AG on Auditor Outcomes104. The NT has produced a guideline105 to assist 
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 It focuses on issues of fraud as raised, compliance with the PFMA, interrogation and evaluation of over 
expenditure and other issues of unauthorised expenditure, irregular and fruitless expenditure, corporate 
governance and risk management. 
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them exercise their political oversight, which emphasises the importance of the Annual 
Report106. The Annual Report is meant to be a backward looking document, assessing what 
happened over a year, and is thus an indication of the quality of governance within a 
department. 
 
The Portfolio Committees look at the technical quality of Annual Reports, whether 
performance targets were reported on, the quality of performance information, the 3Es of 
service delivery as measured by the performance indicators in the Annual Report, and 
commenting on the evaluation by the Minister or MEC of the Accounting Officer (DG or HoD) 
and the proposed bonus or sanction which is imposed. The Portfolio Committee on 
concurrent functions oversees the relevant national departments. These committees are 
expected to have a comprehensive view when looking at, for example, social development. It 
would examine how the 9 provinces function and can consider the 9 provincial Annual 
Reports and make comparisons. It can also consider any AG report, and also request any 
national department to make an assessment on its inputs on the outcome of the 
performance of any national department, and get inputs on the Annual Report of all of these. 
Clearly, this is an important, supportive, oversight committee. 
 
6.16 ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL COMPLIANCE OF THE DSD 
 
The DSD is now assessed against the NT and AG framework. There is also a consideration 
of these assessments by the PSC when it implements its system.    
 
6.16.1 Compliance to the PFMA  
 
Compliance to the PFMA is mandatory and as parts of the compliance the DSD is required 
to produce an internal audit manual,107 which is supposed to guide the operations and the 
audit methodology to be applied by Internal Audit Unit of the DSD108. Its importance from a 
governance perspective can be seen in that it clearly articulates roles and responsibilities in 
terms of internal audit and stipulates how the Audit Committee operates in relation with other 
stakeholders (AG, office of the Accountant General) and peers. It also lists the methodology 
that will be used in the audit and deals with the Code of ethics109. In the Annual Report there 
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 National Treasury. 2005. Guideline for Legislative Oversight through Annual Reports. 26 January 2005. 
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 Section 40 and 55 of the PFMA stipulates how and when Annual Report must be tabled.  
107
  Ibid.  
108
  This document needs to link to the audit policy and internal audit charter of the department.  
109
  In this regard issues of standards of conduct, principles, independency and objectivity, confidentiality and 
conduct are listed. 
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must be a statement that the department has complied with the PFMA, which the DSD has 
done.  The provisions of ensuring that the correct management structure to implement the 
PFMA is in place and duly authorised was found to compliant110.  
 
6.16.2 Compliance with the reporting requirements of NT and the DPSA 
 
The Annual Report111 of a department coincides with the financial year of government, which 
is from 1 April to 31 March. The reporting of progress against plans, which is a schedule of 
the strategic objectives of a department, follows the same time-lines. This makes it possible 
to arrive at a quantitative assessment of “delivery”, which in the case of the DSD relates to 
its key outputs. The extent to which objectives are realised (the NT prescribes that two-thirds 
of objectives must be realised), is telling of the quality of departmental governance, as it 
shows how well resources and objectives are brought together. This is made possible by the 
application of M&E within a department, which in turn is an indicator of good governance.  
 
The Annual Report remains the main window for the public into the workings of a 
department, and the current format has been prescribed by NT and the DPSA. Its 
standardised format helps to create a common language around performance, and also 
assists in comparative assessments. The DSD has met the requirements of the NT and 
DPSA, by amongst others, making explicit its legislative framework, and clearly explaining 
the management structures, and how these tie to the tiers of responsibility112.  The Annual 
Report must explain how voted funds are disbursed, in a form that shows the key 
measurable objectives, programmes and achievements. In the AR of the DSD its 6 
programmes113 are reported on, and as is obligatory, it has reported on variance against 
budget for each of these programmes. The DSD has shown that it has strong M&E 
capability, it that it has managed to quantify its objectives in terms of quantity, quality and 
time, and thus report quantifiably on it. It has also explained the programmes and the 
management measures, as required of it, which helps to clarify its relationship with the 
SASSA114. There is also a clear explanation of the accountability mechanisms115. 
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 The DSD has a duly appointed CFO, with clear responsibilities for supporting the AO on the PFMA. 
111
 Ibid.  
112
  See page 17 of the 2007 Annual Report, which stipulates the Acts which the DSD works with. 
113
 The programmes are administration, comprehensive social protection, social security, transfers and 
administration, welfare services, development and research and strategy, regulatory and oversight 
management.  
114
 SASSA has been set up to administer the budget by making disbursements at a site level. In this regard it can 
take credit for transfers to households, which in 2006/7 amounted to R57,050 billion.  
115
 The Minister appoints a CEO, and also signs an Agency Agreement which defines the relationship between 
SASSA and the DSD. A service agreement further governs the relationship between the partners involved, 
and this is signed by the Minister, MECs, the DG and the CEO of SASSA. The Minister also approves the 
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At a governance level it is clear that performance measures are in place and there is 
monitoring of the attainment of objectives and spending of funds. The DSD thus complies 
with this governance requirement of the PFMA.  
 
6.16.3 Ensuring that expenditure is within the 2% range 
 
The 2007 Annual Report for the 2006/7 period indicates that the department received 62 
billion Rands and spent 99,4% of it. Its spending was within the 2% range allowed by NT, 
and this means that the DSD has performed well in efficiently expending its allotted funds.  
 
6.16.4 Meeting the standards of quarterly reporting  
 
This is an in-year monitoring exercise, with the DSD having to provide reports to the NT on a 
monthly basis, but also using quarterly reports to assess itself. It is a self-reflective 
managerial exercise that will be explained more fully in chapter 6. The outputs are quarterly 
performance reviews aimed at initiating remedial action where necessary. Where there is a 
percentage deviation, early reports allow for this to be rectified in the remaining period. It 
means that programme information needs to be presented against set quarterly targets and 
financial performance of each programme for the period under review assessed. There is 
also provision for non-financial performance reporting, which whilst difficult to prove where 
there is no quantitative and target deviation information, also helps in the analysis. 
 
In an assessment of 4 quarterly reports of the DSD, the following was found.116 The format 
allows for easy monitoring, as each programme is reported within a programme, but broken 
up into functional areas, with outputs, measures and indicators, targets for the annual 
reporting period (2007/08), followed by performance for each quarter and percentage 
deviation. This clear monitoring tool is performance oriented, and the report for each quarter 
then proves quarterly reports of allocations, expenditure and projections (based on the rate 
of expenditure). What is noteworthy of the report is the statement that this activity and 
discipline which it instils should lead to “an intuitional performance monitoring culture” being 
                                                                                                                                                        
annual strategic plans and budgets and requires quarterly reports on progress. In terms of the NDA, the 
Minister appoints a board and the CEO of the NDA, and also approves budgets and requires quarterly 
reports.   
116
 Department of Social development Quarterly Reports submitted to national Treasury for the periods April-
June 2007; July-September 2006; August-October 2007 and November-March 2008. 
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gradually instilled in the department (DSD, 2007: 79)117.  An important aspect of the report is 
that it is able to make a broad analysis of performance. 
 
6.16.5 Financial management assessment undertaken by the PSC  
 
It would be useful to consider other assessments of this aspect undertaken. The Public 
Service M&E system has already been described. What is now presented is its assessment 
of the DSD for the 2007/8 financial year118, for the principle of efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness. The PSC system rates the following elements for the principle:  
  
a) Planned expenditure versus actual expenditure 
b) Quality of department‟s service delivery indicators 
c) Achievement of priority outputs 
 
Each of the areas is allocated a third of the weight for the overall assessment of this 
principle. A brief synopsis of the results follows. It was found that for planned expenditure 
versus actual expenditure, the department had an under-expenditure of 1,1% of the amount 
voted, which was within the acceptable margin of 2%. The under-expenditure in the 2001/2 
period, which was when the PSC assessed the department using this instrument, increased 
from the 0,3% during that period. This result should be seen in context that the budget over 
the period also increased significantly. Of the 6 programmes, 4 showed under-expenditure, 
the worst result being in programme 6 (Strategy, Regulatory and Oversight Management) 
where there was a 38,3 percent deviation. Reasons have been provided for this, which relate 
to turn over and staff delays in the filling of posts. The system requires that material 
variances are clearly explained, which has been done, and the DSD was rated 100% for this 
element. The DSD has shown sound financial management around this aspect, in that it has 
effectively monitored its expenditure and been able to explain material variances.  
 
The second aspect examined by the PSM&ES is the quality of department’s service delivery 
indicator. The sub-elements that are measured are the measurability of outputs and 
indicators, with the PSC instrument examining the quality of service delivery indicators under 
this principle. The DSD was found to have 6 measurable objectives, with 211 service 
delivery indicators, of which 134 were measurable in terms of quantity, quality and time; and 
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 Department of Social Development. 2007d. Quarterly Report July – September 2007. Republic of South 
Africa. 
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  Ibid.  
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77 were not. The most measurable of the indicators was in programme 2, which is social 
security transfers and administration (100% of the objectives were measurable).  
 
Also assessed is the linkage of output indicators. The standard is that the department`s 
strategic plan119 must have a clear linkage between functional areas, outputs, Spatial 
Development Initiatives (SDIs) and targets. The report found that some of the SDIs found in 
the strategic plan were not measurable in terms of quality, quantity and time dimensions. 
Overall, however, more than half were measurable (64%), and the PSC instrument awarded 
a 100% for this element. Finally, the system assesses how well the DSD achieved its priority 
output. It was found that the DSD has succeeded in achieving the priority outputs, with its 
overall achieving 86 of the 211 priority areas, which is a 41% success rate. In looking at the 
specific programmes, the worst performance was in the comprehensive social protection 
area, where only 15% of the priority outputs (which were 26) were achieved. The problem 
was compounded in that in this programme most of the outputs were not stated in Quality, 
Quantity and Time dimensions. The PSC standard for this element is an achievement of 
between 40% to 59%, and thus the 41% means that they score within the band and are 
scored 100% for the element.  
 
6.17 FINANCIAL COMPLIANCE IN RELATION TO M&E AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
a)   M&E 
 
The systems for monitoring and evaluating financial compliance used by the NT, AG and 
PSC fall within the quantitative domain, are empirical and universal, and show deviations 
from norms and standards. They are based on clear reporting protocols and have a set of 
measurable and verifiable indicators. The NT, unlike the PSC has the power to intervene if 
there is unacceptable deviation from the norms and standards, and as such its role as an 
oversight body is likely to be taken more seriously. It has the power to withhold resources, 
and this gives it much influence on how departments shape their budgets. By insisting on 
certain types of reports, largely expected throughout the year and at the end in the form of 
the Annual Report, the NT does direct financial practice. It goes beyond producing reports 
for the purpose of transparency; the accountability outcome of these is more direct as it has 
legislation to hold the Accounting Officers personally liable for the poor management of 
funds. It also has recourse to committees which have more power and which can censure 
poor financial performance. The NT thus uses M&E for policing, and given its legislative 
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support is able to ensure accountability for financial performance, much more than the PSC 
can for the Constitutional Values and Principles.  
 
The AG may be considered as providing an evaluation of financial performance, and its 
opinions are now part of the language of performance and its reports taken seriously. 
However, it too has faced challenges in that many of the departments which receive adverse 
audit opinions are repeat offenders, and this shows that there are serious deficiencies in the 
political-administrative interface when results of poor performance fail to translate into any 
improvement in performance. The point has already been made about the lack of translation 
from findings to action, as being a weakness in the accountability framework and which 
could potentially undermine the thrust for good governance. The recent work of the AG has 
focused more on the ethical element, with it now scrutinising aspects such as financial 
disclosures and looking more deeply into irregularities around conflicts of interests. It has 
also moved into assessing performance management systems of departments, moving away 
from the traditional function of providing opinions only on the quality of financials.  
 
It may thus be summarised that the NT and AG may be regarded as part of the M&E bodies, 
but as in the case of the PSC, their work is more directed towards monitoring compliance, 
although there is an attempt to also look more deeply at the outputs of spending. The Annual 
Report remains a key accountability schema, and is a very useful public tool for holding 
departments to account. 
 
b)   Financial management and good governance 
 
The DSD has shown sound financial management, having met the requirements of the NT 
and AG. In doing so, it has met exacting reporting standards, and put into the public domain 
its performance. This has increased transparency around how the DSD uses its budget, 
which is supportive of good governance. It also helps to show the extent to which the 
programmes of the DSD contribute to meeting the goals of the developmental State. The 
most important type of management is financial management, and a department that 
performs well in this area shows a responsibility for how it uses public funds, and is thus 
accountable. To achieve financial accountability, however, is not easy as there are several 
requirements that have to be met. In practice it compels departments to properly reflect on 
its vision and mission, to plan within the budget, to quantify outputs and constantly assess 
whether its plans are met in practice. If a department achieves these, and this is validated by 
the NT and AG, noting that validation is a necessary part of good governance, the 
achievement is noteworthy. 
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This sub-section has shown that there is explicit policy for the oversight of finances of 
departments, which is accompanied by effective M&E mechanisms for the aspect. The M&E 
of finances is led by the NT, but carried out at different levels. An important value-add to the 
process is the opinion of the AG, which is a summative evaluation of the performance of a 
department in terms of its financial management capability. The committees of parliament 
provide another level of oversight, largely through their scrutiny of Annual Reports, which are 
theoretically a key transparency and accountability inducing mechanism. The actual 
performance of Parliament in terms of oversight is assessed in chapter 7. Finally, one has 
the PSC which also conducts assessment on this aspect on a periodic basis and is able to 
provide a quantitative assessment of how well a department manages its finances.   
 
It was found that the M&E of finances contributes to transparency and accountability of 
departmental operations, which helps in its governance. The PFMA remains a key legislation 
for holding the DGs, who are the Accounting Officers, personally accountable for the 
finances of their departments. There is a complete machinery of financial support systems 
and mechanisms to ensure that the finances of department are well managed. There is a 
slew of regulation to support the system, and this includes the prioritising of ethics and risk 
management.   
 
The case study showed that the DSD has been compliant in all areas, with even the 
assessment by the PSC using the transversal PSM&ES, allocating the department a high 
score for the principle of efficiency, effectiveness and economy. It would appear that the 
M&E of finances has contributed to greater transparency and accountability, and as far as 
the M&E of finances goes, it is an important contributor to the overall compliance climate. 
However, administrative compliance whilst important does not equate good governance, and 
in the absence of impact studies on the work of the DSD, the value added in terms of 
development remains to be seen.   
 
6.18 ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLIANCE 
 
6.18.1 Relevance of area to good governance 
 
Administrative compliance is essential, but should not be equated to resulting in good 
governance, in that is shows a commitment to the prevailing policies. There is a strong 
oversight role played by the Department of Labour (DoL), the DPSA, the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJCD) and the PSC in M&E different aspects of 
administrative compliance. The thrust for administrative compliance “in terms of just and fair 
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decision-making” comes from principle four120, whilst the thrust for sound human resource 
management comes from principles eight121 and nine122. Principle eight is more universal, 
whilst principle nine is country specific.  
  
This assessment focuses mainly on compliance with human resource and management 
practices, as this has been identified as key to improving the quality of public sector 
personnel, which is seen as a necessary condition for better service delivery and thus good 
governance. The Public Service has in place the necessary legislative and regulatory 
framework that makes specific provisions to drive human resource management in a 
particular direction. Key amongst there is a human resources development strategy, which 
has emerged from a White Paper on Human Resource Development123 in the Public Service. 
The main purpose of this paper was to support the transformation of the Public Service by 
improving upon how human resources are managed from a centrally controlled, process- 
driven Public Service to a service that is representative of all people, treats public servants 
as a valuable resource, holds public servants accountable for their actions and is focused on 
service delivery outcomes. The White Paper introduced a changed approach to Human 
Resource Management with a clear focus on improved delivery and enhanced 
performance. This approach built on the ideal of a people-centred Public Service that is 
devoted to addressing the needs of the community that it serves. As can be seen, citizens 
are foremost is this model.  
 
There is an emphasis of promoting skills development, and this is embodied in more specific 
Acts and regulations124. To give effect to skills development, there is a multi-year skills 
development strategy in place.125 In the South African context, an important element that is 
also monitored is the compliance with the Employment Equity Act126. This stems from the 
affirmative action programme, which seeks to redress the legacy of apartheid and make the 
public sector representative of the demographic composition of the country.  
 
                                                 
120
 Principle 4: Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.  
121
 Principle 8: Good human resource management and career development practices, to maximise human 
potential, must be cultivated. 
122
 Principle 9: Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with 
employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness and the need to 
redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation.  
123
 Department of Public Service and Administration. 1997. White Paper on Human Resource Development in 
the Public Service. Republic of South Africa.  
124
 Refer to the Skills Development Act, No. 97 of 1998. Republic of South Africa 
125
 Refer to the  National Skills Development strategy for South Africa, 2006-2010. Republic of South Africa.   
126
 Refer to the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. Republic of South Africa. Specific provisions are made for 
mandatory reporting, the publication of the report, and other provisions.  
I. A. Naidoo:    |   Chapter 6 166 
 
6.18.2 Areas of administrative compliance where oversight is exercised 
 
The main area of administrative compliance where oversight is exercised is around human 
resources management. This includes the M&E of employment equity, the Human Resource 
planning of departments and the promotion of administrative justice. The main role players 
that exercise this oversight are the DoL, the DPSA and the PSC. The systems used relate to 
mandatory reporting obligations on departments, wherein departments are expected to 
submit information based on templates. There is feedback provided on these performance 
areas from these two institutions, which tends to be in the form of high level reports that 
aggregate the data from all the units (departments or entities) that report into these 
institutions.     
 
6.19 M&E OF EMPLOYMENT EQUITY 
 
The policy intent of government is that the public sector should mirror the demographic 
composition of the country. To achieve this, a series of M&E activities on the aspect are 
undertaken, primarily by the DoL. There have also been evaluations conducted of progress 
around representivity, which provide a broad overview of how government as a whole has 
met the Employment Equity targets127.   
 
From a monitoring perspective, departments are obliged, in terms of section 21(2) of the 
Employment Equity Act, to report to the DG of the DoL on representivity128 statistics annually 
on the first of each October. This comes from a requirement that each department is 
expected to develop an Employment Equity Plan129, which requires that departments provide 
information in a prescribed format.130 In addition, the report must stipulate what the 
management infrastructure is within the department in terms of the Employment Equity plan, 
and this includes roles and responsibilities for the tiers of management, a description of the 
consultative forums that are in place, the communication strategy and the M&E and reporting 
procedures.   
 
                                                 
127
 Public Service Commission. 2006e. An Audit of Affirmative Action in the Public Service. Republic of South 
Africa.  
128
 Representivity is defined as meeting targets for race, gender and disability.  
129
 Provisions are set out in section 20(1) of the Employment Equity Act. The plan is multi-year, and subject to 
annual review.  
130
 The prescribed information requires race and gender information along lines of occupational class/salary 
levels. It requires specific information of support (policies and measures) for designated persons, and 
progress against targets, with variance reporting. It is a clear monitoring tool.  
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6.20 ASSESSMENT OF EMPLOYMENT EQUITY COMPLIANCE IN THE DSD 
 
The compliance of the DSD around employment equity reflects full compliance, and is 
contained in the Employment Equity plan131 and its 2007 Annual Report132. More updated 
statistics are drawn from the Vulendlela133 data-base. The targets and performance thereof 
are indicated: 
 
Target:  Blacks at management level: 75% target 
Actual:  DSD 88% (progress from 33% in 2002) 
 
Target:  Gender (women at top, senior and middle management level): 50%  
Actual  DSD 61% 
 
Target:  Disability: 2% target 
Actual:  DSD 2,6% 
 
It was also found that all of the Employment Equity Plan stipulations for the DSD were fully 
met. The DSD met the requirements of having in place a HIV and diversity management 
plan. 
 
6.21 M&E OF HUMAN RESOURCES   
 
Each department is expected to have in place a human resource plan for its office, which 
must be aligned with the MTEF. A template is provided for this, meaning that information is 
collected on a standardised basis.134 At a legal level, the plan requires a sign off by the 
department. Each plan provides an overview of the department, its vision and mission 
statement, values, strategic objectives, HR planning overview, HR challenges and HR 
planning and process matrix. It also requires an environmental scan, requiring a 
consideration of key environment factors that could impact upon the department, trends in 
the macro environment, envisaged changes in the macro environment, and its possible 
impact on the department. There is also a workforce analysis required, that reports on the 
organisational structures, competencies, training and development, types of employment 
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  Department of Social Development. 2006c. Employment Equity Plan. January. Republic of South Africa.  
132
 Ibid.  
133
  This is a data-base that is housed by NT and provides Representivity statistics. It has been augmented with 
statistics from the DPSA and Persal (payroll system). 
134
 This refers to the reporting template provided for reporting on human resource matters for the period related 
to the MTEF.  
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and resourcing, staff turnover, budget analysis, employment equity, employee health and 
wellness and values and ethical behaviour. It needs to also address the priority human 
resource issues, as well as an implementation plan and M&E.   
 
An assessment was made of the Human Resource plan of the DSD for the period 2008-
2012, and for the financial year 2008-2009135. This assessment examined the document to 
establish the extent to which the DSD has complied with the template and reporting 
provisions. The HR plans is a DPSA requirement. The report is comprehensive and requires 
information across the following thematic areas; organisational location, environmental scan, 
workforce analysis, human resource gap analysis and priority departmental human resource 
issues. As part of the self-regulation promoted, the report also requires an action plan and 
an M&E report. It comprises 23 tables, which provides a clear description of the definitions 
and types of information that is required. Its status is that it must be signed off by the 
departments, both by the DG and the Minister.  
 
The report is illustrative of the broader work and intentions of the DSD, and this is best 
captured under the strategic themes which are then linked to the strategic objectives136. The 
importance of this inclusion is that it situates the relationship between the human resource 
requirements and the human resource capacity. The external and internal environmental 
scan provides a matrix which identifies the contemporary trends (along the lines of political, 
economic, social, technological, environmental and legislative) and requires the DSD to 
apply its mind to what this means to the department and also requires that the department 
comes up with a possible course of action137. A similar assessment is made of the internal 
environmental scan, but this time the cross-cutting categories relate to departmental factors. 
It is deemed important that these be addressed from a governance perspective.  
 
The workforce analysis is a gap analysis, and delves into what the demand and supply are 
for categories of skills. This is then linked back to the functionality of the departments. Also 
included is a very clear competencies assessment, which identifies the competencies per 
occupational classification, and identifies the steps required to address these. This is a clear 
way in which departments are made to identify their HR needs, and commit to addressing 
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 Department of Social Development. 2008b. Human Resource Plan for the period 2008-2012. Financial Year: 
2008-2009.  29 September 2008. Republic of South Africa.  
136
 See item 2.5, pages 7-9.  
137
 See item 3.1, pages 11-14.  
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them. The matter is well documented in the area of critical competencies138. Demographic 
data is also provided, to anticipate retirement, and there is a turnover analysis, with the 
reasons thereof. The DSD has a vacancy rate of 24%, which is above the norm of 10%.  
Whilst the filling of posts is an administrative requirement, and helps to ensure that 
departments are capacitated to meet their mandate, it is an internal requirement. It is 
important that departments possess the requisite skills and capacities to implement policies.   
 
The main part of the report is the addressing of priority issues139. The most compliance 
driving element of the report is the action plan which has to be submitted, and which shows 
the activities to be carried out, the targets, responsibilities, budgets and monitoring actions.  
 
Overall, at the compliance level, it is clear that the DSD has complied, and based on the 
aforementioned assessment, it is possible that through this aspect, good governance around 
human resources is promoted. This would be because it links to greater transparency and 
accountability around the aspect.  
 
6.22 M&E COMPLIANCE WITH THE PMDS 
 
The manner in which individual performance of personnel is managed in departments is 
critical to its overall governance, given that any performance management system is rooted 
in principles of transparency and accountability. The contracting of performance means that 
there is commitment to delivering products and services within the constraints of resources 
but with clear indicators in terms of outputs, levels of quality and dates. It is an essential part 
of good governance in that it helps to hold individuals to account to their supervisors, and 
there is a clear basis at the end of the period for a discussion and reflection on what actual 
performance has been. In the absence of such a system, there is no basis for measuring 
whether the resources at the disposal of the employer has been optimally utilised. This links 
back to the earlier discussion on the question of professional ethics, risk management and 
the principles of efficiency, effectiveness and economy.  
 
The DPSA has produced a PMDS, which is a regulatory provision that all public servants 
have to comply with. There are some differences in the detail of the system, but in essence it 
requires performance contracting, either more formally through signed performance 
                                                 
138
 Table 6, page 28, lists the range of competencies required for the full operation of the department. These 
include policy and legislation development, research, programme implementation, M&E, impact assessment 
and customer satisfaction skills, service delivery skills and ethics, with focus on Batho Pele principles.  
139
 Table 22, this cites the departmental priorities, its risk and approaches to mitigate risk and achieve outcomes.  
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agreements at the Senior Management Service level, or signed work plans at levels below 
this. The importance can be seen in that it is referenced in key regulatory140 and policy 
frameworks, and has also been adopted as a resolution141 in terms of collective bargaining. 
The PMDS is supposed to translate into better service delivery, and this also contained 
within is the critical White Paper on Batho Pele142, which is a deliberate strategy to instil a 
culture of accountability within public servants, in relation to service delivery.  
 
There are also specific provisions for the performance management of the Senior 
Management Service143, where the question of performance contracting is much clearer, as 
there is the requirement for signed performance agreements, and a more explicit guide on 
how this translates into performance levels, which then translates into pay progression (for 
satisfactory performance), the invoking of poor performance measures if it is found to be 
unsatisfactory and the granting of bonuses if it is found to be good. The extent to which the 
PMDS is implemented at the Senior Management Service level could be reflective of 
broader compliance levels for the PMDS at other levels.  
 
It was found that the DSD has been implementing the PMDS at all levels within the 
department. This is evident from the Annual Report and strategic plan of the DSD. The DG, 
in terms of his performance agreement with his Minister, has been subject to an evaluation 
which was chaired by the PSC. This is in relation to the annual guidelines that are issued by 
the PSC to inform the process144. The documents that are submitted at this meeting include 
the following, all of which have been reviewed145:  The Annual Report of the department, the 
signed performance agreement between the HoD and Minister Verification statement, which 
is an account of actual performance against plan and a self-assessment on the rating 
instrument together with the Minister‟s assessment. 
 
Based on the review of the documents, and the observation by the researcher who was 
present in the actual evaluation, it can be noted that there was compliance to the evaluation 
system for HoDs. Furthermore, the interrogation of performance by the members of the 
panel (other Ministers and a peer DG) indicates that the process did generate the correct 
                                                 
140
 The regulations referred to are the Public Service Act, 1994, Public Service regulations, 2001, Treasury 
Regulations, 2000. They are revised by the DPSA. 
141
 See Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council Resolution No 13 of 1998. 
142
 Department of Public Service and Administration. 1997. Batho Pele White Paper. Republic of South Africa.  
143
 Chapter 4 of the SMS handbook deals with the process and requirements of performance management and 
development for members of the SMS. It is a directive of the Minister for Public Service and Administration, 
in terms of Part III/B.3 of Chapter 4 of the PSR, 2001. 
144
  Public Service Commission. 2008e. Guidelines for the Evaluation of Heads of Department for the Financial 
Year 2006/2007.  Republic of South Africa.  
145
 The researcher sat on this panel and was able to observe adherence to the process.  
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levels of scrutiny. An important outcome of the HoD evaluation process is that it helps to 
bring out strategic issues which are of concern to the performance of the department, and 
which is then provided as feedback to the DG/HoD by the Minister. The PSC has produced 
more detailed research on this aspect146, in which it illustrates the value that is added due to 
the system of HoD evaluations. In its report, it makes the point that the exercise of 
performance management should proceed beyond mere compliance.  
 
It should be mentioned that the DSD is fortunate in that it has had the same DG and Minister 
since 2003, and there is thus organisational stability and continuity. This point needs to be 
viewed in context of a public service that has an average turnover rate of HoDs of 24%147, 
and where such instability can undermine the ability of a department to perform optimally, 
due to too frequent ministerial and administrative leadership changes.  
 
6.23 COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROMOTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT 
 
The legal framework and quality of adherence thereof is an element of good governance. It 
points to issues of the independence and credibility of the judiciary, and also relates to 
issues of the separation of powers. A key element of administrative compliance is the 
compliance with the Promotion of the Administrative Justice Act, 1996. The Act has been 
cited as critical transformative legislation, in that if there is due scrutiny to the manner in 
which administrative decisions are made, this will prevent the abuse of authority and lead to 
good governance. The main players here are the DoJCD, which has responsibility for the 
Act. The PSC has conducted a joint assessment with the DoJCD on the Act148. The problem 
of poor compliance has been found across of departments that are subject to the 
PSM&ES149.  
 
It was possible to look at compliance with the PAJA in terms of the PSM&ES that was 
applied in the DSD in the 2001/2 and 2007/8 financial years150. The standard indicators used 
by the PSC are that:  
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 Public Service Commission. 2008f. A report on Strategic Issues Emanating from the Evaluation of Heads of 
Department. Republic of South Africa.   
147
 Public Service Commission. 2008g. The Turn-over Rate of Heads of Department and the Implications for the 
Public Service. Republic of South Africa. . 
148
 Republic of South Africa. Compliance with the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No. 3 or 
200). December 2006. 
149
 Public Service Commission. 2007b. Fourth Consolidated Public Service Monitoring and Evaluation report. 
Research Cycle 2006/2007. Republic of South Africa.  
150
 Ibid.  
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a) All decisions are taken in accordance with prescribed legislation/policies and in terms 
of delegated authority 
b) All decisions are justified and fair considering the evidence submitted in this regard 
c) The procedure required in the PAJA in communicating administrative decisions are 
duly followed 
 
The DSD submitted 9 documents for scrutiny, and in its (PSC) assessment the DSD was 
found to be fully compliant with the provisions of PAJA. The matters that were reviewed 
covered a range of issues, most of which had financial implications. There was a need for 
the DSD to chart out a decision-making map. The DSD received a 100% rating for the 
2007/8 period, up from 60% for the same element in 2001/2. This result is above the national 
norm, and indicative of good management.  
 
6.24 ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLIANCE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
a)   M&E 
 
The systems used to monitor and evaluate administrative compliance, notably in the areas of 
employment equity, human resource management, performance management and PAJA are 
less quantitative than the systems used by the NT and AG. In making these assessments 
the DoL, DPSA and PSC consider a broader range of documentary evidence, and whilst 
they still look at the extent to which there is compliance to the prescripts, they also consider 
the processes used.  
 
b)   Administrative compliance and good governance 
 
It stands to reason that if departments are able to adhere to the administrative policies of 
government, there is the necessary discipline and commitment at the level of operational 
units for other forms of instructions to be met. There is a clear logic behind the policies of 
government, and given that many of these expressly seek to bring about transformation, 
they must be met. The PMDS, if properly implemented will bring about the levels of scrutiny 
and reflection necessary for good governance in that it enhances transparency and 
accountability for performance. Similarly, the evaluation of HoDs also qualifies as a measure 
of good governance, in that if properly implemented it shows at the highest level of 
government that there is a commitment to holding leadership to account for performance. 
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The MME of administrative compliance tends to focus on human resource issues. This is in 
accordance with the overall thrust of principles 8 and 9 relating to human resource 
management and employment equity. The results indicate that there had been steady 
progress in improving compliance, and given the clear targets that have been set, it is 
relatively easy to track progress. The highest levels of achievement have been with regards 
to employment equity and results for the DSD show that targets set for attaining the various 
representivity targets have even been exceeded. It is not clear whether the DSD (or any 
other department) where such a situation of over-representation of a group is achieved, 
which tends to be largely with regards to the racial category of blacks. Measures are 
instituted to correct the situation. The data seems to suggest that this does not take place, 
meaning that the policy of achieving diversity is probably not being implemented. This does 
not augur well for the avowed intention of a representative public sector workforce, which is 
perceived, and in many cases actually Africanised. 
 
The achievement of women at the management level has been significant, with the data 
showing achievement above the target level of 50%, it being 61%. The achievement in the 
levels of persons with disability remains problematic across the Public Service151, although 
the DSD has managed to exceed the target. The good compliance to the provisions with 
PAJA may be due to the stable leadership in the DSD, which means that issues of 
delegations are now well embedded.  
 
However, whilst there has been good compliance, it is not clear whether this has translated 
into improved human resource management, or whether it is done by managers just for 
compliance purposes. It may be that whilst the DSD has been compliant, this in itself cannot 
be construed to mean that on its own it constitutes good governance. The relationship 
between reporting and being compliant, and actual improved governance is complex, and 
addressed in chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis, where the use and action on results is 
considered.    
 
6.25 THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
The mandatory bodies, apart from using traditional management152 and forums to present 
their oversight work, are dependent upon Parliament and its committees to act on oversight 
findings by calling departments to account. Parliament is thus a convertor of findings and 
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 Cited in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 editions of the State of the Public Service reports of the PSC. 
152
 The AG and PSC present draft reports to departmental management leadership to comment on, as part of a 
process of finalisation of reports, and committing to acting upon recommendations. 
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recommendations into actions, as it is able to call the Executive to account153, and censure 
when there is no action on the part of the Executive.   
 
This section focuses on the role played by parliament and its committees in oversight. It 
looks at the conventions of parliament that bring about oversight, such as the parliamentary 
question and answer process, the Budget Vote Speech and the work of Portfolio 
Committees in using such information to hold departments and their political principals to 
account. Parliament potentially contributes to good governance by providing the mechanism 
for accountability to be exercised, and due to the composition of Parliament and various 
committees, which in a multi-party democracy enhances debate and transparency, helps 
M&E to produce an impact. The impact referred to is when there is action stemming from 
evaluation, and performance improves or policy is reviewed based on this assessment. If 
this is not the case, then M&E probably serves just an enlightenment purpose, which given 
the high investment and expectation of oversight bodies, may not be justifiable. If this is the 
case, the developmental State will not be sufficiently supported, either because it does not 
receive the correct information, or that its key partner, Parliament, is not exercising the 
oversight required. Through an examination of the inner workings of Parliament and 
considering its impact, a more comprehensive assessment of MME can be undertaken.   
 
There are two questions that need to be asked when reviewing Parliament in relation to 
answering whether MME contributes to good governance. The first is whether Parliament is 
structured and operates in a manner that supports its mandate to exercise oversight, and the 
second is whether there is evidence, based on how Parliament operates, to suggest that this 
institution does indeed serve to action the work of MME bodies, and thus demonstrate 
evidence of improved transparency and accountability. If this happens, it is supportive of 
democracy in that there is the prevention of abuse and holding to account of management 
for their actions.  
 
The issues of transformation of the Public Service have been raised in Chapters 1 and 3. 
Here the contribution of M&E to the developmental State was demonstrated154. The role 
played by the DSD towards this transformation was illustrated in Chapter 5. Parliament is 
thus central to the process of transformation, and due to historic reasons it has been 
accorded a special status and symbolises higher end values, and there is a public 
                                                 
153
 The Committees of Parliament are entrusted to hold the Executive to account, although this process has not 
been effective in the past.  
154
  In chapter 2 of this thesis, the argument is made as to why M&E is necessary for the developmental State to 
be effective. 
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expectation that members of Parliament will act in holding up this ideal155. Given the 
influence of the Public Service on transformation, and the specific role expected of the 
developmental State as an enactor of policies, the interface between Parliament and 
departments, which is often mediated by M&E information and bodies, is an important 
consideration in the discourse on good governance. The operations of Parliament are better 
informed based on evidence, produced by M&E bodies, which can then form the basis for 
Parliament to engage departments more rigorously.  
 
The assessment of how effective Parliament is in supporting MME has been done through 
triangulation, whereby the following elements were identified as relevant, and assessed 
based on observation, documentary review, interviews with member of parliament who 
worked in such committees and researchers. The tabling process used by the MME bodies, 
in terms of the protocols of what information is sent to committees, and for what purpose 
was also examined. This served to track evaluations into the domain of parliament, and see 
what happens to it. Thus in answering the effectiveness question, two functional areas were 
examined, namely:  
 
a) The operations of Parliament in general, by drawing on an independent panel 
review156 of the workings of Parliament, and observations of how some critical 
oversight work of the PSC and the AG was managed 
b) An assessment of the specific working of the committees of Parliament (referred to 
as Portfolio Committees) is examined. This draws on interviews with members of 
such committees and observations and interviews with persons from M&E bodies 
and departments.  
 
The impact element relates to the quality of outcomes, which is best assessed in looking at 
performance beyond the lens of the mandatory oversight bodies. It comes about when the 
producers of M&E are especially reliant on Parliament to act on results, and assessing 
whether this happens in practice will indicate whether the throughput from the production of 
performance information to its use takes place.   
 
                                                 
155
 All references to the South African parliament situate the current institution within a journey from apartheid 
to democracy, and the term “People`s Parliament”, also shown in artefacts within Parliament, seeks to 
portray the institution as accessible. This is a shift from the old institution which passed repressive laws.  
156
 Parliament,. 2009. Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament. 13 January 2009. Republic of 
South Africa.  
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6.26 THE EXPECTATION OF PARLIAMENT TO EXERCISE OVERSIGHT  
 
The South African Parliament was reconstituted with democracy in 1994, and was a break 
from the past when the institution served partisan interests. Since democracy, it has sought 
to re-establish itself as an institution with credibility by being a “peoples` Parliament” (as 
stated by former President Nelson Mandela). With this ideal, the institution was set up to 
enact laws and engage in debate typical of a multi-party democracy, and importantly, 
configured to hold the Public Service accountable for its performance. It does this, as 
mentioned through the various committees that are tasked to exercise oversight over 
specific policy areas. The South African Parliamentary processes have been, at a theoretical 
level, designed to serve as a key nodal point for political/administrative interface.   
 
Apart from the legal authority which gives Parliament the power to hold government to 
account, parliamentary engagement with departments induces transparency, and given the 
nature of reporting, helps to put performance information into the public domain. Most of the 
proceedings are open to the public and media, and through the deliberations emanating from 
the committees it can be fed into other levels, where it can ignite debate, all of which are 
signs of a healthy democracy and supportive of good governance. There have been many 
examples of where the Parliamentary privilege has been used by the opposition parties to 
highlight alleged maladministration, and which have subsequently translated into 
investigations, in support of the public good. The manner in which Parliament has been 
vigilant though, has been inconsistent, and many questions continually stalk Parliament 
when it comes to whether this ideal is consistently met. The review has provided insights into 
what the shortcomings have been by Parliament.  
 
6.27 PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT IN PRACTICE 
  
Understanding parliamentary processes and commenting on its practice will show the 
discrepancy between ideal and actual, and this is a key question given that several reviews 
and observers have slated parliament for not living up to the expectation of being a People`s 
Parliament and acting in the public interest157. When Parliament is rigorous in its oversight, it 
strengthens the accountability chain by respect for the work of MME bodies, which rely on 
Parliament to make decisions and hold the administrative and political leadership to 
                                                 
157
  The respect accorded to Parliament means that this institution is seen as the final judge in the decision-
making chain, and citizens and the media use parliamentary information to arrive at performance 
judgements. 
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account158, as required of the Constitution. The most vocal committee has been the SCOPA, 
which recently called to account a Minister, but was not respected leading to major questions 
asked about the quality of democracy, and whether the ruling party was not using its muscle 
to stifle debate and prevent Ministers from being subject to the work of these committees. 
The Open Democracy Foundation for South Africa has argued that recalcitrant Ministers and 
party politics undermine the institution`s ability exercise oversight159.   
 
The assessment of Parliamentary effectiveness, not in terms of its policy role but that of 
oversight, must be looked at in terms of outcome indicators. The work of the Presidency has 
provided 12 key areas of delivery, and which are premised on the notion that performance in 
most of the areas is weak and needs to be addressed. Although the system is not yet 
operational, the preliminary documents appear to emanate from an acknowledged crisis of 
governance, in areas of education, crime, public administration, to name but a few. It cites 
many public confidence surveys which shows a decline in public confidence, and which once 
again point to the fact that the accountability frameworks and mechanisms are probably not 
optimal. It is expected that the performance agreements between Ministers and the 
President will be made available, and one would envisage that Parliament uses these 
agreements to comment on the performance of the executive. There have been public 
pronouncements on the matter, and practice will tell whether these are met. In order to get a 
sense of how parliament works, the following areas were focused on, using mixed methods, 
to get a sense of the quality of Parliamentary probity. As a backdrop, the review of 
Parliament160 locates this study within the APRM review process.  
 
a) The Parliamentary process, including the question and answer sessions, is an 
avenue for the public to ask the executive to explain in writing or orally, 
transgressions. The assessment focused on questions asked of the Minister for 
Social Development, drawing from Parliamentary records (Hansard) between the 
period 2008 and 2009161. This indicated the content of issues with regards to 
oversight. 
 
                                                 
158
  The nature of the democratic transition and Constitutional provisions makes Parliament responsible for 
ensuring that the Constitutional democracy works. There has been much investment in supporting 
parliamentarians, most of whom are new, understand their roles as they engage in different oversight 
processes. 
159




  All the questions posed to the Minister for Social Development between 2008 and 2009 were assessed, and 
categorised on the basis of questions asked for clarity and/or information, or probity in terms of departmental 
performance. Those relating to accountability issues were assessed to examine the efficacy of the 
Parliamentary  processes in promoting accountability.  
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b) The Budget Speeches of the Minister of Social Development were reviewed, as it is a 
significant reflective moment on performance, and includes opportunities for critique 
from members of Parliament. In this regard, the Budget Vote Speeches for 2007, 
2008 and 2009 were examined.  
 
 
c) Interviews were held with Parliamentary researchers, who work directly with the 
committees and are in a good position to comment on the operations of such 
committees. Importantly, they can comment on what happens to the volume of work 
generated on the performance of a department, and help shed light into the quality of 
interrogation by oversight committees162.   
 
d) The researcher has drawn on his own experiences in observing Parliamentary 
processes, especially at the level of Portfolio Committee oversight since 2000163.  
Interviews were conducted with former members of Parliament and key respondents 
to get their views on how they saw these processes. The Independent Panel Review 
of Parliament was used as a base document to inform this assessment, and 
interviews were conducted with key members of the team to probe some of the 
findings. In terms of the DSD, the researcher has observed the assessments of the 
DG. The relevance of this is that representatives of committees of Parliament and 
other stakeholders participate. Through this process, insight is obtained of how the 
DSD is viewed as part of a broader community of overseers.  
 
6.28 THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF PARLIAMENT, IMPLICATIONS FOR 
OVERSIGHT 
 
As a backdrop to the research on the effectiveness of parliamentary processes in terms of 
oversight over government, it is important to reflect on the findings of a review undertaken 
completed in 2009164, and which was initiated as part of a broader country evaluation 
process, that being the Parliament`s engagement with the APRM process. As mentioned in 
chapter 2 of this study, the APRM is an instrument established by the NEPAD, which is a 
voluntary, self-monitoring initiative for good governance. The mandate of the APRM is to 
ensure that the values and practices of participating countries conform to the values, 
                                                 
162
  This is when reports from oversight institutions get presented to committees for them to exercise their 
oversight. 
163
  The researcher has been a part of teams that have reported to different committees since 2000, and has had 
extensive exposure to the inner workings of these committees. 
164
  Ibid.  
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principles, codes and standards enshrined in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, 
Economic and Corporate Governance. A report was produced on South Africa, but the 
finalisation was mired in controversy with the civil society sector accusing government of 
taking over the process, and claiming that their voices were not adequately represented in 
this report.165 
 
In light of the APRM process, the Parliament`s Joint Coordinating Committee on the APRM 
considered a review of Parliament appropriate, and whilst the assessment failed to meet the 
time-frame for being considered for this review, it has subsequently been used to inform 
Parliament on how better to meet its constitutional mandate in promoting and entrenching 
democracy. This assessment is a critical one in terms of addressing whether Parliament had 
evolved to meet the expectations as outlined in the Constitution (a key one being oversight), 
but an equally important one has been whether Parliament has promoted and entrenched 
democracy. The panel comprised leaders from the field of democracy, governance, politics, 
gender, civil society, race relations, management, labour, to name but a few. It brought to 
bear a leadership for the review that kept to its mandate of executing an independent 
assessment. In assessing the methodology, the researcher found that it was consultative, 
using public hearings, and sought to bring in the marginal voices, with many civil society 
role-players providing key insights. It has included the media and the leaders of political 
parties.  
 
The point of departure of the assessment of Parliament is whether founding principles have 
been adhered to, and in this regard cites a speech of the former president Mandela 
fundamentally questioned whether Parliament achieved what it set out to do over a decade 
ago. The elements extracted from the speech and emphasised here in parenthesis, are 
germane to the issues of public participation and oversight being reviewed. 
 
...the breadth of (consultation and public participation) that few would have imagined 
possible... and reflects people`s deepest aspirations......the 100 laws passed have 
created a framework for the transformation of society and government.....requiring 
oversight of government as never before  
 
(Extract from the speech of Former President, Nelson Mandela, 26 March 1999166).   
                                                 
165
 The former Minister for Public Service and Administration was criticised for not incorporating civil society 
voices, and pushing government policy. 
166
 As reported in the review, citing the speech of the former President which was used as a yardstick for the 
assessment.   
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The findings that are relevant to this discussion on the relationship between Parliament as a 
civic, exercising M&E in pursuit of good governance, were contained in specific chapters of 
the report. The key points in terms of the research questions are highlighted and commented 
upon.  
 
In chapter 3 of this assessment, Parliament`s oversight mandate is examined, with questions 
being asked about the quality of reporting on oversight visits (taken up here when looking at 
Izimbizo). The assessment found that the mandate remains intact, however, questions were 
asked about how effective the oversight visits were, and more specifically what the follow-
through has been in terms of acting on findings and recommendations. The issue of follow-
through appears to be a systemic problem, with many communities feeling that politicians 
only visit at election time, and make promises that they do not keep. It has also been pointed 
out the Izimbizo, whilst demonstrating political commitment to listen, does not follow- through 
in terms of administrative action. Thus whilst the mandate is uncontested, questions remains 
as to whether Parliament has been effective in reaching out to communities and drawing in 
marginalised voices and acting on these concerns. It would appear that many of the 
outreach initiatives are symbolic, with little follow-up.  
 
The role of oversight institutions (chapters 9 and 10) is also considered, and the aspect of 
not following through appears to be a systemic problem with Parliament, with the process 
leading to the enacting of independent findings (referred to as converting performance 
information into action), being unsatisfactory. One thus has a situation where there is no 
shortage of evaluation findings, but a dearth of Parliamentary efficiency and political will to 
act on repeat offenders, such as departments with track records of qualified audits and 
disclaimers. The AG has expressed his disappointment at this situation in most of his 
reports, yet the situation prevails. The lack of political follow-up can potentially adversely 
affect the credibility of these institutions which can be perceived from the public as 
ineffective. If they are not bolstered in terms of being taken seriously and having their 
recommendations acted upon, a key part of the oversight mechanism stands to fail.  
The researcher conducted a personal interview with a member of the Independent Panel 
Review, and asked what he/she saw as the main issue that needed to be addressed to 
improve Parliamentary oversight: 
 
What would you say is the central problem with Parliamentary oversight? 
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Parliament has to take itself seriously. The problem was with political patronage, 
which meant there was no sense of accountability to the people, but to the party. This 
is a central blockage to the independence of the legislature. Both the Kader Asmal 
review and this independent panel review had not been subject to debate, meaning 
that there were not converted into resolutions. When this does not happen, there is 
no action taken. If there is no debate, it is useless and an example is the HIV/AIDS 
issues, where there was a refusal to debate, and only a year later it was reported on 
and then sent to some committee of Parliament, and nothing has been heard since. 
The independence of Parliament is not possible in the context of political patronage. 
Unless this changes there is no accountability to the people of South Africa. 
 
How responsive has Parliament been to the voices of citizens? 
 
There needs to be integrity – when MPs go out they need to listen, and act on that 
information. The same applies in the case of when people come to parliament. There 
are too many instances of people not being listened to. They must listen to what, 
especially the poor, say. 
 
This is a critical perception, and given the status of the interviewee, reinforces other 
information which indicates where the problem is, and why there has not been the 
accountability expected of Parliament. It is concerning that the Independent Panel Review 
report, which was commissioned by Parliament, has to date not been debated, given the fact 
that it was brought up as an essential part of the APRM. This research has, through more in-
depth assessments amplified on these issues in a more critical manner, and has drawn from 
the researcher`s own experience with Parliament over a decade, and these follow in the 
sections below.  
 
The findings indicate that whilst parliament has been set up, there is a lot more that needs to 
be done to make the institution effective. Preventing Parliament from doing this has been the 
capacity differential between departments and Parliamentary committees, which do not have 
much research capacity.  
 
6.29 THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCESSES, INCLUDING THE QUESTION AND 
ANSWER SESSIONS 
 
Oversight by parliamentary committees takes place within a parliamentary calendar, which 
imposes competing demands on members of Parliament, who spread their time between 
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constituency work, party meetings, policy groupings, and other engagements. There are thus 
few events where actual oversight by members of departments takes place, and it is these 
Portfolio committee meetings that are important as is here that deliberations on 
performance, informed by the work of MME bodies takes place. There is thus limited time, 
and what becomes a consideration is how effective the committees are in exercising their 
oversight.  
 
The Portfolio Committees are the engine of Parliament, and assume responsibility for 
performance areas, with departments falling into a cluster. The DSD falls in the social 
cluster. The purpose of these committees is to provide the multi-party oversight of 
departments, and this should include engagement from the planning processes of 
departments right up to when the Budget Vote Speech, a celebratory event, is held. The 
researcher observed that the meetings are held infrequently, about three times a year, and 
the time allocated to the session is limited. There are also issues of poor attendance, with 
meetings sometimes being cancelled due to a lack of a quorum. Interviews with members of 
the committees have pointed out that the problem lies with the lack of research capacity, and 
the fact that there is too much to read, and the material is not accessible. It is for this reason 
that there is a reliance on the presentations, with limited engagement following this. The 
exception has been the SCOPA, which has been more active.  
 
The researcher examined the time spent on actual engagement with the DSD, and found 
this to be limited, a point that was confirmed by interviews with former parliamentarians who 
saw this as often being done for show. There was a great reliance by the parliamentary 
committees on the formal, departmentally produced documentation and reports on its 
performance; which meant that departments led the process, not the committees. This is a 
major weakness, and points to an imbalance in the research capacity between parliament 
and departments, which also undermines the actual effectiveness of such committees. This 
point was corroborated by interviews with a former parliamentary researcher167, former 
Chairs of Committees, observation, and the Independent Panel Review report. The 
opposition party has also repeatedly pointed out to the lack of resources to take the process 
forward, although the SCOPA has been the most effective to date. The result of poor 
preparedness, limited time and capacity and the review process being directed by 
departments, has resulted in the lack of probity of the results, and hence limited 
accountability. 
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 Personal interviews with a senior Parliamentary Researcher and former Members of Parliament.  
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A telling statement about the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight can be seen in a 
presentation made by the former Chair of Chairpersons168 of Parliament, G. Doidge (former 
Member of Parliament), who at a strategic planning session169 of the PSC in 2008 stated that 
the reason the PSC did not see action on its recommendations is probably because the 
deliberations of these committees were not translated into resolutions of Parliament, and 
hence the lack of calling to account. This is a serious indictment of evaluation use, and the 
finding was reinforced by a PSC commissioned impact assessment of its work, which made 
a similar finding in relation to the awareness of the legislature and Parliament on the work of 
the PSC.  
 
The Independent Panel Review report looked at how effective the chapter 9 institutions 
were, and found that there was limited interaction between these bodies and the 
committees. There was limited engagement, which is concerning, as these institutions of 
democracy have been set up with high expectations and at great cost, and whilst they 
produce high quality oversight reports (chapter 5), but rendered weak when taken into the 
next level, that of the Parliamentary system.  
 
On the question of the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight, this was a response by a 
former member who served on the Portfolio Committees for Education and Public 
Administration since 2004: 
 
The key problem is the lack of research capacity, Members are faced with many 
reports which they have to go through, and do not have the time to interrogate them. 
They then rely on the presentations by the department. There is also very little actual 
time spent on oversight, as the time of members is taken up in meetings. There is a 
need to be out on the ground more. 
 
   (Former Member of Parliament, Personal interview, 28 January 2010) 
 
This statement points to the lack of evaluation use, which goes back to the lack of capacity 
within Parliament to support members to understand often dense and inaccessible reports. 
Furthermore, the practice of providing the reports a few days before the oversight meetings 
prevents a critical reading of such reports, and this leads to the problematic situation where 
the probing is based on a brief power-point presentation, led by the department. The 
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  A key position responsible for coordinating and guiding the Chairs of the several committees of parliament. 
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  Strategic Planning Session of the Public Service Commission held between 21-24 April 2008, under the     
theme “To the start and beyond”.  
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researcher has observed this practice and also that frequently the agendas of these 
meetings is long, with the initial time allocated being cut-down, and making the sessions 
ineffective from an oversight perspective. The only meaningful questions asked come from 
the opposition parties. In very few instances does the meeting end with the Chairperson 
stating a decisive course of action. Matters are left to hang over till the next meeting, and 
often party representatives are changed between meetings, resulting in a lack of continuity.   
 
A further perspective was provided by an equally senior former Member of Parliament, who 
was more critical of the process (Personal interview, 28 January 2010). He/she said: 
 
The oversight process is ineffective, due to the inequitable resources between the 
Executive and MPs, and between the departments expected to oversee and the 
portfolio committees. Whilst parliament is expected to hold the executive to account, 
it does not, due to fear and being disloyal to the party. The lead in making 
presentations is the department, and it seems like the information provided is 
deliberately confusing. The departments and Ministers have a full network of 
resources at their disposal, we have none. There is just no time to engage 
meaningfully. The actual capacity of members to understand the issues is in many 
cases weak. We do not really take into account citizen voices, we should start from 
the point of what citizens want, not what departments tell us. 
 
This narrative points to a more serious concern, that being a tacit acceptance that one must 
not be too critical lest it be perceived as being disloyal. It links to the problem of 
representation mentioned, and the lack of direct accountability between citizens and 
Members of Parliament (MPs).  It is obvious that the lack of resources to engage, in the form 
of providing research has rendered oversight ineffective, at times bordering on the symbolic.  
Another interview was conducted with a former parliamentary researcher, who stated: 
 
The entire system of oversight is not working, there is very limited research capacity 
and most reports do not get read or acted upon. There are very few active NPOs, 
and one only hears the voices from those that are donor funded. The interface is not 
clear, and in many cases the system to raise issues is dysfunctional.  
 
 (Parliamentary researcher, personal interview, 26 January 2010) 
 
The above three statements illustrates the fact that whilst there is parliamentary 
consideration, there is often no parliamentary action. This is most apparent in a statement 
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made by the House Chairperson of Committees, referred to before, who acknowledged the 
problem, and demonstrated that the conversion function of Parliament does not take place. It 
is not surprising that frustration has often been expressed by oversight bodies like the 
Human Rights Commission, PSC and AG. The point is illustrated by a statement made by a 
member of the Democratic Party MP, when she said of the PSC State of the Public Service 
Report: “this report sounds familiar, although it is a new year, the same issues have been 
raised previously”. The specific engagements are now considered. 
 
The Annual Reports, which have been commented on as a key oversight tool, may be to an 
outsider technical, highly aggregated and masking the real performance of a department 
(Personal interview, person working within an NPO, which seeks assistance from the DSD, 
January 2009).  Thus, whilst the process for the tabling of the Annual Report is significant, 
and seen as a validation process for a department, in the absence of technical skills to probe 
these, the event may be one undertaken for show. 
 
The convention of parliamentary questions is popular and used mainly by opposition parties 
to force the Ministers to answer questions on behalf of their departments. The departments 
in turn have an entire section, headed by parliamentary offices, whose function is to channel 
these questions into departments and generate the written responses required. It is a form of 
monitoring government, as any question may be asked (parliamentary privilege), and 
responses are required within a stipulated period of time. The presence of the media at 
these sessions ensures that matters raised are put into the public domain, which has been 
shown to contribute to public debates on performance, as matters get reported on and 
analysed from different angles.    
 
The researcher examined all the parliamentary question papers for 2008 and 2009170, and 
focused on the nature of the questions asked of the former and current Minister for Social 
Development. It was found that most of the questions were posed by the opposition party 
(Democratic Party), and the two examples below typify the nature of questions posed.  
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Example 1 
Mrs J A Semple (DA) to ask the Minister of Social Development: 
(1) Whether a tender has been awarded to replace the Scopen system used for the 
disbursement of pensions? If not, why not? If so, why?  
(2) Whether the company chosen to supply the vessel monitoring systems was awarded 
the contract on the basis of a public tender process? If not, why not? If so, (a) (i) in 
which edition of the Government Tender Bulletin was the tender advertised, (ii) how 
many tenders were received, (iii) from whom were they received, (iv) what amounts 
were tendered in each case, and (v) in which edition of the Government Tender 
Bulletin was the successful tender announced and (b) what criteria were used to 
assess the capabilities of the company that was chosen to supply the new system 
with regard to (i) service delivery, (ii) the price, and (iii) the suitability of the 
technology? 
(3) Whether his department has paid the required amount for the implementation of 
this new system? If not, why not? If so, how much was paid? 
(4) Whether there have been delays in implementing the new system? if so, (a) what 
were the delays and (b) what are the reasons for these delays? 
(5) Whether any money (a) has been lost or (b) is predicted to be lost in future by his 
department due to these delays and (c) any steps have been taken to ensure no 
further delays with the implementation? If so, (i) how much in each case and (ii) what 
steps?          
        NW1395E 
 
Example 2 
Mrs J A Semple (DA) to ask the Minister of Social Development: 
Whether any steps have been taken to give effect to the recent court order regarding the 
Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security (Access) against his department? If not, 
why not? If so, (a)(i) what steps and (ii) what effect will this have on the department’s 
budget and (b) how does his department intend informing the public of their rights in this 
regard?           
         NW1260E 
 
In example 1 it can be seen that the issue relates to procurement and potential corruption. 
This appears to be the main type of questions posed to the Minister of the DSD, and this 
shows that there is interest from parties that the matter is dealt with properly by the 
department. In example 2, there is the issue of compliance with court orders, and this also 
addresses the issue of transparency and rights. As the questions indicate, there are very 
specific responses required, forcing the department to provide credible responses.   
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The researcher has examined another important database to get a sense of the issues 
raised by the public, and that is the data from the NACH. Through a review of the nature of 
cases reported on the DSD, which are very specific in that the names of alleged perpetrators 
and transgression, it was found that the feedback rate from the DSD was very low. Of the 
274 cases of alleged corruption referred to the DSD and 156 cases to the SASSA, a total of 
430, only 4 of the cases (a response rate of 9,3%) received feedback, meaning that 90% of 
the cases remain unresolved over a long period of time, and this probably results in the 
public sentiment that government does not act against corruption. This is against the 
background of an entire section in the PSC which monitors the process, and which has sent 
several reminder letters. It is concerning that the public facility of the Hotline is ineffective, 
and not able to bring about the urgency and brevity for dealing with such matters. The lack of 
response from the Ministry, and department is a grave concern171. Thus when one looks at 
this data, one finds a low compliance by the DSD in a critical area.  Furthermore, many of 
the questions posed to the Minister deal with the issue of social grant fraud, the key matter 
reported on the NACH. The inability to stem the problem has dented public confidence, and 
the media has reported extensively on the lack of effective sanctions against offenders. 
There is obviously a problem when it comes to taking action, and this undermines the 
accountability framework, as the sanctions tend to be uneven and mild for such offences.172   
 
This assessment shows that whilst this process offers valuable space for the opposition to 
hold the ruling party to account, it is more about transparency than accountability, as the 
assessment of responses on various matters showed an almost clinical response to very 
specific questions. It was not established whether, based on this highlighting of issues, other 
processes came in to take the matters to the next level of accountability. The parliamentary 
question process thus appears to be followed, without adequate attention being given to the 
quality of the process.  
 
6.30 THE BUDGET SPEECH AS A REFLECTIVE EVENT 
 
The Annual Budget vote of a department is another public event, during which the Minister 
reports on the achievements of his/her department, and fields questions from parties. Whilst 
the events have become celebratory and many have been mired in controversy due to the 
cost of these events, the annual Budget Vote is a window into the actual performance of a 
department. Questions may be posed by members of the committees on the reports, which 
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 Personal interview with a Senior Manager responsible for the NACH,  20 January 2010,. 
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 Public Service Commission. 2008h. Evaluation of the Consistency of Sanctions Imposed for Misconduct in 
the Public Service. Republic of South Africa. 
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as previously mentioned is a summative evaluation of many areas of performance of a 
department.   
 
In terms of engagement, it was found that in the DSD the matters related more to policy and 
what this has meant. There has been discussion on how the agencies contribute to the DSD 
achieving its mandate, with much discussion around the SASSA and the Central Drug 
Agency (CDA), both of which also table Annual Reports, reports.  An interrogation of the 
CDA, which is a statutory body173, meant to forge social pacts to deal with the drug problem. 
Its board comprises representatives of universities, research institutes, government and 
NPOs. In an engagement between the researcher and the authority174, the CDA was 
concerned that it lacked capacity or budget to perform its duties, and was stymied by the 
administrative dependence on the DSD. Thus whilst this body is meant to promote public 
engagement, it does not do so in practice, or as effectively as it ought to.  
 
On public participation, whilst there were processes such as public participation events, 
petitions and parliamentary democracy offices, there was a need for a comprehensive 
review, so that public feedback fed into Parliament. Many of the initiatives cited need to 
result in tangible outcomes, and feedback should be provided.  According to a person who 
was a part of the review panel and former researcher for the ANC (personal Interview, 
January 26, 2010), the main problem lies in the lack of research capacity within Parliament, 
which is compounded by the fact that donors have supported just a few organisations that 
use this to regularly make submissions at public hearings.  
 
6.31 SUMMARY PARLIAMENT IN SUPPORT OF MME 
 
At a compliance level, Parliament is operational in that it meets the stipulations of adhering 
to the parliamentary calendar, which means that most of the oversight meetings such as the 
Portfolio Committee and SCOPA are held. One thus has high levels of transparency around 
performance, but low levels of accountability. It is thus important to separate the terms 
transparency and accountability, where it is often assumed that the former leads to the latter, 
and that there is a natural causality between the two.  
 
                                                 
173
 The Central Drug Agency was established in terms of the Prevention and Treatment of Drug Dependency, 
Act 20 of 1992, and meant to ensure public participation in addressing social problems.  
174
  Presentation made by the researcher to the Central Drug Agency on 21 January 2010, HSRC. 
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6.32 SUMMARY: MME 
 
This chapter set out to examine the role that mandatory oversight bodies have on good 
governance. It drew on the conceptual framework to show what measures have been used 
locally by formal, MME bodies to make the bureaucracy more responsive, efficient and 
transparent. After establishing what the MME bodies are and how they worked in practice by 
examining the results of the DSD, several observations about the relationship between this 
form of oversight and good governance is made.  
 
It is important to reflect on the contribution of such oversight to the attainment of good 
governance. In chapter 2 various definitions of good governance were presented, with the 
commonality between these definitions being that of transparency, accountability and 
participation. There was also mention of the rule of law, as well as issues of inclusivity. In 
reflecting on work of the MME bodies, it was found that there is a strong policy and 
legislative basis for oversight and this is contained in a slew of Acts and regulations. This 
has been a feature of the developmental State, which has implemented these measures to 
transform the apartheid government and align government practice in South Africa with 
global imperatives for good governance, and to which South Africa subscribes. The data 
generated by such bodies is thus important for external consumption, and is influential as it 
indicates what the quality of governance, of which financial management is central, is.  
 
The NT was shown to be the most effective in exercising its oversight, and the results of the 
DSD indicate that complying with the range of instruments and reporting formats does in the 
end produce the type of outputs envisaged. In the case of the DSD this has yielded an 
“unqualified audit opinion”, which is a positive assessment. Furthermore, if one were to link 
this to the cases of financial misconduct reported, it is lower than the national norm, and the 
spending is within the prescribed band recommended by NT. The systems for financial 
compliance may thus be rated as effective. It can be stated that it has produced higher levels 
of transparency around administrative compliance, particularly with regards to the 
management of budgets and the achievement of plans. The most notable contribution has 
been from the NT and the DPSA, which in redesigning the format of the Annual Report have 
directed departments to report in a manner which is more rigorous and allows for 
comparisons of performance across departments. The Annual Reports, however, whilst 
helping the public to access information, is biased towards the reporting of technical and 
regulatory compliance, with very little mention of citizens themselves, except in terms of 
providing statistics on delivery. In the DSD Annual Report mention is made of increased 
engagement with the NPO sector, which indicates commitment, but does not directly 
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address public participation. The oversight of administrative compliance tended to be 
concentrated around representivity. The human resource assessments were reduced to 
reporting on compliance aspects according to formats.  
 
It was found that the levels of transparency around the compliance with these areas of 
performance was high, which indicates a strong regulatory compliance culture within the 
DSD. This is most apparent in the unqualified (favourable) audit opinions that the 
department achieved since 2005. Other areas of compliance which were relatively high were 
the adherence to the 9 Constitutional Values and Principles for public administration. 
However, when probing the statistics and asking deeper questions about the instruments 
themselves, it may be that what is being measured is easy to attain managerially, and 
should become simpler to adhere to over time, but may be measuring issues that are not 
critical to service delivery and may even be inconsequential to what citizens want. Thus one 
cannot conclude that compliance with a defined set of indicators tantamount to good 
governance, as good governance is a more overarching concept. The work of MME bodies 
helps to produce transparency and a degree of accountability around only some of the 
indicators, not all. It is thus necessary to return to the methods used by the MME bodies, to 
examine where the strengths and limitations lie, before assuming that they contribute to 
good governance.  
 
A key gap in the work of the MME is the attention to citizens, or what the relationship is 
between a departments` policy and service delivery impact. The application of the systems is 
very technical, and whilst there have been some attempts to afford departments an 
opportunity to respond to opinions or recommendations, that is after the fact and limited. 
There was no evidence of the departments themselves engaging with the instruments or 
methods, and the top-down approach is evident in this form of oversight (see chapter 3).  
The aggregated level of these results may mask deeper problems, and there is little attempt 
at diagnosing problems. This becomes apparent when one looks at the good governance 
area of corruption. There is a discrepancy between results on a limited set of indicators and 
public perception and evidence which suggests this is a major problem. An assessment was 
made of limitations with the current assessment framework for corruption, with it being found 
that the indicators do not really get to the key area, which goes beyond having a policy and 
risk management strategy in place (which is important and must be measured, but is limited 
in itself). In looking, for example, at how the DSD responds to cases from the NACH, it was 
found to be weak, and this is what should count as critical for addressing corruption. Thus, 
whilst disciplinary cases and reporting on financial misconduct may be complied with, the 
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critical departmental-public interface is more important than what a department does 
internally.  
 
It was found that the systems of the NT, AG and PSC are largely quantitative in nature, and 
whilst they are able to provide assessments of what compliance has been, there has been 
little contextual analysis. The issue of context has been mentioned as critical, as a-
contextual assessments tend to be too generalised to be identified with, and may be seen as 
punitive and not generating a proper discourse on what results means, and how 
performance can be improved. These systems are also focused on what management must 
do, to make the departments more compliant, and there is very little mention of how all the 
compliance impacts on service delivery or good governance. The systems resonate with the 
tenets of NPM, and there is the belief that in measuring something, it will improve. This is not 
the case, and what happens to results is the subject of chapters 7 and 8, where the 
conversion of findings into actions will be assessed. Therefore, the results produced must be 
looked at not only in terms of the enlightenment contribution (which is apparent in the 
transparency produced), but also in terms of utility, in that recommendations need to be 
acted upon. What is not clear is whether these results are engaged with and contribute to 
organisational learning, and if so, how deep into the organisation results are taken and 
engaged with. The extent to which MME influences internal or PME will be interrogated in 
the next chapter.  
 









This chapter focuses on the second M&E perspective, that of persuasive (or internal M&E) -
PME, by examining how M&E information, generated both internally and externally is utilised 
by the management collective of the DSD. The aspect reviewed is thus utility, which should 
emerge if there is perceived value to the information generated. Given that performance 
information generally purports to bring about positive impacts, it use may be considered as 
important for good governance.  
 
This chapter thus lists the types of performance information available in the DSD, and looks 
at how management values it. It is suggested that the more valued it is, the more likely is it 
to be used, and this would demonstrate whether M&E does contribute to good governance 
or not. Whereas the previous chapter looked at MME, where there was compulsion to 
respond to reporting obligations, this chapter focuses on the non-mandatory form of M&E, 
which being internal, has less power to prescribe action upon its findings and 
recommendations. Outside of MME, there are less managerial obligations to act upon 
performance information. Action on such information will only come about if there is a 
learning propensity within the organisation and a commitment to using evidence for decision-
making. This implies that there must be the forum and opportunities where this form of 
reflective information is presented, debated and taken forward. The key issue of learning 
stems from a situation where there are incentives for its utility. It is for this reason it is termed 
persuasive, rather than mandatory.  
 
The M&E objective or intent brought about by this form of M&E is learning, demonstrated 
through utility, and which is evident when there is a demand for such information. This 
chapter considers how information is produced and engaged with, in order to answer the 
question of whether PME does meet the utility objective of M&E. Given that learning is a 
subjective experience, and the extent to which individuals assimilate knowledge differs, this 
chapter draws on a perceptual survey that was administered to managers at the DSD, the 
PSC and a third cohort termed non-DSD (NDSD). The purpose of the survey is to establish 
whether there are differences of opinion on a range of M&E related issues across these 
three cohorts. The first context is a grouping drawn from a selection of departments where 
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there is no formal M&E in place, termed NDSD. One would expect the knowledge of M&E 
from this group to be limited, and it can be viewed as a type of control group. The second 
group is drawn from a sector of M&E professionals, the PSC, who should have the highest 
levels of understanding of M&E as it implements M&E systems.  The third group draws 
managers from the DSD, which is where there is operational M&E in place, and is termed as 
the experimental group. The chapter tests the views on a range of questions to see whether 
there are differences of opinions, and what these may be attributed to. 
  
The demarcation of the respondents into these three cohorts seeks to establish the levels of 
understanding around M&E for each, and establish whether being an M&E practitioner or 
working in a department where M&E is established, influences one‟s perceptions of the 
value of M&E. The issue of context becomes particularly significant in that this study seeks 
to establish what the role of a functional M&E is, in promoting good governance in a 
department.   
 
By seeking responses from three cohorts of respondents, perceptions are compared across 
various issues, in order to assess whether there are differences between the cohorts, in 
terms of how M&E is valued. The question is whether M&E use in the DSD has contributed 
towards good governance, by making a discernable difference to its performance, and which 
can be traced back to management which acted on performance results. An important 
aspect considered in this chapter in relation to the above is M&E effectiveness, and the 
question asked is whether the current structure, capacity and strategy of the M&E function at 
the DSD is optimal for bringing about the type of managerial effects desired. These are the 
entrenchment of a reflective, performance driven organisation, which engages with the 
intention of improving organisational learning, by demanding and using performance 
information in its management deliberations.  
 
The views expressed by Tuckerman (2007) and Engel and Carlsson (2002) suggest that   
performance information should be used to bring about critical self-reflection, in a non-
threatening manner, and in an environment where mistakes are seen as opportunities from 
which to learn (Tuckerman, 2007). The use of M&E here would tend to emphasise the 
“learning” or information aspect (Engel and Carlsson, 2002). Questions need to be asked, 
however, about whether the management culture in departments such as the DSD is 
conducive to learning, and whether the use of performance information is affirmed. A part of 
assessing this is to test the propensity towards M&E through the perception survey that has 
been undertaken here.  
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In this context an understanding of how the key human element responds to oversight or 
good governance imperatives should illustrate where the challenges are, when information 
generation fails to translate into more effective management. Vedung and van der Doelen 
(2007: 104) suggest that this “does not oblige the target to act”. There is an element of 
choice. It is for this reason that the term persuasive is used, and this is what distinguishes 
this perspective from the earlier one. 
 
What this thesis seeks to establish is whether the internalising of results with a view to 
improve upon future decisions, is seen as valuable in itself. The results from the perception 
survey which forms a key part of the evidence for this chapter will indicate the extent to 
which this happens in practice. 
 
Another key question addressed in this chapter is whether PME is reinforced when there is 
strong MME. It is argued that MME serves to establish the overarching context within which 
PME operates, and does to an extent give internally operating M&E a degree of authority 
and direction. MME tends to set the management agenda of a department, as it consumes 
much time of management which has to report periodically on several matters. In assessing 
the contribution of this element to the overarching question of good governance, this chapter 
charts the actual managerial context within which managers exercise their influence, and 
seeks to establish whether having a functional M&E in a department, such as the DSD, has 
influenced perceptions about the value of M&E or not. This is in light of the hypothesis of the 
study that M&E does contribute to good governance, which is an assertion that can only be 
realised if there is actually better performance in a department with M&E than one without 
M&E.  
 
Whereas chapter 6 looked at how the DSD responded to the obligations placed upon it by 
MME institutions, this chapter probes how individual managers in the DSD view issues of 
oversight, M&E and good governance. In chapter 6 the basis of assessment was the norms 
and standards used by MME institutions, and as such was a more objective assessment. In 
this chapter the focus is more subjective and impressionistic, and brings out the thinking on 
the subject of M&E and good governance. It is deemed important, as the perceptions and 
views of managers on the subject are key influencing factors in shaping the performance of 
a department.   
 
The chapter argues that the greater value ascribed to M&E by decision-makers, or 
managers, the greater is the propensity for M&E to be used in the decision-making process 
and the greater is its potential for promoting good governance. This requires an 
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understanding of the decision-making cycle, as the mere presence of information cannot be 
taken for granted as resulting in improved decision-making.   
  
7.2 PERSUASIVE M&E  
 
PME relates to issues of influence, and the form of M&E is where the express purpose is to 
promote transparency and learning. The following are the researchers own connotations of 
the word “persuasive”: 
 
 Non-committal, suggestive, influencing, promoting, value-adding, inherently 
 valuable, non-imposing, respecting human agency, prodding... 
 
 Source: Constructed from literature and researcher observations.  
 
The M&E outcome of individual and organisational learning, which can be brought about by 
this form of M&E is important, as suggested by Roper and Pettit (2002). This perspective is 
embedded in broader discussions about how organisations assimilate and use information, 
which cannot be taken for granted (Leeuw and Sonnichsen, 2000). It has been shown that 
government learning is not easy, with government often referred to as a “black box” 
(Blindenbacher, 2010). The empirical part of this thesis attempts to describe how 
performance information is used, and assesses whether its use translates to the next level, 
which is a contribution to good governance.   
 
In this chapter there is a recognition of the mediating role played by individuals, who given 
their agency filter (interpret and value) information provided to them. There is thus an 
element of unpredictability as the area of knowledge management is very complex, to the 
point that one cannot assume causality between information for M&E and decision-making 
(Rist, 2000). In practice, M&E is one of many streams of information and influences that is 
used by decision-makers, before decisions are finally made. Tuckerman (2007) illustrates 
that learning comes about only when there is communication based on self-reflection and 
dialogue. Nabris (2002) also shows how M&E has a particular learning purpose, as failures 
are explained. Engel and Carlsson (2002) view evaluation as opportunities for improving 
organisational learning. They see evaluation as being about learning. In light of these 
studies, the question that must then be posed is whether the managerial processes in the 
DSD do this; and whether results are used to dialogue and learn, or used to censure and 
admonish, as is often the case. These questions will in part be answered by the researcher‟s 
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observation of how particular evaluation results were received, which illustrates the 
receptiveness to learning and propensity for good governance in the DSD.   
 
The literature indicates that the use or disuse of M&E may not lie only in its availability; its 
quality may be perceived differently based on perceptions of the M&E agenda, its perception 
varies based on whether it is used for accountability, transparency and/or organisational 
learning, to name but a few. Use of information also depends on the perceived utility, which 
as Patton (1997) indicates, is a key factor in determining how it is valued and responded to.  
Other factors, such as where the M&E function is locate and how it is perceived in terms of 
its independence and capacity, also raises issues of credibility and hence potential use.  
 
The perception and behavioural aspect, or organisational-use element of M&E, is critical, 
and is often neglected as there is an assumption that the availability of good quality M&E 
translates into usage, but as illustrated above, this is a grey area and causality is not easy to 
discern. The aspect of how information helps to build organisations has been documented 
by Leeuw and Sonnichsen (2000) and Gray (2009), who indicate that M&E goes beyond the 
accountability function. The emphasis on MME has been on accountability. This chapter 
examines the internal managerial processes of the DSD to see how M&E information is 
perceived and used by the organisation to improve its learning potential. Apart from 
describing the decision-making forums, trajectories and levels of authority, managers are 
surveyed to establish their views on M&E issues. This chapter seeks to provide insights into 
how M&E is perceived, valued and considered, in order to answer these more complex 
questions.  
 
Whereas chapter 6 identified the role of MME institutions and commented on how these 
assessed the DSD in terms of its adherence to the different elements of accountability (as a 
part of the good governance equation), this chapter presents the views of different cohorts 
on some of the assumptions made about the relationship between good governance and 
M&E. It is a more personal and subjective assessment which is different from the more 
objective, standards-based assessment presented in chapter 6 There has been an attempt 
to codify and quantify the range of impressions and feelings on the various statements that 
have been presented for a response, and the Lickert1 scale, coupled with interviews and the 
opportunity for presenting impressions and opinions in the open-ended questionnaires, have 
been used to enrich the data and analysis.  
 
                                                 
1
 Lickert scale allows for the calibration of views from strongly agree to strongly disagree, with the middle 
category being neutral.  
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7.3 CHAPTER ORGANISATION  
 
This chapter is divided into the following sections:  
a) Background and context for decision-making: This section describes the managerial 
processes within the DSD, which are the critical points at which decision-making 
takes place. It is in many of these forums that M&E information, emanating from the 
M&E of the DSD is considered and which may be acted upon.  
b) Methodology: The methodology for assessing this element is presented, including the 
role of the researcher as observer when M&E results were presented to the 
Executive Management Committee (EXMA). The methodology for the perceptual 
survey is also presented, which elicits responses on both how managers view their 
own M&E as well as MME.  
 
7.4 THE DECISION-MAKING CONTEXT IN THE DSD  
 
7.4.1 The managerial context and architecture in the DSD 
 
Decision-making does not take place in a vacuum; it happens in a specific context, which 
can change and which is biased towards particular issues and priorities. The outcome of 
deliberations tends to be influenced by the prevailing context. It should be noted that whilst 
M&E information is used for decision-making, it is not the sole consideration upon which 
decisions are arrived at. The point is that decision-making is not an objective, rational, 
information-driven process. The implication is that evaluative information is but one, and not 
the sole, stream of information that is used before decisions are arrived at.  
 
In the DSD, as with other government departments, it should be noted that there are 
different decision-making forums composed of different decision-makers (often rank based), 
which deliberate on different matters which may make recommendations to higher or other 
decision-making forums. The process from one forum to the next is not necessarily linear, 
although there is an overarching logic of decision-making, which is based on the fact that 
there are delegations of authority. The question of delegations is a key consideration in any 
decision-making process, as these delegations signify the authority accorded to different 
persons or forums. Thus any understanding of the managerial processes in the DSD must 
recognise that there are tiers of authority in the department, with each tier having jurisdiction 
over other tiers.  Further, decisions may be taken at a particular level, or such a level may 
make recommendations to another level, and generally, all management, which constitutes 
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levels 13-16 (Director to DG) are responsible for the decision-making and sound 
management of the department. 
 
The authority levels of the department are based on clear prescripts which describe roles 
and responsibilities, or the accountability framework. The Senior Management Service 
Handbook stipulates what is to be expected of members of the Senior Management Service. 
It identifies the generic key result areas they are responsible for, and also indicates the core 
management criteria. It embeds the management/department relationship within the notion 
of performance management and requires that performance contracting takes place.  
 
From a good governance perspective, the behavioural attributes and conduct of 
management are stipulated, and monitoring individual performance contracts through 
feedback sessions and eventual annual assessments is one activity through which the good 
governance ethos is reinforced. This happens at an individual level, and is a performance 
pressure brought about by policy on performance management, which is implemented by 
management as part of their core responsibilities. Other performance pressures on a 
department include the political performance imperatives, that is, the PoA, the financial 
performance assessments (the AG and NT) and the governance performance imperatives 
(implementation of the TM&ES). In all these assessments the management of the 
department plays a role as a subject of external reviews (NT, AG and PSC), as an enabler 
for such reviews (TM&ES and providing support to the audits of the AG and others), and 
ensuring that its own management is subject to scrutiny based on performance agreements 
which are in place. Understanding the management architecture of the DSD and government 
is important for an appreciation of how performance management is implemented.  
 
The M&E of the DSD should be central to all of these processes, as an enabler and capacity 
builder on M&E for both the management of the DSD, which must respond to external 
reviews and by infusing a performance discourse within the department as it promotes and 
implements M&E. It should raise consciousness about M&E, and thus provide management 
with the language and tools of M&E to make them more performance oriented and effective.  
 
This chapter, in considering how managers view the issue of oversight will thus intimate the 
extent to which the DSD M&E function has met its objectives fully, or whether it has adopted 
a narrow interpretation of its work and thus not managed to expand the M&E consciousness 
in the DSD. More concretely, it solicits views on the DSD M&E function, both from the users 
of this information as well as the persons driving the departmental M&E. The researcher has 
through documentary review, interviews with key personnel, and observation, managed to 
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document and chart the key management events within the DSD2. Understanding this 
context helps to assess how management in the DSD responds to different M&E thrusts, 
which each of the three empirical chapters assesses.  
 
Many of the key management meetings have as their focus the task of ensuring that key 
reporting obligations to the MME institutions are met. It can thus be inferred that the work of 
MME institutions does influence the agenda of internal departmental meetings, given the 
importance attributed to reporting upwards to such institutions. These meetings are deemed 
critical from a governance perspective, to the extent that the AG, as part of his/her annual 
assessment, reviews the minutes of these meetings. This stems from the fact that most 
management meetings are reviews or appraisals of some sort, and a review of these 
governance structures is indicative of the seriousness management gives to its own 
performance.   
 
The DSD holds the following specific management meetings3 or meeting with the entire 
management team: 
 
a) Management Committee, levels 13 -16 - monthly 
b) Strategic Planning meetings (Middle management and Senior Management Service) 
- bi-annual 
c) Executive Management Committee, Senior Management Service and Ministry) - 
quarterly 
 
In assessing the quality of management meetings, and to supplement the documentary 
review, the following questions were posed: 
 
a) Are meetings held as and when scheduled? 
b) Are the minutes of meetings circulated on time, and are decisions followed-up? 
c) Are minutes of such meetings readily available, and is there a central repository for 
these meetings, or are they held by the organising unit? 
 
The documentary analysis was done according to the procedures outlined in Chapter 4. It 
was found that the all management meetings are held as scheduled and properly minuted, 
                                                 
2
  A description of these is contained with the report of the AG.  
3
  Schedule of meetings from the DDG: Corporate Services. Agendas of meetings and minutes are filed 
centrally. 
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thus forming part of the institutional memory of the department4. The minutes were readily 
available, and copies kept centrally in a section in the Corporate Services Unit of the DSD. It 
was found that the secretariat managed this function effectively.  
 
The content of these meetings varies, but a review of the agenda and minutes, in particular 
of the Executive Committee meetings (which comprise the Senior Management Service 
level), shows that standard items relate to discussing performance against targets (budgets 
and service delivery), largely in relation to programme and project performance. Ideally there 
should be a cascading down of political imperatives into policies and programmes which 
bring about better service delivery. Underpinning the operations of management of the 
department would be centrally articulated budgeting frameworks such as the MTEF and 
MTSF. Given the focus on variance or deviation reporting, quantitative M&E information 
becomes very important.  It was shown in chapter 3 that accountability type M&E tends to 
proceed from quantitative data, wherein deviation from targets and norms becomes the 
source for judgement.   
 
Based on an assessment of the documentary information and interviews held, it was found 
that the department does comply with legislation and regulation and decision-making 
appears to be effective. What was not possible to ascertain or document adequately was 
how frequently the DG met his individual DDG. These meetings were of an ad-hoc basis, 
and not publically minuted. The form of communication between the DG/Minister and 
Minister/DDG or DG and individual DDGs or other managers tended to be personal, 
telephonic, email or Short Message Service (SMS), and the researcher did not have access 
to this. Based on the interviews with selected managers, however, it appeared that these 
engagements were in fact quite frequent and filled in the gaps between the more formal 
management meetings. There is thus both a formal and informal managerial infrastructure 
operating in the DSD, which is probably true of most organisations.  
 
7.4.2 Observation of how M&E results are received in the  DSD 
 
The assessment of the management infrastructure of the DSD was also made possible as 
the researcher was able to observe and document managerial processes in the DSD, due to 
his professional role whilst Chief Director and DDG at the PSC. This allowed for a degree of 
ethnographic research to be conducted. However, it must be stated that the impact of an 
outsider, such as the researcher, on the actual behaviour and deliberations at meetings must 
                                                 
4
  Interviews with 6 senior managers at the DSD, to ascertain their views on the value of management meetings.  
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be considered, as it could have influenced how managers conducted themselves when he 
was present. This is because the PSC, as an oversight body, could be perceived as policing, 
resulting in management not behaving naturally. The observations emanating from this 
personal involvement are important in terms of evaluation events led by the PSC, as a MME 
body. Where specifically the results of the TM&ES were presented and the evaluation of the 
HoD was chaired by the PSC. 
 
The researcher observed and participated in two presentations made to the top 
management of the DSD5, which was when the TM&ES was introduced (March 2008) and 
results presented to the top management team in August 2008. The researcher observed 
that in the case of the DSD, relative to other departments also surveyed in the cycle6, there 
was good cooperation from the DG which translated into an overall high level of cooperation.  
This resulted in the research being completed within the three months allocated7. At the key 
meeting when the results were presented, the Deputy-Minister was also present. The results 
of the assessment were well received, probably because the department received a 
relatively good assessment, and showed a significant improvement in most of the 
Constitutional Values and Principles over the previous period when the survey was 
conducted. From the questions posed at this meeting, and the feedback provided by the DG 
and his management team, it was evident that there was receptiveness to critical feedback.  
 
An important point that needs to be mentioned was that the Chief Director of M&E at the 
DSD actively supported the PSC research team, which was made possible by her 
understanding of the issues and ability to extract critical information that was required. From 
this observation, it was apparent that there is an existing M&E practice and culture within the 
DSD, which makes it easier to conduct additional M&E work, and also results in a 
management team more receptive to M&E. This may be indicative of the value added when 
a department has a functional M&E, which supports MME work.  
 
In addition, the researcher was also in the privileged position to observe the evaluation 
process of the DG of the DSD. The current system for the evaluation of HoDs is an example 
of a regulated, centrally driven and managed evaluation system which has sought to be 
more inclusive in its composition and more participatory in its application. The committee 
comprises representatives from civil society, parliament, a peer DG, a Minister, all of which 
                                                 
5
  March and August 2008 
6
  Twenty-five departments were surveyed in the 2008/2009 cycle. 
7
 The researcher from the PSC was interviewed, with the research schedule and records assessed. Excellent co-
operation from the department was observed during the assessments.  
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are intended to bring in a broad range of voices and perspectives to the evaluation process, 
and thus enrich deliberations through the diverse composition. At an intent level, it is an 
advancement upon previous systems which tended to be more bureaucratic and did not 
have external role-players participating. The panel is meant to be constituted to reflect 
broad-based participation, by including another Minister, a peer DG, and a stakeholder. The 
PSC plays a secretariat role, and through the Chair expected to ensure that the system is 
implemented properly. The importance of this event from a governance perspective is that 
critical performance information, which is generated from within the department and outside 
of it, is collated and made available in the evaluation process, and this adds another level of 
scrutiny to persons who may not normally have been privy to the department‟s performance. 
The evaluative information includes: 
 
a) The verification statement of the HoD, which is his /her assessment of one‟s own 
performance against the performance agreement that is, signed with his/her EA. This 
is a self-reflective document, the process of producing which is valuable from a good 
governance perspective as it generates individual learning (researcher’s reflection). 
The Annual Report of the department for the year under review. This contains the 
much referred to audit opinion, and also the actual performance against the strategic 
objectives (this has been discussed at length in Chapter 4). The Annual Report gets 
used by the panel to verify and reflect on performance, and is a critical document 
used in these deliberations.  
b) A summary of the verification statement which is produced by the PSC. This contains 
about three to four questions drawn from the verification statement and Annual 
Report which the HoD is required to respond to in his response. The PSC verification 
statement has in practice tended to be the most read document, and at times 
became a substitute for panel members interrogating all of the documents provided. 
Its utility, however, has been in its focus on areas that require a management 
response, which are those where performance has generally been lacking.   
c) The assessment form which contains the HoD‟s self-assessment together with the 
assessment by the EA. It is the EAs assessment which the panel deliberates on, in 
the case of both the Key Result Areas (which makes up 80%) of the score and Core 
Management Criteria (which makes up 20%) of the score. This document quantifies 
performance, and observing how different panel interpret standards, has indicated to 
the researcher that there is no consensus in terms of what constitutes acceptable, 
unacceptable and good performance at these levels.  
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The process of the evaluation includes inputs by the Minster and DG, who then recuse 
themselves. It is meant to be followed by frank interrogation of the presentation and scores 
awarded by the panel members, who should be unbiased. The Chairperson is expected to 
maintain the integrity of the deliberations by ensuring that there is objectivity in the process. 
It is a step in moving away from clandestine assessments, and at an intent level seeks to 
introduce more rigour, transparency and accountability to individual performance 
management. From a managerial perspective, this is important in that if the HoD is subject to 
this level of scrutiny, it is likely that a performance management ethos will also permeate into 
the department itself. This event has important managerial implications for the DSD, and 
helps to connect the performance of the HoD with all tiers of management in the department. 
The organisational performance information is placed within the purview of external 
stakeholders, representative of a cross section of society, and contributes to transparency 
and good governance. 
 
7.4.3 Charting of managerial processes in the DSD 
 
In seeking to establish how decision-making processes work within the DSD, a set of 
preliminary interviews were conducted with 3 managers from the M&E section of the DSD, in 
order to establish what the modus operandi of the DSD is. It has helped to conceptually 
chart the decision-making trajectories, forums and points where decision-making occurs, so 
as to work out where performance information is utilised. A part of this process included 
studying the delegations of the DSD, which is a critical part of the decision-making chain in 
that it shows where authority is vested within the overall managerial hierarchy. The following 
documents were reviewed to chart the managerial infrastructure of the DSD: 
 
a) Strategic Plan of the Department for 2005/6 – 2009/10 
b) Annual Reports of the DSD from 2005 
c) Departmental Organogram 
d) Route forms8 
e) Selection of submissions wherein decisions are made9 
f) Schedule of delegations10 
                                                 
8
  This is a sequence form, which contains the designations of the tiers of management that apply themselves to 
a subject, and who concur by signing and dating the route form. It provides a track of the persons who have 
applied themselves to a subject, and usually ends with a decision by the duly authorised decision-maker. This 
decision is generally informed by the advice of the preceding signatories.  
9
 This covered various subjects, the aims was to see who signed and what value (in the form of comments) was 
added.  
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g) Promotion of Access to Information Act Manual 
 
The above provided a schema of how management functions, and is typical of government 
departments in that there is generally the same level of authority allocated to the same levels 
of management. The Heads of Branches in the DSD are level 15 or DDGs, and called Senior 
Programme Managers, who assume responsibility for functional and strategic areas, 
budgets and staff. The Annual Report is organised according to these Branches, and this tier 
of management is important as it receives and responds to requests for performance 
information from the MME bodies. It is a nodal point for making decisions about performance 
as it relates to the department.  
 
7.4.4 Managerial priorities for the DSD stemming from MME institutions 
 
The chapter now links the discussion in chapter 5 on MME with the management 
infrastructure described, which serves as a backdrop for the discussion that will follow. An 
M&E taxonomy for the DSD was developed to show power and obligations exerted by 
oversight institutions over departments. It is observed that the act of responding to requests 
from MME institutions does influence the priorities of the management of a department. A 
large part of the time of management is spent on reporting, which has been cited as 
unproductive activity11 by management, who often see this form of reporting as an extractive 
process which does not add value to their immediate work. The Table below indicates the 
obligations that the management of the DSD have in terms of complying with the 
requirements of MME institutions. This shows that much time of the DSD managers is taken 
up in meeting accountability obligations, which involves complying with policies and 
prescripts. The question that arises then, is that how much time remains after meeting MME 
obligations, for the department to engage with the findings of evaluation reports (both 
external and internally produced), in order to engage staff in a critical, reflective and learning 
process. As the literature has pointed out, one cannot assume a linear progression from 




                                                                                                                                                        
10
 This is a schedule which lists who has decision-making authority for which aspect, and is always referenced 
to the prevailing legislation. In practice, the Minister delegates certain levels of authority to the HoD, who 
may then further delegate authority as appropriate. 
11
  An audit of reporting and M&E systems produced by the PSC in 2006 and which surveyed managers showed 
“excessive reporting outwards”, with little perceived value from those who did the reporting. There was a 
call for a rationalisation of reporting by departments, who saw oversight institutions as requesting similar 
information from them, using different formats, and no central management of information extraction.  
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Table 7.1:  M&E obligations of the DSD 
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High Public information 
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PSC (once per 
3 year cycle), 
done in 2002 
and 2008 
Assessment of 









The Table above illustrates that the work of the management team is already cut-out by the 
requirements from the oversight institutions, before it even begins to start looking at 
departmental specific and operational reporting. There is enough of a thrust from the key 
MME institutions which direct the operations of DSD management towards issues of 
financial good governance. Whilst there is pressure from the other institutions, the sanction 
for non-compliance is not so severe, and may result in embarrassment, rather than 
withholding of resources which may come about when not meeting the requirements of the 
financial M&E bodies.  
 
The above shows that MME institutions have an influence on the priorities of the 
management of the DSD. This is because they consume the time of management which is 
obliged to prepare information to meet its reporting obligations to such bodies. What was 
found to be useful was that these reports get tabled at a top management level, usually to 
Branch Heads, who sign off before it is submitted to the DG. By such information being sent 
to this level of decision-makers before being submitted, for their concurrence, is in itself a 
useful process as it provides an overview of key performance areas, as listed above.   
 
The question that needs to be asked is whether these activities are complied with for fear of 
sanction, and whether there is malicious compliance rather than implementing such systems 
because there is a belief in their inherent value? The rationale for the various systems has 
not been questioned; as they talk to issues generally accepted as valuable for good 
governance, and which support the public discourse for corrupt-free administration. In 
interviews with managers at the DSD12, the reporting upwards, whilst cited as onerous, was 
seen as value adding in that it helped management to focus on key performance areas, 
which are generic to any department. The issues of financial management, human resource 
management and service delivery improvement, are central to the good governance of a 
department, and which reporting thereof may be onerous, they do correctly direct the 
attention of management on aspects that are central to the achievement of good 
                                                 
12
  Four managers, three of whom were at the level of Director and one, Chief Director, from the DSD were 
interviewed following their completion of the questionnaire. These managers agreed to a follow-up interview 
with the researcher, who contacted them through email.  
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governance. The improvement by the DSD in its performance across these areas, indicates 
that there has been a contribution to performance improvement. Thus, the reluctance to 
report or citing that reporting is time consuming, must be considered against the value this 
activity provides in terms of contributing to the general good, and its utility can be inferred by 
the performance improvement over time on all of the above areas. There has been good 
compliance to key areas of M&E, which translates into a contribution to good governance.   
 
The discussion now revisits the MME institutions, to explore the link between meeting 
obligations as imposed by MME, and improving one`s own managerial practice through 
responding to internal M&E. In terms of the oversight by the PSC, the main system that is 
applied across all areas of governance is the 9 Constitutional Values and Principles. The 
system is supposed to be applied once in a three-year cycle. In the DSD it was first applied 
in 2001 and then again in 2008. Given the lack of regularity with which this system is 
applied, it is not sure certain whether the managerial interest generated during the 
application is sustainable. The Constitutional Values and Principles system, due to its nature 
probably exerts the following influences on the management of the DSD. It emphasises the 
importance of the Constitutional Values and Principles at the management level, and in the 
application of the system it demonstrates how these values and principles contribute to good 
governance. Based on this, there would probably be some learning in that managers would 
be exposed to M&E terminology, such as performance indicators, standards and scoring 
systems. Whilst understanding these concepts does not imply that managers have acquired 
a sufficient grasp of M&E, it does indicate to managers the importance of being able to 
quantify performance, which should be a part of their normal managerial function. There is 
thus an important utility dimension generated. 
 
It may thus be surmised that the application of the PSC`s PSM&ES does help in improving 
understanding of the targeted department of the importance of M&E, and points to its 
relationship to good governance. This system, which falls within the domain of MME, also 
displays the following characteristics:  
 
a) There are clear performance standards, norms and criteria for assessment. It is 
possible to quantify performance on all aspects, ranging from professional ethics to 
the management of budgets.  
b) The MME “actors” (NT and PSC) reinforce each other. It is common practice for each 
player to draw on information generated by the other MME actors to reinforce their 
findings.  
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c) In the reporting phase, the systems compare performance with peers, and apply 
value judgements when it comes to performance. There is often a apartheid element, 
which is accountability driven but which may negate the learning element of M&E.  
d) A strong underlying feature is fiscal discipline, with all aspects related to this 
receiving attention. 
e) An important element ensuring from the application of the above is the need for good 
governance, as transparency and accountability considerations are emphasised. 
  
The imposition by the MME bodies such as the PSC has set priorities for DSD management, 
which it needs to address in addition to its normal work of achieving the strategic priorities of 
the DSD. The issues from the MME institutions relate to governance issues, the “deemed 
good”, which whilst in certain areas prescribes managerial behaviour, in other areas tends to 
be more of a persuasive nature. The MME institutions thus cannot be considered as a 
homogenous group, although at an aggregated level they are enjoined by their common 
drive for transparency and accountability, which have already been indicated as central 
features of the good governance equation.  The discussion now proceeds to look at how the 
views of managers were solicited to test the relationship between M&E and good 
governance.  
 
7.5 METHODOLOGY FOR PERCEPTUAL SURVEY 
 
7.5.1 Survey instrument and key themes  
 
The choice of a questionnaire, which is the key survey instrument was deemed appropriate, 
and used as the basis for soliciting views of managers on a range of issues relating to M&E. 
It also became the basis for further probing, which was done by the researcher when 
personal interviews were conducted. The underlying principle in designing the questionnaire 
was to ensure that this instrument was easy to fill and not time-consuming. The idea was to 
solicit initial impressions, and for respondents not to go into a pondering stage where they 
would try and provide what they might consider to be an appropriate or correct response.  
The respondents were also afforded the opportunity to speak directly to the researcher, 
rather than respond to the questionnaire. Based on the responses received, the researcher 
followed-up with certain respondents who requested further clarity and information, or who 
wished to talk through some of the elements in the questionnaire. These discussions were 
captured on the relevant questionnaire.  
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Research questions and themes explored in the general questionnaire administered across 
the three cohorts of the DSD, PSC and NDSD. A letter of permission (Annexure 1) 
preceded the questionnaires (Annexure 2), which allowed for an analysis of the following 
themes and issues; the level within the organisation, the managerial forums within which 
respondents participate, their opinion of M&E and perceptions of value added by oversight 
institutions to the work of the DSD.  
 
The Lickert scale was deemed appropriate to elicit responses on a series of statements that: 
 
a) Gauge how elements of oversight are valued and viewed by managers. 
b) Test responses to nationally imposed requirements from the NT, AG, DPSA, 
Department of Labour, and the PSC. These responses are important in that they 
show: (1) understanding or knowledge of the work of these oversight institutions, and 
(2) show how respondents value them. 
c) Establish whether respondents view the work of the above as important to their own 
work. 
d) Assess whether the reporting requirements are considered a burden or not. 
e) Assess the effectiveness of M&E within the DSD. 
f) Look at how managers in the DSD rate and value their internal M&E functionality. It 
assesses elements of: 
- Location and capacity 
- Quality of reports produced 
- Institutionalisation of the Unit 
- Status given to M&E 
- Managerial role in promoting good governance 
 
The section also assesses how individual managers view themselves in terms of promoting 
or contributing to the overall good governance ethos of the DSD. The main issues being 
assessed are: 
 
a) Information management within the DSD. 
b) Compliance with the Promotion of Administrative of Justice Act13. 
c) Relationship with external stakeholders. This relates to the expectation that 
government departments will pro-actively work with communities.  It is an element of 
good governance in that it moves away from an inward-looking organisation to an 
                                                 
13
 Discussed in chapter 4, this relates to how management delegations are exercised. 
 I.A. Naidoo  |    Chapter 7 210 
 
outward one. It shows a sense of appreciation of civic or public responsibility. This 
tests how M&E is perceived; accountability and/or learning. This is further explored in 
Chapter 8. 
d) Views of specific M&E systems (PSM&ES). Given the processes around the 
implementation of this system, the entire management team would have been 
involved. This assessment is thus important. 
e) An assessment of the management processes to see whether it is perceived as 
adding value. 
f) Training and experience. This looks at how far M&E training and experience has 
permeated into the management echelon of a department. It also identifies where the 
needs and gaps are, and is thus future looking.  
g) Challenges: This is also a test of M&E, but now relates more broadly to the field and 
tests whether the national plans, communication and strategy on M&E has filtered to 
an operational managerial level. The question looks at how M&E works in the country 
– which will show whether the perceived view that M&E policy-makers may have is 
as such in reality. The last section looks at possibilities for improving M&E. 
 
In addition to the general questionnaire, which was customised to cater for the three cohorts 
where it was administered, a specific questionnaire was designed for administration within 
the M&E unit in the DSD (Annexure 3).  This was to assess what the views of the leadership 
of M&E at the DSD were, against the views of the managers in the DSD. This specific 
questionnaire was followed-up by telephonic interviews with the respondents, and the 
information was updated by the researcher. 
 
The researcher interviewed selected managers from the M&E Chief Directorate, to establish 
their views on how they see the management of the DSD responding to M&E. This is an 
important perspective, given that many M&E personnel often get disillusioned that their work 
is not taken seriously by the leadership and management of departments. The problem has 
been documented in studies, which point to the following reasons as to why M&E is often not 
being taken seriously or institutionalised within organisations: 
 
a) The M&E function does not enjoy the support of leadership, and/or is perceived to 
support a “policing” or accountability function. It is sometimes seen as an extension 
of leadership, where one tier of leadership uses the M&E function against other tiers 
of leadership. In this scenario, there is often mistrust and suspicion.  
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b) The M&E function may be seen as duplicating other similar functions in the 
department, such as the audit function. This can lead to internal conflicts and 
contestations, with questions asked about what unique value the M&E function adds. 
c) There is also a problem with the location of M&E. It generally should be located at a 
sufficiently high level to be taken seriously, but this may bring about the problems of 
being perceived as policing. 
d) Management may view M&E as duplicating a managerial function, with some views 
held that M&E is an adjunct, or tool, for management, and therefore should not be 
viewed as distinct or unique. 
e) There is also the problem of what issues get identified for M&E. The issue of 
prioritisation is always contested, as the issues that are identified for investigation or 
M&E may be seen as the problem areas, and this brings to the fore the issue of the 
competence of the managers who manage units that will be M&E. 
f) Often times M&E is not institutionalised, which means that there are no regular 
forums where findings are presented. 
 
Based on the above, the questions that were posed to the cohort of M&E managers were: 
 
a) Do you think that the M&E unit is well located? 
b) Are you satisfied with the support for M&E from the HoD and management? 
c) Do you feel that M&E is adequately resourced? 
d) Does your Unit enjoy support from the managers in the department? 
e) What are the key forums where you present your findings? 
f) Do you track the implementation of your recommendations? What systems do you 
use to assess your impact? 
 
The above set of questions examines the issues of organisational location, authority, support 
and institutionalisation, and was captured in a questionnaire administered specifically to staff 
in the DSD M&E. The responses to the above questions are important, as this is the thinking 
of leadership on M&E. 
 
7.5.2 Ethical questions 
 
The following ethical issues were factored into the questionnaire design and administration.  
The respondents were afforded the opportunity to respond with their identities known, 
although they were promised anonymity should they so require. There was no compulsion in 
writing their names, but there may have been concern that their identities could be revealed 
 I.A. Naidoo  |    Chapter 7 212 
 
given that the questionnaires were distributed via email, and responses expected via the 
same mode. To address this concern, respondents were given the opportunity to return 
questionnaires via post or fax. Furthermore, it was important that the participation of the 
respondents was not seen as compulsory. This impression can easily be created given the 
accompanying letter from the HoD, and the affiliation of the researcher himself, who as an 
employee of an oversight body, may create the impression that the participation is 
obligatory. This was made clear in the covering letter of the questionnaire.  
 
7.5.3 Piloting of questionnaires 
 
The core questionnaire mentioned above was piloted with managers in the PSC and DSD. 
Based on the responses, it was redesigned to ensure simplicity for use by the respondents 
and data capture. The core questionnaire was customised in places for administering in the 
different cohorts14. The instrument was kept simple and short. A phased approach involving 
awareness raising, piloting and validation was followed to ensure that the quality of data 
captured was adequate for assessment.  
 
The questionnaires were administered to the entire management of the DSD, which 
comprised 64 managers. At the PSC a purposeful sample was used where it was sent to the 
entire management of the Branch: M&E and the Regional Directors. In terms of the NDSD 
cohort, it was sent to a combination of national and provincial departments.   
 
7.5.4 Data capturing  
 
All data was captured using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). This was 
seen as the most appropriate research instrument, and a sound data base was generated.  
Based on the survey, a set of frequency figures were generated, which was used for 
conducting this assessment. In terms of the Lickert scale15, both numeric values in terms of 
frequency and averages were generated. Both were used for this assessment. Through the 
use of SPSS, data was captured according to the following parameters: 
 
a) Overall data captured on figures/ percentages 
b) Data disaggregated according to the three cohorts 
c) Average weighting figures created to complement percentile figures on responses 
                                                 
14
 See Questionnaires which are at annexure 1 and 2.  
15
 Lickert scale allows for the range of views to be captured. 
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d) All qualitative data captured and categorised post-implementation, through the 
identification of key themes 
.  
7.5.5 Identification of cohorts and preparation for the administration of survey  
 
In the absence of a baseline for assessing the before and after effects of M&E on good 
governance in the DSD, the researcher established the following cohorts which would help 
to assess the impact of the primary influence that M&E is deemed to have, which is to 
promote good governance. As such the questionnaire was administered across three 
cohorts, namely: 
 
a) The DSD management team (DSD). This is the group where the influence of its own 
M&E functionality on promoting good governance is being tested. It is the primary 
group used for comparison purposes.  
b) The PSC management team. This is the group of M&E professionals who would 
have a superior understanding of M&E, given their role in implementing various 
systems across governance departments. 
c) A control group of other managers termed NDSD. This is a selection of managers 
identified from both central oversight departments, such as the DPSA and the NT. It 
also includes managers from two provincial administrations, the Free State and 
KwaZulu-Natal, the Office of the Premier (Gauteng) and managers from the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa.  
 
Overall, an even number of respondents was eventually received, totalling 62 which are 
statistically significant for the survey. The cohorts are referred to as PSC, DSD and NDSD in 
the assessment that follows. The identification of decision-makers for further engagement 
was informed by the following considerations: 
 
a) The area of MME and who in the organisation this area is most likely to be allocated 
to in terms of being responsible for reporting 
b) The persons responsible for the key areas of administration, budget and M&E 
c) Key informants: people who have been involved in M&E within or of the DSD, and 
who have intimate knowledge of its managerial practices16 
 
                                                 
16
 This included the CD of M&E, the Directors of M&E and the Technical Advisor to M&E. 
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The researcher began engaging with the DSD in April 2008, and by the time the 
questionnaire was administered in October/November 2008, sufficient knowledge of the 
department was obtained making it easier to secure access to documents and persons. In 
the case of the DSD, several events were used by the researcher to inform the potential 
respondents of the study, and this helped to produce the levels of co-operation that were 
secured. The researcher, in his capacity as Chief Director and DDG at the PSC presented 
the results of its PSM&ES to the EXMA. This meeting was important, in that the DG and the 
Deputy-Minister for Social Development were present, and hence had the necessary 
authority. 
 
As noted, the researcher obtained written permission for the study from the DG, and this was 
distributed with the questionnaire to all managers in the DSD.  Contact was established with 
the M&E unit of the DSD, which helped to produce the contact details of management of the 
department. The initial batch of questionnaires was administered to 29 respondents, with a 
covering note explaining the purpose of the study, and the letter of permission. A follow-up 
had to be made telephonically to those who had not responded.  This assisted in increasing 
the response rate to the 58% eventually realised. 
 
In the case of the PSC, the questionnaire was slightly modified. The researcher identified 
managers from the M&E Branch of the PSC17 and before sending them the questionnaire 
explained its purpose to all potential respondents. The response rate was 67%.  
 
The third cohort, termed the NDSD, refers to managers selected from those managers who 
were neither implementers of an M&E system, nor exposed to formal M&E in their 
departments. It included those departments which exercise oversight, such as the DPSA, the 
NT and Statistics South Africa. In each of these cases, persons were identified who were 
involved in implementing an oversight system using the purposive sampling approach. The 
second batch of departments selected involved identifying respondents from three provincial 
departments (Gauteng Premiers Office, KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education and the 
Free State Premiers Office). The other was respondents from the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa. This was a good mixture of respondents for the NDSD group. The return rate 
was 53%.  
 
Questionnaires were sent out via the email address of the researcher, and respondents were 
offered the option of responding via email, post or fax. Telephonic follow-ups were made to 
                                                 
17
 This is the section within the PSC which implements various transversal systems across government. 
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most respondents, and there was a need for reminders after the initial date of response was 
not adhered to. 
 
Figure 7.1:  Response rates to survey questionnaire 
 
As the above Figure indicates, the rate of return varied based on the cohort. However, 
overall the rate of return was good, and the number of questionnaires of 34 can be regarded 
as statistically significant for purposes of analysis. Nine of the questionnaires were scanty 
and not used for analysis.  
 
7.6 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS OF SURVEY 
 
7.6.1 Profile of respondents in terms of seniority and committees in which they 
participate  
 
The questionnaire solicited information from the respondents on their post-level, the 
management forums they participate in, and the number of years in their current positions.  
This information was seen as useful in that it helps to differentiate the pool of respondents in 
terms of their relative authority within the management echelon, as this band is broad and 
ranges from middle managers (at level 11) to top management (level 16). Although the 
questionnaires were distributed to the management (and hence the entire decision-making 
echelon), it is useful to have an understanding of the relative authority and power of the 
decision-makers surveyed. The years of experience that a manager had in a particular post 
is also a useful indicator and telling of the experience base within the management echelon 
of government. The managerial seniority question is an important one in the Public Service, 
given that this cohort has become relatively less experienced over the past decade, due in 
part to the removal of minimum periods of service for each promotion level. The 
phenomenon of rapid upward mobility has meant the hollowing of the skills base of 
managers in the public service, as institutional memory has been lost. This has a direct 
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impact on the issue of organisational learning, and has meant that when individuals move, 
the institutional memories also move and do not get embedded within the organisation.   
 
It is in this context that M&E must play an even more important role in building knowledge 
bases and helping new incumbents to understand developments and processes.  
Knowledge management has been widely cited as major problem within organisations, with 
most not having a coherent strategy to induct new staff, and this problem becomes 
exacerbated when institutional memory is lost due to high staff turn-over, and when the 
experiential base of the management collective becomes less over time. It may be that the 
new managers, who are often transient, meet their accountability obligations, but fail to move 
beyond compliance and manage in a way that raises the levels of understanding of staff by 
using evaluative information in a manner that enriches and capacitates the organisation.  
This would help to mitigate against the loss of institutional memory that comes from the 
phenomenon of managerial transition. This section thus quantifies the experience of 
managers and is a useful backdrop for the assessment.  
 
Figure 7.2:  Distribution of respondents according to management bands  
 
 
It should be noted that, given the fact that managers often sit on more than one forum, they 
failed to indicate an exclusive category, hence the overlap evident above. The blurring of the 
lines come about with the categories executive and senior management, with executive 
understood as levels 14, 15 and 16, but such managers also being referred to as senior 
managers. Most of the respondents fell in the Senior Management and above level (47.3%), 
which is the key decision-making band, and in proportion terms, where most of the 
managers in government are placed (Figure 6.3). These bands exert the most management 
influence.  
 
7.6.1.1  Management forums within which respondents participate 
 
The questionnaire requested respondents to indicate which forums they sit on, in order to 
get an understanding of where they exercise their management roles, and what the content 
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issues are. Respondents were also afforded the opportunity to indicate if they participated in 
any other forums than those indicated. The results are reflected in Figure 6.3 below.  
 
Figure 7.3:  Management forums respondents sit on (in %): Multiple responses 
 
 
The above Figure indicates multiple responses, and hence it will not add up to 100%. From 
the Figure above, it is evident that most respondents participate in Management Committees 
(56%). The Executive Management comprised 12.2%, which would include in this case the 
Chief Directors, DDGs and DG. Of significance is that a very small percentage of 
respondents also participated in committees critical to good governance, such as the 
Budget, Fraud Prevention and Risk Management Committees (2.4% each). Only 2.4% serve 
on policy forums.   
 
The data above would suggest that most members of management serve on generic 
management committees, than those specifically allocated to areas related to more 
specialised areas of importance to good governance, such as risk management and 
budgets. The question that must then be posed is why such a small percentage of 
management is exposed to specialised committees, and what implication does this have for 
their ability to transcend generic management functions and focus on more critical areas 
related to good governance. It may thus be that in pursuing specialisation and directing few 
management members to specialised committees, most managers do not get exposed to 
core areas vital for sound management (such as finances, risk and policy). 
 
7.6.1.2  Years in current position 
 
The question of experience in a post (and this relates to the years in a management 
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position) is an important indicator of experience.  
 
Figure 7.4:  Number of years in current position (in %) 
 
 
The results indicated that most of the respondents were recent appointees, with 47.1% being 
in the post for less than 2 years, and 20.6% in the post for between 2-4 years. Collectively, 
67.7% of the respondents were in the post for between 0-4 years, and may be classified as 
relatively junior managers. This probably points to the high turnover being experienced in 
government currently, where there is no stipulation for a minimum number of years at a 
level, before being promoted18. The point about low institutional memory caused by the 
relatively junior nature of the management level applies, which is a cause of concern in that 
organisations fail to stabilise and go about their work uninformed by the lessons from 
operational experience.  
 
In terms of the DSD management, 6 respondents or 46% of the sample have been in their 
positions for less than four years, which reflects a relatively junior management team in the 
DSD. However, 4 respondents or 30.8% of the respondents did not indicate their seniority 
level, which may alter this view of the DSD team being relatively junior. Looking at the 
results above, however, it can be noted that 23 out of 34 (68%) of the managers were in 
their posts for less than 4 years, which reinforces the point being made about the relatively 
junior profile of managers in employ in government. In such a case, there is an even greater 
need for M&E to produce learning situations to enrich the managerial experience of this 
                                                 
18
 Research being conducted by the DPSA and PSC on staff turnover rates. 
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cohort, so as to improve their effectiveness. Unless this takes place, the combination of the 
high turnover of staff at this level and junior status of managers will result in management 
not proceeding from a basis of sound understanding of what works and what does not, and 
making unnecessary errors as they have very little institutional memory to fall back upon.  
 
7.6.2 Perceptions on M&E 
 
An open-ended question was given to respondents, who were asked to provide words that 
expressed their views (connotations) of M&E. These responses are important in that they 
provide the level of awareness of the concepts of M&E at a generalised level. However, this 
awareness should not be confused with knowledge of M&E, which will only be known when 
more specific questions are asked, as other parts of the questionnaire probe. The responses 
are captured in the Table below, where the actual key words are recorded.  
 
Table 7.2:  Opinion of M&E  
 
 
From the Table above, it can be seen there is not much difference in the understanding of 
M&E across the three cohorts, with respondents from all groups showing the same level of 
understanding of M&E, and picking up on the same permeating issues relating to M&E such 
as tracking, checking, ensuring quality, etc. This probably indicates that there is not 
necessarily a better understanding of M&E at the DSD or PSC compared to the NDSD, and 
that having an M&E within a department does not necessarily lead to higher levels of 
awareness of M&E at an aggregated level. Thus it can be concluded that M&E in South 
Africa is understood the same way, irrespective of whether the respondents come from an 
institution with M&E or not. This common and generalised understanding of M&E at the 
connotative level may in part be due to the high media coverage of M&E in the country, and 
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the discourse on M&E within government itself, where most persons are familiar with M&E 
terminology. As mentioned, this is probably more a question of awareness and being able to 
link the term M&E to relevant concepts, rather than understanding these concepts in a more 
sophisticated manner. The questions that follow probe these issues further.   
 
7.6.3 Perceptions of value added by oversight institutions (MME) 
 
This section seeks to establish what an institution that is subject to the work of the oversight 
institutions think of the value it adds. Given the power relations that exist between oversight 
institutions and the bodies/institutions they oversee, the relationship is one sided, with the 
assessor making judgements of the assessed, and seldom any questions asked about how 
the assessed institutions perceive this activity. It may be because, as in the case of the PSC 
and the AG, any interference with the work of these institutions may construe obstruction, 
which is punishable. These institutions also have the power to report erring departments, 
and seldom if ever are the assessed institutions canvassed on the value they received from 
being assessed. This section thus is upward looking and indicates more than awareness; it 
probes the value contributed by the assessing institutions.   
 
It is an important perspective, given that compliance may be due to the sanction imposed, 
rather than a genuine appreciation of the value added by such an institution. This is often 
termed malicious compliance, which is a subject discussed in more detail later. If there is 
malicious compliance to keep within the parameters of accountability, it may mean that good 
compliance results could be deceptive, and do not really point to good governance. It may 
be then the act of compliance is an end in itself, but there is really no contribution to learning, 
either individual or organisational, and as such M&E is simply done for form. An important 
part of the work of MME institutions should be providing of feedback, for results to be used to 
improve performance, and for a performance dialogue to emerge, thus contributing to a 
culture change. The manner in which results are released and disseminated will be analysed 
later in this section.  
 
In assessing this element, value questions were asked. A value closer to (1) shows strong 
agreement, whilst a value closer to (4) shows strong disagreement. The neutral is not 
ascribed a value, but for purposes of the scale is given a (0) and ignored in calculating the 
averages. The understanding of the role played by the following MME institutions which 
exercise mandatory oversight over departments, and its perceived value, were obtained. The 
following were assessed. 
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a) NT, and its requirement that monthly financial reports must be submitted, and 
whether this is perceived as adding value to the department concerned. 
b) The AG, which requires the submission of financial statements and scrutinises the 
financial and non-financial performance of a department. 
c) The Audit Committee, within a department, which supports financial oversight and is 
a player when it comes to reporting to the NT and the AG. 
d) The PSC, to which financial misconduct must be reported, as well as its role in 
collating financial disclosure forms. 
e) The DoL, which requires departments to submit statistics on its human resource 
management, including issues of representivity. 
 
7.6.4 Perception of the value added by the NT 
 
There were two statements asked in the affirmative and negative to test how respondents 
valued the oversight of the NT. The importance of finances has been established as critical 
for good governance and service delivery (Fox, 2002), and the World Bank definition of good 
governance places financial management, which is also closely linked to the issues of 
ethics, high up on the criteria for good governance. Although the ethical question may be 
perceived as a soft issue, it forms the heart of the ethical infrastructure of a country in that it 
defines what may be regarded as acceptable behaviour, and thus sets the parameters for 
conduct of public servants when dealing with public funds. Questions of risk, financial 
disclosures and transparency, to name a few are germane to the quality of financial 
management, and any assessment of finances needs to move beyond the quantitative 
indicators and also consider qualitative issues, like the impact of spending on service 
delivery.  
 
It is important to examine how institutions view the NT in view of the above considerations, 
and assess whether it is perceived as simply providing funding and monitoring budgets. It 
would be useful to see whether the activities and strategies of the MME institution adds 
value beyond budgets, and whether in assessing compliance with its prescribed 
performance measures, its outputs are used, which should translate into learning and 
improve subsequent performance. The translation from ensuring compliance to being used 
and generating learning, and thus producing a sustainable, self-reflective management 
culture is what is required. The question posed and responded to below relates to the 
commonly known and mandatory monthly financial reports required from the NT of 
departments. Views of this subject were solicited from and rated according to the Lickert 
scale for the three cohorts.  
 I.A. Naidoo  |    Chapter 7 222 
 
 
Figure 7.5:  Level of agreement with statement “Monthly financial reports required from NT help to 
better manage budgets” (in %) 
 
 
Figure 7.6(a) Level of agreement with statement disaggregated for cohorts 
 
Figure 7.6(b):  Weighted average 
 
 
The result shows a greater agreement with the statement from the NDSD and PSC, than the 
DSD, which probably indicates in this particular case that managers in the DSD did not 
necessarily see reporting to the NT as particularly value-enriching. Here 3 or 30% of the 
respondents either disagreed or presented no response and this shows that at an 
operational level, there is not necessarily clarity or agreement about the work of an MME 
institution like the NT, and that there is no discernable difference in how different cohorts 
NDSD PSC DSD 
1.2 1.3 1.7 
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NDSD PSC DSD 
3.2 2.7 3.7 




understand this institution. The statement was probed further, this time asking the opposite 
question and the response is contained in the Figure below.  
 





Figure 7.8(a): Level of agreement with statement disaggregated for cohorts 
 
 
Figure 7.8(b):  Weighted average 
 
 
In looking at the opposite statement which was used to validate the response, it can be 
noted that at a global level (across all three cohorts), there was a high level of disagreement 
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(85.3%). Using the weighted average, the level of disagreement was 3.4.  The strongest 
rejection to the statement was from the PSC (3.7), followed by the DSD (3.2%) and the 
NDSD (2.7). The PSC and DSD result is understandable, the former because it draws 
heavily on NT frameworks for its own work, and the latter probably because it views itself 
positively when it comes to the NT and AG, given its excellent financial management track 
record reflected in the previous chapter (of being awarded the coveted unqualified audit 
opinion). The result from the DSD varies slightly from the agreement statement that was 
analysed in the earlier figures. It may be that when the question was posed in such a form, 
the rejection is stronger from the DSD given its own good performance, which it may not 
want to be diluted. 
 
Another critical role played by the NT is the production of the reporting templates for the 
Annual Reports of the departments. These reports are probably the most publically 
accessible evaluation documents of departments, and have evolved over the past 10 years 
from being largely descriptive and narrative to more performance oriented, given the 
intervention made by the NT on reformatting the reports and putting in place processes 
which make these reports key documents for accountability. The reports serve to show 
actual performance against plans, and are relatively accessible to readers who can see what 
has been achieved. The use of concepts such as service standards and indicators, as well 
as other M&E terminology probably contributes to a richer M&E discourse in the country, as 
these terms become used in the engagement with the reports. The reports have to be 
presented to multi-party committees of Parliament, and this leads to the performance of 
departments getting scrutinised. Therefore, the statement below tests whether the intentions 
discussed are valued in practice, is realised. With hindsight this question is probably too 
leading, assumptive, complex and loaded. The results must be treated with circumspection.   
Figure 7.9(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The format of the Annual Report is useful in that it 
compels us to develop internal systems to produce performance information around the key areas and 
helps to self-manage” (in %) 
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The Figure above shows an agreement level at 67.6%. However, there was also a relatively 
high neutral response at 17.6%, and disagreement at 11.8%. The averages show an overall 
agreement level at 1.3, with the highest agreement coming from the DSD (1.2) and PSC 
(1.4), with the NDSD agreeing the least at 1.7.  The DSD has a very high (30.8%) neutral 
response, and when looking at these figures there are no discernable trends across the 
cohorts, as the responses for all the cohorts was internally differentiated. In following up 
through personal interviews in the DSD and PSC, many managers expressed the view that 
the Annual Reports were probably just compliance documents, driven from the Corporate 
Services (administrative section) of the departments, with very little collaboration going into 
its production, and even less engagement with the reports upon its tabling at the 
departmental level. They stated that the report was produced generally for the NT, external 
stakeholders and Parliament, with the least usage taking place within the departments that 
produce these reports themselves (Personal interviews conducted: December 2008, PSC 
and DSD respondents). This result, augmented by the personal interviews, probably 
indicates that the Annual Report has not reached the level of influence as has been stated in 
the questionnaire, and probably explains the results achieved on the value scale.  
 
7.6.4.1  Value ascribed to the NT   
 
The value ascribed to the NT would show, amongst others, the seriousness with which this 
MME institution is accorded. It would further indicate the level of understanding that 
managers have of the NT, which plays a key role in setting and monitoring financial policies, 
as indicated in chapter 6. If there is sufficient understanding and appreciation of the work of 
the NT, one could infer that managers would be more likely to respond to instructions from 
the NT, which in this case relates to mandatory reporting of budgets and adhering to the 
reporting template provided for compiling and submitting the Annual Reports. All of these 
form part of the compliance element of the MME, which is a part of good governance. The 
results from the perception survey appear to indicate that behaviour by all cohorts go beyond 
NDSD PSC DSD 
1.2 1.7 1.4 
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compliance, as there a stronger agreement and disagreement levels around the value 
propositions from the respondents, which at the 80% plus levels indicating strong feelings on 
the matter. It could indicate that there has been an assimilation of the value of the NT by 
managers, and hence departments, to the point where its authority is accepted, and its value 
appreciated.   
 
In looking at the disaggregated results, it was noted that the highest level of agreement was 
from the PSC and the DSD. This result is understandable, given that the PSC draws upon 
the work of the NT in the production of its reports, and uses the findings of the NT to 
augment its own findings. From a compliance perspective, the results in chapter 6 indicate 
that there was good financial management in the DSD as it was able to keep within the 
budget parameters of the NT (2% either way). The ability of the DSD to comply with financial 
and other matters indicates that it is a department that scores well when it comes to 
compliance. Overall, one could conclude that the NT is well established as a central, 
important department, the policies of which are known and accepted, and this indicates that 
it has contributed through its activities of bringing about good governance, in the DSD, and 
across departments more generally.  
 
7.6.4.2  Perception of the value added by the AG and the Audit Committees  
 
The importance of the work of the AG in promoting good governance through its assessment 
processes has been noted in chapter 5, where it was indicated that its ability, sanctioned by 
law, to present audit opinions publically is a contributory factor for good governance. The 
assessments provided have value, in that it points to the quality of compliance, governance 
and leadership. Key reports, such as the Audit Outcomes, which lists the results obtained by 
each department, is telling of the quality of governance of a department. The coveted result 
expected from the AG is a “clean audit”, followed by an “unqualified audit”. A disclaimer is 
the most embarrassing result, and tends to get media attention.  
 
There were two statements presented to respondents for reaction around the area of the 
work of the AG, namely a direct positive statement about the work of the AG and a related 
one about the Audit Committee in a department. The results are explained in the Figures 
below. 
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Figure 7.10(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The work of the AG is important, as it promotes 





Figure 7.10(b):  Weighted average 
 
 
As can be seen there is a strong level of agreement with this statement, at 88.2%, with the 
highest agreement levels found in the DSD cohort at 94.3%, followed by the PSC at 90.9% 
and the NDSD at 80%. The weighted averages confirm this strong level of agreement overall 
at 1.2 as an overall average. The highest level of agreement to the statement came from the 
DSD and PSC at 1.1, followed by the NDSD, with an average of 1.5. All scores being below 
2 confirm the high agreement level confirming the value of the work of the AG, in particular 
on accountability and transparency, which are elements key to good governance. This 
perception is understandable given that the Audit Opinion of the AG is probably one of the 
evaluations taken the most seriously by any department.  
 
The Audit Opinion in essence is an amalgam judgement of the governance of a department, 
which previously focused only on financial issues but now also considers non-financial 
performance matters. It is thus a more comprehensive assessment of a department‟s 
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meets international norms and standards on auditing practices for public entities, implies that 
there is a universality and credibility to these opinions. It would be difficult for these opinions 
to be contested, as they are considered objective, and fall within the quantitative realm of 
M&E, where numbers and measures, against levels of tolerance or bands that describe 
performance are taken as verifiable truths.   
 
In the assessment of the MME institutions, it was found that whilst the PSC often cited the 
reports of the NT and AG in its work, there was less citing of the PSC in the work of these 
organisations. This is despite the fact that there is much overlap in the work, and similar 
work conducted between these organisations. This is probably indicative of the lack of co-
operation between MME institutions, which tends to be informed by issues of independence 
and protecting turf. The net impact of MME institutions exercising oversight on departments 
in similar areas is that departments get frustrated in producing similar information in different 
formats, and not receiving adequate feedback on assessments for purposes of engaging 
with results and learning. In fairness to the Office of the AG, it should be pointed out that it 
has improved on the engagement aspect, and now has a protocol for engagement wherein 
the management of departments are afforded the opportunity to comment on interim 
findings, before these are finalised. This shift needs to be looked at in the historic context, 
where such participatory steps were not as pronounced previously, and where the issue of 
independence was self-interpreted to mean that findings could not be contested, or this 
would constitute a form of unacceptable defiance. Although the AG still falls squarely within 
the accountability category for M&E, the shift in approach is perceptible and should be 
welcomed in light of the fact that influence comes from engagement, not detachment, as 
cited in the literature reviewed for this thesis.  
 
An appraisal of the Audit Committee, which may be regarded as a mini AG, is important; as 
it is this departmentally appointed committee (which also has external stakeholders serving 
on it to ensure credibility) which operates on a day to day basis by exercising oversight on 
the department‟s finances. It works in support of the HoD, who is also the Accounting Officer 
appointed in terms of the PFMA. A properly functioning Audit Committee should in theory 
prevent departments from receiving negative audit opinions, as it serves an on-going 
monitoring and early detection function. The question that is thus posed to assess its value 
as described is important, as one wishes to ascertain what the understanding is of this 
internal, though not highly visible structure is by respondents. As an internal, more regularly 
operating structure, it is expected to institutionalise the ethos and principles of the AG, and in 
so doing should promote organisational learning given that it is embedded in the department, 
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unlike the AG which comes into the department in a contracted period as an external 
evaluator.  
 
Figure 7.11(a):  Level of agreement with statement “As a manager, I am fully aware of how the 





The result varied from the view of the AG, which was more known. In the case of the Audit 
Committee it was found that 67.6%, of the managers (as opposed to 80% for the AG) knew 
about the work of the Audit Committee in their departments. There was a relatively high 
neutral percentage at 17.6%, followed by a disagreement level of 14.7%. Such a perception 
did not exist for the AG, which probably is better known and holds a higher profile accorded 
to external, accountability driving bodies. This result might also indicate that there is more 
emphasis placed on meeting the stipulations of accountability bodies than on what should be 
the internal, persuasive, learning oriented bodies. 
 




The weighted averages show a greater leaning towards the neutral, with the overall average 
being 1.8. The results for the DSD (1.8), PSC (1.9) and NDSD (1.9) show overall agreement 
with the statement, which is slightly different from the result of perception of the AG. Even 
with the DSD, there was lesser understanding of the Audit Committee, despite there being 
an internal M&E function where it would have been expected that these linkages would have 
PSC 
NDSD 
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been formed, and knowledge about the departments accountability infrastructure made 
known. One would have assumed that this committee would be better known, as it resides 
within the department but this is probably not the case and this result confirms the earlier 
discussion regarding management forums, where it was shown that a very small percentage 
of managers serve on specialised committees.  
 
7.6.4.3  Value ascribed to the AG and Audit Committees 
 
The respondents showed a high level of understanding of the work of the AG. There was a 
lesser understanding of the work of the Audit Committees, and this may be because this 
tends to be communicated less within the departments. It can be deduced that the level of 
understanding is the highest when it comes from external oversight, as compared to internal 
oversight, which is concerning as it shows that good governance imperatives tend to be 
followed when there is fear of sanction, rather than as a natural part of management 
functions.  
 
7.6.5 Perception of the value of the work of the PSC  
 
Given that the PSC is constitutionally mandated to conduct M&E, and has been performing 
this function for approximately 10 years, it is useful to see how this MME institution is valued.  
There were different statements posed to elicit responses, the first being on whether the 
PSC was seen as adding value when it came to its role in reporting financial misconduct, 
and whether this activity served as a deterrent. Overall it was found that 67.7% of the 
respondents agreed with the statement, with a relatively high percentage being more 
cautious and being neutral (17.6%), whilst 14.7% of the respondents disagreed. The result 
indicates that the value added by the PSC in its reporting of financial misconduct is not 
actually regarded as that important, more so given the high level of neutral and disagreeing 
responses.  
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Figure 7.12(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The reporting of financial misconduct cases to the 
















At the disaggregated level, however, the DSD ascribed a high value to this activity of the 
PSC (84.7%). There was greater scepticism to the statement when viewing the result as 
weighted averages. The NDSD cohort, at 2.3, showed high disagreement to the value added 
by the PSC, followed by the PSC (1.9). The DSD seemed to agree the most with the 
statement, at 1.6. The issue raised about the DSD being strong on compliance probably 
accounts for this result, but what is important is that there was neither at the aggregated or 
disaggregated level the same level of conviction about this assertion. It may thus be that the 
high media which people are exposed to on government corruption results in a cautionary 
approach to such sweeping and generalised statements, as was offered. From the PSC the 
correct understanding appears to be that monolithic acts of monitoring some aspects of 
corruption cannot on its own act as a deterrent. This more critical understanding is likely to 
be held by the PSC cohort who would engage more deeply with these issues on a regular 
basis.   
 
The impact of the PSC in terms of another corruption addressing activity, managing the 
financial disclosures of Senior Management Service managers, was also probed where it 
NDSD PSC DSD 
1.6 2.3 1.9 
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was implicitly proposed that this activity improved the ethical compliance of staff. Once 
again, this is a sweeping generalisation that does not take into account the complexity of 
addressing ethics, but in its generalisation it would show whether there has been a critical 
response. The question thus sought to assess whether the submission of the financial 
disclosures forms was useful in preventing conflicts of interest, which is a key element that 
stymies public confidence in the Public Service. The reason for this is that it is felt that the 
tender processes, whilst outwardly transparent, accessible and creating employment 
opportunities for previously disadvantaged groups, is in fact not so due to internal 
manipulation. Several studies have been conducted by the Auditor-General19 and the PSC20 
on such matters, and both institutions point to poor management around the conflicts of 
interests. The statement below thus becomes an important indicator for assessing how well 
this element is being addressed in practice, and whether the mandatory submission of 
financial disclosure forms for Senior Management Service managers to the PSC, contributes 
to good governance.  
 
Figure 7.13(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The submission of financial disclosure forms for 
Senior Management Service helps to manage conflicts of interest, and improves the ethical compliance of 




                                                 
19
    Refer to http://www.auditor-general.gov.za  
20
    Public Service Commission. 2009c. Evaluation of Supply Chain management Practices within the R200 000 
Threshold. Republic of South Africa. 
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Figure 7.13(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
Figure 7.13(c):  Weighted average 
 
In terms of the weighted averages, the highest level of agreement to this statement came 
from the DSD at 1.5, followed by the PSC at 2 and NDSD at 1.8. Once again, it shows that 
there is a high level of confidence in this process within the DSD, but this weakens when it 
comes to the PSC and NDSD. The response from the NDSD group probably indicates a 
more critical perception of what this aspect of work of the PSC can, and cannot do, hence 
the bimodal pattern of distribution. The level of disagreement from the PSC itself is 
significant, and may point to the fact that managers at this institution recognise the 
limitations to the system of submitting financial disclosures, and do not see it as an act which 
in itself leads to the prevention of conflicts of interest. Other research within the PSC has 
indicated that many of the business interests are in fact held by spouses of managers, who 
do not have to declare financial interests, and the system may thus have been circumvented. 
This ties up with other research which indicates that corruption is more perverse and 
sophisticated, and it is unlikely that managers who engage in such unethical activities 
declare their business interests to the heads of the departments they work for, more so in 
cases where they have secured tenders. The system thus has serious limitations, and is 
whilst a transparency promoting mechanism, it is not a corruption preventing one (Personal 
interview, Senior Manager at PSC, 15 January 2009).  
 
NDSD PSC DSD 
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7.6.5.1  Value ascribed to the work of the PSC 
 
Overall, the PSC in two aspects of its work, that of reporting on financial misconduct and 
receiving financial disclosures, which purportedly at an intent level were meant to curb 
corruption, was not regarded in high value terms at the aggregated level. There was stronger 
belief in the value brought by the AG and NT, than the PSC. At the disaggregated level of 
the PSC and the NDSD there was scepticism of the statement. The DSD, however, seemed 
more convinced about the value added by the PSC through this type of activity in terms of its 
contribution to addressing fraud.    
 
The results indicate a high level of understanding of the work of the PSC by the DSD, and a 
belief that the work adds value to the internal operations of the department. This result must 
be looked at in the context that this survey was undertaken shortly after the DSD had to 
submit its financial disclosures, and when the PSC was implementing the PSM&ES. Both 
these events meant that at the management level there was a higher sensitivity to the work 
of the PSC at the time than could have been the case ordinarily. There is thus likely to be a 
greater appreciation of the value added by the PSC which may explain this result.  
 
However, the results suggest that when it comes to financial disclosures and the value 
added in curbing corruption, there was a more critical view from the PSC and NDSD; both 
groups did not see the link between disclosures and promoting ethics as being so causal. 
The earlier discussion has alluded to the fact that the system of financial disclosures has its 
limitations, which has been acknowledged by the key drivers of the system within the PSC 
itself. These results may indicate that for a highly compliant department like the DSD, there 
is more confidence in the value or contribution of oversight institutions than those 
departments which either do not comply as well, or where there is no established M&E. 
 
7.6.6 Perception of the oversight work of the DoL in terms of compliance with 
employment equity and Human Resource legislation 
 
The DoL, whilst not a classic MME institution in the sense of the NT, AG and PSC, does 
exercise a degree of oversight over departments given its obligations to monitor progress 
when it comes to employment equity. It was thus deemed useful to test what value this type 
of reporting is seen to add to respondents. It thus tests both awareness and value, the 
former relating to the fact that there is a range of players which compel departments to 
report, but which may not be known across the management structures of departments 
themselves.  
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A statement was posed to test knowledge about the reporting obligations that departments 
have to adhere to in terms of reporting progress on employment equity to the DoL. It goes on 
it establish whether respondents see a link between this reporting obligation and how 
departments conduct or manage human resources internally. In chapter 6 this was indicated 
as a key reporting requirement, and adherence to the stipulations contributes to good 
governance.  
 
Figure 7.14(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The submission of the Employment Equity plan to 
the DoL is a useful monitoring measure, which helps to ensure that the department complies with all of 
the provisions and targets for sound human resource management” (in %) 
 
 
Figure 7.14(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
The results show that whilst there is an overall 64.7% agreement level, there is also a 20.6% 
neutral response, and a 14.7% disagreement. In looking at the cohorts, the highest level of 
agreement was from the DSD at 84.7%, followed by the PSC at 63.6% and then the NDSD 
at 40%. This indicates that there is no consensus that the submission of Employment Equity 
plans to the DoL is a useful monitoring measure, assisting with the achievement of targets 
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In examining the weighted averages, it was found that the overall average was 1.7, with the 
highest agreement level came from the DSD (1.5) followed by the PSC (1.6), but outside the 
range of 2. The NDSD cohort, at 2.4, was more sceptical of the value added by the DoL. 
There is affirmation of the work of the DoL from the PSC, probably because it saw it as 
supportive of its own M&E work, and its understanding and collaboration with the 
organisation. There was also an alignment to the statement by the DSD, which also scored 
well on the compliance aspect (noted in chapter 6) from the DoL. There was much 
scepticism to the statement from the NDSD, which probably did not know much about the 
DoL. This result probably indicates a good understanding of the reporting obligations to the 
DoL from the DSD, which may be indicative of how functional the DSD M&E function is. A 
key area of reporting within the DSD at the management level is on human resource 
matters. The reports contained in the Annual Report of the DSD shows that there has been a 
high level of compliance and that most of the targets have been met. There is thus more 
agreement with the above statement than with the case of the NDSD.  
 
7.6.7 Perception of reporting obligations and its contribution to good governance 
 
Respondents were asked to assess whether they saw the numerous reporting requirements 
to oversight institutions as beneficial to improving their own M&E capacity and capability.  
The point about excessive upward reporting, without this being seen as adding value to 
one`s own work has been made, and has been termed as reporting fatigue. Upward 
reporting can have the effect of improving a department‟s own propensity for reporting, as 
requisite internal managerial infrastructure needs to be put in place to meet external 
obligations. It can in a sense assist in bolstering departments own M&E capacity, a point 
which was made about the impact of MME on strengthening internal utility.   
 
NDSD PSC DSD 
1.5 2.4 1.6 
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Figure 7.15(a):   Level of agreement with statement “The submission of reports (like those mentioned 
above) to external oversight bodies helps to tighten the internal management processes in the department, 
and improve its own M&E capacity and capability” (in %) 
 
 




The results indicate that there was an overall 73.5% agreement level, with the highest being 
DSD (76.9%), followed by the PSC (72.7%) and the NDSD at 70%. The highest level of 
disagreement was also from the NDSD at 20%, followed by the PSC at 18.2% and the DSD 
at 7.7%. There was also a 10% neutral response. There was thus for the DSD and PSC high 
levels of agreement with the value added by reporting obligations and its enhancing of 
internal managerial processes.  
 










N-DSD PSC DSD 
1.4 2 1.6 
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In looking at the weighted averages it was found that the average was 1.6, with the highest 
level of agreement was the DSD at 1.4, followed by the PSC at 1.6. The rating of 2 for the 
NDSD shows there was no real bias towards either agreeing or disagreeing. The element 
was probed further with another statement which posed reporting requirements in a negative 
sense, suggesting that it serves to distract, rather than enhance a department‟s managerial 
objective. The statement was deemed important given the complaints made around 
excessive reporting by departments.  
 
Figure 7.16(a):  Level of agreement with statement “There are too many reporting obligations imposed on 
the department, and this detracts from the department achieving its strategic objectives”  
 
 




It was found that the highest level of disagreement with this statement, meaning that there is 
an acknowledgement of the importance of reporting obligations, came from the PSC, at 
63.7%. This is an understandable response, given that most of the work of the PSC is based 
on departments needing to report to oversight institutions like it. The NDSD has a 
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The weighted average scores are not adequately spread to show a difference, with the PSC  
at 2.8 followed by both the DSD and NDSD at 2.6. One can thus conclude that there is a 
slight bias towards reporting from the PSC, for the reasons mentioned above, as compared 
to the other cohorts. The DSD response shows a more nuanced reaction, with 38.5% 
agreeing, 15.4% being neutral and 46.2% disagreeing.  
 
The next section provides insights into how M&E is perceived in terms of its effectiveness. It 
covers elements of location, utility and authority and provides another dimension of how 
M&E is perceived and valued. 
 
7.7 ASSESSMENT OF M&E EFFECTIVENESS   
 
This section assesses the how effective M&E is perceived to be by respondents. It does this 
by considering responses on aspects that typically influence the effectiveness of M&E in 
organisations such as: 
 
a) Location and capacity; 
b) Utility as a managed tool; 
c) Degree of integration into institutional arrangements; and  
d) Authority accorded to M&E. 
 
The responses to the questions and themes above provide an impression of how the M&E 
function is viewed by managers, in particular the cohort from the DSD. These views are then 
compared with the results from the other cohorts, who were surveyed on similar issues via 
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It is widely documented21 that the location of the M&E function can have a significant impact 
on its overall effectiveness. The issue of location is also highly contested and can be 
political, in that M&E units may be associated with power, given their ability to generate 
judgements. They most certainly create ripples in an organisation (Patton, 1997). In view of 
this, there tends to be debate as to where best the function should be located, what the 
reporting protocols are, whether it has credibility given its capacity and importantly, what 
happens to M&E results. It is often argued that if M&E is subsumed within a line function 
(specific part of an institution), it would be unable to exercise its oversight unfettered by the 
prevailing hierarchy and bureaucracy. This erodes its power, as it would be unable to 
operate in an independent manner. This sub-section is thus important to help understand the 
organisational issues that impact on the effectiveness of M&E. 
 
In looking at the authority and power of M&E, one must consider the question of power by 
association. This means that if the M&E function is located in a section or associated with 
significant power in terms of decision-making, it is more likely to be taken seriously. The 
converse could also apply. Given that M&E units want to be seen as adding value, and must 
for their own perpetuation be able to justify their efforts, M&E managers need success 
factors to bolster their credibility. In this regard specific interviews were held with managers 
from the M&E section of the DSD to get their views on how they saw themselves (in terms of 
authority accorded to them), and what they saw as success and deterrent factors for M&E22. 
The results of their personal interviews are deemed important in assessing the M&E 
effectiveness question. The results were considered against the units own operational 
plan23. 
 
M&E practitioners are always confronted with the question of demonstrating their utility and 
value. It is easy for detractors to charge that M&E adds no value, if they do not see or 
perceive any real management change emanating from M&E reports. It is thus important that 
M&E be perceived as adding value to management, for its own perpetuation and credibility 
within an organisation.  
 
Related to the question of independence is the question of integration. There is a debate as 
to whether M&E should stand apart and aloof, or be a part of the mechanisms of decision-
making. It is not clear where on the location spectrum M&E should be, and as pointed out in 
                                                 
21
    Noted in the conceptual framework.  
22
  The results are covered separately in this chapter. 
23
  Department of Social Development. 2007g. Operational Plan for M&E within the Department of Social  
Development. March. Unpublished. 
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the literature for this thesis there is the view that M&E takes the baton of information to 
decision-makers, and should not move into the realm of actual decision-making, thus remain 
apolitical and detached (Rossi, 2004). There is also the view that M&E practitioners need to 
be proactive and advocate for change (House, 2004), with Cronbach and Associates (1980) 
seeing influence coming from engagement, not detachment. This empirical assessment 
attempts to establish what the prevailing view is at the DSD and elsewhere on the subject. 
 
7.7.1 Location, capacity, integration and perceived value 
 
A set of responses to questions relating to issues of location, capacity, integration and 
perceived value assists in answering the effectiveness question. The perceived value 
question seeks to establish what managers see as being the purpose of M&E, and whether 
this falls in the area of accountability, learning or enlightenment. In the case of the PSC the 
questions relate to M&E within that organisation (the PSC), whist the question is hypothetical 
for the NDSD.  
 
The important questions of location and capacity were asked as one. The question sought to 
establish whether respondents saw the location of M&E in their departments as appropriate, 
and also asked whether it saw the same M&E unit as being adequately capacitated. On 
hindsight the researcher should have asked two separate questions, as it may be that joining 
the issues caused confusion for the respondents. Nevertheless the results are indicated in 
the Figure below. 
 
Figure 7.17(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The M&E function within my department is well 
located and adequately capacitated” 
 
 
The highest level of agreement to the statement on location and capacity was from the PSC, 
followed by the DSD. This shows a positive response to the location and capacity of M&E 
from the DSD where there is a functional M&E and the PSC which performs M&E, albeit 
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across the country as a whole. In looking deeper into the data of the DSD, one finds that 
there is a relatively high neutral response (30.8%), and there is no clear agreement.  
 
Figure 7.17(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 











When examining the weighted averages one sees that the DSD falls outside 2 on the 
agreement Figure, at 2.3, indicating that there is probably no consensus about the location 
question of M&E at the DSD. It should be noted that the M&E in the DSD is located within a 
Branch: Corporate Services, and not sufficiently high up in the bureaucracy to be taken 
seriously. This is probably understandable given the relatively junior profile of DSD 
managers, and the fact that there is in general not much understanding of M&E as a 
discipline amongst managers in government. Interviews with managers from M&E at the 
DSD pointed out that they felt the location was a problem and undermined their 
effectiveness (Personal Interviews with DSD managers, December 2008).  
 
The effectiveness of M&E question was probed further, by asking a separate question, this 
time on integration. It is assumed that the term is sufficiently well-understood by managers 
and should not create any ambiguity amongst the respondents. Linked to the question of 
integration is the question of value-adding. Once again, on hindsight these issues should 
perhaps have been separated, rather than leading the respondents on to draw the link 
between integration and value-adding.  
 
PSC NDSD DSD 
2.3 3 
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Figure 7.18(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The M&E component is sufficiently integrated into 
the institutional management arrangements of the department to add value” (in %) 
 
 
Figure 7.18(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
The overall agreement level for the DSD was 53.9% whilst for the PSC it was 63.7%, with no 
agreement from the NDSD. One can expect a high agreement or concurrence with value 
statements around M&E from the PSC, given its mandate. This indicates a limited 
understanding of the role or value of M&E in terms of operational matters at the DSD, which 
is close to neutral. 
 












PSC NDSD DSD 
2.4 3.4 
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The weighted averages indicate the highest agreement from the PSC (1.9). As noted this 
response must be examined more critically, as it is not departmental specific. The response 
from the DSD looking at the weighted averages is more important, which at a level of more 
than 2, at 2.4, shows that once again there is concern about an aspect of M&E 
effectiveness, whilst the NDSD response of 3.4 shows another extreme. In terms of the DSD 
there is a concern about how integrated the M&E unit is. It is thus not clear to managers 
whether the M&E in the DSD is effective or not.  
 
The next Figure looks at the value proposition of M&E, by asking whether M&E has 
produced value to the management of the department.   
 
Figure 7.19(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The M&E component has not managed to produce 
value to the management of the department” (in %) 
 
 
Figure 7.19(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
In this case there was a very high level of disagreement to this value proposition, wherein 
there was a suggestion that M&E is adding value. The overall level of disagreement across 
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The weighted averages above provide a better picture of the responses, with the PSC 
showing the strongest rejection to the statement (3.4), followed by the DSD at 3.2. The 
NDSD is at 2.2, which is understandable as it is a grouping with no functional M&E. It would 
thus appear that managers in the DSD value the work of their M&E unit, noted in their 
rejection of this statement.  
 
In probing the value proposition of M&E, a further question was posed asking directly 
whether M&E is taken seriously by the department and whether it is viewed as a critical 
management tool.  
 
Figure 7.20(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The department takes M&E seriously, and sees 











NDSD PSC DSD 
3.2 3.4 
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Figure 7.20(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
The Figure above indicates that at the aggregated level 57% agree, with 15% disagreeing, 
whilst a high 26% are neutral. The strongest alignment to the statement came from the PSC 
(63.6%), followed by the DSD (61.5%). There is no clear pattern from the NDSD response. 
The weighted averages below provide more insight into the levels of agreement with this 
statement. 
 












The weighted averages above shows that the average agreement level was 1.9, with the 
strongest agreement coming from the PSC, which as previously mentioned has consistently 
seen M&E as adding value. The DSD and NDSD fall outside the 2 range, at 2.1 and 2.3 
respectively, and this indicates a less certain position on the value proposition that one might 
have expected.  
 
In summary, the following observations may be made with regards to the question of M&E 
effectiveness within a department. Effectiveness is a complex concept, and cannot only be 
looked at from the side of how effective something is perceived to be. It also requires 
insights from critical users, such as the executive management, which in this case would be 
the DG and his/her DGs. These perceptions are captured in the individual interviews that 
were conducted.  
PSC NDSD DSD 
2.1 2.3 
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In terms of the general perception of how effective M&E is, it was found that there is no 
consensus on some key aspects of the M&E effectiveness question from the DSD cohort. 
The PSC has consistently provided an optimistic picture of the value added by M&E. The 
DSD response is nuanced, which indicates that there is no consensus on the value added by 
the M&E unit within the department itself, and may indicate that issues of integration and 
independence have not been adequately addressed. Therefore, whilst there is a functioning 
M&E in the DSD, managers are not fully clear about how it should, or does work.  
  
7.8 ASSESSMENT OF THE MANAGERIAL ROLE IN PROMOTING GOOD 
GOVERNANCE 
 
This section assesses the views of respondents on how they see management as a 
promoter of good governance. It does so by identifying factors and aspects that are within 
the control of management, and which if executed properly, contribute to good governance.  
This assertion is made in light of the fact that government policy in the country and the 
literature on the subject generally behoves managers to operate in a transparent manner, 
acknowledge clients and work with stakeholders, facilitate organisational learning, ensure 
that there is accountability for work done, and make decisions that comply with law. These 
attributes may be regarded as the drivers of sound management, which more specifically 
relate to the following, and which are assessed by the respondents.  
 
a) Information management and its contribution to transparency and accountability. 
b) Compliance with the PAJA when making decisions. 
c) A proactive stance when engaging with external stakeholders. This will be elaborated 
upon in the next chapter which looks at community and participatory M&E. 
d) The use of M&E for accountability purposes. 
e) The use of M&E for learning purposes. 
f) The perception of the PSC Public Service M&E system to the departments own 
management effectiveness. 
g) The promotion of an inclusive culture within a department, in terms of making 
managers feel that they contribute to the good governance of the department. 
 
There is a broad purview of issues that fall within the good governance equation, and there 
must be an acceptance that managers operate within the confines of these imperatives, and 
not in an arbitrary manner. Similarly, the intention and practice of engaging with external 
stakeholders, considered in chapter 8, is a further dimension for assessing good governance 
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as it indicates the willingness of management to engage in a participatory process to deliver 
its services, and receive critical feedback from key external constituencies. Thus the 
statements posed here are important to judge what views are held on the subject, and 
assessing the gradation of these becomes an important indicator for views of the aspect, 
and secondly points to how the aspect is viewed in the three locales assessed in this thesis. 
 
7.8.1 The role of information management and its relationship to M&E, transparency 
and accountability, and organisational learning 
 
The issue of information and its use and abuse has already been discussed in this thesis. It 
was argued that the absence of transparency around information, which was the manner in 
which control was exercised by the pre-apartheid Public Service, assisted in maintaining the 
status quo. It has been demonstrated in the last chapter that several mandatory reporting 
requirements behoves departments to make a minimum set of performance information 
available for broader consumption, and this has helped in ensuring that external role players 
and stakeholders receive a minimum level of performance information. Whilst much has 
been said about the importance of information management, and its importance to 
organisational learning, it appears that this relationship is often not clear (Marra, 2000). The 
first statement posed is whether information management in departments is seen as 
contributing to transparency and accountability.   
 
Figure 7.21(a):  Level of agreement with statement “Information management in the department 
contributes to transparency and accountability” (in %) 
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The aggregated results indicate that 67% of respondents agree with the statement, whilst 
18% are neutral and 15% disagree. This shows that two-thirds of the respondents see the 
link between information management and transparency and accountability. One would have 
assumed that this relationship would have been stronger, but it may point to a question of 
the understanding that currently exists on issues of information management and its 
contribution to good governance. It has been pointed out in the literature that knowledge 
management within organisations remains weak, and this result probably reflects this 
situation.  
 











Only in looking at the results of the weighted averages does a more critical picture emerge. 
The average is 2, with the agreement decreasing from that point, with the PSC at 1.7 and 
NDSD at 1.8. The DSD cohort shows a level above 2, meaning that it agrees the least, and 
probably closer to the disagreement level. This result shows that the PSC recognises the 
link, as does the NDSD, but at the DSD where there is an operational M&E the link is not 
appreciated or as clear. This probably indicates a general lack of understanding amongst 
managers of the relationship, or it shows that the M&E unit within the DSD has not managed 
to communicate to the extent that this has become a common understanding amongst 
managers. It may also be a factor related to the relatively junior management cohort at the 
DSD which has not had adequate exposure to such issues, and thus does not feel strongly 
about the issue. 
PSC DSD NDSD 
1.8 2.4 
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In pursuing the question, respondents were asked to rate what they saw as the relationship 
between M&E and its use for accountability purposes.  
 
Figure 7.22(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The department sees M&E information as being 
necessary for accountability purposes” (in %) 
 
 
Figure 7.22(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
In terms of this statement, it was found that 70% agreed that there was a strong relationship 
between the two, with 18% being neutral and 12% disagreeing. The disaggregated results 
reflected in the weighted average below, indicates a variation across the cohorts.  
 










PSC NDSD DSD 
2.1 2.3 
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The weighted averages indicate a strong pull towards the average of 2 from the PSC (1.8). 
However, the level of agreement weakens when it comes to the DSD (2.1) and the NDSD 
(2.3). This indicates that the agreement is not as strong when it comes to the case study of 
the DSD, where it is more than 2, than the PSC. The PSC once again agrees with the 
relationship, whereas the intra-departmental differentiation within the DSD becomes more 
apparent, resulting in it scoring at 2.1. This result for the DSD is similar to that found on a 
related issue of the relationship between information management and transparency and 
accountability where it was 2.4.  
 
Figure 7.23(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The department sees M&E information as being 
useful for learning purposes” (in %) 
 
 




Respondents were asked to assess whether their departments saw M&E as being useful for 
learning purposes. The importance of M&E in contributing to learning has been established 
in the theoretical chapter, where it was indicated that M&E should not just be about 
accountability and transparency, but also learning (Engel and Carlesson, 2002). The caution 
raised by Marra (2000) is that the link between knowledge generation and utilisation is not 
clear, and this question attempts to establish how this relationship is viewed.  
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At the aggregated level it was found that the agreement level was 59%, with 23% being 
neutral and 18% disagreeing. At this level it can be concluded that the relationship between 
M&E and learning is not clear, and this probably reflects how knowledge is managed within 
the cohorts themselves. It may also indicate that in most instances the link between the two 
is not known. If one were to look at the relationships probed in terms of the link between 
M&E and accountability, it was much stronger. The weighted averages provide a clear 
picture of the agreement levels.  
 











The Figure indicates the strongest agreement from the PSC, which was close to the average  
of 2.1. The level of 2 or more suggests a pull away from the zero level, and here again the 
DSD and NDSD are at 2.1 and 2.3 respectively. It indicates that when it comes to the DSD 
there is not a clear relationship established between M&E and learning (in percentage terms 
for the DSD the agreement level was 53%), indicating once again the lack of a well 
embedded M&E system within the DSD. Had the M&E within the DSD been more visible and 
shown and understood to be promoting learning (through seminars and other forms of 
dissemination), it would not have achieved a result of the NDSD, where there is no formal 
M&E. The PSC result probably once again reflects and ideal situation.  
 
7.8.2 The perception by management of the PSC M&E system 
 
Given that the main oversight system applied to departments is the Public Service M&E 
system, and the DSD performance against this system has been assessed in chapter 5. This 
assessment seeks to establish whether this system is viewed as valuable by the cohorts. It 
thus tests knowledge of the existence of the system, as well as whether in cases where it 
was applied, its perceived usefulness. The statement for response is thus one that seeks to 
establish whether an operational M&E system that is largely accountability driven, is 
regarded as valuable.  
 
PSC NDSD DSD 
2.1 2.3 
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Figure 7.24(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The PS M&E system of the PSC, which was 
implemented this year, produces a useful management report” (in %) 
 
 
Figure 7.24(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
At the aggregated level it was found that 59% of the respondents agreed with the statement, 
with a relatively high 32% being neutral and 9% disagreeing. Thus, less than 60% of the 
respondents either knew of or saw the PSC M&E system as being useful. This is against the 
background of a system that was operational for 8 years (at the time of this survey), and 
which has produced over 100 departmental reports, and 5 Consolidated reports, most of 
which are accessible on the website of the PSC, and which have been referred to in several 
oversight reports. This result confirms the findings of an impact assessment of the work of 
the PSC conducted independently, which showed that at key levels of society there was little 
understanding of the work of the PSC24. The disaggregated picture reflected in the weighted 
averages below gives a more detailed picture of the relative levels of understanding of the 
work of the PSC.  
 
                                                 
24
  Public Service Commission. 2009b. An assessment of the impact of the work of the PSC on policy. Republic 
of  South Africa. 
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The PSC predictably agreed with the statement the most, at 1.2, which is better than the 
average of 1.7. The DSD shows a lesser level of understanding, but as it is below 2, it still 
falls in to the agreement level. This result may have been influenced by the timing of the 
survey, which was just after the results of the PSM&ES was presented to the management 
of the department, and at which time this research was also made known. Had this not been 
the case it can be assumed that, in light of the other results on the M&E of the DSD, the 
level of understanding and value would probably have been lower. The NDSD cohort shows 
a high level of disagreement (2.4), and probably indicates that outside the PSC and the 
DSD, which was under assessment, very little is known about the work of the PSC generally, 
or this system specifically.  
 
7.8.3 The perception by management of compliance with the PAJA 
 
Another important element of management is the quality of decision-making, which can be 
assessed using the steps in the PAJA as benchmarks for sound decision-making. The 
statement posed was whether respondents saw managers as making decisions in terms of 
this normative framework.  
 
Figure 7.25(a):  Level of agreement with statement “Managers exercise decisions in terms of prevailing 
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Figure 7.25(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
At the aggregated level it was found that 67% of the respondents saw the ideal situation as 
being true in practice, with 21% neutral and 12% disagreeing. Thus two-thirds of the sample 
saw management exercising their roles within the confines of law.  
 











In looking at the weighted averages, the picture varies slightly. The average agreement level 
is 1.9, with the PSC and DSD being slightly above that, at 1.7 and 1.8, respectively. The 
NDSD was more sceptical and posted a result of 2.1. Generally, however, it seems that 
there is no problem with how managers are perceived in terms of exercising their decision-
making responsibilities, which augurs well for good governance. However, assessments 
conducted by the PSC using the PSM&ES have shown that the quality of decision-making at 
an aggregated level is not good, when assessed against the criteria for PAJA. This result 
from the survey must then be noted as being perception based, and indicative, rather than 
definitive. The PSC results, against the widespread maladministration reporting in the media 
are probably indicative that decision-making is indeed not as transparent and accountable as 
it should be.  
 
7.8.4 Engagement between the DSD and external stakeholders 
 
An important element of management and good governance is the ability to engage with 
stakeholders. The statement presented to respondents sought to establish whether 
PSC NDSD DSD 
1.8 2.1 







 I.A. Naidoo  |    Chapter 7 256 
 
management took a proactive stance in engaging with external stakeholders. The issue of 
engagement with stakeholders is important in that it shows the willingness of the department 
to engage, which then becomes another influence for enhancing the quality of governance.  
When there is public participation in the affairs of a department, it is more likely that issues of 
social relevance will be taken on board by the management. 
 
Figure 7.26(a):  Level of agreement with statement “The department takes a proactive stance when it 
comes to engaging with external stakeholders” (in %) 
 
 




At the aggregated level a very uneven picture emerged. It was found that just 61% of the 
respondents agreed that an external stakeholder process occurred in practice, with 15% 
being neutral and 24% disagreeing with the statement. It can thus be surmised that the issue 
of engagement with external stakeholders is either not perceived to be important, or not 
happening as it should. This result goes against policy statement of government which calls 
for civil society engagement with the work of the public service. In practice it appears not be 
a key consideration of the work of departments. This element will be probed in detail in 
chapter 7, where the entire department-stakeholder engagement will be assessed in more 
detail. The disaggregated results are important, and show further trends that have already 
been established.  
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It can be seen that the average for this element is 2.2, with the PSC being the closest to that 
average. However, the DSD and NDSD cohorts are above the 2 mark, at 2.4 and 2.6, 
respectively, probably indicating that there is very little or inadequate engagement with 
stakeholders from the side of management. The result from the next chapter which will look 
more exclusively at how the DSD engages with stakeholders will be compared to this result.  
 
7.8.5 Collectivism of management 
 
The issue of ownership of the management process is important. As indicated, management 
is not a homogenous grouping, but rather differentiated into ranks, with different levels of 
power and authority. The purpose of this section is to see whether management operates as 
a collective or not, as it will reflect whether decision-making only resides in the top levels, or 
is spread more across the management level. The question was thus posed to see whether 
managers saw themselves as a part of the collective, and whether they saw there was space 
within their organisations to engage as a management collective. If the latter occurs, it is an 
indicator of good governance in that it shows that there are participatory management 
processes, in which case there is more likely to be management buy-in to issues of oversight 
and following good governance prescripts.  
 
Figure 7.27(a):  Level of agreement with statement “As a manager, I feel a part of the management 
processes and feel that I can contribute to the good governance of the department” (in %) 
 
PSC NDSD DSD 
2.4 2.6 
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Figure 7.27(b):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
At the aggregated level it was found that 73% of the respondents agreed with the statement, 
whilst 18% were neutral and 9% disagreed. The disaggregated results indicate differences to 
this picture, when looking at the three cohorts.  
 











The above Figure indicates that the overall agreement level was 1.9, which below 2 shows a 
relatively high level of agreement level across the three cohorts. In disaggregating the result, 
it can be seen that the strongest agreement was from the PSC, at 1.6, followed by the NDSD 
(1.8) and then the DSD (2.1). It is interesting to note that whilst the DSD scored favourably at 
other levels, many respondents did not see the management as promoting as much 
collective and participatory processes, as in other cohorts. This finding ties up with other 
findings on how DSD staff view management.  
 
7.9 ASSESSMENT OF M&E CAPACITY  
 
A critical element of M&E effectiveness, relates to the capacity of persons who lead, manage 
and implement M&E to do so optimally. As the literature has indicated, there are several 
aspects that must be considered when setting-up and implementing an M&E system. As the 
literature review in chapter 2 has shown, M&E in South Africa has a particular bent which 
requires it to also meet the transformational agenda of the developmental State, support 
PSC DSD NDSD 
1.8 2.1 
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democracy by reinforcing transparency by ensuring that public performance information is 
put into the public domain, and thus support the accountability framework, and also 
consciously look at the question of evaluation use, or utility. There are several requirements 
of M&E practitioners (to include leaders, managers and operational M&E persons), and 
whilst this study has not set out to explicitly assess the quality of training offered, and the 
impact thereof, the following should be points of consideration when identifying training 
needs. This is expressed in the form of a Table which indicates M&E thrust, training 
requirement or body of knowledge expected of incumbent, and possible outcomes should 
this be realised.  
 













Understanding of political, 
State/government relations, 
ability to understand decision-
making processes  
 
Practitioner attuned to political 
and administrative landscape, 
operationalise M&E to achieve 
maximum impact, understands 
need for achieving utility through 
M&E 
 
M&E supports democracy 
 
Understanding of the concepts 




Ability to work in knowledge 
management terrain, 
understanding of issues of 
independence, ability to 
negotiate, work with 
stakeholders 
 
M&E for utility 
 
 
Ability to work with stakeholders 
to produce cogent proposal for 
assessments that seek to effect 
change 
 
Understand need to do 
utilisation–focused evaluations, 







Able to work with multiple 
information sources and 
mediums to improve the impact 
of M&E 
 
Ability to produce differentiated 
M&E, which caters for diverse 
audiences  
 




Understand and be able to work 
confidently with M&E tools and 
methods 
 
Provide credible M&E, establish 
respect for the M&E function, 




It should be remembered that acquiring M&E capacity is a process of life-long learning, and 
experiential. Given the relatively short time-span that M&E has been in operation both in the 
country and the DSD, it can be assumed that there has probably not been sufficient 
experiential learning in M&E. Apart from the two SAMEA events held in 2007 and 2009, and 
a few topical and regional events, there has been little exposure to M&E training at the 
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national conference level. The SAMEA website offers links and resources, but this is for 
members only, and the number registered is just 500, although the M&E community is 
probably much larger, if one were to take into account that not all M&E practitioners are 
SAMEA members.  A quick survey of staff within the PSC showed that less than 20% of staff 
who conduct M&E was in fact registered SAMEA board members, and this is in an 
organisation which has a MoU with SAMEA.25  
 
One must also consider that the now called PALAMA has produced a curriculum framework 
for capacity building for M&E within the South African government26. The framework is based 
on a Cabinet decision to approve the roll-out of the GWM&ES, the underlying purpose of 
which is to improve government and service delivery. To this end the SAMDI initiated a 
project on curriculum development, as required by the Governance and Administration PoA 
cluster (sub-grouping that takes Cabinet priorities forward). The purpose of the document 
has been to “outline the boundaries, principles and guidelines, concepts, values and 
practices to be taken into account when designing, developing and presenting learning 
solutions for M&E in South Africa”27. The eventual purpose of the programme is to provide 
accredited training on M&E on a massified scale. The training would be offered on four 
levels, introductory, intermediate, advanced and expert, and in terms of the provision model, 
delivered by different accredited service providers across the country, with PALAMA, co-
ordinating the programme and ensuring quality control. Each of the programmes has been 
organised according to themes.   
 
An assessment by the researcher of the roll-out of the aforementioned reveals that it has not 
been massified as envisaged, and the results of participant assessment, whilst requested by 
the researcher have not been provided. This probably indicates a reluctance to make public 
the implementation reality of the M&E training offered by the PALAMA.  
 
In light of the limited penetration that the PALAMA M&E training has had on the actual and 
potential M&E community within government, other training opportunities, such as short 
courses by service providers, courses offered by universities, attendance of seminars and 
conferences would have to be considered as the supply side for M&E capacity building.  
Thus far no assessment has been made of M&E courses offered in South Africa, but 
interviews with four SAMEA Board Members, one current and three former (October 2009, 
                                                 
25
  See the website of the South African Monitoring and Evaluation Association, www.samea.org. 
26
  South African Management Development Institute. 2007. Capacity  Building for Monitoring and Evaluation 
within the South African Government. Republic of South Africa.  
27
  Ibid.  
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Personal Interviews)  suggest that it is being considered seriously within tertiary institutions, 
but the most advanced thus far has been in the course offered by the University of 
Stellenbosch. Data from this institution suggest a growing demand from government 
departments since the course was initiated in 2005. Evidence from the DSD suggests that 
this was well managed in terms of M&E, with staff being offered regular exposure to M&E 
training. In terms of international events, the costs are probably prohibitive and only few, 
high level staff are likely to attend. No study has been done of exposure that M&E staff in 
departments has had of such events. 
 
The other level of exposure to M&E comes from participating in the M&E forum managed by 
the Presidency. However, this event has taken the form of knowledge sharing, largely 
around the work of the Presidency with regards to M&E, and the exposure is limited to 
representatives from central departments. It cannot thus be considered as a capacity 
building initiative.  
 
Finally, exposure to M&E as a discipline probably comes the most from PSC reports. The 
most explicit foray in the field of M&E capacity building must come from the PSC`s work on 
its Basic Concepts in M&E28, which has been distributed to all departments in the country, 
and which at a basic level illustrates how M&E works in the country. In light of the above one 
can surmise that the capacity building initiatives for M&E have been largely informal, and 
exposure to training is not mandatory but comes from the particular priority and value given 
to it from particular departments. The PALAMA initiative for providing M&E training is still in a 
developmental phase, and appears to have petered out since is much publicised launch in 
2007. In light of this background, it would be useful to see what level of exposure managers 
and their subordinates have had of M&E training, as broadly defined above.   
 
It has been shown that apart from M&E needing to be properly institutionalised, staff need to 
be competent in both qualitative and quantitative techniques (Mackay, 2006). The process of 
building capacity is long term, but requires specific interventions, as shown by Boyle and 
Lemaire (1999). This is often overlooked in public sector organisations, which McDonald et 
al (2003) indicate as critical for sustainable and effective M&E systems. Given the 
importance of building M&E capacity, responses were sought from managers on the M&E 
training they and their subordinates received. This provides an indication of the commitment 
given to capacity building in M&E, as well as whether relevant skills are present. For the 
three cohorts it shows what the commitment levels are to providing training.  
                                                 
28
 Public Service Commission. 2008a. Basic Concepts in Monitoring and Evaluation. Republic of South Africa.  
 I.A. Naidoo  |    Chapter 7 262 
 
 
7.9.1 M&E training attended by managers 
 
The first question asked of all three cohorts was whether they had attended any M&E 
training workshop in the past 7 years. This may appear to be quite an extensive historic 
time-line, but given that most of the M&E development has taken place in the country since 
around 2002, as noted in the conceptual part of this study, such a time-line was viewed as 
reasonable. Furthermore, there is no central authority for M&E training in the country.  
However, the PALAMA has claimed this function. 
 
It has not managed to prevent training being sought from other service providers, or imbued 
confidence in government M&E people, to be sought. M&E capacity building may thus be 
viewed as something that takes place when it is sought personally, offered departmentally or 
when there is some invitation to an individual. The state of M&E training provision in the 
country remains underdeveloped, with very few tertiary institutions offering accredited M&E 
training.  
 
The Figure below indicates that at the aggregated level 71% of the respondents attended 
some form of M&E training during this period. The disaggregated results in Figure 6.28(b) 
indicate a somewhat different picture.  
 
Figure 7.28(a):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
From the Figure below, it can be seen that the highest training opportunities were given to 
staff at the DSD, with 85% having received some form of training. At the PSC the 
percentage is 73%, and in the NDSD cohort it is 50%. The results of the DSD were probed 
by specific interviews with managers from the M&E unit29, as well as an assessment of the 
                                                 
29
 Personal interviews were held with managers, and the discussion was recorded in writing, with interviewees 
promised anonymity. The interviews focused on their appraisal of the need for training, 
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Annual Reports, wherein training has to be reported on. The results confirmed that the DSD 
has invested in significant M&E training, as evident from the training schedule provided. 
Most of the M&E training was provided by Dr. Ray Rist, who is acknowledged internationally 
as an M&E training expert.  
 




7.9.2 M&E training attended by subordinates 
 
It was also important to establish what exposure subordinates had to training over the past 7 
years, as this would indicate whether training was only confined to managers or whether 
these opportunities were shared with staff.  
 
Figure 7.29(a):  Distribution of responses as a percentage 
 
 
The Figure above shows that at an aggregate level, 53% of managers did provide training to 
subordinates, 29% did not, and this was not applicable in 18% of the cases. Evidently, the 
training received by managers is significantly higher than what managers offer their 
subordinates. It reflects that training opportunities are concentrated at the management 
level, which may not augur well for developing skills across the organisation.  
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Figure 7.30(a): Whether staff of respondent (subordinated) attended any training workshop in the past 7 




The above Figure disaggregates the results. In the case of the DSD, the greatest exposure 
to training by managers for their subordinates was offered, 69%. There is clearly an intention 
to ensure that staff received appropriate training, and that these opportunities are not 
confined to managers only. The result was probed by interviewing key staff from the M&E 
directorate of the DSD (Personal interview, CD and Director M&E, August 2009), who 
indicated that this was a priority and planned and budgeted for. An assessment of the 
attendance registers, programme and evaluation thereof shows that the DSD has received 
high quality training30, and staff at all levels has been trained in M&E over the past 3 years. 
This is probably the only department in the country which has so purposefully addressed the 
question of building M&E capacity within its institution. This shows leadership support for 
M&E, and probably also reflects an acknowledgement of its value to the good governance of 
the department.   
 
The result from the NDSD cohort is probably reflective of the situation across the country as 
a whole, where only 50% of subordinates received M&E training. It would probably appear 
that low exposure to training by managers probably leads them to being less likely to offer 
training opportunities to their subordinates, as they do not see the benefits. In terms of the 
PSC cohort, it was found that 45% of subordinates received training, against the 73% of 
managers at the institution who received M&E training themselves. Training here has been 
top-heavy, but the data may also reflect more that fact that the PSC as an institution is top-
heavy.  
  
                                                 
30
 Reports on the M&E training offered to the staff of the DSD are publically accessible. The courses are 
certified, are in line with the International Programme for Development Evaluation Training course offered. 
See www.ipdet.com.  
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The overall result shows that apart from the DSD where it has been a priority, and the PSC 
which does M&E work, there is little M&E training offered to most staff in the Public Service.  
The next section looks at the challenges faced in relation to M&E, at the departmental and 
country level.   
 
7.9.3 Challenges in relation to M&E at the departmental level 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate against a set of statements what they saw as the main 
challenges being experienced in M&E at their level. They were also afforded the opportunity 
to list challenges not on the list. All of these were then thematically classified, and the 
responses aggregated for departments in the country as a whole, and then disaggregated 
for the three cohorts.    
 




From the above Table it can be seen that the main challenges listed are that there is 
inadequate human resources capacity in M&E (79.4%), with the related question of the lack 
of training coming in at 62%. This result confirms the earlier assessment that there is limited 
to M&E training in the country, which whilst at the management level was 71%, was 53% for 
subordinates. This result probably also reflects the point made about the relatively late 
entrance to M&E of the country, which has only accelerated in uptake over the past 5 years, 
and the fact that the PALAMA promise of massified M&E training is yet to be realised. 
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The high frequency reflected in the result that the lack of M&E technology being in place 
(76.5%) is a challenge, is an interesting observation. The issue of M&E technology not being 
in place is interesting, and may reflect an understanding that M&E needs a strong 
technological platform, in which case it is probably seen as a “tool”, more that an approach 
and strategy. This result indicates a somewhat limited understanding of what M&E is 
supposed to be, or do, and equates M&E with technology, rather than an embracing 
philosophy that seeks to support management in the pursuit of good governance. Falling in 
the 40% range are issues of the lack of an effective communication strategy for M&E 
(47.1%), the lack of funding/resources for M&E (47.1%) and M&E not being viewed as a 
priority (44.1%). Thus the main issues militating against an effective M&E function are those 
of capacity, resources, and the fact that the importance of M&E is not properly 
communicated, leading to it not being a priority. These results are confirmed by the literature 
which indicates that M&E capacity remains a key factor in determining M&E effectiveness, 
and which is dependent on issues of training and resources (Mackay, 1998).  
 
The discussion now looks at the disaggregated results of the cohorts, to see whether there 
are any significant variations to this pattern across the cohorts.  
 
Figure 7.31(a): Main challenges currently being experienced in relation to M&E in the department (in 
%): Multiple responses: PSC 
 
 
The result of the PSC confirms the generalised picture, but shows a much higher percentage 
of respondents agreeing to the fact that the lack of training and inadequate capacity are the 
main challenges (81.8%), followed by the statement that M&E technology is not in place 
(72.7%). The issue of inappropriate implementation strategies and lack of funding (45.5%), 
followed by the issues of prioritisation and communication (27.3%) were also deemed to be 
important.  
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Figure 7.31(b): Main challenges currently being experienced in relation to M&E in the department (in 
%): Multiple responses: DSD 
 
 
In the case of the DSD the respondents cited inadequate human resource capacity/people 
trained in M&E at 69.2%, with M&E technology given the same rating. This was followed by 
the lack of an effective communication strategy (53.8%) being seen as a major challenge. 
This result is different from the PSC one, in that there is less of an emphasis on the fact that 
training is a challenge, 69.2% as compared to 81.8% for the PSC, and probably reflects that 
fact that the DSD has offered the most M&E training to its staff compared to the other 
cohorts (see result for training above). 
 
Figure 7.31 (c): Main challenges currently being experienced in relation to M&E in the department (in 
%): Multiple responses: NDSD 
 
 
In terms of the NDSD cohort, the top three challenges were the lack of M&E capacity, M&E 
technology not being in place (90%), and the lack of training (60%).  From this group once 
again the capacity question has been identified as a challenge.  
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7.9.4 Challenges being experienced in relation to M&E in South Africa 
 
The questionnaire also sought to establish from respondents what they saw as being the 
main challenges for M&E in relation to the country. This was to establish whether there was 
a similar view held regarding challenges at a country, compared to departmental level.  
 
Figure 7.32: Main challenges currently being experienced in relation to M&E in South Africa generally 
(in %): Multiple responses. 
 
 
The results at an aggregated level indicate capacity as the main issue; in terms of the lack of 
training and inadequate capacity (76.5%), which is a similar result as that offered by 
respondents of challenges for M&E at the departmental level. An interesting difference is 
that the third most cited challenge cited was that M&E is not viewed as a priority followed by 
M&E not being viewed as a priority (70.6%). This indicates that whilst M&E has been 
communicated as being a priority from the Presidency and the PSC, amongst others, it is not 
seen as a priority for the country as a whole. The result may indicate that the development of 
M&E at the country level is recognised as not being taken seriously, probably because there 
has been much M&E activity, largely the body of compliance reports generated from the NT, 
PSC and AG, but with little discernable improvement, from a public perception point of view, 
as confirmed by surveys which indicate a lowered confidence in government31, wherein 
corruption was cited as increasing. Thus, had M&E been the priority that it professes to be, 
there would not be a situation where the quality of governance has not changed adequately, 
as a prioritised M&E should have delivered a more favourable governance result.   
                                                 
31
  Survey conducted by organisations such as Markinor on a range of issues provides these results. See 
http://www.markinor.co.za  
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Figure 7.32(a): Main challenges currently being experienced in relation to M&E in South Africa 
generally (in %): Multiple responses (PSC) 
  
 
The PSC result for priorities cites the lack of training and M&E not being viewed as a priority 
as the foremost challenges for M&E at the country level, followed by information systems 
and strategic issues. The high result on the priority question probably indicates a sense of 
frustration with the implementation realities faced by the PSC, where it has to grapple with its 
recommendations not being implemented, and its results showing inadequate changes in 
performance over time (see PSC State of the Public Service reports, which repeatedly 
highlight the same issues of non-compliance).  
 
Figure 7.32(b): Main challenges currently being experienced in relation to M&E in South Africa 
generally (in %): Multiple responses (DSD) 
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The DSD results also concur that the lack of training is an issue (17.5%), but is more 
focused and sees the identification of agreed on priority areas for M&E as an issue (12.7%), 
placing this issue at the same level of inadequate human resource capacity in M&E.  
 
Figure 7.32(c): Main challenges currently being experienced in relation to M&E in South Africa generally 
(in %): Multiple responses (NDSD) 
 
 
The NDSD cohort indicate M&E not being viewed as a priority and the lack of training as the 
foremost challenges (13.8%), followed by questions of implementation strategies and the 
lack of M&E systems to collect information (10.8%). The question of priority identification and 
inadequate human resource capacity came in at 9.2%.  
 
Thus from the above results the following observations can be made. The question of M&E 
capacity and training remain challenges at both the departmental level, and country level. In 
the case of the country level, there is a view that M&E is not viewed as a priority, and this 
may be symptomatic of the fact that despite vigorous oversight, there is the public perception 
that the quality of governance leaves much to be desired. The result from the PSC reflects 
this situation more strongly, and probably reflects the institution‟s frustrations with not 
achieving the desired outcomes for its oversight work. The priority question is probably also 
indicative of the fact that apart from the periodic political pronouncements that M&E is a key 
priority of government, this is not experienced at a practical level within departments 
themselves. The much publicised GWM&ES was supposed to deliver much, but has not and 
has not been reformulated by the Presidency as the government-wide M&E framework, 
which as yet needs to be effectively communicated to show results at the departmental level. 
There thus remains critical challenges for M&E in South Africa, most of which are rooted in 
the fact there is no common vision for M&E in the country, inadequate training and M&E 
capacity, and the fact that M&E is not as yet seen as a priority.  
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7.9.5 Strategies to improve M&E in the future 
 
In moving forward, respondents were asked to suggest how M&E could be improved in the 
future. Most of the respondents did not provide any responses outside the three suggested 
areas of increasing capacity, improving training and improving reporting. The verbatim 
responses were organised and fell into the following four categories, which indicate what 
should be done to improve M&E effectiveness.  
 
a) Communicating M&E more effectively 
 
Improving the communication around M&E, as it is often viewed as policing, and there is no 
clarity on what compliance brings in terms of improving governance. More needs to be done 
on the part of management to improve this. Also falling within this category were issues of 
the particular need to communicate M&E better, given that it is a new concept. This was 
related to the question of the need for training in M&E to properly cost and measure the 
benefits of projects.  
 
b) Correctly locating the M&E function 
 
There was the view that M&E is often misplaced, and needs to be in a strategic location 
(suggestion, the office of the DG), so that it got the authority to perform its work.  
 
c) Improving information systems 
 
Several responses cited information related issues, such an information technology, better 
reporting mechanisms, and training in data collection and analysis as being necessary to 
improve effectiveness. This was also linked to the question of feedback of results and the 
action expected thereof.  Also listed were issues of coordination and quality control.  
 
d) Providing  training and support  
 
Respondents cited issues of the lack of coordinated training, support and mentorship as 
being key challenges. There was the view that there needed to be M&E frameworks, 
procedures and manuals to ensure that staff knew how to work and what to do. There was a 
view that MME training should be provided.  
 




This chapter set out to provide a perspective on how internal M&E works. It looked at the 
entire area of persuasion, as opposed to compulsion which MME bodies seek to promote. In 
M&E persuading, which was assessed largely in terms of the work of the DSD, the question 
of value adding was addressed, and the assessment was preceded by an overview of the 
decision-making context and architecture of the DSD. It was asserted that the DSD, being a 
government department, has to comply with policies, norms and standards, and the manner 
in which decisions are taken there would be typical of decision-making in other departments.  
Observations were made about how the DSD receives its M&E results from MME bodies, 
such as the PSC. The thesis then argued that management priorities for the DSD are set by 
MME bodies, which influence internal managerial (and M&E) priorities. 
 
The perceptual survey was organised around key themes, drawn from the literature survey 
and the work undertaken on MME. The themes allowed for an exploration of a diverse range 
of issues, such as the experiential base of practitioners, and the manner in which oversight 
institutions are perceived and valued, particularly in terms of how they report. An 
assessment was also made of how managers in the DSD viewed their M&E function, and 
the views of managers within the DSD were also solicited to assess what they saw as 
challenging their effectiveness. This section was considered to be particularly important in 
that M&E effectiveness, or its ability to persuade managers to govern better, is dependent on 
range of issues relating to capacity building, location and priority accorded to the M&E 
function. The results from the survey were presented for the themes noted, and in most 
cases at an aggregated and disaggregated level.  
 
A key finding is that whilst the DSD has performed well when it comes to meeting the 
stipulations of the MME bodies, its internal M&E is not perceived very positively. Its 
managers (M&E unit) see its organisational location at problematic. There is a degree of 
ambiguity regarding the value it adds, and the result probably also indicates the limitations in 
the level of understanding by managers at the DSD of what the M&E function is supposed to 
achieve. Several questions were asked about how M&E was seen, and what value it was 
supposed to yield. It was found that for the important area of learning, the impact was 
minimal. This probably points to the fact that the DSD has pursued an M&E agenda that has 
focused on ensuring compliance or accountability, than generating learning opportunities. 
The DSD does, however, perform well when it comes to the training it has been exposed to, 
which is better than the country average.  
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The chapter ends with asking respondents what they saw as the main M&E challenges, and 
these were predictably the lack of training in M&E. It was also noted that a challenge for 
M&E was that it was not seen as a priority, and this is in a context where there has been 
much M&E activity. However, this result probably indicates that the communication on M&E 
has been weak, and the lack of understanding is indicative of the fact that the massified 
training promised by PALAMA has not as yet been delivered. There could also be a 
frustration that M&E has not brought about the type of changes to the governance of the 
country, as expected, due to the low compliance to a very well-crafted accountability 
framework that is in place. Thus, there is yet a case to be made for the impact that M&E has 

























It has thus far been argued that good governance is an amalgam of many attributes, and it is 
made possible when different types of M&E are applied. This thesis has hinged on the 
proposition that cross-cutting feature in any definition relating to good governance is 
transparency and accountability, which effective M&E can bring about. There would be 
differences in emphasis and methodology for each of the M&E perspective contextualised in 
this thesis, but ultimately M&E should generate performance information, which depending 
on the decision-making infrastructure, should be used to improve performance. This last 
perspective examines how the form of civic oversight contributes to better decision-making, 
when information generated by this sector is used to improve performance and policy. Given 
the high social spending on poverty programmes, these need to and have been evaluated 
(van der Berg, 2006).  
 
In chapter 6, MME bodies were shown to emphasise and drive administrative compliance 
and accountability, which is a necessary part of good governance, as adhering to policies 
which are appropriate from a public policy point of view, is a prerequisite for transparent and 
effective government. However, the conclusion drawn in the chapter indicated that the 
emphasis was inward looking and that policy compliance without also adequately 
recognising the impact of such policies on service delivery had limitations. The main problem 
is that managers can learn how to comply with systems, and obtain favourable scores in 
such systems, but without deeper probity, the results may not be very meaningful. Similarly, 
in chapter 7 on PME it was found that MME bodies exerted a considerable influence on the 
inner workings of departments, but in looking at the intra-departmental reflection and use, 
the impact of internal M&E on improving service delivery, as opposed to compliance, was 
not clearly evident. In addressing the gap between the inward focus of mandatory and PME, 
this perspective looks at a series of assessments of delivery by the DSD, by considering 
research generated by the civic sector, to see what has been produced and how it has 
influenced policy and service delivery. The M&E-good governance relationship would be 
incomplete without considering this critical perspective, which has been affirmed in policy 
documents of government which professes to be citizen-centred. The focus on civics (which 
includes the NGO sector and which is defined more fully later, brings to the fore the voices of 
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beneficiaries. The role of M&E in the social sector is particularly important, as Noyoo and 
Mamphiswana (2003) have argued that practitioners need feedback on the impact of their 
work, and conducting M&E with communities also contributes to transparency and 
accountability, something that did not happen under apartheid. He highlighted that the sector 
faced challenges as it moved towards transition, many of which related to re-establishing a 
new identity. The future of this sector has been a subject of review, given the changed 
scenarios posed by funding, which is now channelled directly to government, rather that the 
NGO sector (Lee and Buntman, 1989).  
 
Despite this qualification, it is necessary to examine what public participation practices have 
been used, what research has been conducted by and with civics, and how this has been 
used to provide probity from the civics of government performance.    A further argument as 
to why CME is important, is that the effectiveness of the developmental State, which claims 
to be pro-poor and interventionist, can only be made when there is empirical evidence of 
people benefitting from government policy. NGOs act as intermediaries and support the link 
in grassroots development (Carroll, 1989). It has also been demonstrated that the non-profit 
sector plays a critical role in supporting development in South Africa (Dangor, 1987). There 
are also strong arguments made as to why civil society, rooted within a democracy, can 
support development (Mamphiswana, 1999). Due to their rootedness, civil society has been 
shown to support development in South Africa1.    
 
The commitment to engage citizens on government performance stems from the ruling party 
commitment to participatory democracy, which is contained in the main policy document of 
the ruling party (ANC, 2007). There has been a translation of this vision into policy, with 
government policy highlighting the role expected of citizens in ensuring that governance is 
transparent and service delivery effective2. Despite being 15 years into democracy, the 
commitment has not translated into a vibrant civil society, which engages regularly and 
productively with government on its performance. This may be due to historic reasons, the 
main being that civil society capacity in the form of a critical citizenry is uneven, due to 
geographic and other reasons. This involves listening to the voices of citizens, amplified 
through civics, and this chapter provides perspectives on what the commentary has been on 
government policy as it relates to the DSD, the key policy instrument being that of social 
grants. The perspective becomes more pertinent given the decrease in public confidence in 
                                                 
1
  Ibid 
2
 The Social Welfare policies contain reference to the importance of citizens in ensuring that policy is 
delivered effectively. Avenues are provided for redress by the department, with citizens encouraged at a 
policy level to be involved in monitoring service delivery. 
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the State since democracy, and the acknowledged breakdown of local government by 
research undertaken by the Government (Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(COGTA, 2009). The matter even warranted attention in the speech of the Minister in the 
Budget Vote address of the relevant Minister (Shiceka, 22 April 2010). This situation points 
to an obvious disjuncture between what is professed in policy and politically and what is 
experienced by citizens, with several calls being made to civil society and M&E sector to 
share their expertise with government to improve the situation (Mgijima, 2009). 
 
Evident from this report and an acknowledgment that there is a crisis in local governance, 
questions need to be asked about why the situation has deteriorated to a crisis point in the 
first place, and what has happened to civil society formations to pre-empt the situation. The 
issue of corruption around the social grants, for example (noted in chapter 6 under the 
discussion on the role of Parliament in improving probity), and the management attention 
given to it (noted in chapter 7), indicates that there remains governance challenges on this 
key policy. Insight into the challenges will come from assessing the work of civics, and 
examining whether this has been filtered into the decision-making of the DSD. .   
 
It should be pointed out that the interaction between the DSD and civil society is not confined 
to the policy formulation or policy appraisal process. There is also the well-known 
registration process which the DSD manages, and questions must be asked about the value 
added by the DSD working on this, and whether it is appropriately located. The chapter also 
looks at DSD-civic engagement, to get a sense of the commitments to implementing 
government policy on the matter, against the backdrop of the ANC manifesto on citizenship. 
The interaction has not been static, as Mamphiswana (2004) has demonstrated, there has 
been a transformation in the relationship since democracy, with the advocacy role being 
often replaced by contractual ones, and which has implications for oversight. In assessing 
the impact of CME, one would get a sense of whether the public participation practices 
(which includes direct engagement between the DSD and citizens) has been effective, in 
that the insights generated at these meetings have been taken seriously and used to 
improve performance.  
 
8.2 CHAPTER ORGANISATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter will discuss citizens within the discourse of good governance, by following the 
logic used in the previous two M&E perspective chapters. The chapter commences with a 
theoretical overview of civics and considers their importance in terms of promoting good 
governance, and its relationship to M&E and accountability. The chapter then looks at 
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specific work undertaken by civics in relation to DSD policy, and examines the related 
question of what the DSD commitment is to civics and how and what the different interaction 
relationships are. The purpose of this is to illustrate that there may be different forms of civic-
government interaction, but the critical question is which of these contributes to enhancing 
service delivery. Infused in the discussion is a historic narrative of how civics have gone 
through transition, and how their roles have changed with a consideration of what this means 
for their ability to conduct oversight and exercise probity.  
 
It should be noted that CME also involves a consideration of public participation practices, 
most of which were found to be government led. The frequency and form of these is another 
avenue through which government receives feedback on its performance, and this does 
point to a commitment to engaging citizens on services that they receive.    
 
This chapter draws on a multitude of sources, including expert interviews, documentary 
reviews, undertakes a meta-evaluation of some of the assessments by civics or where civics 
were consulted, and also looks at evaluations of public participation practices of the DSD. 
Internet searches and interviews with persons working in M&E and the NGOs have also 
been conducted. The assessment is conducted against the backdrop of evidence of large-
scale corruption around the social grants, and debates about its role in bringing about 
economic sustainability.  
 
8.3 THE ROLE OF CIVICS IN PROVIDING OVERSIGHT 
 
Civics help improve the citizen-government interface by bridging the communication and 
capacity gap that exists particularly in poor communities, and their perspective on 
performance is critical as it answers the outcome question, and relates to whether the quality 
of life of citizens improves due to the various forms of oversight. It is a particularly important 
question politically, and the developmental State is ultimately judged not only on the quality 
of regulatory compliance but on whether this leads to improved service delivery and 
improvements in the quality of life.   
 
Globally, it is recognised that citizens must engage in the performance of government, and 
non-profits (defined herein as civics) provide this avenue (Mathison et al, 2008). As a 
category civics includes groupings that are outside of government, and which have the 
space to be critical and advocate for changes based on legitimacy and expertise (Bhorat and 
Kanbur, 2006). Importantly, civics provide legal assistance to marginalised communities and 
are thus able to amplify and direct marginalised voices to decision-makers, thus bridging the 
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gap between disempowered individuals, communities and government (Community Law 
Centre, 2002). This would occur when civics critique policy or challenge government by 
acting on behalf of citizens. This may be related to matters relating to being treated unfairly 
around accessing social grants, which is the main area where civics in the social sector have 
mobilised to support communities. Many cases have been taken up by organisations such 
as the Legal Resources Centre and the Black Sash, to name a few that work in the 
advocacy and support area.   
 
In South Africa, most civics are referred to as NPOs, which includes non-governmental, 
community based, faith based, civil society and public benefit organisations. Most of these 
would fall under the South African Non-Government Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO), an 
umbrella body for civics in the country. For purposes of this assessment, civics would also 
include those research institutions which evaluate social policy, such as the Centre for Civil 
Society Research, the CASE and the International Poverty Centre at the University of 
Western Cape.  
 
The main characteristics of an NPO3 is that they should be voluntary (no laws force them to 
exist), and are independent (they are controlled by the people who have formed them).  
They generally work to improve the lives of people and society, and engage in research and 
innovation, public education, advocacy and lobbying. They operate in a domain where they 
can be critical of government, as they should be sufficiently detached and independent and 
can potentially be a strong oversight force. This is an ideal, however, and the research by 
Mamphiswana shows how the NGO sector changed with transition, and its role in M&E, 
found that whilst they were strong on advocacy, there was little M&E capacity developed, 
and it was not clear what their basis for advocacy was. He goes on to argue that with 
transition, NGOs have in many instances lost their independence, as they undertake work on 
behalf of government and this contractual relationship affects their ability to be objective4.   
 
Civics often work in coalitions, and in terms of engaging government on its performance, 
have been active when it comes to commenting on policies related to social grants. Civics 
have worked with organised labour, the main being the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU, 2002), to make submissions on how to better implement and target these 
grants. Therefore, what is generated from the civics sector has been a thorough critique of 
social policy, reflecting voices from the academic, research, NPO and organised labour 
                                                 
3
  The Nonprofit Organisations Act, 71 of 1997 placed requirements n the sector to register, purportedly to 
make them more efficient and be able to secure funds more easily.  
4
  Personal interview with the author on his doctoral thesis, as it relates to this finding.  
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sectors. As community rooted perspectives, the voice of civics on these matters bears a 
legitimacy and credibility, as the perspectives on performance are outside of government, 
and tend to be more objective. Government evaluations would always be looked upon by 
civil society with a degree of scepticism.  
 
In light of the service delivery crisis faced, the question that must be asked is where the 
civics been, and whether they have been sufficiently active to predict the problems and use 
their positions to direct marginalised voices and engage decision-makers. Many civics claims 
that they have and do raise performance issues, but do not receive adequate recognition by 
government, and thus cannot be held responsible when citizens engage in protest action, 
outside the normal democratic processes. A further contextual factor facing civics, and which 
may have altered their focus is that due to funding constraints, many civics now operate as 
service providers or contractors to government, rather than advocates for the citizens they 
represent. This changed relationship has implications for oversight (DSD, 2009)   
 
8.4 CITIZENS WITHIN THE DISCOURSE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE  
 
In line with the central argument of this thesis that M&E contributes to good governance, it is 
important to reflect on how citizens are considered within international definitions of 
governance. The brief review below, illustrates that citizens are generally not privileged 
within good governance definitions, with the focus being more on what government must do, 
than on what is expected of citizens to achieve sound governance. Whilst it is acknowledged 
that government sets the enabling legislation for good governance and must create the 
space for citizens to exercise their oversight role, the bias of definitions of good governance 
towards government institutions means that citizens can become passive recipients of 
government services. It could lead to a situation where government leads even in the how 
and when citizens can M&E its performance, which means that agendas are also 
predetermined by government.    
 
The OECD (2005: 10) points out that citizens are demanding greater accountability and 
transparency of their governments, and avenues must be opened for this to be expressed. 
The literature indicates that the modalities for such expression may be government initiated, 
which in mature democracies includes on-line and other types of citizen surveys of services5.  
In South Africa the majority of the population do not have the know-how or resources, there 
is more of a reliance on civics to act on their behalf, and protect their rights. In the context of 
                                                 
5
 In the Canadian and British Public Services, citizens‟ report cards are used to solicit feedback on how services 
are perceived.  
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the DSD, where most of the beneficiaries are poor and marginalised, civics are expected to 
act decisively to support citizens.   
 
In the World Bank definition of governance by Kaufmann et al (1999), civic issues appear in 
only one of its 6 dimensions, that being “voice and accountability, which includes civil 
liberties and political stability”. It is not a stand-alone indicator, but correctly recognises the 
importance of the enabling environment in helping citizens prosper. Weiss (2000) in defining 
governance mentions the issue of citizens in the context of responsive-government, which 
suggests that there must be a close interface between citizens and government, and which 
in turn requires effective public participation mechanisms. The responsiveness question is 
relevant to South Africa, as the main critique levelled against government has been slow 
service delivery, and an inability of citizens to access decision-makers when they face 
problems6.     
 
The NEPAD seeks better governance, and has mentioned the role of citizens, but indirectly 
with it according the role of accountability to the political structures, such as Parliament. This 
assumes of course, that Parliament is able to effectively exercise its accountability role as 
the representative of citizens. In chapter 6, a critique was provided of how the South African 
Parliament has worked, and where it was shown that whilst there was voice, in that results 
were made public, this was not followed by accountability or responsiveness.7    
 
Having considered how some of the international definitions of good governance view 
citizens the discussion now focuses on what this means for M&E, and how it relates to 
questions of accountability and utility.    
 
8.5 CIVICS AND M&E 
 
Consistent with the perspective approach of this thesis, the concept of civics is expanded 
upon. The terms below have been derived from the researcher`s engagement with the 
sector and the literature relating to its operations. CME relates to concepts and terms 
associated with:   
 
 
                                                 
6
  The President of the country has repeatedly instructed public officials to timeously attend to complaints, 
before they escalate to crisis proportions.  Many civics criticise government for failing to respond to matters 
brought to their attention.  
7
  Voice and accountability and responsive-government are part of the NEPAD definition of good governance. 
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Individual and social empowerment, democratic expression, social activism, media 
freedom, critical engagement, political expression, political oversight, service 
delivery, client/citizen satisfaction surveys, empowering, grassroots, activist, 
engaging, critical, anti-establishment, freedom protecting, rights protecting, 
mobilising, holding to account, supporting the marginalised, talking truth to power, 
preventing abuse, highlighting corruption, advocacy, mobilising, relevance seeking, 
rights instituting.  
 
Constructed from literature and researcher observations.  
 
As the language suggests, this is different from the connotations for the other M&E 
perspectives, which largely resonated with the language of accountability and 
managerialism. In such cases the focus is on objective criteria, standards and the practice 
largely driven by compliance imperatives, either to internal or external bodies. CME 
examines performance from the lens of citizens, with the M&E imperative focusing on the 
social outcomes and impact of the work of the government. Civics should advance the goals 
of the developmental State by providing credible M&E which informs and compels key 
decision-makers to act. There have been studies which suggest that NGOs are well placed 
to promote participatory M&E, which this study has argued when looking at the different 
types of M&E, is empowering (Booth et al, 1998). Clearly, there is strong intermediary role 
played by civics, and this has been recognised in terms of policy. The objective information 
often used by civics in their oversight should get “converted by civics” into political outputs 
that advocate for change and which ought to at both the theoretical and practical level, bring 
about accountability. The connotations are enjoined by the issue of social change, as it 
relates to issues of human rights, voice, accountability and empowerment.    
 
There are considerations when using civics to hold government to account, and these relate 
to the question of purpose and methods. Given that the intent of CME is about effecting 
social change, this political purpose aligns with the arguments made by House (2004), who 
sees M&E as needing to serve a primary purpose. This is apart from M&E also contributing 
to democracy, as already mentioned. There is thus a strong political dimension when 
citizens get involved in commenting on government performance, and this is reflected in 
political-citizen forums such as Izimbizos8, where elected representatives engage directly 
with citizens. The tools that are used to capture citizen perspectives on performance would 
include citizen satisfaction surveys, inspections and site visits, and in general methods that 
                                                 
8
  Meaning meetings with communities.  
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are citizen friendly and participative. The subjective views of citizens, considered as lived 
experiences, will constitute the truth about service delivery, and in this sense qualitative 
methodologies would apply. Constructivist techniques, whereby case studies and narratives 
are used, would be applicable, as the lived experiences of citizens would be considered the 
truth.  
 
In looking at civics, it was found that whilst their advocacy role was established, due to the 
transitional pressures since democracy many now operate as service providers to 
government. This means that their ability to be critical may be reduced. This is consistent 
with what was found by Mamphiswana who traced how the roles changed over time. He 
found that in the pre-1994 period, there was no formal M&E practice, but NGOs needed to 
demonstrate this commitment post-1994, when they had to demonstrate their effectiveness, 
as a part of securing funding. The focus tended to be on questions of efficiency, 
effectiveness an optimal use of resources, unlike the pre-1994 period where it was on the 
quality of services. In his review of M&E within the NGO sector, he shows that there were 
active attempts to institutionalise M&E within the sector, and attempts to own the process, as 
there were often negative perceptions about M&E which was perceived as being externally 
driven. M&E also helped the NGOs to be transparent and accountable, not only to funding 
sources, but the communities they served. 
 
The M&E approaches used by civics would not favour an imposition of performance 
standards by experts, but rather prefer an engagement with citizens which allows them to 
determine what the drivers of citizens satisfaction are, before these are used for 
assessments9. There would be what is termed bottom-up approaches, which are particularly 
favoured in South Africa, given the rejection of the approach of imposition followed by the 
apartheid government. The empowerment methods offered by Fetterman (1996) would be 
important, but the context needs to be considered as these techniques are time consuming 
and costly, and can lead to disillusionment, as Vestman and Conner (2006) argue, when 
they state that evaluation can only empower if used expeditiously and alters the manner in 
which citizens engage with government. This means that tools are as good as the political 
drivers for such engagement, and one needs to also consider the capacity of communities 
themselves to engage in such evaluative processes, which can be time consuming and 
                                                 
9
 Interviews were conducted with two senior managers from the PSC whose research responsibility is to 
monitor and evaluate the extent to which citizen experience service delivery. These interviewees have sound 
experience in methodologies that assess citizen satisfaction. Interviews conducted: 14 February 2010.    
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demanding10. The PSC has produced a toolkit on public participation, which it offered to 
departments to use, but in the last 5 years there has been minimal uptake. This probably 
reflects recognition by government of how difficult this form of engagement is, and a 
preference to steer away from these engagements. It has been suggested by opposition 
political parties, organised labour and the NGO sector and research institutes that that there 
has been a more fundamental disconnect between citizens and government, which probably 
explains the breakdown of local government and the service delivery protests11.  
 
It is thus not surprising that the researcher found very few instances of civics using M&E to 
hold government to account, in the manner in which they engage on a sustained basis with 
communities, and use these results to effect change. Civics were more active when it came 
to forming coalitions to take policy forward, or in conducting issue based research, a point 
confirmed by Mamphiswana‟s (2004) study of the NGO transition in South Africa.      
 
8.6 CIVICS WITHIN THE M&E ACCOUNTABILITY CHAIN 
 
Civics are a part of the accountability chain, in so far as they have the space to articulate 
concerns to key decision-makers, bureaucratically and politically. In terms of the former, 
there is generally a stakeholder engagement strategy which departments have developed to 
allow for feedback in the course of its work. Civics, due to their ability to work in coalitions, 
and their location within political formations, also have the space to directly engage 
politicians on government performance. The main outputs of civics in terms of promoting 
good governance are: 
 
a) Highlighting corruption, which they escalate either as organisations or coalitions to 
oversight bodies 
b) Serving as the voice for the poor and marginalised 
c) Highlighting poor performance directly with the media 
d) Engaging in issue-based research and making policy submissions 
e) Supporting marginalised communities and individuals to access rights, such as 
grants 
f) Documenting evidence of performance within communities, based on their proximity 
to citizens themselves 
                                                 
10
 The PSC has recognised the labour intensive nature of conducting such reviews, which often lead to 
disillusionment as change does not follow investigation.  
11
  This may be gleaned from the media, Parliamentary questions around service delivery, and observations 
made by organised labour and the NGO sector.  
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g) Using Parliamentary, public-submission processes, to make inputs 
 
From the above, it can be seen that civics are able to exert influence, and are able to act in 
many diverse ways to achieve their outcomes. A key role would be around research, which 
is where they contribute to research, commission research, or use research findings to 
advocate policy change. NGOs, CBOs and organised labour were particularly active in the 
process of reviewing the social grants of the DSD, such as the Basic Income Grant (BIG) 
and the Child Support Grant (CSG). Their inputs improved implementation and led to policy 
reviews.   
 
Of importance, given the location of civics, is that poor service delivery can also be engaged 
with through the parliamentary and other democratic processes, including engaging with the 
media, to exert pressure on the political leadership to account for poor service delivery. They 
may do so through their coalition networks, such as the SANGOCO, by individually 
presenting experiences at public forums, as was done during the 2nd Biennial SAMEA 
Conference and by participating in commissioned research. Other opportunities for getting 
their voice heard include using political parties to raise issues in Parliament and engaging 
with the media. SANGOCO emerged in 1995 to coordinate NGO input into government 
policy and ensure that the rich traditions of civil society, forged in the resistance to apartheid, 
continue to serve the people of South Africa. SANGOCO is the largest single umbrella body 
of NGOs in the Southern African region, and considers all issues relating to South Africa's 
development. Recent developments suggest that it is not as effective as it should be due in 
part to the funding crisis and capacity constraints.  
 
The Figure below describes Parliament at the apex of the accountability chain, and depicts 
some of the political/administrative interface that drives the accountability framework. In a 
constitutional democracy one could reasonably assume that an effective Parliament, whilst 
operating largely as an organ of State, also provides an opportunity for ordinary citizens to 
be able to raise issues (through, for example, making policy and other submissions). Some 
NGOs in South Africa have used this process very effectively, such as the Black Sash and 
Legal Resources Centre. Some of the public participation processes used by Parliament to 
give notion to the “People`s Parliament”, are public hearings and submissions and 
“Parliament meets the people” processes. Civics often prepare the submissions that are 









Figure 8.1: Civics within the Accountability Structure of Parliament   
  
 
Parliament is a key point in the accountability chain, and that it uses multiple sources of 
information to exercise its oversight. In an effective Parliament one would also expect a form 
of CME, where citizens can also make submissions on how they receive services, and which 
should be a critical consideration of government. Administratively, the Ministry also deals 
with the media and complaints from the public, and in general manages the 
public/departmental interface.12  The media13 has demonstrated vigilance over the DSD and 
often amplifies issues raised in Parliament, which it feeds into the public space and helps 
highlight performance issues.   
 
The citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of services, and when they are dissatisfied with 
                                                 
12
  An assessment of the Organogram and budget of the DSD indicates that the Ministry is well-located and 
resourced to address its political obligations. The media function also works closely with the Ministry.  
13
 The media has remained critical of government, and most of the headlines relate to government 
maladministration.  
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the services that they receive, they often complain to civics, which in turn use the space 
afforded to them to seek answers. However, as mentioned many NPOs currently do not 
serve as monitors of government; they are contracted to the DSD to deliver services, and 
whilst they possess the intimate knowledge of communities, it is not evident that they 
engage in M&E for empowerment purposes. Therefore, whilst there are commitments to 
public participation, assessments of the extent to which this takes place indicate that it is 
uneven, but generally limited (Engagement with M&E officers at the DSD training, 13 
November 2009). 
 
The Table below expands upon the discussion by elaborating upon the processes and 
products from civics, and makes a brief introductory comment on the modalities used for 
holding the DSD to account. A summary of the civics is presented below which amplifies the 
processes and products and modalities for holding the DSD to account.  
 
Table 8.1: Advancement by civics of good governance  
 








Civics use parliamentary 




Through the public hearings 
processes civics make inputs, 
which must be considered by 
multi-party committees. The 
perspectives of civics helps to 
validate other observations 
made by such committees when 
they engage with information 
from mandatory oversight 
bodies. 
 
Insights from civics enter the 
public domain through 
parliamentary processes, and 
this focuses attention on 
problematic performance areas, 




coalitions, not contracted 
 
Formal recognition of the sector 
by the DSD, briefings on 
progress and obligation by the 
DSD to consult with sector on 
policy development.  
 
Regular meetings with sector 
representatives and Ministry 
and department. 
 
Not for profit sector, 
contracted to DSD (NPOs) 
 
 
Required to be registered as 
NPOs, but many may also 
contract to the DSD as service 
providers. 
 
Ability to be critical of DSD by 
using channels of engagement. 
 
 
Having sketched how civics contribute to M&E and good governance, it is necessary to 
describe the relationship between the developmental State and civics, before examining the 
research outputs of civics.  
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8.7 THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND CIVICS 
 
The ability of civics to be effective is dependent upon the policy environment, resources 
available for oversight and political will. South Africa, as a Constitutional democracy, has 
entrenched several rights around transparency and accountability, with the 9 Constitutional 
Values and Principles for public administration and the Batho Pele principles providing the 
normative benchmark for performance, as previously discussed. The developmental State 
requires feedback from civics, which are best placed to comment on service delivery, in 
order to better manage government. This means that civics must be taken seriously, as they 
represent critical views of the poor and marginalised citizens which government purports to 
be serious about. In practice, it means that civics should be able to act independently, by 
having resources at their disposal to produce research and engage in oversight, and their 
views on policy and performance matters must be taken seriously by the developmental 
State.    
 
A part of the developmental State is having and using oversight structures effectively and 
this includes Parliament. This thesis has commented on the effectiveness of Parliament in 
terms of how it reacts to performance information. A further question would be to consider 
how civics have used the space afforded to them, either through parliamentary or extra-
parliamentary processes, to perform M&E of government programmes. This chapter will look 
at how policy issues under the purview of the DSD have been considered by civics, and 
assess whether their role in such assessment has been significant enough to contribute to 
better governance.   
 
The ANC in its strategy and tactics document14 clearly outlines the role expected of citizens, 
either individually or represented. In drawing on the character of the national democratic 
revolution it emphasis issues of human rights, and calls for government to continually involve 
people in policy formulation and implementation. It states that as part of democratisation and 
governance, it shall strengthen relations between government and civil society, including 
non-government and community-based organisations, and promote their role in the process 
of transformation. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on meeting social needs. There is a 
commitment to being people-centred, people-driven and gender-sensitive, which is based on 
five pillars, two of which relate to citizens again; namely to “to lead people in the tasks of 
social transformation” and “deepen democracy and culture of human rights and mobilise 
people to take an active part in changing their lives for the better”.  
                                                 
14
  African National Congress. 2007. Strategy and tactics of the ANC, Building a national democratic Society. 
As adopted by the 52
nd
 National Conference of the ANC, 16-20 December 2007, Polokwane, Limpopo 
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The commitment to being people-centred was echoed in 2007, at the Polokwane 
conference15, where building a national democratic society was again emphasised. A 
document was adopted which critically reviewed advancements and challenges, and which 
pointed out to issues of weakness in the State machinery in delivering services. There is a 
strong political mandate and direction that there needs to be greater citizen involvement, to 
hold government to account. The developmental State, in this context as the enactor of 
political direction, has put in place policies and mechanisms to give effect to this 
commitment, and which will be assessed based on evidence considered in this thesis.  
 
The developmental State professes to be pro-poor and interventionist (Salojee, 2007; Levin, 
2004b) when it talks about being citizen-centric, it assumes that there is the quality of public 
participation to ensure that there is good governance. The Constitutional values for good 
governance cite public participation as being an element of good governance. All this points 
to the political commitment mentioned above, being taken forward into policy. However, 
whilst there have been many pronouncements to the effect that citizens will be involved in 
matters of government, with even mechanisms being put in place to support these practices, 
evidence from oversight bodies and civics themselves shows that this is often not the case.  
 
The Annual State of the Public Service reports by the PSC have lamented the lack of 
implementation of citizen forums,16 all of which point to a Public Service that has not 
genuinely engaged its citizens, and which may account for the effect of public interest and a 
breakdown, in particular of local government. Public participation practices have been 
limited.17 Questions are now asked about why the democratic intent of participatory 
government has not been met, and even more serious questions are asked about whether 
the accountability system is in fact working. This problem has been candidly recognised by 
the Minister for Performance Monitoring, when he stated that “the problems have been 
diagnosed, yet there has not been a follow-through in solutions.  Something is wrong with 
the system of accountability” (Chabane, 2009: 3).  When a statement such as this is made 
by a person holding such office, it is a serious indictment of how M&E is viewed, and 
questions have been asked about the efficacy of oversight over the past 15 years.  
 
Sentiments have also been expressed in public platforms, such as at the 2nd Biennial 
SAMEA Conference held in August 2009, where the Chairperson of the PSC called upon 
                                                 
15
  Ibid.  
16
  Public Service Commission. 2005. Citizen`s Forum Toolkit. Republic of South Africa.  
17
  Public Service Commission. 2008i. Assessment of Public participation Practice in the Public Service. 
Republic of South Africa.  
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civil society to assist by helping to get results used.  The lack of public engagement 
translates into poor performance across many sectors18. Had there been more active civics, 
ensuring that accountability considerations are at all times heeded, the publically 
acknowledged crisis in terms of corruption, insecurity and inefficiency and joblessness would 
probably not have occurred. It therefore follows that examining civics in terms of what they 
can and have done is an essential part of understanding the CME-good governance link.  
 
Bringing citizens through civics back into the centre of government has probably come about 
more due to the crisis faced by government, than a genuine effort to create a citizen-centric 
government. A feature of the new administration has been a heightened approach towards 
engaging citizens in helping government achieve its aims and objectives. This has been 
most pronounced in the attention given to local government19, where it has been recognised 
that at the critical citizen-service delivery interface serious challenges exist, and which have 
rendered promises of better service delivery void. The commitment to a more direct 
engagement with citizens can also be seen with, amongst others, the installation of a 
Presidential Hotline, the direct intervention by national government in dysfunctional 
municipalities, and a general prioritisation of local government, and by implication citizen-
centric approaches. Several assessments by the PSC, the HSRC and the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa have found that the past decade has been a period of intense 
planning and policy activity, with inadequate translation into implementation capacity. There 
has been very little consultation with communities themselves.20 The service delivery 
protests that have characterised the last two years, coupled with reports of rampant 
corruption which have directly affected service delivery, has probably informed the new 
administration approach of wanting to engage more vigorously with citizens.  
 
Questions must be asked about what happened to the vibrant role played by the civics, 
mainly NPOs, in the early days of democracy. During this period civics were active in the 
policy formulation process, mainly around the Green and White paper engagements. There 
was consultation, but it appears that in terms of Batho Pele this is uneven and even appears 
to have dissipated21. There is currently a weak capacity by citizens or civics to engage on 
performance results. The revised roles played by NPOs, many of whom now act as 
                                                 
18
 Presidency. 2010b. Measurable Performance and Accountable delivery. Developing the MTSF into 
outcomes with measurable outputs and optimal delivery. 7 January. Republic of South Africa. 
19
 The department of Local Government has been restructured, and the new Minster has taken an approach 
which involves intense citizen participation. 
20
  Public Service Commission. 2007c. Report on the Evaluation of the Implementation of the Batho Pele 
Principles of Consultation. Republic of South Africa.  
21
  Public Service Commission. 2008f. Report on the Implementation of the Batho Pele Principle of Openness 
and Transparency in the Public Service. Republic of South Africa.  
 I. A. Naidoo:    |   Chapter 8 290 
 
contractors to government, as opposed to M&E the performance of government and acting 
exclusively in the interest of citizens, may not be in the interest of service delivery. Most 
communities, without the support of civics, would not be in a position to critically engage with 
government when their rights are not being realised.  
 
This section has examined the precedents for citizen engagement, by looking at the source 
of this commitment, which is the ANC Strategy and Tactics document. It has gone on to 
describe how this has been taken into the developmental State as a policy, and reflected on 
assessments which indicate that public participation in general has been weak. The next 
section explores why this is the case, by looking at how civics engage within the 
accountability chain.  
 
8.8 THE RESEARCH AGENDA OF CIVICS AND CONSIDERATION OF ITS UTILITY  
 
This section examines the research agenda of civics as it relates to the policies and 
performance of the DSD. It is an important body of reflection, and significant in that most of 
the research has involved civics, either in leading the studies or contributing to the 
assessment. As noted, the term includes those research institutions which also undertake 
social research meant to inform social policy. As this is a pivotal point of engagement, it is 
the first of the three relationships discussed, the others being around the registration process 
between the DSD and civics, and engagement through public participation practices.  
 
The main output of civics to social policy comes from their participation in research, when 
they participate in, commission or use research findings. It was found that civics mobilise 
with partners on issues, and this has been apparent around the debates on grants; that 
being the BIG and CSG. By looking at a selection of studies on these areas, it is clear that 
civics have been active, by commenting on policy and its implementation.  
 
In reviewing selected studies, of which there are over 300, it was found that the research 
processes were generally participatory when the research was undertaken by an NGO. An 
assessment of the methodologies used in the studies, reflect that the research questions 
were located within the existing debates on poverty alleviation, and in many cases drew on 
oversight work of other organisations. Given that any assessment of poverty must comment 
on impact, both quantitative and qualitative techniques were used. The studies used case 
studies, focus groups, household surveys; all of which generated views from actual 
beneficiaries on what they thought of the policy, and where they saw its challenges. The 
research processes can be considered as empowering and participatory, and it helps 
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communities to reflect on their own experiences, and does become an opportunity for 
reflection on the benefits accrued from government policy. The research reports, whilst 
containing findings and making recommendations, is not an end in itself, but a means by 
which critical engagement with stakeholders takes place. This can be seen in the effort put 
into debating the terms of reference for the studies, the use of reference groups to comment 
on the research progress, and the use of locally based fieldworkers, who speak local 
languages, in the studies. Whilst the studies were not individually assessed in terms of its 
merit with regards to methodology, it can be gleaned that there was a strong participatory 
aspect to the research, with an emphasis on qualitative techniques. The case studies and 
anecdotal information produced by the studies reflects a grounded perspective of how 
citizens view services, brought to the fore by socially relevant research as in the case of 
social grants.  
 
Coalitions that have formed around social grants include labour movements, faith based 
organisations (South African Council for Churches, South African Catholics Bishops 
Conference, Diakonia Churches of South Africa), organisations with an interest in human 
rights (Black Sash, Community Law Centre of the University of Western Cape, National 
Association of Democratic Lawyers, Human Rights Research and Advocacy Project), 
research-based organisations, such as Co-operative for Research and Education, 
Foundation for Contemporary Research, South Africa, New Economics Evaluation, 
Community Law Centre, and civil society in general (SANGOCO).  An important player in the 
coalitions is the Black Sash, which is one of the oldest human rights organisations in South 
Africa, and has a long history of assisting people with social grants. It has used its expertise 
to fight on behalf of citizens who feel that they have been denied the benefits, due to 
corruption or the incorrect application of the means tests. It has called for a universal, non-
means-tested grant, based on its knowledge of what is happening on the ground (Black 
Sash, 2002).   
 
Research into social grants is very much pivotal to whether the developmental State, 
through the policy instrument of cash transfers, has been interventionist and pro-poor, and 
helped to redress inequality. There has been much analysis of the impact of social grants, 
with the subject of cash transfers being related to broader development questions, such as 
the dependencies created, contribution of grants to poverty alleviation, and its sustainability. 
Indeed, the sustainability of paying out grants of the magnitude which the DSD does, at 70 
billion Rands a year, has been reflected on by the former Finance Minister in his budget 
speeches in 2007 and 2008, and commented on in the PSC Poverty Dialogues held in 2007, 
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2008 and 200922. The social grant system has also been the target of fraud and corruption, 
with over 2,000 officials found guilty of assisting in fraud. Clearly, there is a need for social 
grants to be properly administered, and research on it contributes to its good governance.  
 
Specific studies and their consideration 
 
Several studies have been commissioned on the implementation of the child support grant. 
Examples are studies undertaken by Goldblatt and Hall (2006), who have studied how the 
grant is implemented in four provinces, and looked at its relation to service delivery.  
Budlender and Woolard (2006) have examined the grant in relation to schooling and work. 
The child support grant and social security grants have been assessed in relation to 
questions of poverty alleviation (Bharat, 1995). It has also been reviewed on the extent to 
which it has contributed to social policy (Lund, 2008). A central question also addressed has 
been the relation between economic growth, poverty and inequality (Bhorat and van der 
Westhuizen, 2008). Other studies that have examined the application and impact of the 
grants are those by Makino (2004), who looked at how the grant has assisted in post-
apartheid South Africa. Samson, et al (2004) provided an assessment of the overall impact 
of the grant on the development of the country. There have also been studies which look at 
how social grants is an example of addressing inequality and promoting inclusive 
development (Samson et al, 2005) address this aspect as a policy promoting inclusive 
development. As can been seen, much research has been conducted on the subject of 
social grants, and interviews with DSD personnel, past and present, indicate that it has been 
used to review policy. 
 
A study on the uses, implementation and obstacles of the CSG was compiled and produced 
for the DSD23, the SASSA and the United Nations Children`s Fund (UNICEF) by the CASE, 
an NGO which undertakes socially relevant research. The research was externally funded, 
and produced at a time when the CSG came under review, largely due to the impact of 
HIV/AIDS and the effect this has had on increasing the number of child-headed households.  
 
                                                 
22
 The Poverty Dialogues held by the PSC have brought together civics in the country to review the poverty 
alleviation programme, and participants at each of the dialogues have debated the viability and impact of the 
social grants.  
23
 Department of Social Development. 2008c. Review of the Child Support Grant, Uses, Implementation and 
Obstacles. Produced for the Department of Social Development, the South African Social security Agency 
(SASSA) and the United nations Children`s Fund (UNICEF) by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry 
(CASE), March 2008. Republic of South Africa. 
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The CSG is the State`s largest social assistance programme, in terms of the number of 
beneficiaries reached, with the primary objective to ensure that caregivers receive financial 
assistance in the form of a cash transfer to supplement, rather than replace household 
income. The study sought to look at the use of the grant within low-income areas, the 
recipient‟s experience of the application process and payment system, and the operational 
barriers that impact on the access to the grant. As an evaluation, the study provides an 
externally generated, and community based perspective on how the grant is received. A 
study of this nature is important for the good governance of the DSD, as it promotes 
transparency and accountability, and also forms the basis for organisational learning. The 
utility of this M&E study shows that M&E by civics does contribute towards good 
governance.  
 
The study was important in that it brought in different views of persons involved in, or 
impacted upon by the grant, from SASSA officials to stakeholders, as well as recipients and 
non-recipients of the grant. It generated new demographic household data which was useful 
for planning purposes. The processes for generating data were valid, with due consideration 
of research techniques. An attempt was made to capture the lived experiences of 
beneficiaries, with a national household survey consisting of 2,675 respondents. A clearly 
thought out and legitimate process was used to implement the survey instrument. Local 
fieldworkers were recruited from the national database of CASE, and language and 
geographic considerations were taken into account in the sampling.  
 
The study showed that the grant has had a positive impact on the lives of children in poor 
households in South Africa, and that it has helped in improving the nutritional status of 
children, with the related effect on educational attainment. The evaluation thus indicated that 
the intervention of the grant had a developmental outcome. The grant positively impacted on 
economic well-being, and addressed racially-based poverty. This is important information for 
addressing the stipulations of the MDGs, and contributes to the developmental State being 
able to reflect on its effectiveness based on evidence. In terms of seeking relevance, the 
study raised the issue of the extension of the age limit and the targeting mechanism, that is, 
the means test. It was found that due to geographic circumstances, many potentially eligible 
caregivers did not access the grant, which impacted of the effect of the grant. Due to 
poverty, the grant accounted for 40% of household income, and was a major source of 
income. In terms of accessing the grant, it was found that the process of obtaining 
documentation was a challenge, especially identity documents. Furthermore, the time and 
cost involved in travelling to apply for the grants was a problem. The problem of non-
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biological parents accessing the grants was also a problem, and this study generated an 
important assessment on policy implementation.  
  
The study has recommended a review of the application process, to make it simpler. This 
has included improving coordination, and ensuring that there are one-stop shops. Studies 
undertaken by the PSC, and interviews with officials at the DSD indicates that many of the 
recommendations of this study have been implemented, the main being that the eligibility 
age has been increased on a phased in basis (as announced by the Minister of Finance in 
the 2010 Budget Address). The use of mobiles has increased access to grants, and 
decreased processing times, and the use of bio-identification techniques has reduced fraud. 
 
This study, probably because it was commissioned for the DSD, which participated actively 
on the steering group with the SASSA, has generated a sound understanding of how the 
CSG, and identified challenges which have been addressed. It is a clear case of where a 
civic, working with the department on a social relevant project, can generate new 
demographic and planning data, and a set of recommendations that impacts on policy and 
improves service delivery. This is an example of where a civic has contributed to good 
governance.  
 
A study was undertaken through the Centre for Civil Society (Makino, 2004) which analysed 
the social security system in South Africa, and which looked specifically at the influences 
from organised labour and civil society, that have shaped this policy. It indicates the extent of 
collaboration between different role players in the country on a social policy, and the study 
reflects that inputs from organised labour and other civil society coalitions are taken 
seriously by government. The report draws on several research reports by civics on the 
subject, which indicates the extent to which social grants is a major policy issue, with its 
implementation monitored and its impact constantly being evaluated. The description of the 
processes by which civics work on coalitions to drive a policy position, indicate the 
importance of this policy to the overall question of how to promote development and alleviate 
poverty.  
 
The study is interesting in that it demonstrates when and how role players converge on an 
issue. This included the NEDLAC and COSATU, and the research also brought in critical 
views from Parliament. The BIG Coalition is a loose coalition of various civil society 
organisations that call for the introduction of a BIG, and has included civil society 
organisations in general, with COSATU being the leader in the coalition. Pressure to have 
the BIG introduced came from COSATU, the South African Communist Party and the 
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SANGOCO. It included inputs from the Treatment Action Campaign and the Black Sash. The 
main recommendation made in 2001 was that the age of the CSG be increased to 18 years. 
The study revealed how coalitions forced government to change its policy, especially around 
the eligibility of the grant. Another instance cited of where an NGO actively supports the 
marginalised, is the Black Sash, which has offered people legal advice, with nearly half of its 
cases dealing with social grants (Black Sash, 2002). It has developed solid proposals 
regarding the administration of social grants.   
 
The work done by these coalitions has been taken seriously, evident by the statement by the 
Minister of Social Development who voiced support for the principle of a universal income 
grant to ease poverty, although he questioned whether there were resources to implement it. 
This sentiment indicates that the then Minister considered the views on the matter by civics.  
 
This research is relevant in that it shows the social compacts and influences that this has on 
improving governance. The study looked at the role of social security in the context of the 
poverty alleviation programme of government. It acknowledges the contribution of the 
different grants to reducing levels of inter-racial inequality, and traced the growth in the grant 
from 2001, describes how it has targeted different groups, and what it effect has been on 
alleviating poverty. The paper focuses on the debates on the BIG, and describes this grant in 
the international context and what the main issues of debate have been in terms of social 
assistance in post-apartheid South Africa. The programme is assessed in terms of the 
reconstruction and development programme, and a detailed chronology of events around the 
White Paper for Social Welfare is described.  
 
The study showed that inputs from organised labour, in the form of COSATU, was taken 
seriously, with the critique by COSATU of the Draft White Paper in 1996, leading to   
COSATU being successful in having the State`s obligation made more explicit. In reviewing 
the White paper in 1995 COSATU criticised it for not stating what government would do, and 
due to its input, paragraphs were added to the White Paper in 1997. It was COSATU that 
thereafter set up research, based on the fact that 13,8 million people in the poorest 40% of 
communities did not have access to any form of assistance, as they did not qualify for any 
form of grant, as they did not have access to any member qualifying for unemployment 
insurance or social grants. The BIG was thus made in terms of the Presidential Job summit. 
In relation to the DSD, civics were involved in the People`s Budget Campaign, and 
supported the BIG. This came from mainline Christian organisations and the Black Sash, 
and pressure also came from the COSATU (2002) as well as the SANGOCO (1998). The 
research shows that there were coalitions formed to drive the BIG, with civics being central 
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to this. The policy did change due to inputs from civics, and this indicates that the work of 
civics on grants, and their oversight did have the effect of being used. The research 
generated by civics such as the Centre for Civil Society also contributed to the knowledge 
base on the poor, as new demographic data was generated, which is necessary for planning 
purposes. The inputs by civics helped to reconceptualise what was meant by income, with 
the DSD using a means test that focused on personal income, as opposed to household 
income. Furthermore, the study helped to explain what was meant by the term household, 
which in the context of caregivers, is different from the traditional definitions. This has helped 
in evidence based policy-making. The recommendation by civics that the grant be extended 
to 18 years has been implemented on a phased basis. This recommendation comes from an 
appreciation of poverty conditions, and a need to address the problem in a practical manner.  
 
A study was commissioned by the DSD to look at the uses of the CSG, as well as its 
implementation and obstacles (Delany, et al, 2008). It was a joint undertaking between the 
DSD, SASSA and UNICEF, led by CASE. This is an example of a partnership around 
research, which sought to provide new information for policy-making. Another aspect that 
has been monitored, which have social consequences, has been that of the socio-economic 
rights of children in South Africa (Streak and Coetzee, 2004). 
 
A study by Williams (2007) also looked at the social and economic impacts of South Africa`s 
CSG, and found that the grant had a positive effect on living standards. The generation of 
this research was informed by the Black Sash, which would have brought in key insights 
from communities. There have also been studies on the use and effectiveness of social 
grants in South Africa (Nevas et al, 2009). The study looked at the effectiveness of social 
grants in South Africa, and how recipients use their grants. This was undertaken by the 
Economic Policy Research Unit and the Programme for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, 
and used qualitative inquiry built on a number of urban and rural case studies, which looked 
at the larger context of decision-making. The study reviewed the effects of the grant, and 
focused on case transfers to the elderly, children and the disabled. It then looked at the 
effect of the grant, and looked at its use, and finally examined the policy implications of the 
findings. Further reviews on the impact of the Child Support Grant were done by Budlender 
and Woolard (2006), where the relation of the grant to schooling and work was examined.  
 
The key policy implications were than the grant was economically and socially empowering, 
with a recommendation that it be scaled up to increase eligibility. The study makes 
recommendations on how to increase the coverage, and make it more accessible, which is 
an implementation problem. This study showed that social grants have had a positive effect 
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on livelihoods and development in South Africa. However, when research comes from 
outside the civil society formations, such as research institutions with an economic policy 
inclination, the situation tends to be different, as in the case of a study undertaken by the 
Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town that argues against the 
expansion of the social welfare system. This study did not concur with the general sentiment 
that grants are effective, but rather argued against their expansion, stating that the 
expansion of the social security provisioning has a negative effect on the expenditure and 
education and health impacted negatively (Pauw and Mncube, 2007).  
 
The above indicates that civil society, or civics, do engage on policy matters, and have 
through this generated insight into the impact of social policy, and also offered the DSD 
practical solutions on how to improve its implementation. Thus, CME does contribute 
towards good governance, and there is evidence that the voices are heard, and policy 
revised in line with citizen aspirations.  
 
8.9 THE DSD AND ITS PRACTICE OF CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT 
 
This section serves to foreground the context within which civics at the DSD operate, by 
commenting on the historic relationship that civics have had with communities, and 
explaining why this is important in driving the DSD programme. It then assesses what 
political and administrative leadership commitments have been made to civics, and how 
these have been operationalised in terms OF specific programmes within the DSD. Prior to 
citing how and what civics have done to M&E the DSD, the three relationships between the 
DSD and civics are categorised, as these bear on the M&E question, and more specifically 
the issue of independence. The independence issue becomes important given the evolution 
of government-civics relationships in South Africa, which when historically located was one 
of advocacy and support for communities, against government, but with democracy 
transformed in the main to be that of service providers to government. Noting these 
relationships and what the implications are for oversight are thus important.   
 
Apart from the DSD engages with civics which it contracts to perform research, or when it 
participates in civic led research, it also interacts with civics (this being NGOs) through the 
registration process which it manages for the country (an administrative relationship), and 
through contracting civics to deliver services on behalf of the DSD (a contractual 
relationship).  
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Whilst all relationships are important, the most critical one in terms of whether civic oversight 
at the DSD improves governance, relates to the research contribution made by civics. This 
has been demonstrated to be the case it meta-evaluation conducted above. It is important to 
also look at what the political and administrative commitments have been to demonstrating a 
commitment to civic engagement.  
 
The nature of the DSD (see chapter 4) is such that it must involve civics, and there has been 
engagement since 1994 between the DSD and the sector. This took place initially during the 
policy formulation process, when most civics were aligned to the democratic movement and 
were legitimate voices for communities. Shortly after democracy in 1994, civics played an 
active part in policy formulation, during which time the policy-making processes were very 
participatory. Much of the leadership from civics was absorbed into key positions in 
government, which contributed to the loss of expertise and experience from civics over time, 
as many were absorbed into key government positions. An assessment of the career paths 
of some of the key management at the DSD indicates that many of them have emerged from 
the civic sector24.   
 
The researcher reviewed the early policy documents and archives (minutes and other 
publications) of the DSD, where policy options were being discussed during the Green and 
White paper processes25. It was found that most of the civics were represented, and 
expressed their views strongly, at these engagements. This is in line with the Strategy and 
Tactics document of the ANC, which has guided policy formulation and government 
approach, the importance of civics, working in social pacts, is emphasised. The engagement 
between the civics and the DSD is contained within its key policy document, where it sets 
out why it supports the notion of engaging in developmental social welfare26. The DSD has 
implemented a strategy and programme to engage with civics, which has evolved over the 
years and which can be seen it its mission statement which supports partnerships, where it 
“commits to working together with organs of state, defined as civil society, business and 
academia and the international community (DSD, Annual Report, 2009: 11). The policy and 
programmes of the DSD relate to the civics, which also deal with issues of poverty, 
unemployment, globalisation, the environment, address gender inequality, HIV/AIDS 
                                                 
24
  The Minister for Social Development and many of the top management of the department have activist 
backgrounds. 
25
  Civic organisations were represented in most of the deliberations around the policy of the DSD, especially 
those relating to the social grants and safety nets. 
26
 Republic of South Africa. 1997. White Paper for Social Welfare Principles, guidelines and 
recommendations, proposed policies and programmes for developmental social welfare in South Africa. 
Notice 1108 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
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syndrome and human rights violations. The DSD policy reflects a pro-civic sentiment, given 
that its mandate relates to supporting and empowering people, resonates with the 
developmental State. Therefore, an effective DSD in relation to the civics would reflect in 
part the extent to which the developmental State is successful, and whether political 
commitment is met in the form of relevant and targeted social services.  
 
Some of the challenges faced by government with regards to civics are how to engage with 
the sector in a manner that is not controlling, whilst ensuring that as government, through the 
registration and contracting processes, it is able to expand private charitable support and 
make the sector more self-sufficient27. The relationship question is thus a complex one, as 
there is a necessary oversight that the DSD must exercise over NPOs, given the NPO Act 
and the requirement for registration. However, this process must not be construed as control 
of a sector, whose identify is based on being self-sufficient, critical of and outside of 
government. As a representative of the poor and marginalised, it cannot be viewed as an 
extension of government; which is a real danger when a contractual relationship replaces an 
advocacy one. This has serious implications for the propensity of such civics to exercise 
oversight. As a critical stakeholder of the DSD, civics should possess the capacity and 
propensity to exercise oversight over the DSD, irrespective of whether the relationship has 
evolved over time, and whether now, due to economic reasons, many civics have become 
beholden to government for their sustainability. This aspect is critically commented on in 
terms of two studies commissioned by the DSD, which looks at the impact of the NPO 
registration process.  
 
The civics have played a significant role in the transformation of the country, as shown by 
Dangor (1987). However, the question that must be asked at this juncture, is whether the 
new State-civic relationships, evident in an administrative and contractual relationship, have 
eroded the independence of civics, and whether they are still a major oversight force as they 
were prior to and soon after democracy? Evidence of whether civics can monitor and 
evaluate the DSD will be inferred by considering specific studies they have undertaken, and 
examining whether this has influenced social policy and service delivery.  
 
The intent to engage with civil society has been consistently expressed by the Minister and 
DG of the DSD in various policy documents. Although in 2009 the department had a change 
in Minister, the new Minister continued where her predecessor left off by stating that “during 
the past 15 years the department created partnerships with other institutions and civil society 
                                                 
27
 Department of Social Development. 2006b. Information Sharing Manual for the NPOs. Republic of South 
Africa.  
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organisations...in the fight against poverty...a major outcome has been the provision of 
comprehensive, integrated and quality social development services”28 . This commitment 
may also be seen in the more formal policy and review documents of the department, such 
as the Strategic Plans, the Annual Reports29 and the Budget Vote Speeches30 and 
accompanying publications. The Annual Report in particular contains strong reference of the 
need to and commitment on part of the DSD to engage the NPOs, and build vibrant 
partnerships. The Annual Report of 200931 shows how the department has now developed to 
the point where there is now a Branch (the highest level of internal organisational units) 
dedicated to enhance matters relating to community development and outreach, termed 
Branch: Community Development and Branch Welfare Services. Within this Branch there 
are functional areas falling under Chief Directorates responsible for community development, 
HIV/AIDS and the NPOs and partnerships. As a programme of the department, it professes 
to create an enabling environment for the delivery and accessibility of integrated social 
welfare services in partnerships with all relevant stakeholders.  
 
In addition to what is contained in the Annual Reports of the DSD, the researcher appraised 
various speeches made by the Minister for Social Development32 since 2000, and also 
reviewed questions33 asked of him in this regard through the Parliamentary processes (see 
chapter 5). The purpose of the review was to establish whether there was a consistent 
political commitment to civil society engagement. It was found that there was such a 
commitment, and the Minister was generally complimentary about the contribution of civil 
society towards supporting the programme of government. An assessment of the DSD 
website34 also reflects this sentiment, with the aspects of registrations clearly visible and 
easy to navigate.   
 
An appraisal was made of how this happened in practice, and the former DG of the 
department, who worked with the former Minister in the early stages of the department, 
confirmed that much time was dedicated to pursuing relationships with civics. Importantly, 
she attested to the fact that current policy has been shaped through civic-departmental 
                                                 
28
  Department of Social Development. 2009a. Annual Report for the financial year 2008/9. Republic of South 
Africa.  
29
 Annual Reports form 2004-2009 were examined to trace the evolution of this intent, which is most 
pronounced in that there is Branch dedicated to the function. 
30
 Budget Vote Speeches from 2004-2009 were assessed, to examine the extent to which NPOs were referred 
to. 
31
 Ibid.  
32
 An assessment was made of all public speeches by the Minister from 2004-2009, most of which have been 
posted on the DSD website, and are also accessible from the Communications Directorate of the DSD. 
33
  The researcher reviewed the Parliamentary questions and addresses by the Minister of Social Development. 
The data is commented on in Chapter 5, where Parliament is considered under mandatory M&E. 
34
  Accessible through http://www.dsd.gov.za 
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engagements (Personal interview, former DG of DSD, 13 January 2010). Interviews were 
also held with different managers on the subject, and whilst many indicated that the current 
relationship was largely a contractual one35, with civics a part of the service delivery 
mechanism of the department, their role was seen a pivotal. They stated that the policy of 
the department reflected community sentiments, which were brought in by civics. Examples 
which were cited related to areas of home-based care, HIV/AIDS and orphanages. A review 
of the Annual Reports of the DSD has found that in almost all programme areas, the 
counterpart has been some form of civic organisation.  
 
The departments have made a strong commitment to community development, evident most 
clearly in the Minister‟s foreword which indicates that “during the past 15 years the 
department has created partnerships with other institutions and civil society....towards the 
provision of an integrated, comprehensive and quality social development services”36. The 
sentiment has been reinforced by reference to the Community Works Programme and the 
partnership with the Kwanda Programme, which is a social mobilisation, multimedia 
development communication platform to showcase integrated government programmes37. 
When such political commitment to the sector is made, it indicates recognition of it and 
suggests that a relationship exists. The utterances of the Minister and DG on the matter 
reflect a commitment to promoting civics. The question is what this relationship means when 
it comes to oversight and delivering effective services.  
 
The review of practice indicates that there was good performance when it came to 
management of stakeholder liaison and the NPO registration process, both of which are 
described and commented critically upon.  
 
8.9.1 The management of stakeholder liaison 
 
The DSD has a strategy for managing stakeholder liaison, and has either received and 
acknowledged inputs, or made requests for written comments on policy matters from specific 
stakeholders, clients and beneficiaries. The latter refers to issues relating to HIV/AIDS and 
Drug prevention, to name a few. The function for stakeholder liaison is effectively managed, 
and reviews of the DSD by the PSC38 indicate that the system for receiving public comment 
works effectively. It was also found that complaints receive immediate attention, and a 
                                                 
35
 Interviews were undertaken with 3 managers on the subject at the DSD, November 2009. 
36
  Department of Social Development. 2008a. Annual Report 2007/8. Republic of South Africa. 
37
  Ibid. 
38
  The 2008/9 review of the DSD, undertaken by the PSC Transversal M&E system, indicates that the public 
participation processes, in terms of the above, works effectively.  
 I. A. Naidoo:    |   Chapter 8 302 
 
database is readily available to attest to good performance in this area. The Annual Report 
and other management meeting minutes indicate that this aspect receives the required 
attention. The engagement with relevant managers revealed that there was sufficient 
outreach taking place, and a system in place for managing public contributions, which was 
assessed, and found to be fully functional and up to date. 
 
Some of the modalities mentioned as evidence of the department`s commitment to engaging 
citizens includes outreach programmes, Izimbizo and unannounced visits by the Minister.  
There were clear objectives for public participation for the DSD, which included: 
communication about the service rendered, develop the programme of services, strengthen 
partnerships with civil society and promote healthy customer relations. Public comments 
were received for the following content areas: the establishment of Early Childhood 
Development Centres, 24 hour call centres, multi-purpose community centres, strengthening 
of ward communities and unannounced visits by the Minister. In considering inputs, it was 
found that the DSD acknowledges 100% of the inputs received, with follow-up taking place in 
all cases considered. The research showed that all inputs were solicited and how they were 
considered. An example of drawing in civil society to offer advice, is around the CDA, a body 
set up with public sector stakeholders, to advise the Minister on how to address the drug 
problem.  
 
Included in stakeholder liaison, would be the responses to the NACH. This is because the 
DSD has purported itself as responsive, and one would expect it to also respond to cases 
referred to it by the PSC from the NACH. It would be useful to examine other contributions to 
the debate on how effective the DSD has been in promoting public participation. Whilst 
public participation practices do not constitute civic oversight per se, they do intimate the 
extent to which the department is serious about engaging its key stakeholders and clients.  
 
The DSD has been subject to two assessments by the PSC, which relate to the question of 
public participation, which are one of the good governance indicators, in 2001/2 and 2007/8.  
The same standards were used for both assessments, which are that a policy is in place for 
public participation, and inputs are responded to and used.  The assessment improved from 
2001/2 to 2007/8, from 80 to 100%. The 2001/2 assessment showed that the consulting 
process was still being formalised. The 2007/8 assessment found that the DSD still did not 
have a formal policy in place, but a draft departmental guideline, with a pocket handbook 
envisaged39. This has subsequently been finalised. The 2007/8 review found that, whilst 
                                                 
39
  Ibid. 
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there was no policy in place, officials were aware of the broad steps for consultation. The 
PSC assessment found that the draft guideline40 was used, and that there were sufficient 
opportunities for open dialogue between the DSD and citizens.   
 
8.9.2 Management of the registration of NPOs 
 
The main engagement between civics and the DSD has been through the registration 
process. This section briefly describes what this entails, and what the professed benefits are, 
and then cites an impact assessment that was commissioned by the DSD which indicates 
that the reality has not met the ideals as set out.  
 
The DSD registers NPOs in terms of the NPO Act, and conveys a series of benefits for 
registration. In listing the benefits of registration, the DSD states that registration would 
improve the credibility of the sector, as the NPO can account to a public office, organisations 
are brought into the formal system, the sector is helped to get organised, and there is a 
benefit in terms of tax incentives and funding opportunities. The Directorate can only register 
an organisation that has a constitution or any other founding document. It was found, 
however, that the process has been circumvented41, with many private companies 
converting themselves into NPOs, and potentially getting tax benefits they would not 
ordinarily be eligible for. This defeats the purpose of registration.  
 
A further benefit conveyed to NPOs who register, is the promise of information sharing and 
understanding of departmental programmes and strategies. It links to the question of pro-
active communication and is a positive contribution to transparency. It is an important 
function in that unless the programmes of the DSD are known and understood by this key 
sector, it is less likely to be successful. In terms of delivering through partnerships, an 
objective is also to seek partnerships for specific programmes with key stakeholders, for 
example, NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, Women‟s Groups, Business, Labour, Traditional Leaders, 
and Youth formations.  
 
The DSD reports on progress through the Annual Report. The DG has identified this aspect 
of DSD-civic relationship as important, in that he chose to comment on the 12% increase in 
NPO registrations over the previous year, bringing it to 56,237, citing that 14,207 applicants 
were received of which 6,819 met the requirements. He states that as more NPOs comply 
                                                 
40
  Department of Social Development. 2007f. Draft Public Participation Programme. Unpublished.  
41
  Interviews were undertaken with two service providers on their experience with the NPO registration 
process.  
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with the law, the efforts to create a more accountable and robust civil society will gain force 
(DSD, 2009:7).   
 
The NPO Act provides for a voluntary registration facility for NPOs. In terms of the NPO Act, 
there are requirements for registration42, with each type of NPO having different 
requirements. With the NPO Act in place, NPOs can choose whether or not to register. They 
may fund raise, and fraud can be reported. If they are registered and found to be fraudulent, 
they can be deregistered. The registration process should contribute to increased 
accountability and transparency, and improve their governance from one man/woman 
situations, to where it is more democratic. There are also requirements for maintaining 
registration, with obligations placed upon the organisation in terms of record keeping, 
submitting reports (financial statements, auditor‟s report, narrative report) and dealing with 
appeals. There are currently over 70,000 NPOs on the DSD database, and the support 
provided in terms of documentation to build the capacity of NPOs, indicates that NPOs have 
been supported.  
 
The NPOs can access this process by working through the DSD website, where there is a 
prominent link for NPOs, and which clarified which organisations can apply for NPO status.  
It includes organisations that have registered as Section 21 Companies under the Company 
Act 61 of 1973, Trusts that have registered with Master of the Supreme Court under the 
Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 and any other Voluntary Association that is not-for-
profit. Different legislation affects the NPO sector, which includes several Acts43. When the 
sector acts as an employer, it is affected by most labour legislation44, as are other 
employers. The DSD emphasises the need for NPOs to be legal entities, in that unless they 
are registered as such, may not be recognised by donors, and may not obtain property. The 
issue of donor support and coordination is important, more so that donor funding was 
channelled since democracy to the NT and government itself, rather than the NPOs, and this 
resulted in a funding crisis for many NPOs which were not seen as having the capacity to 
manage funds disbursed to them. The problem was compounded due to reports of 
irregularities in how some of the funds were managed, and this created negative public 
perceptions for many NGOs, especially from the international community which had 
traditionally been the main funders.   
 
                                                 
42
  There are specific requirements for registration.  
43
 The relevant Acts are the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (for section 21 Companies), Trust Property Control 
Act, Act 57 of 1988 (for Trusts), Non Profit Organisations Act, 71 of 1997 (for Voluntary Associations) 
44
  The applicable act is the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
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The DSD provides model constitutions, and provides applicants with Codes of Good Practice 
which it has developed for the sector45. These codes were assessed in terms of how they 
promote good governance, and it was found to provide useful information to the NPOs on 
leadership and management, fundraising and resource mobilisation and roles and 
responsibilities of donors and sponsors, as well as an extensive reference list. They help 
NPOs understand why they need to improve upon their management, and in the sub-
section, “what motivates donors to give”. It suggests that NPOs must realign to attract 
funding, with the Donor Bill of Rights highlighting the issue of accountability and obligations46  
 
The NPO sector is now like any other sector and should adhere to good governance 
principles. The DSD approach in getting NPOs to register has been an attempt to bring 
about this regulation, in order “to maintain the standards” (according to the DSD objectives 
for the NPOs). However, the Act seeks to maintain the independence of NPOs, and calls 
upon government to intervene only when necessary. There should be no undue pressure 
upon NPOs (Boulle, 1997). From the above, it can be noted that the DSD has set itself up to 
provide a one-stop shop for NPOs, and promises through its registration process, that NPOs 
will benefit from information provision, managerial support and networking opportunities to 
improve their funding prospects. The main modality through which this coordination was 
expected to take place is through an NPO Directorate, which is meant to create an enabling 
environment for NPOs to flourish and set and maintain adequate standards of governance, 
accountability and transparency.  
 
However, the process of registration appears to have been circumnavigated. Many 
companies have managed to register as NPOs, simply by conforming to the requirements for 
registration. There is a view from such groupings that their registration process does not 
cater for differences in entities, and the main motivation for registering is not to get the 
managerial support promised, but to get a better tax status and use this to source funds. 
This was stated in a personal interview with a person who registered his company to access 
the grant, and was dissatisfied, which reinforces a finding in the impact assessment of NPOs 
that was commissioned by the DSD.  
 
                                                 
45
  This is issued in terms of section 6(1) (b) (I) of the NPO Act 1997. Copyright (c) 2001, DSD, Directorate: 
NPO 
46
  Department of Social Development. 2006d. Nonprofit Organisations Information Sharing Training manual.  
Republic of South Africa. 
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A critical assessment commissioned by the DSD was that of the impact of the NPO Act47. 
The assessment may be considered as authoritative, in that it was commissioned and 
undertaken by an independent, credible group, the work of which was overseen by a broad-
based reference group, comprising key sectors which have an interest in or have worked 
with NPOs, such as the Legal Resources Centre48. This is an important assessment, with 
strong civic voices within it, and as such authoritative. An assessment was made of the state 
of the NPO registration in 200949, which appraised whether the NPO act had:  
 
a) Created an enabling environment: establishing an administrative and regulatory 
framework within which NPOs can conduct their affairs. 
b) Encouraged NPOs to maintain standards of governance, transparency and 
accountability, and to improve those standards. 
c) Created an environment within which the public may have access to information 
concerning registered organisations. 
 
The impact assessment found that whilst the Act brought about a much greater drawing in of 
the sector, with government involvement having increased significantly, however, it was 
found that resources and implementation capacity were lacking, and that the finances 
allocated were grossly insignificant in proportion to the size of the sector being addressed. A 
further assessment drawn on by this study by Wyngaard (2003) showed that although it was 
well intentioned, it is complex to implement. The sector is large and vibrant, making it difficult 
to co-ordinate effectively.  
 
The assessment found that whilst there was some impact when it came to the administrative 
element (noting the large number of registrations). It found that the requirements for 
registration were onerous, and the one-size approach for all did not seem to work. The 
complexity on the ground was difficult to reduce into a bureaucratic process, with many 
NPOs seeing it as a compliance burden. It found that there was a general lack of capacity 
within NPOs to manage their affairs and deliver quality services. In general, there were poor 
standards of financial reporting. There was suspicion on the part of NPOs towards how 
grants were made, and these processes were perceived as not being sufficiently transparent 
and accountable. The lack of national communication strategies meant that the systems did 
                                                 
47
  Department of Social Development. 2005b. Assessment of the NPO Act. Republic of South Africa. 
48
  An NGO which offers legal support to poor communities, and which has been pivotal in protecting the rights 
of vulnerable people, especially during forced removals under apartheid rule. 
49
  Department of Social Development. 2009b. Impact Assessment of the Not for Profit Organisations. Republic 
of South Africa. 
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not talk to each other, and this could lead to potential corruption when it came to the 
awarding of grants.  
 
It was shown that the NPO sector does not exert any significant influence over the 
governance of the DSD, and its role in policy formulation is limited. The question than needs 
to be asked is whether this is best located within the DSD, and whether what is largely an 
administrative process is not better located within another department. The impact 
assessment undertaken has stated that the role of the DSD remains that of registration 
administrator. There are many questions posed as to whether the goals set out have been 
successful, and whether the forms of support provided does in fact enhance the 
effectiveness of NPOs. The registration process can be located elsewhere and the DSD 
should rather not engage with the sector administratively, as this potentially impacts on the 




This final perspective chapter began by stating that good governance is an amalgam of 
many attributes, and its realisation is supported by M&E. It has been shown in chapters 6 
and 7 that M&E pressures from above (mandatory) and within (persuasive) help sharpen 
management, as it directs attention to performance. However, it was stated that these forms 
of M&E, whilst important, are limited in that they tend to focus more on managerial than 
service delivery issues. In this regard, it has been argued that the developmental State can 
best be informed of how effective it is if citizens experience services positively. The voices of 
citizens with regards to their experiences have been made known in some of the work 
undertaken by the MME bodies, in particular the work of the PSC around its measurement of 
the quality of governance. It has been shown that there has also been reporting on aspects 
of citizen engagement in the Annual Reports, and even Parliament offers avenues for public 
submissions to be made. However, these are partial impressions of how citizens experience 
government, and what one hopes is a more grounded perspective of service delivery. This 
chapter has argued that such a perspective is best obtained from civics (which for purposes 
of this assessment includes relevant research institutions) when they conduct M&E.  
 
This thesis has argued that the contribution of M&E to good governance must include 
grounded perspectives on performance, most of which come from civics and citizens 
themselves. It has stated that one of the ways this can be done is by looking at CME, as 
reflected in the work of civics and public participation practices, is critical to building the 
picture of the utilisation of findings and to improve governance and performance. The 
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chapter has indicated the role played by civics as intermediaries, in reflecting community 
sentiment and thus contributing to the policy formulation. It has also noted that since civics 
are active within communities, they are able to reflect community sentiment, and any 
research that involves civics provides grounded perspectives on performance. A meta-
evaluation of research undertaken around social grants, the main policy instrument for 
addressing poverty of the DSD, has indicated that the insights have been taken up by 
government, and helped to improve its implementation. The studies undertaken by civics, 
and which were assessed in this chapter, most of which were commissioned or supported by 
the DSD, was critical of performance and does reflect a sentiment of an organisation willing 
to learn and listen. There was also evidence that the DSD acted on these assessments, 
which indicates utility of CME. This shows utilisation and supports that argument that M&E 
contributes to good governance.   
 
The ANC (2009) party political manifesto has spoken of a people-centred government, which 
means that the form of interaction between the DSD and communities should be open and 
transparent, and allow for feedback on performance and action thereupon. M&E was also a 
part of the reconstruction and development programme of the ANC, which needed 
information to inform it of its progress (ANC, 1994). It was found that whilst the DSD has a 
stakeholder liaison strategy, this was not fully effective, although there was evidence of 
Izimbizo being used to draw in communities to engage in performance. It was also found that 
the response rate to cases referred to the DSD from the PSC Hotline was very low, which is 
not reflective of a responsive and people centred government. Thus when it came to public 
participation the situation was uneven, and all avenues available for citizens to engage 
government do not work as well as promised. The low feedback rate to cases related to the 
DSD, via the NACH, is a concern, and indicates a problem in the accountability mechanism.  
 
It was found that whilst the DSD has invested resources into the registration process, the 
benefits have not been as tangible, as evident from a DSD commissioned study on the 
process. This is essentially an administrative activity and questions need to be asked about 
whether the registration process is best located within the DSD and whether it should not be 
moved elsewhere. The DSD-civic engagement could take a better form than being 
administrative, which will be assisted if the DSD relinquishes this function.   
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Chapter 9 





This chapter presents a high level summation of the key findings emanating from this 
research, by reflecting on the research overall question and proposition, which is that M&E 
contributes to good governance. The study produced three conceptually coherent, but 
interrelated, M&E perspective chapters, each of which interrogates the proposition that M&E 
does produce good governance. It set out to examine what the contributions of each M&E 
perspective have been, in terms of improving levels of transparency around performance 
and ensuring accountability through usage. The line of sight which M&E produces for 
decision-makers, by drawing attention to good governance norms and actual against 
envisaged plans, comes about when different streams of performance data are tabled at 
different levels. Whilst the purpose of different types of M&E may vary, the underlying 
intention is to produce credible M&E data that helps maintain the line of sight, and is used to 
improve service delivery.      
 
The introduction of this thesis has contextualised the importance of the subject and 
explained its relevance to generating knowledge and insights to advance public 
administration and M&E. As a new area, the operation of M&E in a developing country 
context, is of practitioner and policy-maker interest because M&E serves many purposes, all 
of which contribute to promoting good governance. It has produced the first grounded study 
of how M&E works in South Africa, by considering why, where and how M&E enters the 
decision-making value chain, in pursuit of better decision-making. The analysis has been 
supported by pertinent insights from persons involved in the exercise at the highest levels of 
government and Parliament, researcher observation made possible by the advantageous 
position held by the researcher professionally, and his engagement with the M&E and 
development community internationally over 15 years. The research approach has brought 
in voices that are critical to the commentary on the M&E-good governance relationship, and 
as such this study is a major contribution to the field. 
 
The research has commented on the evolution of M&E in the country and internationally, by 
examining historical precedents. Of relevance to South Africa is the fact that M&E bolsters 
oversight and potentially prevents the country from regressing into an unaccountable past, 
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and helps through its work and events, to link the governance discourses domestically with 
those internationally. South Africa is a signatory to many good governance accords, such as 
the MDGs and a participant in the APRM. Support for the work of M&E associations, locally 
and internationally, has advanced the M&E and good governance debates and 
demonstrated a commitment to promote transparency and accountability. The study thus 
proceeded from this platform of commitment and understanding, to assess via the three 
M&E perspectives how M&E has contributed to good governance in the DSD. Through the 
assessment, an analysis of the relationship between M&E and public administration, M&E 
and democracy, M&E and decision-making (including the accountability structures which 
includes Parliament), and M&E and civil society has been demonstrated. Each of the 
relationships seeks to operationalise good governance, by generating probity and 
information to improve performance in different areas.    
 
The critical question posed is what has been the effect of 15 years of policy aligned to good 
governance prescripts, and what have been the strengths and weaknesses of the oversight 
infrastructure. In answering this question, the research has argued that M&E is not a stand- 
alone function performed only by some Units of, or within and outside of government; rather 
it is a form of scrutiny and probity which is contextually informed, and undertaken by different 
agencies, operating at different levels, and for different purposes. In light of the expanded 
definition provided of M&E, a multitude of M&E influences are considered as it influences the 
performance of the DSD. The three directional M&E forces; above (the MME bodies), within 
(departmental M&E) and outside (civil society M&E) have each been evaluated in terms of 
how they influence management practice of the DSD. The common questions asked in each 
instance are whether the M&E activity has contributed to good governance, by enhancing 
performance transparency. More importantly, in considering use, the question of whether it 
has improved accountability and utility is more critical. By examining how M&E is considered 
and valued, insights into M&E utility have been obtained.    
 
Underpinning the debates around M&E utility, is what contribution better performance 
information has made to the policies of the developmental State, which in implementing new 
policies and programmes, often without precedent, needs effective feedback. This implies 
that evidence about performance, drawn from M&E, is critical to steer practice and shape 
policy. The developmental State, through its DSD, which has been shown in chapter 4 to 
well reflect a mandate central to the developmental State itself, has been subject to M&E. 
The study has examined how M&E has worked in either holding the DSD accountable, or 
contributing to the quality of its decision-making around performance.  
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The chapter now revisits the conceptual framework which served as a backdrop to the study, 
and then proceeds to provide high level overviews of how the three M&E perspectives have 
operationalised M&E and good governance principles. It reflects on what has informed each 
of the perspective`s relationships, in terms of its purpose and outcomes. In all instances 
there is engagement between the evaluators and the recipients, and the quality of the 
engagement throughout this period is important as it is here that learning and value is 
added. Depending on whether users see the form of M&E as useful, its actual usage is 
affected. This is an important question addressed throughout, given that M&E is a priority 
activity, with high expectations placed on M&E institutions for improving governance. It is 
thus a politically relevant question that must be addressed. 
  
9.2 REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The conceptual framework used for the study was based on two core areas; that of 
governance and M&E. The interrelatedness of these areas has been explained, in relation to 
the fact that the prerequisite for M&E and good governance is democracy, which is 
necessary for M&E practice, while M&E also contributes to democracy by raising levels of 
transparency and accountability. Throughout the conceptual framework the interplay 
between concepts relating to good governance, M&E, transparency, accountability and 
democracy is illustrated. This was deemed necessary given that there is a dynamic and 
mutually reinforcing relationship between M&E and good governance, with the study arguing 
that different forms of M&E work in concert to produce the outcome of good governance. 
The approach of delineating three M&E perspectives has been informed by observation of 
how M&E is executed in government. The creation of the conceptual categories has also 
been informed by the oversight process, constitutional obligations and historic circumstances 
of the country which have generated the institutions and oversight relationships that currently 
exist between differently placed M&E actors, and government. This is elaborated upon in the 
summaries of these perspective chapters which follow.  
 
The evolution of M&E as a practice in South Africa was traced, and it was indicated that its 
use from around 2000 has been fortuitous in promoting democracy. It has thus built on the 
strong civic sentiment for transparency and accountability, and the engagements, termed 
watershed events for M&E, such as the M&E conferences, and the practice of oversight 
bodies and the media releasing regular performance information into the public domain, has 
created an M&E demand. A limitation though, is that the supply has come largely from M&E 
bodies, such as the AG and the PSC, with little evidence of the M&E of government from the 
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NPOs. One would have expected that the historic propensity of the NPOs, which possess 
the grounded experience of what citizen‟s experiences are, would have been carried through 
into the democratic era with them remaining active by promoting community M&E. This has 
been very limited, with the sector under immense funding challenges, and in most instances 
now acting as service providers for government. It will be indicated that empowerment 
evaluation is almost non-existent in South Africa.  
 
The exploration of the good governance field has illustrated that a combination of 
globalisation, government collaboration and networking has integrated democracies into a 
community of public administration practice which privileges transparency and citizenry and 
which is also receptive to critical oversight. The country has rapidly incorporated 
international policy which relates to fighting corruption, ensuring transparency and 
accountability, protecting the institutions of democracy and the independence of the 
judiciary. It has protected media freedom and professed to commit to ensuring the efficient 
and effective delivery of services. The integration of South Africa into the global mainstream 
over the past 15 years has resulted in it being subject to ratings in these areas, and being 
compared to counterparts. It has also created an appreciation domestically of the importance 
of good governance ratings for investment and development. At the continental level, it was 
subject to the APRM, a milestone for transparency and accountability in a country on a 
continent which has generally not been receptive to such measures.  
   
At a more practical level, it was found that good governance definitions tend to privilege what 
government should do and less what citizens` responsibilities are to achieve the outcome of 
good governance. Admittedly, government acts on political mandates through democratic 
processes, and there is the assumption that citizen interests would be reflected in 
government policy and programmes. It was found that an operational definition of good 
governance does exist in South Africa, through the 9 Constitutional Values and Principles for 
public administration, and which is the M&E framework for a key M&E body in the country, 
the PSC. Recently, the Presidency has established a Ministry for Performance Management, 
which seeks to monitor the performance of the State according to twelve outcome areas. 
Attaining performance on these outcomes areas, most of which relate to socio-economic and 
democratic improvements, relies on good governance, the standards of which are the 9 
Constitutional Values and Principles. There is thus a relationship between effective 
governance by departments, and the eventual attainment of the 12 outcomes that will be 
measured by the Presidency. This study focused on the currently operational MME bodies, 
as the Presidency system has not as yet delivered results on the outcomes areas. By 
describing the relationship between the values and principles and good governance, effected 
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through M&E, it becomes clear that an operational M&E system to test and promote good 
governance has been functional, and its work augmented by that of the NT and AG. The 
country thus has systems that can quantify performance across a range of good governance 
indicators, and show and compare performance trends, and thus make valid judgements 
about the state of different elements of governance in the delivery entities (departments) in 
the country.   
 
In the discussion on good governance, the influence of M&E in promoting this has been 
examined, and various insights into how M&E supports democracy and learning, also a part 
of good governance was demonstrated. The issue of having a vibrant media, active civil 
society and effective parliamentary processes was also indicated as important elements for 
promoting good governance, largely because these created pressure points and demand for 
M&E results. The influence of globalisation as it impacts by transmitting normative values 
across space and into the imagination of ordinary citizens in all parts of the world creates an 
expectation from citizens of their own governments‟` M&E with its communication about 
standards and norms, measures and performance.  
  
The discussion on good governance has also reflected on what NPM, with its emphasis on 
measurement and managerial accountability, means for government and what the 
challenges have been. In the conceptual discussion, the role and expectation of the 
developmental State in terms of driving transformation, and being able to do so that an 
informed, evidence base, so as to improve its predictive capacity, has been discussed. In 
essence it was shown that for the developmental State to meet its various objectives 
requires M&E and part of the management tools and strategies of departments, is 
subscription to M&E, either by taking the work of mandatory bodies seriously, or by 
generating their own M&E expertise. There is thus a clear relationship between good 
governance and M&E, which serves a managerial utility function, which in South Africa also 
helps to consolidate and deepen democracy.   
 
In relation to this case study, it was found that a major contribution of M&E was towards 
helping management to demarcate and focus on certain performance areas, especially when 
these areas were prescribed (MME). The case study revealed that the DSD performed well 
when it came to regulatory and compliance matters, which can be ascribed to an acceptance 
of the importance by the management echelon of the department to performance reporting 
obligations from the NT, AG and PSC. The result was that the DSD management aligned 
their practices towards areas addressed by these MME institutions, which has regularised 
DSD management practice, making it more transparent and accountable. The fact that 
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reports to and from these institutions is considered within management forums, is reflective 
that MME, apart from influencing management priorities of departments, also produces the 
content for learning, and thus adds value.  
 
In examining the area of M&E, the key issue, apart from looking at methodology, has been a 
reflection on M&E purpose. The generally accepted outputs of M&E; enlightenment, 
accountability and learning were presented and debated as it contributes to new vistas of 
knowledge about public service transformation, and produces a framework by which 
accountability can be better exercised. The latter comes about when persuasive evidence by 
credible M&E bodies and others is served upon management and leadership of the country 
and its citizens, to create the conditions for greater probity of performance. In this regard the 
section examined the products and services of M&E, by looking at what is generated by 
which bodies, and what is expected of the bodies in terms of its use. The utility question 
addressed a key dilemma around M&E, which is that much performance information is 
generated and even tabled at structures such as Parliament, hence meeting the 
transparency obligation, but little causality can be discerned from the process in terms of its 
utility. It has been argued that production without use is very much like transparency without 
accountability, and the study has cautioned about using these terms interchangeably, 
wherein an automatic causality is presumed. It has been argued that one could have M&E, 
which is an activity and to an extent servant of management and democracy, but unless 
there is performance improvement emerging from use, there is a limitation. The section thus 
asserts that using M&E for learning is essential and that there must be an appreciation of the 
management culture, the decision-making trajectories, so as to assess whether M&E as an 
activity leads to good governance as an outcome.  
 
In each of the M&E perspective chapters the users are considered, in order to get a sense of 
utility. This is not to claim that the production of performance information is not valuable in 
itself, but that when one is able to see how this information enters the decision-making 
terrain and changes behaviour, and leadership and management improves on its 
performance, will the benefit be regarded as more significant. This implies a bias towards 
utility over enlightenment, which in turn means that M&E practitioners must upfront consider 
and strategise on use. M&E is thus presented as serving a political purpose, which should 
resonate with the needs expressed by the political leadership of the country that M&E must 
improve state performance and enhance service delivery.  
 
The implicit theory of change has been that there is sufficient policy and institutions that 
support good governance, and which exist to direct the developmental State to be 
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successful in its transformation efforts. The thrust for good governance has been set out in 
theory, to be carried out by independent M&E institutions, sound managerial practices, 
Parliament and strong civil society. There is the assumption that each of these bodies, 
working from above (MME), within (PME) and outside (CME) would through their individual 
and collective efforts ensure that there is transparency and accountability for performance, 
and thus produce the outcomes of good governance.  
 
Within the context of a transforming country and Public Service it was established why M&E 
was also necessary for democratic and managerial reasons. On the question of 
managerialism, there has been a critical approach to this concept, which whilst appealing at 
the level of improving much needed efficiency in the Public Service sector, needs to be 
tempered with an understanding that some of the policy thrusts of the country do not work in 
practice. There may be conflict with some of the technical ideals and measures, and it is 
important to recognise less quantifiable, political achievements, which may fall outside a 
classic M&E measurement schema.   
 
The conceptual framework focused attention on the “M&E for what purpose?” question. The 
researcher argued that in a context where there is a need for urgent social change, and 
where government has to deliver on mandates, there is a need for M&E to be effective. What 
constitutes effectiveness can be broad, and if one is looking at M&E uses, it has firstly to be 
about accountability, but at the same time deliver learning opportunities to improve capacity 
and enhance future practice. The transparency deliverable, which has taken the form of an 
impressive body of performance reports, has perhaps prevented a slip into the apartheid 
order of the past, as there is now relevant information about how the State functions.   
 
The research suggests that there is a very political purpose for M&E in a transforming 
context, and that this required a particular evaluator orientation, leaning towards an 
advocacy, activist approach. The study did not examine individual M&E behaviour, but in 
looking at the M&E bodies, comments can be made about the extent to which they have 
achieved change, through their products and strategies. Important observations were made 
about the importance of context, and the fact that technically correct, but ungrounded 
evaluations could miss their audiences. The issue of whether independence means 
detachment, and what the importance of engagement is in actually getting results to work, 
was also assessed. In setting out the concepts and debates within these areas, the 
researcher was able to craft conceptual perspectives that allowed for three views of how 
M&E can and does contribute to good governance. The mixed-methods approach to the 
research allowed for a comprehensive investigation of the research questions, and helped to 
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address the knowledge gaps identified in chapter 1, and produce vignettes of M&E 
experiences in South Africa, as reflected through the M&E perspective chapters.   
 
9.3 REFLECTING ON THE PERSPECTIVES 
 
The M&E and good governance relationship has been assessed by delineating three 
conceptual focus areas, which have been defined based on their authority and location. 
These serve to define the dominant purpose of that form of M&E, which in turn influences 
the methods to exercise oversight. The connotative list provided for each perspective 
illustrates what the dominant thrust of a perspective is, and addresses the language 
repository of an area; accountability, learning, citizenship. The study recognised that the 
divisions were primarily conceptual, with much interconnectivity between them. It also 
recognised that the relationships both within and between the perspectives are dynamic, and 
can change over time. In gleaning out some of the overall observations, this section begins 
to answer some of the research objectives of the study.  
 
9.4 MANDATORY M&E 
 
The development of M&E for accountability purposes was found to be relatively advanced in 
the country, with the oversight institutions having developed significant capacity for 
regulatory M&E. The systems used by the NT, AG and PSC were implemented with a high 
degree of regularity and precision, and there is now a substantial body of historic 
performance information, largely related to the management of finances and adherence to 
the 9 Constitutional Values and Principles for public administration. These bodies drive 
compliance with regulation and prescript, which is implicitly regarded as the basis for good 
governance, as it is assumed that the policies stem from social and economic priorities that 
need to be addressed, and as such should support the developmental State in its 
transformation efforts. The basic act of complying with policy provisions in support of good 
governance indicators is the basis for the attainment for good governance. This thesis has 
shown that the MME bodies advance practices which comply with international good 
governance practices, and as such this form of M&E, with its emphasis on accountability, is 
an example of how a type for M&E promotes good governance.    
 
MME has had a significant impact on the governance of the DSD case study, because as 
mentioned it has influenced management priorities and practices. The DSD is a department 
with an important political and social mandate, and redressing the legacy of apartheid by 
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improving socio-economic conditions of citizens is an urgent transformation question. It also 
manages a complex and extensive policy and commands a large budget. It is thus critically 
important that there be sufficient and effective oversight to this department, in order to 
ensure that its governance is exemplary. The work generated within the department from 
MME bodies contributes to this goal, as it focuses attention on how the mandate is 
translated into programmes and projects, whilst the requirement for quantifying performance 
introduces an important measurement bias. It has helped to provide a line of sight in the 
department, by impressing upon staff what their mandate is and constantly providing 
feedback on how well such a mandate is addressed. M&E in this instance, initiated largely 
by the pressure from MME, has had a positive effect on the management of the department. 
There would be serious ramifications if the budget of this department is not managed well, its 
objectives not realised, or corruption and fraud allowed undetected. In all of these instances 
M&E has provided the operational probity for early detection and correction. Therefore, a 
management team that responds to or uses M&E, as in the DSD, has a greater possibility of 
ensuring that the policies are government, in this case socio-economic and transformational, 
are realised.  
 
The study found that the DSD performed relatively well when subject to the assessments of 
the MME institutions; there was thus good administrative compliance. The receipt of the 
coveted unqualified assessments by the AG for 4 years in a row, coupled with an increase in 
the results of several performance assessments undertaken by MME, such as the PSC, 
indicates that the DSD management shows a resolve to comply, and does take this form of 
oversight seriously. This result is understandable in that most of the DSD management 
indicated in a survey conducted as part of this study that they value these bodies, which they 
also state have influenced their own management priorities.  However, the performance 
across all aspects of compliance was uneven, and when probing the responsiveness of the 
DSD to the very critical area of responding to cases referred to it from the NACH, it was 
found that performance was poor. This particular result is important, as responding to 
corruption allegations, which have been surfaced by citizens themselves, indicates how well 
the DSD manages corruption, which is also a key good governance indicator. Therefore all 
aspects relating to accountability need to be addressed, not only those relating to internally 
focused administrative compliance. Accountability to citizens in terms of improving service 
delivery should be an outcome from the application of successful MME, as it will indicate use 
and demonstrate that there has been M&E utilisation.  
 
In describing the features of MME, it was found that the approach to oversight by these 
bodies has tended to be centralised, authoritarian, working on an approach that all 
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departments are the same and applying standardised instruments. However, it tended to 
lack context, which the literature indicates can be a problem. Regarding the issue of 
engagement, which has been mentioned as important for the entire M&E exercise, it was 
found that it is limited, although there has been room afforded to the department to comment 
after the fact. The institutions convey an impression that the instruments are valid and 
irreproachable, with them offering limited room for management engagement on the 
instruments or criteria. This is a shortcoming, and the narrow focus of the instruments of the 
AG and PSC means that service delivery indicators are more peripheral than central; there is 
an emphasis on the measurement of internal activity rather than external results.   
 
An advantage of the approach to MME, however, was that it helped to develop a 
performance culture, by providing a basis for discussion on performance. This is a valuable 
part of good governance, as it improves understanding and better prepares users to make 
decisions on an informed basis. The outcome of MME on its own is not enough to produce 
good governance, and is reliant on other management processes and key players within the 
accountability framework, like Parliament. Parliament was found to be an important cog in 
the accountability chain, as it has the power to act on results. This is due to its multi-party 
nature, which should produce the checks and balances necessary in a democracy and curb 
the abuse of power. Another important factor is that the deliberations of Parliament are open 
to the media, which produces the levels of transparency that are a cornerstone of 
democracy, and necessary for good governance.  
 
A key source of information for Parliament comes from M&E bodies, which whilst they have 
their own powers to sanction, are in many cases limited in that they only make 
recommendations to higher bodies, such as Parliament which can act. The structure within 
Parliament that does this is the portfolio committees, which should exercise rigorous 
oversight over departments. The study found that these structures have been weak in 
exercising oversight, with the quality of oversight in most instances involving very little 
interrogation of accountability documents such as the Annual Report, beyond the 
department led, power-point presentations. The study pointed to the fact that the party 
system produced a tacit system of non-criticism of departments, and was linked to issues of 
party loyalty, patronage and a lack of any real accountability between citizens and 
Parliament.  
 
There has been a recent exception, which was unique enough to be reported on in the 
mainstream media, the SCOPA (Khan, 2010), and this may bode well for the future if such a 
practice is replicated by all of the committees of Parliament, and of course sustained. The 
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convention of parliamentary questions, another form of oversight, appears to have been 
eroded with many politicians not responding. For the first time this was addressed by the 
ruling party itself, when Ministers were given a deadline to respond (Hartley, 2010). The 
previous administration appeared to discourage critical oversight of departments and the 
executive, a form of quiet complacence probably motivated by political concerns, and a 
political culture dismissive of negative results.    
 
In the assessment of Parliament, it was found that this institution is not performing optimally, 
and fails to give due attention to the work emanating from MME bodies, resulting in a gap 
between the production of evaluation and its use. Unless Parliament acts on assessments 
which it has itself commissioned, this cog in the accountability framework shall fail the MME 
institutions, by preventing them from achieving their full potential in producing good 
governance.  
 
In should be pointed out that MME, which tends to be compliance focused, needs to move 
beyond simply meeting standards or regulations. These elements are important, but not an 
end in themselves. It was found that in the DSD whilst there was good compliance, there 
was not in all instances a translation of this into better performance, especially from the 
perspective of citizens. The low rate of feedback to the NACH is a cause of concern, and it 
appears that there has been a greater effort in meeting the requirements of MME bodies, 
than concerns about service delivery from citizens. It appears that efforts to address 
reported cases is inadequate, and it may be necessary as part of a contribution to good 
governance for one of the MME bodies to report on this dimension, in the same manner as 
financial compliance is reported upon. This will have the effect of directing public scrutiny to 
an area that is rooted in citizens‟ experience of service delivery, and thus encourage the 
department to be more outward, than upward focused. Overall, MME was found to provide 
the basis for other forms of M&E, and thus a critical part in that it gives authority to the 
process of oversight, and forms the basis for departments and civil society to also embrace 
M&E. 
 
9.5 PERSUASIVE M&E 
 
This M&E perspective was termed persuasive because there is no compulsion from 
managers to act on performance information generated, especially when it is from outside 
MME bodies. The internally produced M&E information tends to be but one of several 
streams of information which managers use in their decision-making. The perspective 
examined the management and decision-making infrastructure to assess the accountability 
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framework, in order to understand how M&E was perceived and valued within the DSD. 
Survey data, which compared the performance of the DSD on a range of issues with other 
cohorts, helped to indicate whether having an M&E function within the DSD increased the 
propensity and effectiveness of management in this institution, towards achieving better 
performance.  
 
The perspective chapter provided an understanding of actual management practice in terms 
of how performance information is contemplated, and acted upon. The researcher over a 
three year period engaged in primary observations of key management processes, and also 
engaged with management asking them many questions related to oversight and its value.  
A pivotal element of this assessment was the department‟s M&E function, which was 
assessed in terms of how it was used, and how it (the M&E Directorate) saw its own value in 
directing management. The assessment had a strong perceptual dimension, and it was 
possible to establish whether having an M&E function in the DSD placed the department at 
any comparative advantage over those that did not. The value accorded by managers to 
oversight bodies would be indicative of how seriously issues of transparency and 
accountability are taken, and is important for M&E to contribute to good governance.  
  
The DSD emerged as a department which valued the work of M&E bodies, evident from the 
perception survey and the generally positive results achieved by the department when it 
came to regulatory compliance. The serious limitation remains that of responding to cases 
referred to it from the PSC, in terms of corruption related information. Given the high 
vulnerability of the department to corruption, especially when it comes to social and other 
forms of grants, this lack of performance is concerning.  It is also a key service delivery area, 
with grants being the main policy instrument for addressing poverty in the country. Thus 
whilst the department has “persuasive” information from M&E bodies and others on this 
aspect, choosing not to act, is a concern. It indicates that there was a selective response to 
oversight, and a key area, potentially huge in terms of its implications, does not receive 
adequate attention.  
 
The observation by the researcher of the manner, in which performance information was 
received and engaged with by the department, indicates an appreciation of M&E information.  
However, whilst the M&E function within the DSD is well located and capacitated, the 
absence of effective provincial M&E officers presents challenges when it comes to creating a 
broader M&E understanding across the country, and which is necessary given that the sites 
of service delivery are in fact at the local level. The lack of dedicated capacity at these levels 
means that the credibility of information provided to the national M&E office, by non-M&E 
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persons, is questionable. Efforts to train M&E officers at the local level are an encouraging 
development, but a more sustained approach to building M&E is required.  
 
An important area is the extent to which evidence influences policy-making. Instances cited 
indicate that this is not the general practice, with some policies being devised outside 
research evidence, and drawn rather from political considerations. However, in considering 
the work generated from civics on the social grants, it was clear that management has been 
persuaded to alter its policy. Interviews indicate that M&E results were the basis for 
changing the policy approach. In these instances there is evidence of M&E contributing to 
learning and improvement.   
 
Thus whilst the DSD has an effective management system, and has integrated its own M&E 
function into key decision-making meetings, more can be done. It has been found to take the 
work of the AG and PSC seriously, and many of its management priorities have been 
influenced by the priorities of these bodies. The area of developing the M&E function is 
important, in that unless there is a broader understanding of M&E, which requires greater 
levels of training and even the installation of M&E officers at other levels, where more 
intense M&E can take place at project level, the outputs of the DSD M&E will be limited. It 
currently is generally aggregated and meets the requirements of the National Office, and has 
not reached the point where it works with the service providers, mainly NPOs, to empower 
beneficiary communities to self-assess and engage on this basis more rigorously with 
government.  
 
In this area of organisational learning stemming from M&E, a management infrastructure and 
decision-making trajectory exists. It was evident that when performance information is 
placed in the decision-making forums, it was acted upon. Good performance in terms of 
regulatory compliance probably indicates that in such instances it is taken seriously. A solid 
managerial leadership also appears to be in place and the M&E function has been 
supported. Thus M&E operating within the management of the DSD has contributed to 
increased transparency and accountability, which may be viewed as a part of organisational 
learning. In this instance there has also been a partial contribution to good governance.  
Therefore, in the DSD case study, it was shown that PME does work, but not to the same 
extent as MME, and this is linked to the actual effectiveness of the M&E Unit, which needs to 
be improved. The potential exists for a more integrated and effective M&E programme in the 
DSD, which is reliant on greater resources being allocated to the function, and greater 
recognition and integration of M&E into all tiers of DSD management.  
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9.6 CIVIC M&E  
 
A critical M&E output should be to deepen democracy and bring about social change 
(Greene, 2006). It should also generate the kind of activities which bring about accountability 
for better service delivery, mainly from the perspective of citizens themselves.  A key part of 
this is to ensure that broader civil society is involved in reviewing the performance of the 
DSD, as it provides end-user perspectives on service delivery, which is ultimately a key 
consideration. As a form of M&E, it contributes to good governance, especially if the insights 
from civics are considered by management to improve the performance of a department.  
 
The thesis reviewed the work of civics, to establish whether they have contributed to 
performance improvement. In reviewing civics, which included political groupings and 
research institutions, it was found that much research was generated, largely around social 
grants, and this has helped in producing information for planning. It was also found that, in 
terms of the NPOs, the engagement between the DSD and the sector was largely 
administrative, and it is not clear what value this adds. Furthermore, whilst there have been 
public participation practices, these have been uneven. Overall, it was noted that the sector 
has produced research, and is well informed of the performance of the DSD. The sector has 
also used the avenue of public submissions, within the parliamentary processes, to make its 
views known, and evidence was provided of how certain coalitions were formed with civil 
society groupings to influence policy. It is important that the voluntary sector is afforded the 
space to participate in the decisions of government (Boulle, 1997). 
 
The perspective indicated a particular form of engagement with communities, which may be 
regarded as empowering. It found, however, that the non-government organisation sector 
had evolved since democracy, and given that many were now in a contractual relationship 
with the DSD, they did not possess the basis or inclination to be critical. An assessment was 
cited which examined the NGO sector, and whilst this looked at the role played by the sector 
in M&E, and recognised that the sector saw M&E as important, there were challenges.  
Some NGOs were dominant, and supported beneficiaries (Black Sash), mainly in accessing 
social grants. This is important, and does indicate that there are NGOs that use their position 
to support service delivery, hopefully from an M&E basis.  
 
Thus, CME contributes to good governance, largely due to the advocacy generated through 
its oversight over the work of government, but also due to the contribution to transparency. 
This is because the sector is able to engage more broadly and critically with aspects of 
government policy, with constituencies that are more political than bureaucratic. The sector 
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also manages to get media attention for this, as it tends to be biased towards the sensational 
and critical, and brings in alternative voices and perspectives, which is important for 
democratic enrichment. Therefore, in the case study, it was found that more can be done to 
support and improve CME, which is dependent on the DSD allocating more resources to 
CME. Ways need to be explored on how to link the DSD M&E function more effectively with 
local structures that support CME. The case study revealed that apart from a few NGOs 
which perform this task of capacitating communities, it is generally uneven and weak.  
 
9.7 REVISITING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
a) The nature of M&E in South Africa 
 
This study set out to describe what M&E looks like in South Africa. Its comparison to 
international practice was evidenced from the literature, where different types of practice 
were highlighted. In the South African government, M&E for accountability is strongest when 
it comes to the formal oversight institutions, that of the AG and PSC. With the processes of 
referral available to these institutions, they perform well, but along a narrowly defined set of 
indicators. The institution of Parliament has largely not been effective in holding departments 
or the executive to account, and the NPO sector has been transformed into becoming 
service providers. The public exercise of oversight is through the NACH, and the media 
plays a role in amplifying concerns, which then get taken up by institutions or the opposition 
parties in holding government to account. 
 
M&E has produced high levels of transparency, especially from oversight bodies, and there 
are, for certain performance areas, high levels of monitoring. However, there are limited, 
contextually specific, diagnostic evaluations. In the M&E systems, there is an absence of 
emphasis on actual service delivery, and very little empowerment evaluations or 
consideration of citizen perspectives on the services they receive. The M&E bodies have 
largely adopted an approach of engaging departments only, through the formal structures, 
and are thus probably not seen as having an impact more broadly across society. The PSC 
has played a pivotal role in propelling M&E along and raising awareness about M&E. The 





 I. A. Naidoo:    |   Chapter 9 324 
 
b) The effectiveness of the developmental State to use M&E to support good 
governance 
 
In so far as the developmental State has developed policies and supported its oversight 
institutions, it has shown a commitment to good governance. If one were to consider the 
various initiatives to improve planning, public participation initiatives, and efforts to address 
corruption; the establishment of a Ministry, located at the apex of government, and dedicated 
to performance management is a significant milestone. The recent work on producing a set 
of outcomes indicators, which government has committed will be a publically accessible 
document (and the results thereof also made public) is a major contribution to transparency 
and accountability.  
 
However, the evidence to date of the use made by the developmental State of M&E seems 
to suggest that it is uneven. The impact assessment of the PSC found that even 
parliamentarians, who are the principal clients of the PSC, did not know about its work. By 
extension, one can assume that there is an equally weak understanding of M&E generally by 
this constituency, which is concerning as it shows they do not appreciate the importance of 
evidence in their fundamental oversight positions.  
 
The process that is generated when M&E is conducted, is in itself valuable, and does help to 
ensure that at least the adherence to policies is assessed. Thus one can conclude that the 
formal M&E bodies, coupled with the media, opposition political parties and pressure from 
citizens (in whatever form) have helped to highlight issues critical for a successful 
developmental State. These activities and processes, which ought to eventually feed into the 
different government structures, have helped to produce the effects important for good 
governance.  
 
c) Lessons learnt to date and how can the future implementation strategy of M&E be 
enhanced 
 
The country lacks an M&E policy, although the work of M&E has been continuing through 
the oversight bodies, which receive their mandate from the Constitution. The new Ministry 
responsible for M&E can add to M&E getting a profile, but what would be important is 
whether results, in terms of addressing a government acknowledged crisis in service delivery 
can be reversed. The accountability dimension will also remain important, and probably be 
dominant within the accountability-transparency-learning equation, largely because of the 
spread of government corruption, and the seemingly weak response to it.  
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A future M&E implementation strategy needs to be driven with more resolve, and not 
confined to the work of a few organisations. The engagement with civil society and even 
parliament on its historic poor performance in conducting oversight is needed. The issue of 
capacity building in M&E remains critical. Although M&E is viewed as a government priority, 
the relatively low number of government M&E practitioners who are members of professional 
bodies, or who have received exposure to M&E is concerning. It is equally concerning that 
many high level M&E posts are being created and filled by persons without any serious M&E 
capacity. This will negatively affect the performance of M&E units, and can result in the 
function then being disavowed by the managers it is supposed to support.  
 
d) The impact of M&E in promoting good governance in South Africa 
 
This thesis concludes that for the major indicators of good governance, M&E has helped 
produce the type of activities and effects which deepen democracy and lead to a more 
reflective management ethos. The most visible benefit has been the high levels of 
transparency, which has taken the form of performance information on key areas of 
government performance. The shift from transparency to accountability, however, has been 
uneven, and whilst it appears that at an intra-departmental level M&E has helped to sharpen 
management focus and meeting performance indicators, this has not been taken up with 
conviction by parliament. In fact, parliament has not demonstrated an ability to be an 
institution where action is taken, especially against perpetrators of corruption.  
 
The area of citizen participation, which M&E institutions such as the PSC promotes, is likely 
to lose momentum, given that the impact of the reporting is extremely low (less than 30%). 
Coupled with the breakdown in service delivery, citizens may lose confidence in so-called 
powerful institutions, and resort to more informal, less socially acceptable practices of 
protests. It should be pointed out that all of the predictive information on this was available, 
yet there was leadership inaction. The blame therefore cannot be placed on the lack of M&E, 
but perhaps the efficacy of M&E, which may have developed into a managerial endorsing 
and inwardly looking activity, which missed the key deliverable of services to citizens.  
 
The study thus concludes that M&E has increased transparency, and helped to deepen 
democracy as it has produced the information for engagement on performance of the State.  
It has been limited in taking on board citizens to date, and where it has assessed service 
delivery, the changes have been limited. Furthermore, there have been probably self-
imposed limits to accountability or how far the oversight bodies have gone, and this has 
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meant that despite investment in the production of performance information, this has not 
been acted upon. Irrespective, M&E has helped in a long and difficult process to put in place 
systems which can be worked on, and which help to produce a performance discourse, 
which is a key contributor to good governance.  
 
The study therefore supports the assertion that M&E contributes to good governance. The 
case study has served to illustrate the different perspective relationships, and showed where 
the strengths and weaknesses are for each of the forms of M&E. Overall, whilst MME is 
strong, well-responded to and brings about administrative compliance, it has not gone far 
enough in generating a more citizen oriented M&E, evident in the limited M&E of this type 
found within communities themselves. The case study has revealed that a key translator of 
findings into action, Parliament, whilst improving recently in the quality of its oversight, has 
generally not been effective in helping to support in a practical manner the large body of 
oversight work undertaken in the country. None of these qualifications, however, should 
detract from the fact that the research does prove that M&E does lead to good governance. 
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The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess your reactions to a 
series of statements on monitoring and evaluation (M&E). There is 
no right or wrong answer, and what is required is for me to get a 
sense of how you see issues from where you sit as a manager in 
the department. These questions will provide insights into how 
M&E is viewed, and what its role is in terms of promoting good 
governance. The questionnaire requires in most instances a cross 
(x) in the boxes provided.   
 
It should not take you more than a few minutes to fill in.  
 
Kindly email back to me, at IndranN@opsc.gov.za or fax to (012) 323 
2875. I would appreciate the responses by Wednesday 19 
November 2008.  
 
You may also call me should you require any clarity on the 
questions, at 012-352 1039 or 082 499 8108. 
 
Please feel free to provide answers to any of the questions in more 
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SECTION 1:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.1 What is your post-level in the organisation?  [  ]
  
 
1.2 Which management forums do you sit on? 
 
Management Committee  
Executive Management   
Other (specify)  
 
1.3  Number of years in current position 
 
> 2 yrs 2 – 4 yrs 5 – 6 yrs 7 – 8 yrs 9 -10 yrs > 10 yrs (specify) 
 
 
SECTION 2:  PERCEPTIONS OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) 
 





SECTION 3:  PERCEPTIONS OF VALUE ADDED BY OVERSIGHT 
INSTITUTIONS TO THE WORK OF THE DEPARTMENT  
 
In this section I am assessing your views on the mandatory reports that 
your department is obliged to submit to oversight bodies and 
institutions. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements as per the codes in the table below: 
 
CODES 
1= Strongly Agree (SA); 2= Agree (A); 3= Neutral (N);  4= Disagree (D); 5= Strongly 
Disagree (SD) 
 
 SA A N D SD 
3.1 The monthly financial reports required from  
National Treasury help us to better manage our 
budgets 
 
     
3.2 The reports required from National Treasury do 
not add value to our work 
     
3.3 The work of the Auditor-General is important, as it 
promotes Accountability and Transparency in your 
department 
     
3.4 As a manager, I am fully aware of how the audit 
committee Functions 
     
3.5 The format of the annual report is useful in that it 
compels us to Develop internal systems to produce 
performance information around the key areas and 
helps to self-manage 
     
 
3.6 The reporting of financial misconduct cases to the 
PSC is useful and serves as a deterrent to staff within 
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the department when it comes to committing fraud 
3.7 The submission of financial disclosure forms for 
SMS helps to manage conflicts of interest, and 
improves the ethical compliance of staff 
     
3.8 The submission of the Employment Equity plan to 
the Department of Labour is a useful monitoring 
measure, which helps to ensure that the department 
complies with all of the provisions and targets for 
sound HR management 
     
3.9 The submission of reports (like those mentioned 
above) to external oversight bodies helps to tighten 
the internal management processes in the 
department, and improve its own M&E capacity and 
capability 
     
3.10 There are too many reporting obligations 
imposed on the department, and this detracts from the 
department achieving its strategic objectives 
     
 
 
SECTION 4: EFFECTIVNESS OF M&E WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT   
 
In this section I am assessing your views on how effective you see the M&E 
component of your department. Please indicate your level of agreement with 
the following statements as per the codes in the table below: 
 
CODES 




 SA A N D SD 
4.1 The M&E function within my department is well 
located and adequately capacitated 
     
4.2  The M&E component adds value to my work as a 
manager, in that it produces useful management 
tools and information 
     
4.3 The M&E component is sufficiently integrated into 
the institutional management arrangements of 
the department to add value 
     
4.4 The M&E component has not managed to 
produce value to the management of the 
department  
     
4.5 The department takes M&E seriously, and sees 
M&E as a critical management tool 
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SECTION 5: MANAGERIAL ROLE IN PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
In this section I am assessing how you see your role as management in 
promoting good governance in your department   
 
CODES 




 SA A N D SD 
5.1 Information management in the department 
contributes to transparency and accountability 
     
5.2 Managers exercise decisions in terms of 
prevailing legislation and regulation, and thus 
comply with the PAJA 
     
5.3 The department takes a proactive stance when it 
comes to engaging with external stakeholders 
     
5.4 The department sees M&E information as being 
necessary for accountability purposes 
     
5.5 The department sees M&E information as being 
useful for learning purposes 
     
5.6 The PS M&E System of the PSC, which was 
Implemented this year, produces useful 
management report 
     
5.7 As a manager, I feel a part of the management 
processes and feel that I can contribute to the 
good governance of the department  
     
 
SECTION 6: TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE 
 
6.1 Have you or your staff attended any M&E training sessions/ workshops in 
the past 7 years? 
 
 Yes No 
Respondent   
Staff   
 
6.2 If yes, specify type of training received or workshop attended? 
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SECTION 7: CHALLENGES 
 
7.1 What do you think are the main challenges relating to M&E in your 
Department?  
 
(Multiple responses – you can tick as many statements as applies as well as 
add if need be) 
 
Inadequate human resource capacity/ people who trained in M&E  
Lack of funding/ resources for M&E  
Not viewed as a priority by senior government officials/ politicians  
M&E technology/ system to collect information easily and systematically not 
in place 
 
Inappropriate M&E implementation strategies  
Lack of training   
Identification of agreed on priority areas for M&E  
Lack of an effective communication strategy to inform policy development 
and planning 
 
Consultants trained in M&E that are available to assist   
Other (specify)  
  
 
7.2. What do you think are the main challenges relating to promoting M&E in 
South Africa generally? 
  
(Multiple responses – you can tick as many statements as applies as well as 
add if need be) 
 
Inadequate human resource capacity/ people who trained in M&E  
Lack of funding/ resources for M&E  
Not viewed as a priority by senior government officials/ politicians  
M&E technology/ system to collect information easily and systematically not 
in place 
 
Inappropriate M&E implementation strategies  
Lack of training   
Identification of agreed on priority areas for M&E  
Lack of an effective communication strategy to inform policy development 
and planning 
 
Consultants trained in M&E that are available to assist  




7.3 How can M&E be improved in the future? (Multiple responses – you can 
tick as many statements as applies as well as add if need be) 
 
More regular reporting mechanisms  
Employ more staff who are trained and responsible for M&E information  
Have more training sessions  











I THANK YOU FOR YOUR VALUABLE TIME AND INSIGHTS. 
 
 
Indran Naidoo (Researcher) 
Other 
 
















The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess your reactions to a series of statements 
on monitoring and evaluation (M&E). There is no right or wrong answer, and what is 
required is for me to get a sense of how you see issues from where you sit as a 
manager in the department. These questions will provide insights into how M&E is 
viewed, and what its role is in terms of promoting good governance. The 
questionnaire requires in most instances a cross (x) in the boxes provided.   
 
It should not take you more than a few minutes to fill in.  
 
Kindly email back to me, at IndranN@opsc.gov.za or fax to (012) 323 2875. I would 
appreciate the responses by Tuesday, 18 November 2008. As agreed with your DG, 
the findings of this survey will be made available to your Department. You may also 
call me should you require any clarity on the questions, at 012-352 1039 or 082 499 
8108. 
 




SECTION 1:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.2 What is your post-level in the organisation?  [  ]  
 
1.2 Which management forums do you sit on: 
 
Management Committee  
Executive Management   
Other (specify)  
 
1.3  Number of years in current position 
 




SECTION 2:  PERCEPTIONS OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
(M&E) 
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SECTION 3:  PERCEPTIONS OF VALUE ADDED BY OVERSIGHT 
INSTITUTIONS TO THE WORK OF THE DEPARTMENT  
 
In this section I am assessing your views on the mandatory reports that your department is obliged 
to submit to oversight bodies and institutions. Please indicate your level of agreement with the 
following statements as per the codes in the table below: 
 
CODES 
1= Strongly Agree (SA); 2= Agree (A); 3= Neutral (N);  4= Disagree (D); 5= Strongly Disagree (SD) 
 
 SA A N D SD 
3.1 The monthly financial reports required from National 
Treasury help us to better manage our budgets 
 
     
3.2  The reports required from National Treasury do not add 
value to our work 
     
3.3  The work of the Auditor-General is important, as it promotes 
Accountability and Transparency in the DSD 
     
3.4  As a manager, I am fully aware of how the audit committee 
Functions 
     
3.5  The format of the annual report is useful in that it compels us 
to Develop internal systems to produce performance 
information around the key areas and helps to self-manage 
     
3.6  The reporting of financial misconduct cases to the PSC is 
useful and serves as a deterrent to staff within the DSD when 
it comes to committing fraud 
     
3.7  The submission of financial disclosure forms for SMS helps 
to manage conflicts of interest, and improves the ethical 
compliance of staff 
     
3.8 The submission of the Employment Equity plan to the 
Department of Labour is a useful monitoring measure, which 
helps to ensure that the DSD complies with all of the 
provisions and targets for sound HR management 
     
3.9 The submission of reports (like those mentioned above) to 
external oversight bodies helps to tighten the internal 
management processes in the DSD, and improve its own 
M&E capacity and capability 
     
3.10There are too many reporting obligations imposed on the 
department, and this detracts from the DSD achieving its 
strategic objectives 
     
 
 
SECTION 4: EFFECTIVNESS OF M&E WITHIN THE DSD 
 
In this section I am assessing your views on how effective you see the M&E component of your 
department. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements as per the codes in 
the table below: 
 
CODES 
1= Strongly Agree (SA); 2= Agree (A); 3= Neutral (N);  4= Disagree (D); 5= Strongly Disagree (SD) 
 
 
 SA A N D SD 
4.1 The M&E function within the DSD is well located and 
adequately capacitated 
     
4.2  The M&E component adds value to my work as a manager, 
in that it produces useful management tools and information 
     
4.3 The M&E component is sufficiently integrated into the      
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institutional management arrangements of the DSD to add 
value 
4.4  The M&E component has not managed to produce value to 
the management of the DSD 
     
4.5 The DSD takes M&E seriously, and sees M&E as a critical 
management tool 
     
 
SECTION 5: MANAGERIAL ROLE IN PROMOTING GOOD 
GOVERNANCE 
 
In this section I am assessing how you see your role as management in promoting good governance in 
the DSD.  
 
CODES 
1= Strongly Agree (SA); 2= Agree (A); 3= Neutral (N);  4= Disagree (D); 5= Strongly Disagree (SD) 
 
 
 SA A N D SD 
5.1 Information management in the DSD contributes to 
transparency and accountability 
     
5.2 Managers exercise decisions in terms of prevailing 
legislation and regulation, and thus comply with the PAJA 
     
5.3 The DSD takes a proactive stance when it comes to engaging 
with external stakeholders 
     
5.4 The DSD sees M&E information as being necessary for 
accountability purposes 
     
5.5  The DSD sees M&E information as being useful for learning 
purposes 
     
5.6  The PS M&E System of the PSC, which was implemented 
this year, produced a useful management report 
     
5.7  As a manager, I feel a part of the management processes and 
feel that I can contribute to the good governance of the DSD 
     
 
SECTION 6: TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE 
 
6.1 Have you or your staff attended any M&E training sessions/ workshops in the past 7 years? 
 
 Yes No 
Respondent   
Staff   
 
6.2 If yes, specify type of training received or workshop attended? 
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SECTION 7: CHALLENGES 
 
7.1 What do you think are the main challenges relating to M&E in your Department? (Multiple 
responses – you can tick as many statements as applies as well as add if need be) 
 
Inadequate human resource capacity/ people who trained in M&E  
Lack of funding/ resources for M&E  
Not viewed as a priority by senior government officials/ politicians  
M&E technology/ system to collect information easily and systematically not in place  
Inappropriate M&E implementation strategies  
Lack of training   
Identification of agreed on priority areas for M&E  
Lack of an effective communication strategy to inform policy development and planning  
Consultants trained in M&E that are available to assist   
Other (specify)  
  
 
7.2. What do you think are the main challenges relating to promoting M&E in South African generally?  
(Multiple responses – you can tick as many statements as applies as well as add if need be) 
 
Inadequate human resource capacity/ people who trained in M&E  
Lack of funding/ resources for M&E  
Not viewed as a priority by senior government officials/ politicians  
M&E technology/ system to collect information easily and systematically not in place  
Inappropriate M&E implementation strategies  
Lack of training   
Identification of agreed on priority areas for M&E  
Lack of an effective communication strategy to inform policy development and planning  
Consultants trained in M&E that are available to assist  
Other (specify)  
  
 
7.3 How can M&E be improved in the future? (Multiple responses – you can tick as many statements  
as applies as well as add if need be) 
 
More regular reporting mechanisms  
Employ more staff who are trained and responsible for M&E information  
Have more training sessions  




I THANK YOU FOR YOUR VALUABLE TIME AND INSIGHTS. 
 
Indran Naidoo (Researcher) 
Other 
 








PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 




The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess your reactions to a 
series of statements on monitoring and evaluation (M&E). There is 
no right or wrong answer, and what is required is for me to get a 
sense of how you see issues from where you sit as a manager in 
the department. These questions will provide insights into how 
M&E is viewed, and what its role is in terms of promoting good 
governance. The questionnaire requires in most instances a cross 
(x) in the boxes provided.   
 
It should not take you more than a few minutes to fill in.  
 
Kindly email back to me, at IndranN@opsc.gov.za or fax to (012) 323 
2875. I would appreciate the responses by Wednesday 19  
November 2008.  
 
You may also call me should you require any clarity on the 
questions, at 012-352 1039 or 082 499 8108. 
 
Please feel free to provide answers to any of the questions in more 
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SECTION 1:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.3 What is your post-level in the organisation?  [Director]  
 
1.2 Which management forums do you sit on? 
 
Management Committee Budget from 
time to time 
Executive Management   
Other (specify)  
 
1.3  Number of years in current position 
 
> 2 yrs 2 – 4 yrs 
X 
5 – 6 yrs 7 – 8 yrs 9 -10 yrs > 10 yrs (specify) 
 
 
SECTION 2:  PERCEPTIONS OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) 
 
2.1. What in your opinion is “M&E? 
 
Monitoring relates to compliance with set standards and evaluating puts a  
 
value to the compliance. 
 
SECTION 3:  PERCEPTIONS OF VALUE ADDED BY OVERSIGHT 
INSTITUTIONS TO THE WORK OF THE DEPARTMENT  
 
In this section I am assessing your views on the mandatory reports that 
your department is obliged to submit to oversight bodies and 
institutions. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements as per the codes in the table below: 
 
CODES 
1= Strongly Agree (SA); 2= Agree (A); 3= Neutral (N);  4= Disagree (D); 5= Strongly 
Disagree (SD) 
 
 SA A N D SD 
3.1 The monthly financial reports required from  
National Treasury help us to better manage our 
budgets 
 
     
3.2 The reports required from National Treasury do 
not add value to our work 
     
3.3 The work of the Auditor-General is important, as it 
promotes Accountability and Transparency in 
your department 
     
3.4 As a manager, I am fully aware of how the audit 
committee Functions 
     
3.5 The format of the annual report is useful in that it 
compels us to Develop internal systems to 
produce performance information around the key 
areas and helps to self-manage 
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3.6 The reporting of financial misconduct cases to the 
PSC is useful and serves as a deterrent to staff 
within the department when it comes to 
committing fraud 
     
3.7 The submission of financial disclosure forms for 
SMS helps to manage conflicts of interest, and 
improves the ethical compliance of staff 
     
3.8 The submission of the Employment Equity plan to 
the Department of Labour is a useful monitoring 
measure, which helps to ensure that the 
department complies with all of the provisions 
and targets for sound HR management 
     
3.9 The submission of reports (like those mentioned 
above) to external oversight bodies helps to 
tighten the internal management processes in the 
department, and improve its own M&E capacity 
and capability 
     
3.10There are too many reporting obligations imposed 
on the department, and this detracts from the 
department achieving its strategic objectives 
     
 
 
SECTION 4: EFFECTIVENESS OF M&E WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT   
 
In this section I am assessing your views on how effective you see the M&E 
component of your department. Please indicate your level of agreement with 
the following statements as per the codes in the table below: 
 
CODES 




 SA A N D SD 
4.1 The M&E function within my department is well 
located and adequately capacitated 
     
4.2 The M&E component adds value to my work as a 
manager, in that it produces useful management 
tools and information 
     
4.3 The M&E component is sufficiently integrated into 
the institutional management arrangements of 
the department to add value 
     
4.4 The M&E component has not managed to 
produce value to the management of the 
department  
     
4.5 The department takes M&E seriously, and sees 
M&E as a critical management tool 
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SECTION 5: MANAGERIAL ROLE IN PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
In this section I am assessing how you see your role as management in 
promoting good governance in your department   
 
CODES 




 SA A N D SD 
5.1 Information management in the department 
contributes to transparency and accountability 
     
5.2 Managers exercise decisions in terms of 
prevailing legislation and regulation, and thus 
comply with the PAJA 
     
5.3 The department takes a proactive stance when it 
comes to engaging with external stakeholders 
     
5.4 The department sees M&E information as being 
necessary for accountability purposes 
     
5.5 The department sees M&E information as being 
useful for learning purposes 
     
5.6 The PS M&E System of the PSC, which was 
Implemented this year, produces useful 
management report 
     
5.7 As a manager, I feel a part of the management 
processes and feel that I can contribute to the 
good governance of the department  
     
 
 
SECTION 6: TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE 
 
6.1 Have you or your staff attended any M&E training sessions/ workshops in 
the past 7 years? 
 
 Yes No 
Respondent   




6.2 If yes, specify type of training received or workshop attended? 
 















SECTION 7: CHALLENGES 
 
7.1 What do you think are the main challenges relating to M&E in your 
Department?  
 
(Multiple responses – you can tick as many statements as applies as well 
as add if need be) 
 
Inadequate human resource capacity/ people who trained in M&E  
Lack of funding/ resources for M&E  
Not viewed as a priority by senior government officials/ politicians  
M&E technology/ system to collect information easily and systematically not 
in place 
 
Inappropriate M&E implementation strategies  
Lack of training   
Identification of agreed on priority areas for M&E  
Lack of an effective communication strategy to inform policy development 
and planning 
 
Consultants trained in M&E that are available to assist   
Other (specify)  
  
 
7.2 What do you think are the main challenges relating to promoting M&E in 
South Africa generally? 
  
(Multiple responses – you can tick as many statements as applies as well 
as add if need be) 
 
Inadequate human resource capacity/ people who trained in M&E  
Lack of funding/ resources for M&E  
Not viewed as a priority by senior government officials/ politicians  
M&E technology/ system to collect information easily and systematically not 
in place 
 
Inappropriate M&E implementation strategies  
Lack of training   
Identification of agreed on priority areas for M&E  
Lack of an effective communication strategy to inform policy development 
and planning 
 
Consultants trained in M&E that are available to assist  
Other (specify)  
  
 
7.3 How can M&E be improved in the future? (Multiple responses – you can 
tick as many statements as applies as well as add if need be) 
 
More regular reporting mechanisms  
Employ more staff who are trained and responsible for M&E information  
Have more training sessions  
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I THANK YOU FOR YOUR VALUABLE TIME AND INSIGHTS. 
 
 
Indran Naidoo (Researcher) 
Other 
 
Any other comments you may have, please include here. 
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Questions to M&E staff of the Department of Social Development 
 
Probe question CD response M&E Staff response 
Appropriateness of 
location of M&E within the 
management hierarchy 
  
Support received for M&E 
from the Head of 
Department 
  
Support received for M&E 
from the management 
team of the Department 
  
Resources allocated to 
M&E 
  
Key forums where findings 
are presented 
  
Track implementation of 
recommendations, and 
what are the results of this 
  
Your views of the 
understanding that 
management has to M&E 
  
 
 
